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
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GREAT AND GREATER
BRITAIN

J. ELLIS BARKER

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GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN

THE PROBLEMS OF MOTHERLAND AND EMPIRE

POLITICAL, NAVAL, MILITARY, INDUSTRIAL
FINANCIAL, SOCIAL

BY

J. ELLIS BARKER

AUTHOR OF

'MODERN GERMANY' 'THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE NETHERLANDS'
'BRITISH SOCIALISM' ETC.

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TO
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN, P.C., M.P.
THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED

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PREFACE

A BOOK entitled 'Great and Greater Britain—The Problems of Motherland and Empire,' cannot treat all British national and Imperial problems in detail, especially when the writer has dealt in previous publications with some of these problems. I would therefore indicate some of the limitations of this volume.

Socialism is on everybody's lips. Yet I have not discussed it in the following pages because I have treated this subject exhaustively in my book 'British Socialism.'

Germany's political, naval, and economic competition is of great and constantly growing importance to Great Britain and the Empire. I have carefully considered Anglo-German relations in this book, but I have not gone very deeply into German naval and economic affairs because I have treated these very fully in my book 'Modern Germany.'

The British World-Empire is the direct successor of the Dutch World-Empire. Two and a half centuries ago the Dutch had the most valuable

colonies in all parts of the globe. They possessed nine-tenths of the world's shipping. They were the greatest manufacturers, traders, bankers, and engineers in the world. Their navy ruled the sea. They were allied to all the European Great Powers. They held the balance of power in Europe in their hands. They had to solve the identical problems of Empire which confront us now. They solved them unwisely. They would not allow their narrow State to expand into a World-Empire, and they would not protect their industries; and the result was that they lost their navy, their colonies, their trade, their manufacturing industries, and their vast accumulated wealth. Although the history of the Dutch World-Empire offers the most valuable of all lessons to the citizens of the British World-Empire, I have only briefly alluded to the history of the Dutch. Those who wish for fuller information will find it in my book 'The Rise and the Decline of the Netherlands.'

I acknowledge my indebtedness to the great Imperialist statesmen of the past, and to their worthy successor, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain. I am under the greatest obligation to Mr. Chamberlain. He has been my teacher. He has formed my views, and he has influenced my writings. Therefore I had the strong wish to be allowed to dedicate this book to him, and I feel highly gratified and honoured by his having accepted my dedication.

PREFACE

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Some of the chapters have appeared in the form of articles in 'The Nineteenth Century and After,' 'The Fortnightly Review,' 'The Journal of the United Service Institution,' and 'The British Medical Journal.' Their editors have allowed me to draw upon these articles, and I thank them for their kind permission to do so.

J. ELLIS BARKER.

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September 1909.

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GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN

CHAPTER I

GREATNESS OR DECAY ?—WHAT WILL BE GREAT BRITAIN'S FUTURE ?

All States are in perpetual war with all. For that which we call peace is no more than merely a name, whilst in reality Nature has set all communities in an unproclaimed but everlasting war against each other.—PLATO, *De Legibus*, Book I.

It is a law of Nature common to all mankind, which no time shall annul or destroy, that those who have more strength and excellence shall bear rule over those who have less.—DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, l. 5.

Many desire one and the same thing at once, which frequently they neither will nor can enjoy in common nor yet divide. Hence it follows that the desired objects must be given to the stronger, and who is the stronger can be known only by fighting.—THOMAS HOBBES, *De Corpore Politico*, l. 5.

EXPERIENCE is the mother of wisdom. History is philosophy teaching by example. The laws of history are as immutable as are the laws of nature. If we wish to gauge the future of Great Britain we cannot rely on the theories and views of abstract thinkers, whatever may be their standing, but we must refer to the past for information, and, guided by historical fact and analogy, we may venture upon a forecast based upon knowledge and experience.

Great Britain, with her Colonies, is the greatest commercial and maritime State existing. Her greatness is bound up with her commercial and maritime pre-eminence, and dependent upon it. Great Britain, with her Colonies, possesses at present commercial and maritime supremacy, but she has not always possessed that supremacy. Nothing is permanent in this world excepting change. Great

2. GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN

Britain may lose her power and her wealth. If we wish to understand the problems of Great Britain and to be able to foresee the difficulties and dangers of the future, and perhaps of the immediate future, we must inquire into the history of those States which at one time possessed commercial and maritime supremacy, and study the causes which led to their political and economic decline.

Phœnicia is the oldest commercial and maritime State of which we have some knowledge. The Phœnicians were merchants and seafarers of the greatest ability, but they owed their commercial and maritime pre-eminence firstly and principally to the nature and geographical position of their country. Their territory was mountainous and poor, but it abounded in excellent ship timber. Nature had compelled the Phœnicians to seek their sustenance on the sea. It is noteworthy that Sidon signifies 'fishery.' The implements used in fishing are said to have been invented in ancient Tyre. The maritime greatness of Phœnicia, as that of Athens, Venice, Genoa, Marseilles, Holland, England, was founded upon the fishing industry. The geographical position of Phœnicia was most favourable. Between the years 1000 and 500 B.C. the greatest civilised States were Assyria, Babylonia, Media, Persia, and Egypt. Phœnicia lay in the very centre of the then civilised world. Owing to their favourable geographical position it was natural that the Phœnicians embarked upon international trade, that they exchanged the productions of the countries surrounding them, that they founded trading establishments in all the neighbouring States—in Nineveh and Memphis vast Phœnician settlements have been unearthed—and that they became exceedingly rich. The demand for men regulates the supply of men. The prosperity of Phœnicia caused a rapid increase of the population; an outlet for the surplus population had to be found, and, whilst extending their trade, the Phœnicians began to establish colonies everywhere on the Mediterranean, and

on the coasts of Africa and Asia. According to Strabo, they founded three hundred towns on the West African coast alone. Their trade embraced the civilised and the uncivilised world. They worked silver, gold, and copper mines in Spain, and exploited the tin mines of Cornwall and the Scilly Islands. According to Herodotus, they doubled the Cape of Good Hope two thousand years before Vasco da Gama. Thus the Phœnicians became the pioneers of civilisation. Phœnician culture opened, civilised, and reformed the world.

The Phœnicians brought from foreign countries not only their wares, but also their arts and handicrafts, and improved them greatly, so that they became the greatest manufacturers in the world. Homer shows in his 'Iliad' and 'Odyssey' that in his time Phœnicia was the workshop of the world. She was celebrated throughout the universe for her beautiful textiles dyed in marvellous colours, for her wonderful metal and glass ware. Phœnician engineers and workmen built the Temple of Solomon and the Bridge of Xerxes. Phœnician shipping carried on the trade of the world, and the Phœnician navy ruled the sea. The Phœnicians were believed by the ancients to have invented alphabetical writing and numerals, the arts of shipbuilding and navigation, the use of weights and measures and of money, and to have invented countless industrial arts. The Phœnicians were no doubt the Englishmen of antiquity.

In course of time the Phœnician colonies grew up and embarked upon commerce and industry, competing with the mother country. The culture which the Phœnicians had spread led to the rise of new centres of civilisation on the coasts of Greece and of Italy, on the southern coast of France and Spain, and on the northern coast of Africa. New commercial and industrial communities arose and opened up the savage hinterland. Carthage, a colony of the Phœnicians, peopled, like the United States, by political refugees, and situated in the centre of the Mediterranean,

had a more favourable geographical situation for the general Mediterranean trade than had Phœnicia herself, and much Phœnician trade fell to Carthage. In the eastern part of the Mediterranean the towns of Greece, which had founded numerous colonies in Asia Minor, began to oust the Phœnicians from those markets which lay nearest to their own ports, and to monopolise the trade of Persia.

According to the text-books of political economy, competition is the soul of business. Competition may be very desirable for the idle consumer whose only interest it is to buy cheaply, but the producer and the merchant wish to obtain a substantial profit on their wares. A nation can derive vast prosperity from its international commerce and from its export industries only if it has, through Nature's bounty or some other cause, practically a monopoly of trade. Free national competition leads, as a rule, to some arrangement among the competing interests, but free international competition brings profits down to the vanishing point. Therefore all the great commercial and industrial nations of the world could arrive at prosperity resulting from its export industries and international trade only by possessing virtually a monopoly, and the destruction of their trading monopoly meant to them the destruction of their greatness and power. Therefore those nations which depend for their existence on their foreign trade must be able to defend their commercial pre-eminence against all attacks, or they will perish.

Carthage being peopled by men of Phœnician blood, Phœnicia could bear her competition with equanimity, but the competition of the Greeks, aliens to them in race and in civilisation, was unbearable. Apparently through the aggressiveness of the Greeks—the Greeks were professional pirates in the time of Homer—Phœnicia came into collision with her great rivals. It became a question whether Greeks or Phœnicians should possess supremacy on the sea and the trade and the wealth of the world, and arms only could decide that question. According to Herodotus, the cele-

brated attack of the Persians upon the Greeks was brought about by the Phœnicians. Phœnicia and Carthage attacked Greece and her colonies simultaneously in the east and in the centre of the Mediterranean. Whilst Greece was being attacked by land and sea by an enormous Perso-Phœnician force, the great Greek colonies in Sicily were attacked by a Phœnico-Carthaginian force commanded by Hamilcar, in which, according to Herodotus, 3,000 ships and 800,000 men were engaged. By a curious coincidence, this enormous force was defeated by Gelon at Himera on the very same day on which the Greeks under Themistocles totally defeated the Perso-Phœnician navy at Salamis. It is worth noting that the Phœnicians furnished the principal naval contingent at that great sea-battle. The Greek ships were but few if compared with those of their enemy, but the Greeks had not yet become effeminate by luxury, self-indulgence, and vice, and superior bravery and seamanship gave them the victory. By war the Greeks acquired commercial and maritime supremacy in the eastern half of the Mediterranean, and by war they were to lose it.

Through the spreading of civilisation the world had become so much enlarged, and the imperfect construction of ships made the progress of merchantmen so slow, that, after the decline of Phœnicia, the world had room for two great commercial and maritime nations. Carthage, situated in the very centre, between Greece and Spain, between Morocco and Asia Minor, became supreme in the trade of the Western Mediterranean and of the seas beyond; whilst the Greeks, situated in the middle between the Greek colonies in Asia Minor and the Greek colonies in Italy, became supreme in the eastern half of that sea. The stony soil of Attica could not nourish the Athenians. Necessity made them fishers, seamen, and traders. The victory of Salamis gave them naval supremacy among the Greeks and barbarians, and practically the monopoly of trade in the eastern half of the Mediterranean. They

became immensely wealthy, and Athens became the centre of a large colonial empire. The Greek islands and colonies became tributary to Athens. Athenian fleets and Athenian garrisons protected the Greek islands and colonies against their enemies, and these enriched with their contributions their mighty protectress. The Greeks considered Athens as the centre of the world's trade. Isocrates tells us : ' She made the Pyræus, as it were, a common mart in the midst of all Greece, where there was such a variety of necessities and merchandise that what was difficult to be found in small quantities in other places it was easy to find here in the greatest abundance.' According to Xenophon : ' The grandeur of Athens caused the produce of the whole earth to be sent to that town.'

The artistic manufacture of Athens became celebrated throughout the antique world. At Athens was the High Court of Justice for the settlement of all legal disputes in the Greek colonies, the money market of the Greek Empire, and the University and Academy of Arts of the whole world. The world's wealth seemed to be centred in Athens. According to Demosthenes, Athens financed the whole Greek Archipelago. Athens began to live largely on foreign labour, on her capital invested abroad, and on the tribute which she received from the islands and colonies in return for protection given. The extreme prosperity of Athens turned the heads of her citizens, who began to believe that Athens was destined by Nature to be, and always to remain, the greatest and the richest commercial and industrial State in the world ; for the sober Xenophon informs us in all seriousness : ' The Athenians are the only nation among the Greeks and barbarians who can possess wealth ; for if other States are rich in timber for ship-building or in steel or brass or flax, where can they dispose of these unless they sell them to the rulers of the sea ? Our enemies are excluded from the use of the sea, and without labour we enjoy by means of the sea all the earth produces.'

Pampered by fortune and misguided by their politicians, the Athenians became a nation of pleasure-loving idlers. Athens was a democracy, and ambitious politicians endeavoured to obtain supporters and to rise to power by flattering, amusing, and bribing the masses. Sumptuous public buildings for the entertainment of the masses were erected by the State; theatrical performances, after having been gratuitous, became a source of income to the citizens, who received a remuneration for the time spent in enjoying themselves. Honorary appointments were converted into salaried ones, and these were so enormously increased that a large portion of the populace received bribes in the form of salaries. Official positions were distributed by lot. Citizens were paid even for attendance at the assembly of the people. According to Aristotle, twenty thousand citizens lived on the contributions paid by the allied and subject States. Gratis distributions of corn and other food for gaining popularity and votes were common. Thus Athens was corrupted, and became filled with idlers whose only aim in life it was to live well without work and to be amused, who did not know the word 'duty,' and who claimed the privilege of idleness and ease as a right, but who objected to work, to paying taxes, and to serving their country in war. Foreigners took the place of Athenians in the army and fleet, and the contributions of the tributaries had to be greatly increased in order to feed and amuse the clamorous idlers of Athens, who subsisted on foreign corn, agriculture being neglected. The Crimea supplied Athens with grain, and garrisons at the Dardanelles ensured the regularity of the food supply. According to Demosthenes, Athens imported more grain than any other nation. Athens was the corn market of the world. Nowhere in the world was bread cheaper than in Athens.

Sparta, the great military land Power, became jealous of the wealth of Athens, and began to look with contempt upon the Athenians who refused to fight for their country.

The Spartans thought that Athens ill deserved her prosperity, and resolved to capture it by war. The terrible Peloponnesian war was, according to Thucydides, caused chiefly by Sparta's commercial jealousy. Political intrigues and divisions, the necessity to pursue a popular though unwise policy, the self-indulgence of the citizens, and their reliance rather on their wealth than on their weapons, caused the defeat of Athens. Athens lost the rule of the sea, her supremacy in trade, and her colonies. Her tributaries and her foreign debtors ceased to pay tribute and interest when Athens had fallen from her great position. Her vast wealth disappeared ; Athens declined and decayed.

During the Peloponnesian war, which devastated the mainland of Greece, Rhodes had remained neutral, and she had captured much trade whilst that terrible struggle was in progress. Thus through the fortune of war, the Rhodians, who had been but a small nation, became a great commercial State. Rhodes was excellently situated for carrying on the trade between Greece, Egypt, Asia Minor, and between Greece and Italy. Besides, Rhodes had roomy harbours, she was reputed to possess the best sailors of antiquity, her citizens were cultured, progressive, diligent, energetic, and prudent, and she had excellent sea-laws, upon which those of Rome were modelled. Thus commercial and maritime supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean fell to Rhodes. According to Polybius, she ruled the sea. Rhodes became the successor of Athens, the wealthiest State of Greece, and one of the foremost centres of culture and learning. Cicero and Pompey studied at Rhodes, and Cæsar was captured by pirates when on the way to the university of the world.

In the centre and west of the Mediterranean Carthage was supreme ; she ruled the sea as absolutely as Rome ruled the land, and she became the world's manufacturer. Her navy was considered invincible, and her traders knew no rivals. Carthage, as Phœnicia before her, pursued a profitable

policy—that is, a policy profitable to her ruling class of merchants and bankers, who cared only for immediate cash profits, and these became immensely wealthy. Carthage neglected her agriculture and her army, trusting for her defence to her navy and to her money-bags, as Phœnicia had done before her. Sicily provided Carthage with grain, and Spain was her India whence she drew her wool for her vast textile industry, and copper, silver, gold, and precious stones. Rome, poor, warlike, and ambitious, envied Carthage for her wealth, and despised her for her effeminacy and cowardice. The Romans invaded Sicily and Spain, threatened simultaneously Carthage's food supply and wealth, and raised the slaves against her. Carthage had to fight for her existence. War to the death became inevitable between the two countries. The Romans built a fleet on the model of a stranded Carthaginian vessel and manned it with soldiers. Owing to the ingenious invention of grappling-irons, made by Duilius, the Roman general, Rome succeeded in destroying the fleets of Carthage. After a lengthy and desperate struggle the poor but warlike nation defeated with its national army the mercenaries of its wealthy but unwarlike opponent. Carthage was destroyed.

Cicero summed up the policy of all military Powers, and of Rome in particular, in the words: 'Is any State that is known to be rich allowed to enjoy peace? Or have the generals of Rome ever permitted a wealthy State to live in quiet?' When Rome had destroyed Carthage the wealth of the world lay at her feet. The Greeks were, according to Aristotle, by nature fitted to rule the world 'had they been happily united under a single Government,' but their disunion proved fatal to them. When Rome had vanquished Carthage she ruled the world both politically and economically. It is true that the Romans were by nature peasants and soldiers, but wealth and trade are apt to fall not to the ablest, but to the strongest, for Power is Wealth. Rome swept the wealth of the world into Italy with an iron broom

Roman merchants were preferentially treated by law throughout her dominions, and Rome obtained commercial and maritime supremacy.

After having been a kingdom and a veiled aristocracy, Rome became a democracy. Her politicians competed for the votes of the people, and success at elections fell as it usually does, not to the ablest, but to the most unscrupulous and to the highest bidder. Appealing to the lowest instincts of the masses, the politicians bought support with bribes. The populace was encouraged and taught to live in idleness on doles and charity. Some democratic statesmen made themselves popular by giving to the people gratuitous performances in gigantic circuses, others by giving them cheap food, which the subject nations were compelled to provide. The free peasantry of Italy being unable to compete with their grain with slave-grown foreign corn, sold under cost price, were ruined. The once fruitful Campagna, after having been a grazing-ground, became a desert. Agricultural land in Italy was either converted into pasture which required hardly any labour, or tilled by slaves. The sturdy country population was driven into the towns and decayed in the slums. Rome became completely dependent upon foreign food. Tacitus wrote: 'Formerly Italy exported supplies for the legions to distant provinces, and Italy is not by any means a barren country. But the nation prefers cultivating Egypt and Africa, and the existence of the Roman people is entrusted to ships and to the dangers of the sea.' Periodically Rome was visited by famine, and poverty and starvation were alarmingly prevalent in the wealthiest town of the world. Quintilian complained: 'Whilst we are selling to the neighbouring nations in the pursuit of a profitable policy, we have neglected all regard for public safety, and, having emptied our store abroad, have brought distress upon ourselves at home.' Rome lived on her foreign investments. Cicero exclaimed: 'Rome is dependent upon the revenues of Asia.

The public credit of Rome and the circulation of money in the Forum is connected with it.' The mighty Roman Empire had allowed its foundation to decay.

Town and country are interdependent, and nourish one another, the former providing manufactures, the latter food, and the poverty of the one necessarily brings about in the end the poverty of the other. Towns cannot live by themselves. The population of Rome could not make a living when, through the decay of agriculture, one-half of the home market had been destroyed, whilst the number of men had not diminished. Therefore, notwithstanding the cheapness of food, extreme poverty and distress were permanent in Rome. Notwithstanding its cheapness, food was found to be too dear by those who could not obtain employment and by those who would not work, and who were encouraged in their idleness by reckless demagogues striving after power, and anxious for popular support. Instead of stopping the influx of foreign corn and repopulating the devastated country districts, the Roman demagogues, pursuing a popular policy, and wishing to keep their electors in hand and dependent upon their bounty, continued their demoralising policy of doles. In 123 B.C. Caius Gracchus reduced the price of corn to about one-third its natural price, at which the head of every family could purchase it from the Government stores. In course of time further reductions took place, and at last gratuitous distributions of corn on a vast scale were instituted. In Cæsar's time 820,000 people were in receipt of gratis corn. Even that was found insufficient. In the third century after Christ gratis distributions of corn were followed by gratis distributions of bread, and these were followed by gratis distributions of meat, oil, salt, wine, &c. The population of Rome consisted of wealthy merchants and idlers, and of a hungry mob living on charity. The strength of Rome had been sacrificed to the Moloch of cheapness and popularity. Nowhere in the world was corn cheaper than

in Rome ; nowhere was distress greater. The policy of the Roman statesman was summed up in two words—cheap food. A bad harvest would cause a revolution. In the words of Tacitus : ‘ Alexandria was the key to Egypt, and by blocking up that plentiful corn country all Italy could very easily be reduced to starvation.’ The Roman army was recruited from the wretched slum proletariat which possessed neither stamina nor patriotism, neither the sense of duty nor that of discipline and subordination. The Roman army became an armed mob. Tiberius Gracchus complained : ‘ The wild beasts of Italy have their dens, but our brave soldiers possess nothing except air and light. Tramps and beggars are the defenders of their country, and the masters of the universe have not a foot of ground they can call their own.’ Soon the wretched slum proletariat was no longer fit either to work for its own support or to fight for its country, being no longer willing to exchange the pleasure and idleness of town for a military life or a life spent in honest labour. Rome had to rely on foreign workers and on foreign mercenaries. German soldiers garrisoned the capital, and Dutchmen guarded the emperors. Rome, rotten to the core, had become a nation composed of capitalists and paupers, defended by her money-bags. The barbarians attacked Rome, and the gigantic Roman Empire fell to pieces like a house of cards.

The centre of the Roman Empire was removed to Constantinople. Constantinople became the heiress of Rome’s power and of Rome’s policy and traditions. Through her matchless geographical position and as centre of the still large East Roman Empire, Constantinople became exceedingly wealthy. The world had to feed Constantinople, and Constantinople did an enormous trade in food and those articles which the hosts of its idle citizens required. The masses of Constantinople could give power by their votes. Therefore they were corrupted with

bribes by the ambitious. 'Panem et circenses' was the cry of the populace in Constantinople as it had been in Rome. Parties were formed round the favourites of the theatre. Constantinople lived on its capital and on foreign tribute, on contributions exacted by force, and on the interest of money lent by her capitalists to productive nations. Constantinople had to be defended by foreigners against her enemies. When the Turks stormed the degenerate town in 1453, ten out of the twelve commanders on the walls were foreigners. Italians and other foreign soldiers had done most of the fighting.

In the eighth century a new world-power, the Arabs, had arisen and had rapidly conquered Asia Minor, the whole of North Africa, and Spain. Power is wealth. Commercial and maritime supremacy may quickly be gained by the sword. The Arabs, possessing some of the richest portions of the globe, embarked upon trade with the productions of their vast empire, and soon their commerce embraced the whole known world. Arab merchants traded from China to Sweden. Baghdad became the centre of the world's trade and of the world's wealth. During the Middle Ages the great Arab towns were the centres of a new civilisation. The foremost universities and the largest libraries in the world were those of the Arabs; the best doctors, the greatest lawyers, the foremost engineers, the leading architects and artists were followers of the Prophet. Monuments of the power, wealth, and genius of the Arabs may be found throughout Spain and the Orient, and when these are destroyed, words such as admiral, frigate, magazine, tariff, tare, bazaar, and numerous others will remain a lasting monument to the greatness of the Arabs and witnesses of their commercial and maritime supremacy.

The Arab nations lacked the sense of solidarity, and they were destroyed one by one by the nations of Europe. The Crusaders broke the Arab power in the East, the

Spaniards broke it in the West. With the greatness of the Arab Empire disappeared its world-wide trade and its culture.

The Crusaders were transported to the Holy Land by sea, and the Italian sea towns became wealthy and powerful in transporting millions of men and horses to and fro. At an early date the Italian coast towns had stipulated that they should be given trading facilities and settlements of their own in all places occupied by the Crusaders. A vast trade sprang up between Europe and the East. The Crusaders had been introduced to the productions of the East, and a demand for Oriental spices, sugar, glass ware, pottery, silk, tapestry, metal ware, arms, &c., arose throughout Europe, and the Italian coast towns hastened to supply the articles wanted. A lively trade arose between East and West. Caravans coming from the interior of Asia and Africa brought Oriental wares to the coast of the Mediterranean, whence they were fetched by Italian merchants who sent them towards the north of Europe either *viâ* Gibraltar or across the Alps and down the Rhine. Italy lay on the high-road of the world's traffic, and, owing to the constant stream of merchandise and of wealth, the Italian coast towns and Florence, Milan, Verona, Lucca, Augsburg, Nuremberg, Strasburg, Cologne, and others flourished greatly.

Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Amalfi transported the Crusaders and their belongings, and carried on the trade between Europe and the Orient. Of these four town republics Amalfi was in the beginning the greatest. In the ninth century Amalfi, which had fifty thousand inhabitants, ruled the sea and outshone all her competitors in wealth, industry, culture, and learning. The *Tabula Amalfitana*, the celebrated sea laws of that town, became the sea laws of the Mediterranean; Flavio Gioja, an Amalfitan, introduced the mariner's compass; Amalfitan coins freely circulated throughout the Orient. Pisa,

Amalfi's greatest competitor, became jealous of Amalfi's prosperity. A war between the two republics ended in the victory of the Pisans, who sacked Amalfi in 1185, and Amalfi became what it is still, a miserable village. Few people know nowadays that Amalfi ever ruled the sea.

The destruction of her great rival gave commercial and maritime supremacy to Pisa, which became a most flourishing town. Rapidly expanding Pisa conquered and colonised Corsica, Sardinia, and the Balearic Islands. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, during the time of her splendour, she built the magnificent Duomo, begun in 1063; the Baptisterio, begun in 1153; the leaning tower, begun in 1174; and the Campo Santo, begun in 1203, which are still objects of universal admiration. 'Those who live by the sword shall perish by the sword.' Genoa, Pisa's mighty rival, wishing to crush her great competitor, frequently made war upon Pisa, and at last succeeded in destroying her power in the terrible battle of Meloria, in which no fewer than 16,000 Pisans were killed or made prisoners. Genoa became mistress of the sea, and Pisa decayed utterly. Pisa, which in the eleventh century had 150,000 inhabitants, and which then was, perhaps, the largest town in Europe, became a poverty-stricken village.

When Amalfi and Pisa had been destroyed, Genoa and Venice had the Mediterranean trade to themselves. Friction occurred between the two competitors and again war had to decide whether commercial and maritime supremacy, wealth and power should fall to the one or to the other. During three centuries Genoa and Venice were at war, and at last Venice succeeded by a mighty effort in destroying her great rival. At the beginning of the fifteenth century Venice was at the height of her power. She ruled the sea, she conquered and colonised the islands and the coasts of the Mediterranean, and she became the head of a vast colonial empire and the centre of the world's trade, the world's wealth, the world's culture, and the world's art.

The sea was covered with Venetian ships, manned by no fewer than 50,000 sailors.

During two thousand years civilisation had progressed along the shores of the Mediterranean, but the Arabs and Italians had introduced trade and culture, arts and sciences to the countries of Northern Europe, and new centres of civilisation began to spring up on the savage shores of the North Sea and the Baltic. Under the fostering care of enlightened princes, manufacturing industries grew up in Flanders and Brabant which provided Muscovy, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Germany with textile fabrics and other wares in exchange for raw produce, such as timber, corn, wool, pitch, tar, hemp, furs, furnished by these nations. Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg, lying in the centre of the northern trade route, acquired commercial and maritime eminence. The Hanseatic League arose. The Italian merchants found it difficult to trade directly with the countries of Northern Europe because the imperfect state of navigation made it impossible for them to reach the Baltic in a single season. Therefore they agreed with the Hanseatic merchants that a town lying half-way between Italy and the Baltic towns should be made the market for the exchange of northern and of Italian and Oriental productions and an international storehouse. Bruges was fixed upon, and Bruges became by far the greatest and the wealthiest town of Northern Europe. Venice in the south and Bruges in the north handled the trade of the world. Venice and Bruges were the two poles round which the commercial world revolved. The prosperity of these two towns seemed to rest on the most solid basis.

Through Vasco da Gama's circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope and the discovery of the sea route to India, the trade of the world was suddenly completely changed. When it was found that it was far cheaper to fetch the productions of the Orient *via* the Cape of Good Hope

than to fetch them from the southern shores of the Mediterranean after a tedious land voyage, the commercial and maritime supremacy of Venice was destroyed. The current of the world's trade altered its course. Venice became deserted, and Lisbon, lying half-way on the new trade route between East and West, became the greatest emporium of the world's trade and the heir of Venice. The Venetian Republic offered to buy the whole of the Oriental goods brought to Portugal and not wanted for Portuguese consumption in order to retain at least the second-hand trade in the produce of the Orient. That offer was refused. Venice had to live on her accumulated capital, and, being unable to extend the basis of her wealth and power and to keep pace with the progress of the other nations of Europe, she gradually decayed, for no nation can live on its wealth invested abroad.

Flanders and Brabant were the Lancashire of Europe. Arras, Ypres, Mechlin, Ghent, Brussels, Liège, and Namur provided the world with manufactures of every kind, and Bruges, lying in the centre of that wealthy district, was at the same time a huge manufacturing town and a great trading centre. In the fifteenth century Bruges had 200,000 inhabitants, and was far larger than London or Paris. However, Flanders and Brabant, though they possessed a most fruitful soil, had neglected their agricultural for the more profitable manufacturing industries. According to the 'Libell of English Policye,' written in 1486, these towns produced only bread enough to last for one month. The democratic Governments of these wealthy towns pursued a popular policy, sacrificing to ease and luxury, to popularity, and to the pursuit of commercial gain the strength of the country, and neglected arms. The Dukes of Burgundy made war upon them. Being disunited among themselves and divided within by party strife, these mighty towns were easily subdued one by one by force or were starved into surrender. A large part of the population

of Flanders and Brabant, being unable to make a living in their declining country, emigrated. Ypres, which at the time of her glory had had 200,000 inhabitants, became a village, and the emigrants from Flanders and Brabant laid the foundation of the great industries of Holland, Germany, France, and England. The decline of the industries of Flanders and Brabant brought about the decline of Bruges. The leading merchants of that town migrated to Antwerp, and, through the fortune of war, Antwerp became the commercial and financial centre of Northern Europe.

The commercial supremacy of Antwerp was short-lived. The Dutch and Belgian Netherlands, which had fallen under the rule of Spain, rose in revolt against Spain in consequence of the cruel religious persecution of Philip the Second, and of Alva, his lieutenant in the Netherlands. The Dutch Netherlands, being comparatively poor and possessing a very warlike population, fought bravely and expelled the Spaniards. The Belgian Netherlands, with their enormous towns, offered but a feeble and futile resistance, for the town population is better at shouting than at fighting. Through the pusillanimity of the popular Government and the cowardice of the large industrial proletariat, Antwerp was conquered and plundered, and the traders of that town fled to Amsterdam for safety. Flanders and Brabant were ruined by the Spaniards, and the population fled from the unhappy country and took their industries to neighbouring Holland.

The war between Holland and Spain, which Alva's persecutions had kindled, lasted almost uninterruptedly during eighty years. According to the current theories of English political economists, peace is the greatest interest of all nations; war is ruinous to all. History, which disproves so many idle theories, teaches us that there are ruinous and profitable wars, and the Eighty Years' War against Spain, though ruinous to Spain, was exceedingly profitable to the Dutch. At the beginning of the war Spain and Portugal

possessed the greatest colonial empire in the world. Pope Alexander the Sixth had, in 1498, divided the New World between Spain and Portugal. Spain and Portugal had conquered the New World, and when, in 1580, Portugal was conquered by Spain, Spain became the possessor of the whole of the New World. Before the outbreak of the Eighty Years' War, Spain was the richest nation in all the world, and the strongest on land and sea. At the end of that war the industries of Flanders and Brabant, and the wealth of the Spanish-Portuguese Empire and its most valuable colonies, had passed into the hands of the Dutch. Besides, the Dutch, having chased the Spanish and Portuguese ships from the ocean, had conquered the rule of the sea. By the sword the Dutch had won industrial, commercial, and maritime supremacy the world over. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Dutch had, according to Sir Walter Raleigh and many other reliable writers, a greater merchant marine than all other nations combined. New York, then called New Amsterdam, was a Dutch settlement ; Brazil was conquered by the Dutch from the Portuguese ; India was dominated by Dutchmen ; the Spice Islands, the most valuable points on the African coast, and the Cape of Good Hope, were Dutch. The world was dotted with Dutch naval stations. The Dutch possessed a world-empire similar to the British World-Empire of to-day. They were the wealthiest, the most industrious, and the most powerful nation existing. The New World might have become Dutch instead of Anglo-Saxon. The religious persecutions and the Thirty Years' War on the continent of Europe, and the stormy rule of Charles the First and the Civil War in England, destroyed the industries and trade of Europe and strengthened still further the Dutch monopoly of manufacturing and trade. The trade of England and France was carried in Dutch bottoms. Amsterdam financed the world. The whole world was tributary to Holland.

England's commercial and maritime greatness is of very recent date. At the time when Flanders and Brabant were prosperous manufacturing countries, England was a third-rate Power and a purely agricultural and pastoral country, whence Flanders and Brabant drew the wool they needed. The trade of England was carried on by Hanseatic merchants called 'Easterlings,' who have given the name to the coin of the realm, and by Lombards, whose arms may be seen outside every pawnshop. The far-reaching trading privileges of these foreigners, which were similar to those enjoyed now by Englishmen in China, were withdrawn by Queen Elizabeth, who wished to foster the English industries. At the time when the Dutch carried on the trade of the world England possessed hardly any ships and hardly any fishing industry. The greatest British maritime industry was piracy.

Proud of her wealth, and confiding in her wealth and her semi-insular position, which could be made completely insular by piercing the dykes, Holland neglected her army and those industries which raise food and warlike men. Her agriculture hardly sufficed to nourish one-eighth of the inhabitants, and she allowed her mighty fisheries, whence she drew her seamen, to be captured by foreigners. Her merchant statesmen followed a utilitarian policy most profitable to themselves. The nation was hopelessly divided by party feuds. Believing that no country would venture to attack a State which had defeated the Spanish Empire, the Dutch allowed their navy to lose its supremacy, believing that they could in time of need improvise a navy with their unlimited wealth and latent resources. Cromwell, seeing that Holland was almost disarmed, and divided within, attacked her in 1652. His 'colonels at sea,' Blake, Dean, Monk, and Popham, defeated with their infantry the ablest Dutch admirals and seamen. Cromwell's navigation laws crippled the commerce of the Dutch and created the greatness of the English merchant marine. Further attacks by

England and by France destroyed the maritime and commercial supremacy of the Dutch.

In 1661 Colbert began to direct the economic policy of France. France was a poor agricultural country, Holland was a rich industrial and commercial State, and Colbert resolved to capture a large part of the industrial and commercial wealth of the Dutch. Hitherto France had levied customs duties for revenue purposes only. Colbert introduced fiscal protection and transferred a large part of the Dutch industries from Dutch to French soil. Colbert's policy was copied by all other nations, whilst the Netherlands followed the policy of free trade. All Europe made fiscal war upon the Dutch industries, and these decayed utterly.

The Netherlands rapidly declined. France and England, equally strong, desired to become great commercial, maritime, and colonial nations at the cost of the Dutch, and very soon they fell to fighting over the great Dutch inheritance. Competition between English and French traders and between the English and French Governments, for trade, ships, and colonies, led to war. During more than a century, from the time of Louis the Fourteenth to that of Napoleon the First, England and France fought for the rule of the sea, for colonial empire, and for the trade of the world. The overthrow of Napoleon gave to England commercial and maritime supremacy the world over. England's commercial and industrial supremacy and her colonial empire were won by the sword and by the protective policy of her rulers.

During the wars of the Revolution and the Napoleonic wars the whole continent of Europe was devastated, many Continental Governments became bankrupt, the industries and commerce of England's competitors were destroyed ; England only had peace at home, and became exceedingly wealthy through the disappearance of all her competitors and the consequent monopoly of England in trade and industry. England became the manufacturer, trader,

shipper, banker, and financier of the world. The whole world was pawned to Englishmen.

‘Pride goeth before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall.’ In the forties of the last century England produced more coal, more cotton goods, more iron, and she had more money, more miles of railway, and more ships than the rest of the world. English merchants began to believe that, as Mr. Cobden put it, England was destined by Nature to be, and always to remain, the workshop of the world, and being in power they threw away the economic and political defences of their country. Since then the glory and greatness of England have much diminished. Industrially, commercially, and financially, England has greatly declined. Her commercial and maritime supremacy is seriously threatened by the United States and Germany, who have been advancing with giant strides whilst Great Britain has stood still. What will be the future of Great Britain and the British Empire? Will Great Britain learn the lesson of history? The eleventh hour has arrived.

The history of three thousand years teaches us that all the good things of this world, land and riches, commerce and shipping, are not to the peaceful and to the feeble, but to the warlike and to the strong; not to the sluggard, armed with a ‘scientific’ formula pronounced by a learned theorist, but to energetic and ambitious men of action, armed with common sense; that wealth and power can be preserved only by military strength; that wealth is a bad substitute for power; that power may be easily converted into wealth, but that money-bags do not defend themselves; that strength is better than wealth; that the neglect of the army and the decay of agriculture have been fatal to all great commercial States of the past, from Phœnicia to Holland; that huge towns devour the strength of the country.

Great Britain has allowed her agriculture to decay, and she has, at the bidding of interested manufacturers and traders and of crazy theorists, erected the mightiest economic

fabric the world has seen upon a single pillar. That pillar stands upon foreign ground, and foreign nations are engaged in sawing through that pillar. The British Empire can be preserved only as long as the British fleet is supreme, and the British fleet can remain supreme only as long as Great Britain can afford to maintain a larger fleet than any other nation. Great Britain is no longer the richest nation in the world. The outlook for Great Britain and her Colonies is very serious and threatening, for might is right in international politics. The law of the survival of the fittest and strongest, which rules the whole animal and vegetable creation, applies with equal force to man and to his political associations.

Great Britain and the British Empire stand at the parting of the ways. The greatest danger to Great Britain is her weakness. Great Britain must have strength commensurate with the extent of her possessions, or she will perish. The British Empire is merely a geographical expression. In its unorganised state it is as little an empire as was the Dutch World-Empire or the Phœnician World-Empire of old.

The greatest States of all times have perished because they have not acted in accordance with the spirit of the times. Unless Great Britain reforms herself, adapts herself to modern conditions, abandons her insane and pseudo-liberal policy of drift, neglect, and mammonism, miscalled non-interference, individualism, and free trade; unless she husbands and develops her resources and increases her rapidly-ebbing national strength by reconstituting her agriculture and making the population warlike and prepared for war; and unless the British Empire is unified—for only the united and organised strength of the whole of the Empire can suffice to defend it—Great Britain, and with her the British Empire, may, by the inexorable law of History and of Nature, follow the way which Phœnicia, Carthage, Athens, Rome, Constantinople, the Arab Empire, Amalfi, Pisa, Genoa, Venice, and the Dutch Empire have gone in the past.

CHAPTER II

NAVAL SUPREMACY—ITS STRATEGICAL ASPECTS AND ITS POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL FOUNDATIONS

THREE centuries ago England was a backward and ignorant agricultural country, without enterprise, without trade, without wealth, without colonies. But England, though poor, was ambitious. Her leading men wished her to become a World - Power. Sir Walter Raleigh wrote : ' Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade ; whosoever commands the trade commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself ' ; and Lord Bacon declared, ' The rule of the sea is the epitome of monarchy,' and advised this country to conquer the wealth and the colonies of Spain because Spain's power was no longer sufficient to defend her vast and wealthy possessions. Following the advice of her greatest statesmen, England made war upon Spain, not for political or religious reasons, but because Spain owned the wealth of the New World. Spain declined and Holland became by war and by work heir to the larger part of Spain's wealth. Then England transferred her hostility from Spain to Holland. Attacked by England, who was later on joined by France, the Netherlands declined. England and France fell to fighting over the great Dutch inheritance, and war had to decide whether the New World was to become French or English. Thus by three centuries of war, firstly against Spain, then against Holland, and lastly against France, was the British Empire won, and the struggle for empire ended only in 1815

when at last Great Britain had vanquished all her European rivals. (British colonial and commercial supremacy is barely a century old.

The rise of the British World-Empire has been similar to that of all other States and Empires, and only those who are ignorant of history and of the great physiological and historical laws which rule the world can condemn the triumphant progress of the Anglo-Saxon race. This world is not a world of ease and peace, but a world of strife and war. Nature is ruled by the law of the struggle for existence and of the survival of the fittest and the strongest. States, like trees and animals, are engaged in a never-ending struggle for room, food, light, and air, and that struggle is a blessing in disguise, for it is the cause of all progress. Had it not been for that struggle, the world would still be a wilderness inhabited by its aboriginal savages.

The abolition of war would be a misfortune to mankind. It would lead not to the survival of the fittest and strongest, but to the survival of the sluggard and the unfit, and therefore to the degeneration of the human race. However, there is no likelihood that universal peace will be established. As long as human nature remains what it is, as long as self-interest, not benevolence, is the predominant motive in men and in States, those nations which are ambitious and strong will seize the possessions of those which are rich and weak. Thus Nature constantly rejuvenates the world and compels States to increase in civilisation and strength by the same means by which she compels individuals to cultivate both mind and body, and those States which disregard the supreme law of Nature and of History disappear.

All States and Empires are founded upon power. By the exercise of power, families have grown into tribes, tribes into States, and States into Empires. The word 'Power' happily expresses the essence of the State, for the

State is not only founded upon power, but ~~is~~ power. Power is the only valid title by which a nation holds its possessions, and only by power can it retain them. That is the law of Nature and the law of History. The fate of nations depends, therefore, chiefly on their strength and on their fitness for facing the universal struggle for existence, and wars will hardly be abolished by international agreement unless the universal law of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest and strongest be previously abrogated. It is true that the prophet tells us, 'They shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more'; but he shrewdly adds that that happy event will come to pass only 'in the last days,' and these are not yet.

In Lord Bacon's words, 'For Empire and greatness it importeth most that a nation do profess arms as their principal honour, study, and occupation.' The great commercial world-empires of the past from Phœnicia to the Dutch World-Empire have been conquered and have declined and decayed because they neglected cultivating their strength and providing in time for their defence. May not the loosely jointed and ill-organised British Empire have a fate similar to that of its great predecessors, and may we not, if we recognise that possibility in time, take in time the necessary steps to guard ourselves against such a calamity?

> The maintenance of naval supremacy is an absolute necessity for the defence of the British Empire, for it can hardly be doubted that the disappearance of our naval supremacy would inevitably, and very speedily, be followed by the peaceful dissolution or by the violent break-up of the Empire. As soon as the connexion between the various parts of the Empire can be severed at will by a Power supreme on the sea, the British Empire exists only by permission of that Power. Inter-imperial trade in peace

would be at the mercy of that nation which rules the sea, and which conceivably might interfere with the free flow of inter-imperial trade with the object of benefiting its own citizens. A State supreme on the sea might, therefore, drain the British Empire of its wealth by navigation laws and wanton fiscal interference against which diplomatic protests might prove unavailing. If the British Empire should be engaged in war with a third Power, concerted action and mutual assistance would become impossible for the members of the Empire except by the permission of the supreme naval Power, and our possessions would inevitably, one by one, fall to the nation supreme on the sea, which alone would be able, economically and militarily, to protect them, and which would be able to acquire them at its leisure either by war or by economic or diplomatic pressure. With the disappearance of British naval supremacy the British Empire would exist merely on sufferance, and Great Britain could keep only that portion of her oversea trade and those of her Colonies which the supreme naval Power would allow her to retain. Like Spain and Portugal, Great Britain would be deprived of her most valuable possessions and be left only with those which would not be worth the taking. Therefore the end of British naval supremacy would certainly mean the end of the British Empire. Hence the most important question arises, Will Great Britain be able to continue maintaining her naval supremacy?

Our naval policy is at present based upon the two-Power standard. Great Britain endeavours to maintain a fleet equal in strength to the combined strength of the fleets possessed by the two second strongest naval Powers, rightly considering that these might possibly ally themselves against her. Up to a few years ago France and Russia, whose policy then was hostile to this country, were the two second strongest naval Powers. Lately the danger of a Franco-Russian attack on this country has diminished,

but at the same time the United States and Germany have come forward and have become competitors with this country for naval supremacy.

Two questions ought now to be considered : (1) Ought Great Britain to maintain a fleet strong enough to meet the combined fleets of the United States and Germany ? (2) Is Great Britain able to maintain the two-Power standard against the United States and Germany ?

In order to solve these two questions we must first of all consider our relations with the United States and Germany and the probable development of these relations.

The United States and Germany were formerly Land Powers, one might almost say Inland Powers. Their citizens were chiefly occupied in agriculture, and they exchanged their surplus of wheat, meat, timber, and other raw produce against British manufactures. In the course of the last two or three decades the policy of Protection has changed the economic aspect, and with the economic aspect the political character, of both these countries, and has converted our best customers into our most active and most dangerous competitors. The United States and Germany not only supply their home markets with the productions of their flourishing industries, virtually excluding our manufactures, but not our raw products, from them, but they also export huge quantities of manufactured goods to all countries, and they have deliberately embarked upon a policy of maritime expansion and colonisation with the object of securing the control of the raw materials used by their industries, and of obtaining an adequate outlet for their surplus manufactures. In France and Russia we used to have competitors who were actuated mainly by political ambition, by the desire of colouring the map. In the United States and Germany we have now competitors for colonies and empire who are actuated by a far more powerful and therefore far more dangerous motive—economic necessity.

Let us consider separately the relation of Great Britain and the British Empire with the United States and with Germany.

Englishmen and Americans are of the same stock, and, from the sentimental point of view, they are friends, but economically, and therefore to some extent politically as well, they are rivals. During many years the United States have steadfastly and unflinchingly striven to become a great industrial nation, and they have succeeded, and now they are striving with the greatest energy and determination to become a great maritime and colonial nation as well. The largest portion of the American exports and imports is at present carried in British ships, but powerful interests in America are striving to eliminate the British middleman, and to transfer this profitable branch of our carrying trade to American hands by means of large subsidies paid under a Shipping Bill which has been discussed in Congress and the Senate, and which ought soon to become law. However, America means not only to reserve the American shipping trade to American citizens by protective measures similar in character and effect to those by which she has created her manufacturing industries and has reserved to her citizens her home market, but she also endeavours to take away from us the most profitable branch of our foreign trade—our trade with the East. The Panama Canal is designed to strike a terrible blow at our Eastern trade. As the great industrial centres of America are situated on or near the East Coast where coal and iron abound, they are separated from Asia by a longer sea distance than that which separates Great Britain from Asia. Therefore Great Britain is at present the half-way house and the carrier for the sea-borne trade between the United States and the East. When the Panama Canal is finished, the American East Coast will no longer be farther away from Asia than Great Britain, but Great Britain will be farther away from Asia than

the American East Coast, and then the Suez Canal route, which possesses many great disadvantages, may cease to be the world's high-road of commerce between the East and the West. America may therefore become the natural half-way house and the carrier for the water-borne goods exchanged between the East and the West, and, unless we take in time vigorous counter-measures, in self-defence, we may lose to the United States not only the Chinese and Japanese markets, but our Indian market as well. If, later on, America should favour American trade at the Panama Canal by differential tolls or by refunding tolls—and such a step seems by no means impossible notwithstanding paper undertakings to the contrary—the most valuable part of our shipping trade and our great Eastern markets may suddenly be taken away from Great Britain, and be transferred bodily to the United States.

Desiring to be self-supporting and self-sufficing, and considering their territories too narrow, the United States have become an imperial and a colonising nation. They have conquered the colonies of Spain, they have clearly shown their desire to extend their colonial empire in various directions, they are building an enormous fleet, and we cannot too often ask ourselves, 'What is the American navy for?'

Although Anglo-American relations are most cordial, the vigorous expansionist policy followed by the United States is not without danger to the British Empire, because 'business is business,' and because the most desirable colonies happen to be in British hands. We must also not forget that not so very long ago President Cleveland was ready to use our paltry differences with Venezuela as a pretext for war with Great Britain in order to withdraw public attention from his political mistakes, and that a war with Great Britain would then have been very popular in America. The American people are an easily excitable people in whose mind there is a

strong strain of aggressiveness. Besides, some of our diplomatic dealings with the United States—I refrain from quoting painful examples—should have convinced us that the Government of the United States follows not a sentimental but a business policy, that it promotes the interests of its citizens without overmuch regard to abstract virtue and to the feelings of other nations, and that it relies as much upon power for achieving its aims as do the military States of Europe. Therefore we cannot take it for granted that the United States will always be friendly to this country, and we cannot contemplate with indifference a desire on their part to acquire the rule of the sea unless we are determined to commit political suicide. Only the strong are respected in international politics. Canada, our West Indian islands, and our harbours throughout the world, are a standing temptation to the sense of acquisitiveness, which is at least as strongly developed in American statesmen and business men as it is in our own. The stronger we are, the more cordial will be our relations with America. Our weakness might prove an irresistible temptation to American politicians, anxious for renown or for popularity, to increase the wealth and strength of their country at the cost of the British Empire.

The foregoing should make it clear that Great Britain must maintain her naval supremacy against the United States if she wishes to preserve the Empire.

Let us now look into Anglo-German relations and their probable development.

Germany, like the United States, used to be a poor agricultural country and a customer of Great Britain for her manufactured goods. In 1879 Bismarck introduced the policy of Protection. Since then the industries and the wealth of Germany have so marvellously increased that she has become our most dangerous industrial competitor in all our markets, including our home market.

Not satisfied with having become the greatest industrial nation, though not the greatest exporting nation, in Europe, Germany desires to become a great maritime and colonial empire as well, because she wishes to buy the raw products she requires in her own possessions and to have secure outlets overseas for her surplus manufactures, but chiefly because she requires outlets in the temperate zone for her rapidly growing population, which increases every year by about 900,000, whilst ours increases only by some 800,000.

In order to be able to become a great maritime and colonial State, Germany requires in the first place a sufficiency of well-situated commercial and naval harbours. Hamburg, her only great harbour, is not very favourably situated, for nearly all the great industrial centres of Germany lie on or near the Rhine, which is the great high-road of German trade, because coal and iron abound in its vicinity. Therefore the greatest German harbours are not Hamburg and Bremen, but the harbours at the mouths of the Rhine, Antwerp and Rotterdam, and it is not unnatural that Germany desires to obtain the control of these harbours. Modern Germany, Prusso-Germany, is the heir of the old German Empire, of which the Netherlands formed as much a part as did Alsace-Lorraine, and Germany has as strong an historical claim on the former as that which, in 1870, she successfully asserted with regard to the latter. From the point of view of every thinking and patriotic German it is absurd that the mouths of the principal German river should be in the hands of a nation of the fourth rank which originally formed a part of Germany, and which speaks a Low-German dialect. From the point of view of every German business man it seems intolerable that the Netherlands should be allowed to make a profit, one might almost say to levy tribute, on every article exported from, and imported into, the principal manufacturing districts of Germany *via* the Rhine; that the Netherlands should become wealthy by Germany's work. From the German

point of view the fact that Holland and Germany are two separate States is an anachronism.

Germany has two war harbours—Wilhelmshafen, on the North Sea, and Kiel, on the Baltic. The former is a narrow artificially dug-out port which is totally insufficient for Germany's requirements. The latter is a large port which has the equally great disadvantage that it can be reached only by making the lengthy and very dangerous *détour* round Denmark, or by using the Baltic North Sea Canal, which might easily become blocked in war time, either through accident or through hostile action. Besides, it is not deep enough for the huge ships which Germany is building, and £10,000,000 will be required for widening and deepening it. Germany is in the absurd position that she is building an enormous fleet without possessing adequate harbours for her ships, and she is therefore compelled by necessity, either to acquire the great harbours of the Netherlands or to give up her claims to oversea expansion. Consequently it seems absolutely certain that Germany will, earlier or later, make a most determined attempt to make Rotterdam and Antwerp German ports, and from her point of view she is quite justified in doing so.

Germany must be able industrially and politically to expand; she must become a great maritime and colonial Power or she will, for lack of space, lose her rank as a Great Power. The Emperor's watchword, 'Germany's future lies upon the water,' has become the watchword and the rallying cry of the German nation, and as Great Britain rules the sea, and possesses practically all the most desirable colonies situated in the temperate zone, Germany must be able to overcome this country in order to carry out her aims. Therefore the preamble to the great German Navy Bill of 1900, by which about £200,000,000 were voted for naval purposes, plainly stated 'Germany must have a fleet of such strength that a war against the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening

the supremacy of that Power.' Through that document Germany proclaimed to the world her determination to challenge the naval supremacy of this country. By the supplementary Navy Bills of 1906 and of 1908 an additional sum of about £100,000,000 was voted for naval purposes, and in a few years some twenty German ships of about 20,000 tons, each of which is to be larger and stronger than our own *Dreadnought*, will be built; and the new Reichstag, which contains an expansionist majority, may be expected to vote further huge sums for naval purposes. Germany is challenging in earnest the naval supremacy of Great Britain.

Germany may enter upon her career of active expansion either by a naval attack upon this country, or by an attempt at securing an adequate base for her oversea operations by acquiring in some form or other the harbours of the Netherlands. Circumstances will determine whether she will follow the former or the latter course, but both eventualities should carefully be considered.

As Germany is not yet strong enough on the sea to attack this country alone, she has naturally tried to gain partners in a possible enterprise against Great Britain. France would have been a very useful ally to Germany, because she has a strong fleet, and because an invasion of this country could more easily be effected from the French than from the German harbours. Russia's support would have been very valuable, because a joint Russo-German expedition might threaten India. Through the far-seeing diplomacy of King Edward, France and Russia have abandoned their policy favouring Germany's aims, upon which they had embarked through Bismarck's skill and the clumsiness of our own amateur statesmen.

Last, but not least, America could threaten Canada, and could therefore serve as a valuable counterpoise against this country. To this consideration the 'traditional' friendship of Prussian statesmen for America, from

Frederick the Great, who supported the revolted Colonies against the Motherland, to Bismarck, was due, and the gift of a monument of Frederick the Great, which William the Second made to the United States, was full of significant meaning. So far German diplomacy has been too crude and too obvious, and has therefore failed in securing America's support in her expansionist policy. However, it seems by no means impossible that, with more skilful statesmen in Berlin and less skilful ones in Washington, German diplomacy may succeed in securing the support of the United States for her policy of expansion.

The fact that, notwithstanding the breakdown of Russia and the peaceful attitude of France, Germany is rapidly increasing and strengthening her army seems to indicate that she contemplates using her land forces for expansion in Europe, and it seems not unlikely that she will make the acquisition of the Netherlands the first step in her programme. The Netherlands would make Germany paramount on the Continent of Europe, and immensely strengthen her power of aggression against Great Britain, which could comparatively easily be invaded from the numerous harbours on the mouths of the Rhine. If Germany should acquire the Netherlands, a situation would be created which would be as threatening to all European nations, and especially to this country, as was the situation created by Napoleon I.

The foregoing analysis of the political situation clearly proves that Great Britain, if she wishes to preserve the Empire, is compelled to maintain the two-Power standard against the United States and Germany, although she is at present not threatened by either country, because the natural development of Germany and of the United States may cause them to encroach upon the British Empire unless the British Empire is strong enough at sea to forbid such encroachment. Therefore we must now consider the question: will Great Britain be able to maintain her naval

supremacy against the combined fleets of the United States and Germany ?

Great Britain has no longer the monopoly of maritime ability. The Germans and Americans have proved themselves able seamen and excellent shipbuilders. The longest national purse can build the strongest national fleet. Therefore the question whether Great Britain will be able to maintain the two-Power standard against the United States and Germany is mainly a financial one.

Unfortunately it seems clear that Great Britain will, financially, not be able to maintain her naval supremacy against the United States and Germany, and it must even be doubted whether Great Britain will be able to continue for long outbuilding the German Navy, notwithstanding all official and semi-official declarations to the effect that for every ship laid down by Germany Great Britain will lay down two ships. It is generally known that the United States are richer than Great Britain, but it is not generally known that Germany also is apparently richer than is this country ; that in a financial duel for naval pre-eminence Germany may prove stronger than this country. Great Britain has some 40,000,000 inhabitants, Germany has some 60,000,000 inhabitants, and as the German workers are fully employed whilst a very heavy percentage of British workers is always out of employment, we may say that in productive manpower Great Britain and Germany stand not in the relation of four to six, but approximately in the relation of four to seven. Besides, all the German industries, including agriculture, are exceedingly flourishing, as may be seen from the fact that, notwithstanding the immense yearly increase of her population, Germany suffers chronically from a dearth of workers, so that immigration into Germany is greater than emigration from Germany, whilst most British industries are stagnant or decaying, as may be seen by the fact that, notwithstanding a yearly emigration

of from 200,000 to 300,000 people, the British labour market remains congested, and that Great Britain suffers continually, and very acutely, from a dearth of work and consequent unemployment and pauperism. In view of this state of affairs, we cannot wonder that, if we compare the British and German income-tax statistics, we find that the income of the German classes has, during the last fifteen years, increased five times faster than that of the British classes, and that, if we compare British and German savings-banks statistics, we find that the savings of the German masses have, during the last six years, increased ten times faster than those of the British masses. These and many other facts, which it would lead too far to mention in this space, make it clear that Germany is considerably richer than is Great Britain, and that her wealth is rapidly growing whilst ours remains comparatively stationary, and if we look at the other side of the account we find that the German citizens are not only richer but are also less heavily taxed than are the British citizens. For every £1 paid in the form of income-tax by the average German taxpayer, the average British taxpayer has to pay £2, and for every £1 paid by the average German householder in local taxation the average British householder has to pay £2 10s. The foregoing facts indicate that Germany is financially able to outbuild the British fleet, and the result of the recent Reichstag election seems to show that the nation has also the ambition and the will to do so.

The wealth of a nation depends in the first instance, not upon the quantity of commodities exported and imported and upon the quantity of its possessions of printed paper in the shape of stocks and shares, but upon the number of its inhabitants engaged in active production. The United States have some 80,000,000 inhabitants, Germany has some 60,000,000 inhabitants, Great Britain has some 40,000,000 inhabitants. The German population increases three times

faster than the British population, the American population increases five times faster than the British population, and the population of Germany and of the United States combined increases eight times faster than the British population. In man-power, which after all is a more important economic factor than machine-power, although it is hardly mentioned in the text-books of political economy, Germany and the United States are so far superior to Great Britain; and the disproportion between the man-power possessed by Great Britain and her two greatest rivals is increasing to our disadvantage with such alarming rapidity, that it is evident that Great Britain cannot much longer maintain her naval supremacy, because she will lack the necessary financial means, and, having lost her naval supremacy, she will certainly be deserted by her present allies.

The foregoing remarks make it clear that the British Empire can be preserved only if the supremacy of the British Navy be maintained against both the United States and Germany, but they make it equally clear that Great Britain will soon financially be unable to continue maintaining her naval supremacy, not only against the two second strongest naval Powers, but even against Germany alone. As the burden which rests upon the British producer can hardly be greatly increased, it seems almost certain that within ten, or at the utmost within twenty years, Great Britain will have sunk either to the second or to the third rank among naval Powers, and that the British Empire will then be a thing of the past.

The position of the Empire is evidently a most critical, though it is not yet a desperate, one. Happily, the possession of the rule of the sea gives us several years' breathing time, and enables us to provide against the very great dangers of the future. Although Great Britain, standing alone, cannot possibly much longer preserve her naval supremacy, the United British Empire can certainly main-

tain it. The latent resources of the British Empire are greater than are the latent resources of the United States and Germany combined. Although the British Empire cannot possibly be defended by Great Britain alone against the two second strongest naval Powers, it can certainly, as far as one can see into the future, be defended practically for all time by a navy which is paid for by an Imperial Exchequer.

Necessity, not parliamentary resolutions and after-dinner orations, creates States and Empires. The necessity of making the British Empire, which is at present merely a geographical expression, a political reality has now arrived, and that necessity is most urgent. The British Empire can be preserved only if the Governments of Great Britain and the Colonies are willing to place Imperial above local interests. The British Colonies are naturally averse from paying into the British national exchequer large contributions for Imperial defence, over the spending of which they have not the slightest control, which are to be used towards the maintenance of a navy which is exclusively directed by a British Admiralty. Therefore, an Imperial defence based upon Imperial means can be organised only if the nucleus of an Imperial Cabinet, with an Imperial Navy Board, an Imperial Exchequer, and an Imperial Senate, representing the whole Empire, be created.

The British Empire has grown out of its old clothes. We can no longer leave the organisation of the Empire in a state of chaos, and follow a happy-go-lucky hand-to-mouth policy without any definite aim, making Imperial interests subordinate to the British party-political requirements of the moment, but we must follow a far-seeing policy of deliberate and constructive Imperialism. We must organically connect our vast Colonies and possessions with the Motherland, and planfully rear a solid Imperial edifice. We must, before all, protect the magnificent undeveloped or partly developed Imperial domain for future generations,

by organising the defence of the Empire on an Imperial basis. We must, under the protection of a supreme fleet, people our Colonies as rapidly as possible, and thereby strengthen them both militarily and economically. We must re-create the British industries which our blind faith in the wisdom of certain economic theories and our consequent policy of deliberate neglect have caused to decay, so that Germany, notwithstanding her poor natural resources and the burden of militarism, is now actually richer than Great Britain, and can afford to challenge our maritime supremacy.

The question of the unification of the Empire by the creation of a supreme Imperial Government, representative of the whole Empire, as well as the question of the protection of the national resources and the home industries of Great Britain by suitable State action, fiscal or otherwise, is not a party question, but is the most important national question. It is in the first instance a question of military defence, and it is a question upon which depends the life or death of Great Britain and of the British Empire. The latent resources of Great Britain and her Colonies are practically boundless, but they have been insufficiently developed, and these latent resources must be developed to the utmost and fully utilised for the preservation of our possessions, of our position in the world, of our peace, of our prosperity, and of our civilisation. This is the most urgent political problem of the moment. Our policy should therefore be to develop our latent resources with the greatest vigour, not in accordance with the dictates of abstract scientific theory, but in accordance with the dictates of common sense, and with the universal practical experience of mankind.

I think it is clear that Great Britain cannot much longer defend the Empire single-handed. Therefore the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and of the Colonies must seriously think of creating without delay an Imperial

force for the defence of the Empire, directed by an Imperial Cabinet and financed by Imperial means. The action of the present Colonial Conference may determine the fate of Great Britain and of the Empire, for the next ten or twenty years should decide whether the British Empire will stand or fall.

CHAPTER III

BRITISH FINANCES AND IMPERIAL RESPONSIBILITIES

GREAT BRITAIN'S financial position is an unfavourable and a very serious one, and it seems likely that it will become increasingly unfavourable and serious in the immediate future. Our Chancellors of the Exchequer find it more difficult from year to year to balance the Budget, not because the contending politicians and parties cannot agree as to the precise form which new taxation should take, nor because the people are unwilling to pay additional taxes, but because the taxpayers are staggering under their constantly increasing burdens. The country is impoverishing. It is visibly coming to the end of its financial tether, and the time seems to be close at hand when it will become doubtful whether Great Britain will financially be able to continue discharging the liabilities which she has undertaken hitherto. I am making this statement with a full sense of its gravity. I shall endeavour in the following pages to prove its correctness by showing why our financial position is unfavourable and very serious, and I shall then propose certain reforms which, to my mind, are called for by the circumstances in which we find ourselves.

Our Radical and Socialist demagogues, to whom a hundred millions is a small thing, as well as those of our social reformers who are unacquainted with the realities of finance, are constantly calling for the spending of immense sums by the national and local authorities, and they assure us that Great Britain can easily find the money

required for their schemes by the taxation of the rich. It is apparently very easy to improve the position of the poor at the cost of the rich, and nothing is so popular as to devise far-reaching schemes for the benefit of the many which are to be paid for by the wealthy few.

Our social reformers tell us that the British people are far too lightly taxed, that Great Britain is the richest country in the world, that its wealth is rapidly increasing, and that the wealthy people in this country can well afford to pay far more in taxation than they do at present. I am afraid that our social reformers are greatly mistaken in their estimate of British wealth, and I shall endeavour to prove :—

(1) That the British nation is by far the most highly-taxed nation in the world ;

(2) That Great Britain is certainly not the richest country in the world, and that its wealth is stagnant if not declining ;

(3) That it will be exceedingly dangerous for the workers of the nation to increase still further the taxation of the rich.

National taxation, howsoever and upon whomsoever it may be imposed, falls ultimately upon the whole nation. The rich cannot safely be taxed *ad libitum*. They do not keep their money in sacks in their cellars, but have it invested in reproductive enterprise, such as railways, factories, and mines, or in securities which represent railways, factories, mines, &c. Therefore the taxation of the rich or of the very rich by means of a high income-tax, a super-tax upon large incomes, death duties, &c., falls not on the wealthy few, but on the industries in which their capital is invested and the workers employed in them. As practically the whole national wealth is owned by individuals, every drastic attempt to diminish the wealth of individuals results in diminishing the wealth-creating resources of the nation. The taxation of the rich does

therefore not effect a more equable redistribution of private wealth, as Radicals and Socialists try to make us believe, but a destruction of general wealth. I will explain this by an example.

The heir to a factory which is worth £1,000,000 has to draw out of that factory in the shape of death duties £150,000, which are spent by the State, and he can, as a rule, make this enormous payment only gradually out of the yearly profits of his factory. The larger part of business profit is usually re-invested in business. Had it not been for the death duties, the £150,000 paid by the heir to the State would probably have been employed by him in enlarging his factory and in increasing its machinery. Thus the endeavour to tax the wealth of the wealthy out of existence often results in taxing machines and industries out of existence, in taxing work and wages out of existence, in creating unemployment and poverty among the workers. Our high death duties are, rightly considered, a high duty on working capital, which is perhaps the most important inanimate factor in production.

Whilst the death duties constitute an irregular and occasional charge on industry, the income-tax is a regular and constant one. It is borne not so much by the rich, who are, after all, only the highly-paid directors and managers of the national wealth, as by that part of the national wealth which they happen to direct and manage. Income-tax is as much part of the working expenditure of every shop and every factory as is the expenditure on coal or rent. It is a permanent charge upon industry, upon production, and, therefore, upon wages. A high income-tax is a high tax on working expenditure, and it is bound to cripple industry and so restrict employment by increasing the cost of production. It cannot be doubted that high death duties and a high income-tax have a most disastrous effect upon industry and employment by discouraging and restricting enterprise.

The foregoing makes it clear that, although different taxes differ in their immediate effect, they have the same ultimate effect. In the last resort all taxes fall upon the masses of the people. Therefore the best way of ascertaining whether taxes are high, moderate, or low in Great Britain is to compare taxation per head in Great Britain with taxation per head in other countries. The German Ministry of Finance made, late in 1908, an exhaustive examination of the finances and the taxation of various countries, and it arrived at the result that the taxation per head of population is as follows in some of the principal countries :—

TAXATION PER HEAD OF POPULATION.

					Marks.
In Great Britain	95·80 per head.
In France	82·70 " "
In United States	80·80 " "
In Italy	48·40 " "
In Germany	48·17 " "
In Austria-Hungary	41·70 " "

The foregoing table reveals the fact that Great Britain is not lightly taxed, as our Socialists assert, but that it is by far the most highly-taxed nation in the world.

The prosperity of a nation, as that of a private trader, depends largely upon the position and the activity of its principal competitor. Industrially and politically Germany is our greatest and our most dangerous competitor. Hence it is particularly disquieting that taxation per head of population is exactly twice as high in this country as it is in Germany. In view of the importance of Germany's political and industrial competition, I shall continue comparing British and German finances in these pages.

Our national expenditure does not appear as large as it is in reality, because a large part of our expenditure, which is

national in character, such as expenditure on education, the maintenance of high roads, &c., has been placed upon the local authorities. From the investigations of R. von Kaufmann it appears that German and British local taxation per head of population compare as 10 and 25, that for every £1 paid in local taxation by the average German the average Englishman has to pay £2 10s.

British direct taxation is not only much heavier than German direct taxation, but it is so clumsily devised that its immediate effect is to restrict business enterprise. The British succession duty amounts in the case of large estates—and our most successful business enterprises are large ones—to 10 per cent. and more. Germany, on the other hand, has no succession duty at all for direct heirs, and she has only a small one for indirect ones. Hence, according to the German Ministry of Finance, the burden of the succession duty amounts to marks 9·42 per head in Great Britain, and only to marks 0·50 per head in Germany. In other words, the tax on working capital by means of the succession duty is nineteen times as high in Great Britain as it is in Germany. That is a fearful handicap.

Our income-tax, allowing for abatements, amounts to from 9d. to 1s. 8d. in the £. The German income-tax amounts to from ½d. to 1s. in the £. Our working expenditure also is therefore far more heavily taxed than is that of Germany. It may be popular to have a high income-tax and high succession duties, but popularity may be bought too dearly. We are engaged in killing the goose which is laying the golden eggs, for the sake of popularity. By means of so-called popular taxation we are ruining our industries for the benefit of our foreign competitors.

Our indirect taxation is as clumsily and as unscientifically devised as is our direct taxation. The taxation

of drink and tobacco in Great Britain is the highest in the world. It is so high that any further increase would lead to a great decrease in consumption, and, therefore, to a decrease in the yield of the tax. Mr. Rosenbaum, the well-known statistician, recently delivered a lecture on food taxation before the Statistical Society, in which he gave the following estimate :—

TAXATION PER HEAD OF POPULATION.

		On Drink.	On Tobacco.
In the United Kingdom	..	17s. 5d.	6s. 2d.
In Germany	4s. 5d.	1s. 5d.

According to Professor Adolph Wagener, the taxation of drink and tobacco in Great Britain comes to marks 24·20 per head, as compared with only marks 4·80 per head in Germany. The estimates of Mr. Rosenbaum and Professor Wagener differ slightly, but they agree in this, that taxation on drink and tobacco is about five times as high in this country as it is in Germany.

The foregoing facts, and many similar ones which I might give, prove that the British nation is the most highly-taxed, and the most over-taxed, nation in the world.

Radical and Socialistic schemers may argue : ' It is true that the British people are very highly taxed. Still the British nation can easily stand a much higher taxation than other nations, because this nation is the richest nation in the world.' Great Britain was no doubt the richest nation in the world when it was the workshop of the world, but things have changed since then.

Those who assert that Great Britain is the richest nation in the world rely, as a rule, for proof of their assertion on four arguments. They point to the fact that Great Britain has a greater foreign trade per head of population than have the United States or Germany ; to the fact that the income subject to income-tax has rapidly

grown of late; to the fact that British Consols stand higher than German and other foreign Consols; and to the fact that money is cheaper and more plentiful in Great Britain than it is in the United States and Germany. Unfortunately, all four arguments are fallacious. The wealth of nations cannot be measured by their foreign trade. This is evident from the following figures :—

FOREIGN TRADE PER HEAD OF POPULATION.

	£	s.	d.
Of Ireland	26	15	2
Of United Kingdom	22	4	5
Of Germany	12	6	1
Of France	12	0	9
Of United States	7	18	9

If the prosperity of nations could be measured by their foreign trade per head, it would follow that the poor Irish are far richer than the English. It would follow that the Irish are about twice as rich as the well-to-do inhabitants of France and Germany, and about three times as rich as the wealthy people of the United States.

If we now turn to the income-tax figures we find that the gross amount of income subject to income-tax in Great Britain has grown during the last fifteen years as follows :—

GROSS AMOUNT OF INCOME SUBJECT TO INCOME-TAX.

1893-4 ..	£679,490,517	} Very good years. Yearly increase of Income + £15,000,000
1897-8 ..	£734,461,246	
1900-1 ..	£833,355,513	} Time of the South African War. Yearly increase of Income + £33,000,000
1906-7 ..	£943,702,014	
		} Bad years. Yearly increase of Income + £18,000,000.

The foregoing table tells its own tale. The fact that British income subject to income-tax increased very slowly during the good years which preceded the South African war, and that it increased very rapidly during the time of

the war and during the bad years which followed it, suffices to show that our income-tax figures are unreliable as an index to our prosperity, that they have been swelled, not by a great increase in our prosperity, but by the exertions of our tax collectors. Probably Great Britain is poorer now than she was before the South African war, although she is much richer on paper. The increase in our income shown by the income-tax statistics is fictitious. The great demand for money for financing the South African war caused the tax collectors to 'put on the screw.' Wherever one makes inquiries one finds that people who used to be under-assessed are now fully assessed or over-assessed, and many of them bear these over-assessments because they wish to avoid the annoyance of an official inquiry into their circumstances, or, in case of business men, because they fear such an investigation, believing that their credit might suffer if it should become known that they are not earning as much as they used to. Evidently the greatness and the increase of our national wealth cannot safely be measured either by the foreign trade statistics or by the income-tax figures.

It is true that money is usually cheaper and more plentiful in Great Britain than it is in Germany or in the United States. The price of money, like that of cotton, is regulated by demand and supply. Money is habitually dear in countries in which the industries are active and rapidly expanding, and is habitually cheap in countries in which industries are stagnant or decaying. Money is, as a rule, dear in Germany and the United States, because the rapidly-expanding industries of these countries constantly absorb the floating supply of money and keep it down. On the other hand, money is plentiful and cheap in France and Great Britain, not because they are the wealthiest countries in the world, but because their stagnant industries require little financing.

The money rate governs the interest rate of securities.

British securities yield a smaller rate of interest than do American and German securities, because the competition of idle money for securities in this country is great; and idle money is plentiful because our industries are partly stagnant and partly retrogressing. American and German investors are not satisfied with a return of 3 per cent. on their money, because they can make considerably more than 3 per cent. in their prosperous industries, which readily absorb at a good rate all the money which comes forward.

It is also true that British Consols stand habitually higher than foreign, for instance German, Consols. At present, British $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Consols and German 3 per cent. Consols stand at the same price. The price of Government stocks depends on the general money rate and on the law of demand and supply. The demand for Government stock may be a natural one or an artificial one. In Great Britain the demand for Consols is very largely an artificial one. Our savings banks, our Government departments, and our law courts must invest their enormous funds in Consols, and through these forced purchases British Consols are driven up, and are kept at an artificial high price. No similar means of driving up the price of Government stock exists in Germany. Of the funds of the German savings banks, for instance, only $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. are invested in German Consols, and the funds of the Government departments and the law courts of Germany are invested chiefly in mortgages.

Owing to the enormous purchases by the British Government, which holds more than £200,000,000 of Consols, the price of British Consols is a fictitious one. The withdrawal of the Government support would flood the market with Consols. It would have an effect similar to that of issuing a Government loan of £200,000,000. The natural price of British Consols, that is, the price of Consols after Government support had been withdrawn:

should be considerably below 80. German Consols, not being manipulated by the Government, stand at a natural price; British Consols stand at an artificial one. The position and character of the two securities being so dissimilar, it is inadmissible to conclude that Great Britain is a richer nation, or that she has a better credit, than Germany because British Consols stand somewhat higher than do German Consols.

The foregoing makes it clear that the figures which are usually given in proof of Great Britain's prosperity do not allow us to assume that Great Britain is the richest country in the world, and that our national wealth is rapidly growing. They do not even allow us to conclude that Great Britain is richer than Germany. In fact, there are very strong reasons for believing that Great Britain is poorer than Germany.

As all taxation falls ultimately upon the masses, and as its effect can most clearly be seen by the condition of the masses, so the wealth or poverty of a nation is most clearly reflected, not in the income of the income-tax paying few, but in the condition of the many. Therefore it is perhaps safer to deduce the wealth of a country from figures relating to the wealth of the masses than to measure it by figures relating to that of the classes. Formerly Great Britain had the largest savings bank deposits in the world. Now there are only £210,000,000 in the British Savings Banks, while there are almost £800,000,000 in the German Savings Banks, and more than £800,000,000 in the American Savings Banks. The development of national prosperity can, of course, better be gauged by the development of national savings than by their present amount. Hence the result of an inquiry of the American Government into the state of the savings banks of the principal countries, which was recently published, is of great interest. Arranged by the order of their importance, the savings banks deposits in various countries have

grown as follows during the last year for which statistics are available :—

INCREASE OF SAVINGS BANK DEPOSITS DURING LAST YEAR.

					Dollars.
In the United States	207,941,747
In Germany	191,742,600
In Austria-Hungary	75,595,724
In Russia	44,520,900
In Italy	27,537,182
In Australia and New Zealand	20,637,245
In United Kingdom	20,298,984

It is an ominous and a most serious phenomenon that Great Britain stands at the bottom of this short list ; that the savings placed yearly in the savings banks of the United States and Germany are ten times as large as ours ; that the popular savings of Great Britain, which used to grow far more quickly than those of any other nation, are at present increasing more slowly than even those of Italy, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and of Australasia, with but 5,000,000 inhabitants. As a matter of fact, rightly considered, popular savings in Great Britain are no longer increasing, but, if we allow for the interest added to deposits, they are actually decreasing. During several years the withdrawals from our savings banks have exceeded the deposits by £2,000,000 a year.

Our savings banks statistics seem to point to the fact that our national wealth is declining, and they are unfortunately confirmed by other indications. Formerly Great Britain was the banker of the world. British engineers and British money built the principal railways on the Continent and in the United States. Countless continental waterworks, gasworks, slaughterhouses, factories, mines, docks, warehouses, &c., belonged to Great Britain, and we financed the wars of foreign countries by taking up their war loans. Nearly all the continental enterprises of Great Britain have been sold to foreigners ; our holdings

of American railway stocks and of continental Government stocks have been reduced to a trifle; and our financial decline may be seen from the fact that America and France had to assist us in financing the South African war. Formerly British capitalists bought business enterprises in every country. Now foreign capitalists are buying up or financing enterprises in Great Britain. America has bought a million tons of our best shipping, many British factories, and entire British trades, such as the Smithfield meat trade. Formerly Great Britain was the greatest buyer of works of art. Now Great Britain is the greatest seller of works of art. Formerly American financiers came to London to sell their railway bonds and industrial shares. Now they come to London to buy up our factories and our art treasures. A distinguished American financier said to me some time ago, 'Britannia is an old lady who has seen better days. At present she is selling off.'

Whilst the growing poverty of the masses is clearly visible to all from our savings banks statistics and from the rapidly growing number of unemployed workers, of paupers, and of emigrants, the growing poverty of the classes is apparent from the rapid decrease in the consumption of wine and of other luxuries, and from the declining value of house property of the best class. The impoverishment of the middle-class may be seen from the constantly growing difficulties of local authorities in collecting the rates. Summonses for failure to pay the rates are issued by the thousand. In one of the London suburbs alone more than 11,000 of these summonses were recently issued.

The impoverishment of Great Britain is great and undoubted. It affects all classes, from the richest to the poorest. It can be seen by all but those who will not see.

As Germany is our greatest and our most dangerous industrial and political competitor, it is worth our while to compare British wealth with German wealth. Most Englishmen assume that Great Britain is a much richer

country than Germany, but I think that that assumption is erroneous. Great Britain was no doubt by far the richer country, but inherited wealth diminishes and disappears gradually, and counts comparatively for little. All solid wealth must be based on production, and man-power is more important than machine-power. It stands to reason that 68,000,000 well-employed Germans produce considerably more wealth than 44,000,000 ill-employed Englishmen. The German Ministry of Finance stated in its recent investigation of the financial position of various countries: 'Those who say that Great Britain and France are wealthier countries than Germany consider as still existing a state of affairs which prevailed in the past but which scarcely exists in the present.' Herr Steinmann-Bucher, in his recent book on the national wealth of various countries, wrote: 'Formerly we were taught that Great Britain's national wealth amounted to £12,500,000,000, and ours to £10,000,000,000. At present Great Britain's national wealth comes to £15,000,000,000, and ours to £17,500,000,000.' There is every reason to believe that Germany is considerably richer than Great Britain, and Herr Steinmann-Bucher underestimates, in my opinion, the difference in favour of Germany. The fact that Germany is richer than Great Britain is exceedingly disquieting, for the longest purse can pay for the strongest fleet.

During the last fifteen years British national expenditure has grown very greatly, and the following table shows the direction in which its growth has been most pronounced:—

	Total British Expenditure.	On Army and Navy.	On Civil Service.
1893-4 ..	£99,220,068	£33,327,475	£25,051,465
1907-8 ..	£163,444,231	£56,087,925	£40,119,540

During the last fifteen years our population has increased only by about 10 per cent., but our national expenditure has grown during the same time by more than 50 per cent.

The growth of expenditure was particularly marked on the Army and Navy, which has grown by 70 per cent., and on the Civil Service, which includes part of our expenditure on education, which has grown by 60 per cent.

In order to keep abreast of the times we must spend on education much more than we have done hitherto. Our civil servants increase in number with every social innovation, and many of them require an increase in their salaries. We have assumed the burden of old-age pensions, which will require at least £10,000,000 a year. Already demands are heard that the scope of old-age pensions should be greatly enlarged by abolishing the pauper disqualification, and by lowering the age limit to sixty-five or to sixty years. Proposals are being made to include in the old-age pension scheme all those who are disabled through illness or accident, and who, we are told, are as much entitled to a pension as are people over seventy. Last, but not least, we have to defend an enormous Empire, and our expenditure upon armaments is bound to increase very greatly in the immediate future.

The Government have told us that we must rebuild our whole Fleet, replacing our present battleships with *Dreadnoughts*. We have not only to guard ourselves against a German attack in the North Sea, but to watch other Powers in other seas as well, and to defend our Colonies and our commerce. Consequently we must build at least two ships for every single German ship. Under her Navy Bills of 1900–1906 Germany will build thirty-three *Dreadnoughts*; but if she should replace the older and smaller ships of her naval programme with *Dreadnoughts*—and the German Navy League is already advocating that step—she will build fifty-eight *Dreadnoughts*. We shall have to increase our naval expenditure very greatly in the immediate future. If we lay down two ships for every German ship, and this step is inevitable, we must spend on the Navy at least two sovereigns for every single sovereign

spent by Germany. As Germany spends £28,000,000 a year on her navy, we must be prepared to spend at least £50,000,000 a year upon ours—£20,000,000 more than we have been spending—because voluntary service is more costly than compulsory service, and because we have to maintain numerous naval stations all over the globe.

Some people say that the burden of armaments is ruinous and crushing to Germany; that Germany will not be able to build her *Dreadnoughts*; that she is in serious financial difficulties. I think they are mistaken. According to the calculations of the German Ministry of Finance, the warlike expenditure of Great Britain and Germany is as follows:—

EXPENDITURE ON ARMY AND NAVY PER HEAD.

In Germany	Marks	18'95
In Great Britain	"	29'23

Our military and naval expenditure is almost 60 per cent. larger than that of Germany. Hence Germany can increase hers very greatly before it will be level with ours. As her military and naval burden is carried by a larger number of people, it is less oppressive than ours. The financial difficulties of Germany have been very much exaggerated. The Germans are able and willing to bear increased taxation; but Germany is not a single State, but a union of independent States, each of which raises its own taxes in its own way. Therefore the difficulty consists, not in obtaining the taxes from the people, but in making all the individual Governments agree on some form of imperial taxation. Germany wishes to raise an additional £25,000,000 in imperial taxation. The vastness of her unexhausted resources may be seen from the fact that, according to Professor Conrad, she could raise an additional £50,000,000 per year by increasing only her indirect taxation to our own level, leaving her more direct taxation unchanged. We cannot

safely reckon on Germany's financial inability to build her great fleet.

The foregoing should suffice to show that the financial position of Great Britain is unfavourable and very serious. Our national wealth is stagnant if not declining. Our taxation is the heaviest in the world, and it is twice as heavy as is that of Germany. Yet we shall have to increase our taxation very greatly in the immediate future. Our national expenditure, which amounted to £99,220,068 in 1893-4, and to £158,444,231 in 1907-8, will probably exceed £200,000,000 within four or five years. Old-age pensions, our naval requirements, and the automatic growth of our expenditure on education, salaries, &c., alone should increase next year's Budget to at least £180,000,000.

Where is the money to come from ?

The advice of Radicals and Socialists to put taxation on the rich in the form of a super-tax on large incomes or of a land tax of some kind or other is worthless, because taxation, howsoever and upon whomsoever imposed, is bound to fall in the end on the masses of the people. A tax on land values, for instance, will raise the price of land, of houses, and of rents. Therefore any further increase in taxation on the present lines is bound to increase the economic stagnation and decay which is everywhere apparent in this country, and to accentuate the prevailing poverty and unemployment. Evidently Great Britain has come to the end of her financial resources.

Great Britain is easily able to provide for her purely national requirements, especially when Tariff Reform has strengthened our declining industries and has placed part of our financial burden upon foreign countries, but the country is becoming increasingly unable to provide single-handed for our Imperial liabilities which it has assumed hitherto. The financial system of this country is antiquated throughout. It urgently requires revision and reform, and

the Government will be wise to appoint without delay a Commission to inquire into British national and Imperial taxation. Perhaps it will be useful to include representatives of the Great Dominions in that Commission. It will very likely recommend certain important technical reforms in taxation with which I cannot deal in the present paper, but the most important and the most far-reaching recommendation which such a Commission will probably make will be to separate the British National Budget from the British Imperial Budget. That is a tremendous, and I think a most necessary, innovation.

In former times our Colonies were an appendage and a convenience to the Motherland. They were considered to exist merely for the purpose of enriching this country, and they were exploited by this country. We drew a large part of our revenue from the Colonies, and we protected them as a matter of course in our own interests. Times have changed. The ancient Colonial settlements and traders' stations, which were supposed to bring in considerably more than the cost of their defence and administration, have grown up into great Dominions. The helpless infant communities in savage lands across the seas have become wealthy and powerful self-governing States, from which the Motherland derives no revenue. Per head of population the Dominions are much wealthier than is overtaxed Great Britain. Nevertheless we continue to bear the entire charge for their naval defence, because the change in the position from weakness and poverty to power and opulence has been so gradual that we have scarcely noticed it.

The British Budget is still called the 'Imperial Budget,' although against our Imperial expenditure there is no longer an Imperial revenue, but merely a British national revenue. In its financial aspect the British Empire is like an immense pyramid which, instead of resting securely upon its broad basis, balances precariously upon its slender

apex. The 44,000,000 inhabitants of the British Isles cannot afford to defend for all time four continents, countless islands, and the seas which separate and connect them against all comers. That way lies national bankruptcy, defeat in naval war, the conquest of our Colonies, and the disruption of the Empire.

The British Empire has grown out of its old clothes. Forty-three years ago Joseph Howe, the great Canadian Imperialist, wrote in his essay, 'The Organisation of the Empire':—

'Security for peace is only to be sought in such an organisation and armament of the whole Empire as will make the certainty of defeat a foregone conclusion to any foreign Power that may attempt to break it. The question of questions for us all, far transcending in importance any other within the range of domestic or foreign politics, is how the whole Empire can be so organised and strengthened as to command peace and be impregnable in war.'

Being closely in touch with the leading colonial circles, I know that Howe's thought is the thought of many of our most prominent and influential colonial citizens in both hemispheres.

Hitherto the Colonies have contributed practically nothing to the Fleet, not because they are unwilling to pay, but because they have no share in the Fleet. They do not care to provide money over the spending of which they exercise no control. British citizens also would object, and rightly, to send millions of pounds every year to Canada or to Australia to be spent by their Ministry on their own defence. Besides, people like to have some fun for their money. Our leading colonial citizens have not unnaturally the wish that their friends and relatives should be able to enter our Navy as freely as the sons of Great Britain. It is an honour to serve the Empire, and colonial citizens rightly ask why they should be practically debarred from that honour; why a career in the Imperial Services

should be the monopoly of the inhabitants of this country.

When the recent speeches of Mr. Asquith, Mr. McKenna, and Sir Edward Grey suddenly revealed to us the menace of the German *Dreadnought* fleet, the Colonies hastened to offer us *Dreadnoughts* as a present. They did so, not only for sentimental reasons, but also because they felt that the German *Dreadnoughts* threatened them as much as us; that Germany required colonies in a temperate zone for her rapidly expanding population; that an overwhelmingly strong British Fleet is the best guarantee of their peace and security. It is to be hoped that the Government will not merely pocket the Colonial money contributions for *Dreadnoughts*, but that it will invite the Dominions to furnish the officers and crews for their ships as well. The creation of British-Colonial naval contingents is a most desirable step. They might form the nucleus of a truly Imperial British Fleet, paid for, manned, and officered by the whole Empire. The Colonies would give money far more freely for an Imperial British Fleet if they could spend it on ships and men of their own than if it would merely be paid into the coffers of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, and be used by him for the upkeep of a British national navy.

The generous contributions to our Fleet, which the Dominions have so readily promised, are most welcome to us, and they are bound to strengthen the Imperial tie and the Imperial sentiment. But it is vain and foolish to expect that henceforth we shall be able to run the Empire by means of voluntary colonial contributions. The Empire cannot possibly be financed in the same way in which one may perhaps manage a charitable institution. The Empire must be run on business lines. The Colonies must be invited to take their share in the defence of the Empire, and I have every reason to think that they are ready to do so. Great Britain is the armoury, the citadel, and the

naval base of the Empire. The key to the Empire is not Simla or Bombay, Cape Town or Sydney, but London. Our Colonies can be conquered only in London, and the Colonies know it. Besides, Great Britain is, and will continue to be, the sentinel and outpost of the Empire in Europe. Great Britain must guard the Empire against possible aggression on the part of the military States of the Continent. She has shielded them in this way during two centuries, and she will have to continue to do so for a long time. For these reasons our Colonies are just as much interested in the safety of the British Isles as is Great Britain herself.

The principle, 'no taxation without representation,' is deeply ingrained in the mind of all English-speaking citizens. We cannot expect the Colonies to do the taxing and Great Britain to do the spending. If we wish the Empire to defend the Empire we must organise the Empire. We cannot keep for ever our great Dominions in childish leading strings. They cannot be treated for ever like babes and minors. It is very aggravating for the Dominions to have to refer countless trifling matters to the decision of men in London who are thousands of miles away, and who may be ill acquainted with the subject under discussion. We can realise the position of the Dominions best if we imagine that we should have to refer every fishery dispute with Holland to a Government in Melbourne, and if we had to appeal to Melbourne to assist us against the tariff attacks of foreign nations. We must provide a supreme Imperial Government and an Imperial Parliament which is chosen by the whole Empire, which is representative of the whole Empire, and which therefore is qualified to take in hand the defence of the Empire. As Sir Wilfrid Laurier said, we must call the Dominions to our councils. At present Great Britain has all the honour of defending the Empire, but she has to bear all the burden too. Our honour is a very costly one.

It is no doubt difficult to organise the Empire and to provide for a common defence to be paid for out of a common purse, but difficulties exist to be overcome. I cannot outline an Imperial organisation in the present pages. That would be outside the scope of this chapter. I would therefore only say that the problem of providing for a common defence, paid for from a common purse, has been successfully solved by other States. The United States are a voluntary union of forty-five self-governing States; the German Empire is a voluntary union of twenty-five self-governing States, of which three are republics; Switzerland is a voluntary union of twenty-two self-governing republics. Germany, the United States, and Switzerland have well solved the problem which confronts us now. Why, then, should we be unable to do likewise?

If at the next General Election a Unionist Government should come into power, it will immediately call an Imperial Conference to arrange preferential tariffs throughout the Empire, and will thus lay the foundation of its economic unification. If that conference be called, not only for economic purposes, but also for devising a scheme of Imperial defence, it may lay the foundation of the political unification of the Empire as well. The Dominions are waiting for such a call, and they will answer it with alacrity.

The next Unionist Prime Minister will have an opportunity which occurs scarcely once in a century, an opportunity for which future generations of statesmen will envy him. History may know him as the man who found the Empire in a state of chaos and who placed it upon a secure and enduring basis, as the man who unified and organised it, and who, one might almost say, created it. Let us hope that that statesman will build well, that he will build for ages. After all, our financial difficulties may prove to have been to us a blessing in disguise.

CHAPTER IV

THE ECONOMY OF EMPIRE

THE opinion is very widely held that political economy is a science of yesterday. That opinion is erroneous. Adam Smith is habitually called the Father of Political Economy, but he does not deserve that name. Adam Smith is not even the father of modern Political Economy or of Free Trade. Political economy is after all only current economic policy and thought reduced to a system, and economic policy is as old as is civilisation itself. Although dry and bulky handbooks are of comparatively recent origin—they would not have found a sufficient number of purchasers in former ages—my studies of ancient literature have convinced me that since the earliest times statesmen and thinkers have devoted much time and thought to economic science.

The ancient Jews were not, like the modern Jews, a race of business men. They were agriculturists and shepherds, whose industries and foreign trade were carried on chiefly by their neighbours, the Phœnicians. Yet many passages occur in the ancient Jewish writings which show that political economy was by no means neglected by them. I would, for instance, draw attention to the fact that in Psalm cv. wealth is beautifully defined as the 'inherited labour of the people,' and that the first statement of the Malthusian doctrine may be found in chapter v. of Ecclesiastes in the words: 'When goods are increased, they are increased that eat them. And what good is there to the owners thereof

saving the beholding of them with their eyes?' The ancient books of China also furnish much evidence that political economy was studied by the very practical statesmen and philosophers of that country. Confucius, Mencius, Laotsze and many others have left on record their economic view which prove that already the ancient Chinese were divided in Free Traders and Protectionists. Confucius recommended benevolent and paternal economic policy: 'To govern means to rectify.' 'There is a great principle for the production of wealth. Let the producers be many and the consumers be few. Let there be activity of production, and economy in expenditure. Then wealth will always be sufficient.' Laotsze advocated the policy of extreme individualism and *laissez faire*: 'Let all things take their natural course, and do not interfere. Practice inaction. Concentrate yourself upon doing nothing. If laws and restrictions are increased, the people will grow poorer and poorer. If I do nothing, the people will work out their own salvation.' Mencius condemned *laissez faire*, and the purely commercial policy of individualism: 'If a ruler makes profit the principle of his conduct, all will find their pleasure in the pursuit of profit. Ministers will serve their rulers for profit, sons will obey their fathers for profit, younger brothers will respect their elder brothers for profit, and, abandoning virtue and righteousness for their guiding stars, rulers and ministers, fathers and sons, elder and younger brothers will act with a view to their personal profit. But never has there been such a state of affairs without ruin being the result.' The Greeks took the keenest interest in political economy. The study of Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, Xenophon, Demosthenes, and of a host of minor writers, shows that political economy was closely studied by them, and that the statesmen of Greece were guided in their actions by the prevailing economic theories. From the Greek plays, especially from those of Euripides and Aristophanes, it appears that even the masses of the people

took a keen interest in political economy and economic policy.

Since the dawn of history, economic policy of nations was based upon certain fundamental theories and principles which professors nowadays would probably call Economic Laws, and these fundamental theories and principles have not unnaturally changed with the changing political and economic conditions of the world. The political economy of antiquity was based on slavery. To the ancients, slavery seemed justified either on religious grounds or sanctioned by the law of Nature. We read in the second Psalm : ' I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost ends of the earth for thy possession.' Aristotle considered the Greeks entitled to subject and enslave all alien nations. Euripides says, in his ' Iphigenia in Aulis ' :

It is meet
That Greece should o'er Barbarians bear the sway,
Not that Barbarians lord it over Greece ;
Nature hath formed them slaves, the Grecians free.

It is vain to believe that some economic theory or other may be considered eternally and universally true. Nothing is immutable in this world, in which the only thing abiding is constant change. The economic ideas which our fathers and our grandfathers held, and which are associated with the names of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Cobden, are losing their hold, and we appear to be embarking upon a new economic policy without knowing whither it will lead us. After the opinion of many people, Great Britain is about to make economically a leap in the dark. Therefore it behoves us to glance at the changes which British economic policy has undergone in the past, and then to look at the great tasks which await us, and which call for a new economic policy.

At a time when the continent of Europe was inhabited by nations which were eminent in science and art, in

manufacturing and trade, Great Britain was inhabited by backward peasants and shepherds who provided the more civilised countries of the Continent with raw produce. Our principal article of exportation was raw wool. It was bought by the merchants of Italy and of the Hanseatic League. It was taken to the Continent in foreign ships, and was turned into manufactures in the large and flourishing towns of Flanders and Brabant. The English were called on the Continent, 'the shepherds of Flanders.' The 'woolsack' in the House of Lords, the name of our principal coin, pound sterling, which comes from Easterling, the fact that the three golden balls which are to be found outside our pawnbrokers' shops are the ancient arms of Lombardy, and the name 'Lombard Street,' which is still London's banking centre, as it was in the time of the Medici and Peruzzi, remind us of the time when Great Britain was industrially and commercially a savage country, and when Venice and Genoa, Hamburg and Lübeck, Bruges and Antwerp did the business which is now done by London, Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow and Liverpool.

Ever since the fourteenth century, the rulers of England strove to increase the wealth of the country by legislative enactments devised to entice the leading wealth-creating industries of foreign countries to our shores. In Anderson's 'Commercial History' we read under the year 1381: 'King Edward III, attentively observing the riches and powers of the Provinces of Flanders and Brabant merely proceeding from their vast woollen manufacture, and considering farther that they owed all their said wealth and power entirely to his English wool, it was extremely natural for him to infer that if he could gain the artificers in that manufacture to settle in England, the trade whereof would soon prosper in his kingdom. Seventy families of clothworkers were accordingly induced to settle in England, and in this manner the foundation of our manufacturing industries was laid.' In course of time,

many continental industries were transplanted on English soil, by bounties, immunities, privileges and other forms of encouragement offered by the English Government, and England became largely for business reasons a place of refuge for the persecuted manufacturers, merchants and artisans of the Low Countries, of France, and of other States. The infant industries of England, which our rulers had artificially created, were protected against their mighty foreign competitors by the taxation or by the exclusion of competitive imports, and thus the new industries were able to become acclimatised, to take root in British soil, and to grow great and powerful.

Our shipping industry also owes its rise to the initiative of the Government, and to its fostering care. In 1381, in the reign of Richard II, the first English Navigation Act was passed, which provided 'that for increasing the shipping of England, of late much diminished, none of the King's subjects shall hereafter ship any kind of merchandise either outward or homeward, but only in ships of the King's subjects on forfeiture of ships and merchandise, in which ships also the greater part of the crews shall be the King's subjects.' This Navigation Act was followed by numerous other enactments devised to encourage and to promote the growth of our merchant marine. Our shipping and our shipbuilding industries were established by prohibitions and lavish bounties, and by attracting Dutch sailors and shipbuilders into the service of England.

When America and the sea-passage to India were discovered, Venice, which until then had monopolised the trade of the East *viâ* the Mediterranean, declined, and the wealth of the Indies in spices, gold, silver, &c., fell to Spain and Portugal. A race for colonial possessions ensued amongst the Powers of Europe. England, which had been one of the last of European nations to embark in manufacturing and in foreign trade, was also one of the last in acquiring colonies. 'At first she had, like Germany at the

present day, to be contented with colonies such as Newfoundland, which the great colonial nations of the time considered valueless. However, during the Elizabethan era, at a time when England had as yet no colonies, an insignificant merchant marine, and but a few struggling industries, it became the ideal of our greatest thinkers and statesmen to take advantage of the security which its insular position gave to England, and to convert their poor and backward agricultural country into a wealthy and powerful empire by developing its manufacturing industries and its merchant marine to the utmost, and by acquiring colonies, not for exploitation, but for settlement in all parts of the world. Lord Bacon wrote, in his 'Advice to Sir George Villiers, the Statesman': 'Instead of crying up all things which are either brought from beyond sea or wrought here by the hands of strangers, let us advance the native commodities of our kingdom, and employ our countrymen before strangers. Let us turn the wools of the land into cloths and stuffs of our own growth, and the hemp and flax grown here into linen cloth and cordage; it would set many thousand hands at work, and thereby one shillingworth of the materials would, by industry, be multiplied to five, ten, and many times to twenty times the value.'

Whilst the Spaniards and Portuguese saw in their colonies merely an opportunity for amassing gold and silver by violence and plunder, Bacon advised us in his celebrated essay 'Of Plantations,' that our surplus population should be 'deliberately planted' oversea in industrious agricultural communities. Bacon may perhaps be called the Father of Modern Colonisation and of the British Empire. In his 'History of Henry VII' Bacon praises that king highly because: 'The King, having care to make his realm potent, as well by sea as by land, for the better maintenance of the navy ordained "That wines and woads from the parts of Gascoign and Languedoc should not be brought but in English bottoms"; bowing the ancient policy

of this Estate, from consideration of plenty to consideration of power. For that almost all the ancient statutes incite by all means merchant strangers to bring in all sorts of commodities, having for end cheapness, and not looking to the point of State concerning the naval power.' It will be noticed that the principle of buying in the cheapest market was not invented by Adam Smith and his followers.

In things political and economic, Bacon believed rather in Governmental action than in the policy of *laissez faire*, although he did not underrate the *vis inertia* of custom and indolence. Therefore he concludes his essay, 'Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates,' with the words : ' "No man can by care taking (as the Scripture saith), add a cubit to his stature," in this little model of a man's body ; but in the great frame of kingdoms and commonwealths, it is in the power of princes, or Estates, to add amplitude and greatness to their kingdoms ; for by introducing such ordinances, constitutions, and customs as we have now touched, they may sow greatness to their posterity and succession, but these things are commonly not observed, but left to take their chance.'

The economic views of that universal genius, Sir Walter Raleigh, were similar to those of Lord Bacon. Raleigh presented to King James I a weighty memoir in which he proposed : 'To turn the stream of riches raised by your Majesty's native commodities into the natural channel, from which it hath been a long time diverted, may it please your Majesty to consider whether it be not necessary that your native commodities should receive their full manufactory by your subjects within your dominions.' Raleigh not only advocated the development of our manufacturing industries by Governmental action. In his 'Observations touching Trade and Commerce with the Hollander' he urged the King that England should deprive the wealthy Dutch, who then were the carriers of the world, of their great fishing and of their carrying trade. In his mind he

saw England as a great World-Power and the mistress of the sea, and in his 'Discourse of the Invention of Ships' he left on record the following splendid maxim which, curiously enough, has become one of the mottoes of modern Germany and of her Navy League: 'Whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade, commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.'

The teachings of Bacon and Raleigh and of many other statesmen and thinkers urge England to reserve, by appropriate regulations, the home market to her industries.

For a long time she did not succeed in creating a great merchant marine, being unable to compete with the Netherlands. Before 1651 England's foreign trade, and even her colonial trade, was carried on chiefly by Dutch traders and in Dutch ships. Cromwell and many British patriots viewed England's economic dependence on the Dutch with great dissatisfaction, and on October 9, 1651, Cromwell's sweeping Act of Navigation, which superseded all the more or less ineffective Navigation Acts which had preceded it, was passed by the British Parliament. By that Act Cromwell decreed that all goods and commodities whatever, grown, produced or manufactured in Asia, Africa or America, should be imported into Great Britain only in ships belonging to British subjects, of which the master and the greater number of the crew were of British nationality, and that all goods produced in Europe should be imported into Great Britain only in ships belonging either to Great Britain or to that country in which the goods imported were actually produced. As the Dutch had little native produce to export except butter and cheese, it was clear that Cromwell's Navigation Act was aimed directly at the maritime supremacy of the Dutch, which he intended to transfer to this country.

The expulsion of Dutch shipping from the British trade caused at first a great scarcity in British shipping, a rise in

the price of ships, in the wages of English seamen and in freights, and a diminution of England's foreign trade; but the monopoly of the maritime trade which Cromwell had secured to Great Britain led very soon to an enormous expansion of England's foreign trade, of her merchant marine, and to a great increase in the maritime skill of the people. Child, Petty and Davenant, the three greatest English economists of the seventeenth century, agree that the commerce and riches of England had never increased faster than between the passing of Cromwell's Navigation Act in 1651 and the Revolution of 1688. Henceforward the shipping of England increased by leaps and bounds, whilst foreign shipping almost disappeared from the British trade, as the following figures show :—

SHIPS CLEARED OUTWARD.

	British.	Foreign.
1663-69 ..	95,286 tons.	47,634 tons.
1749-51 ..	609,798 tons.	51,386 tons.

Foreign shipping disappeared from the English trade, and gradually the English took the place of the Dutch as the carriers of the world.

A great merchant marine requires a great carrying trade, and a great carrying trade requires powerful home industries which work for exportation. During the two centuries between Cromwell's Navigation Act and the introduction of Free Trade in 1846, Great Britain endeavoured to develop simultaneously her manufacturing industries, her agriculture, her shipping and her foreign trade. During two centuries her economic policy was a strongly Protectionist one. Theory and practice went hand in hand. Great Britain's opinion was formed, not by abstract thinkers, men of theory, who were unacquainted with practical business, but by men such as Thomas Munn, Joshua Gee, Josiah Child, Dudley North and other eminent Protectionist writers who were at the same time the leading

political economists and the leading merchants of the time.

(During the eighteenth century Great Britain began to extend her trade still further and to strengthen the hold which her industries had acquired on the markets of other nations by concluding with them advantageous commercial treaties and treaties of reciprocity, such as the celebrated Methuen Treaty with Portugal. (She entered on a sort of partnership with her most important foreign customers, and secured better terms to her home industries by means of her tariff than other nations could obtain. Furthermore, she strove to regulate the trade of the whole Empire, with a view to reserving as far as possible the trade of the Empire to the citizens of the Empire.) That great imperialist statesman Lord Chatham frequently stated his economic views in words such as the following: 'Trade is extended and complicated consideration; it reaches as far as ships can sail and winds can blow; it is a great and various machine. To regulate the numberless movements of its several parts, and combine them into effect for the good of the whole, requires the superintending wisdom and energy of the supreme power in the Empire.'

It is fashionable nowadays among many political economists, not only to trust entirely to the natural development of things in economic matters, but even to assert that our economic predominance has grown up naturally and spontaneously under Free Trade. That is not true. Our manufacturing industries, our foreign trade and our shipping are not plants of natural growth. They are an artificial creation.

Under the most comprehensive system of encouragement and protection of all the native industries which the world has seen, the wealth of Great Britain increased to a prodigious extent, to the admiration and envy of all foreign countries. Frederick the Great wrote in his 'History of My Own Time': 'Among all the nations of Europe, the English

nation is the wealthiest. Its trade embraces the globe. Its capital is incredibly large. Its resources are almost inexhaustible.' Vattel, the Swiss jurist, wrote in 1758 : ' The State ought to encourage labour, to promote industry, and to increase ability, to grant honours, rewards, privileges, and to take such measures that every citizen may live by his industry. In this respect England deserves to be our model. Her Parliament attends incessantly to these important affairs, and neither labour nor expense is spared in the promotion of industry.'

(Towards the middle of the eighteenth century England was by far the richest and the most powerful among her national competitors. Unfortunately the English manufacturers and traders, who were strongly represented in Parliament, followed a very short-sighted and selfish policy. They wished to regulate the trade of the Empire, not for the benefit of the Empire, but for their own benefit. They wished not only to restrict arbitrarily the economic activity of the Colonies, but also to tax them without their consent. The citizens of our old American Colonies were at heart loyal to Great Britain.) The study of the American pre-revolutionary literature makes it clear that their ideal, as Lord Chatham's ideal, was a British Empire ruled by an Imperial Government which should be self-supporting and self-sufficing. Our American colonists were quite willing to have their trade and industries regulated in the interests of the Empire, and to have taxation imposed upon them by truly Imperial Parliament, but not by the parochial Parliament of Great Britain in which they were not represented. Twenty-two years before the fatal Declaration of Independence, Benjamin Franklin sent to Governor Shirley a weighty memoir ' On the Subject of Uniting the Colonies more intimately with Great Britain by allowing them Representatives in Parliament,' in which he wrote :

' I should hope that by such a union, the people of Great Britain and the people of the colonies would learn to

consider themselves as not belonging to different communities, with different interests, but to one community with one interest; which I imagine would contribute to strengthen the whole and greatly lessen the danger of future separation.

‘ It is, I suppose, agreed to be the general interest of any State that its people be numerous and rich; men enough to fight in its defence, and enough money to pay sufficient taxes to defray the charge; for these circumstances tend to the security of the State and its protection from foreign Powers. . . . The iron manufacture employs and enriches British subjects, but is it of any importance to the State whether the manufacturer lives at Birmingham or Sheffield, or both, since they are still within its bounds, and their wealth and persons still at its command? The colonies are all included in the British Empire, and the strength and wealth of the parts is the strength and wealth of the whole. What imports it to the general State whether a merchant, smith or hatter grow rich in Old or New England? And if there be any difference, those who have most contributed to enlarge Great Britain’s Empire and commerce, increase her strength, her wealth and the numbers of her people at the risk of their own lives and private fortunes in new and strange countries, methinks ought rather to expect some preference. . . . ’

The views of Franklin were shared by the most prominent Americans, and they were supported in England by the far-seeing Lord Chatham. On the other hand, the narrow-minded merchants, being more concerned about the profits of the present than about the future of the British Empire, did not wish to see their monopoly in the American market impaired, whilst the majority of the politicians in the English Parliament desired to have the game of politics to themselves, and objected to allowing to the American Colonies representatives in Parliament. Thus our merchants and politicians opposed for selfish reasons the consolidation

of the British Empire. They would not allow it to be placed on a business footing. Lord Chatham's eloquent pleas for fulfilling the reasonable wishes of the colonists and for making them political and economic partners in the Empire, fell on unwilling ears. Adam Smith wrote in his 'Wealth of Nations':

'There is not the least probability that the British Constitution would be hurt by the union of Great Britain and her colonies. That Constitution, on the contrary, would be completed by it, and seems to be imperfect without it. The assembly which deliberates and decides concerning the affairs of every part of the Empire, in order to be properly informed, ought certainly to have representatives from every part of it. That this union, however, could be easily effectuated, or that difficulties, and great difficulties, might not occur in the execution, I do not pretend. I have yet heard of none, however, which appear insurmountable. The principal, perhaps, arise, not from the nature of things, but from the prejudices and opinions of the people both on this and on the other side of the Atlantic.'

Unfortunately for Great Britain and the British Empire, Adam Smith's advice came too late, and illness struck down Lord Chatham at the fatal moment when he alone could have saved the Empire from disruption. Through short-sightedness, selfishness and sheer stupidity, the British Empire was broken up. Has Great Britain learned the terrible lesson of the Anglo-American War, or will the first dismemberment of the Empire be followed by a second and still more disastrous dismemberment?

(With the revolt of the American Colonies a series of wars began for Great Britain. The long duration of the Anglo-American War, which lasted from 1775 to 1783, encouraged other nations to attack Great Britain. France and Spain took part in the struggle. The war against the Armed Neutrality League followed, and then came our wars against

the French Republic, and against Napoleon. During the forty years from 1775 to 1815, Great Britain was almost constantly at war. In our wars against the French Republic and against Napoleon alone, Great Britain expended, according to MacCulloch, far more than £1,000,000,000. At that time a sovereign had about the same purchasing power which two sovereigns have now. Besides, the population of England was then equal to only about one-quarter of her present population. Therefore our expenditure in the French wars may be compared to an expenditure of £8,000,000,000 at the present day. The Boer War cost £250,000,000. Consequently we may say that more than a century ago Great Britain expended on her wars with France a sum that was practically thirty-two times as large as the sum which we expended in the late Boer War. The fact that Great Britain was not crippled by that enormous expenditure proves that Great Britain was enormously wealthy long before the introduction of Free Trade, railways and the steam-engine; that her enormous wealth has not been created during the Free Trade era, but during the era of Protection.

The end of the Napoleonic wars left the nations of the Continent prostrated. Their wealth had disappeared. Their industries were crippled, and the British industries found a free field throughout the world. Calling to their aid the steam-engine, the railway, the steamship and the electric telegraph, the British industries increased their productive powers at an unheard-of rate. Trade and commerce throughout the world became a British monopoly. In the forties of last century Great Britain possessed two-thirds of the world's shipping. She possessed a greater mileage of railways than the whole continent of Europe. She raised about two-thirds of the world's coal, she manufactured about two-thirds of the world's iron, and she turned about two-thirds of the world's cotton into manufactures. Great Britain was indeed 'the workshop of the

world,' as Cobden exclaimed, and she was besides the world's banker and engineer. The railways of the United States, of Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, and of many other countries were built by Englishmen with English money. The industries throughout the world were financed in London.

During the time when England had followed the vigorous creative and Protectionist policy of Bacon and Cromwell, France had followed the equally vigorous policy of Richelieu and Colbert, who had transplanted the industries of Venice and Holland upon French soil. France and England had become exceedingly wealthy under a régime of Protection, and other nations had followed their example. A rigidly Protectionist and national policy had been adopted by all the civilised States of Europe, excepting the Netherlands, whose formerly all-powerful manufacturing and shipping industries had decayed under the régime of Free Trade.

Towards the middle of the eighteenth century, some French philosophers began to protest against the spirit of mutual exclusion, and of nationalism, of which the Protectionist policy had been a symptom and a part. They wished to escape from this complicated and artificial world to a land of primitive simplicity in which men and women could live as shepherds and shepherdesses. They dreamt of replacing the ordered discipline of the State by the gentle brotherhood of man, and the rigidity of the law by the law of nature and the rights of man. They dreamt of making all men happy by making all men equal. Swords were to be beaten into ploughshares. A lofty cosmopolitanism was to replace narrow patriotism and nationalism. Freed from all compulsion, the natural goodness of man would bring about universal harmony. In this atmosphere of poetic sentimentalism and cosmopolitanism which was dominated by the impractical ideas of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith was born. His work, 'The Wealth of Nations,' was strongly influenced by the

prevailing ideas of the French philosophers, and by the physiocratic school of French economists, especially by his friend Quesney. Adam Smith's work, which gives the most powerful expression to the spirit of opposition against Governmentalism which prevailed in the cultured middle class of France, became soon immensely popular, and it became a powerful factor in forming economic opinion throughout Great Britain.

'The Wealth of Nations' possesses the fundamental defect that it is saturated with the poetic and impractical sentimentalism and cosmopolitanism of eighteenth-century France. Its title is a misnomer, for Adam Smith treats practically only of the wealth of individuals, and ignores nations and States. His producers and consumers are citizens of the world, according to Rousseau's model, not Englishmen or Frenchmen. He teaches that the interests of the State ought to be subordinated to the interests of the individual, although, in the words of Adam Smith, 'the individual aims only at his private gain.' Nevertheless he thinks that the unchaining of the spirit of private gain will lead to the happiest results because the individual, in working for his private gain, is, according to Smith, led 'by an invisible hand to promote the public good.' His faith that unrestrained individual greed of gain will by the action of 'an invisible hand' promote the public good is perhaps poetry, but it is certainly not common sense. A similar faith in the brotherhood and equality of men and the original goodness of human nature converted France and all Europe into a shambles.

Opposing Government restrictions and regulations in the spirit of the philosophic anarchists, Smith advocated replacing the protection and regulation of the national industries in the interests of the nation by the perfect freedom of trade. He wrote in Book IV. chap. v. : 'Were all nations to follow the Liberal system of free exportation and free importation, the different States into which a great

Continent was divided would so far resemble the different provinces of a great Empire.' International Free Trade presupposes, as Adam Smith clearly recognised, the disappearance of States and of frontiers, the Brotherhood of Man, Arcadia, the Millennium.

The purely speculative and cosmopolitan economic ideas of Smith were further developed by his followers. The British Free Trade school of political economy arose. In the forties of the last century, when Great Britain had reached the zenith of her industrial and commercial eminence, when she had the world's monopoly in industry and trade, Ricardo was considered to be the greatest representative of the Free Trade school. He taught that wages invariably tend towards the irreducible minimum of existence: 'The natural price of labour is the price which is necessary to enable the labourers to subsist and to perpetuate their race without either increase or diminution.' Similar views were held by many of his brother economists of the classical school, such as Senior, James Mill and John Stuart Mill. The doctrine that every cheapening of the means of subsistence would inevitably lead to a lowering of wages was generally taught by our economists, and it was credited by many of our manufacturers.

Although Great Britain's exports were enormous, competing industries began to arise in various countries, and these industries worked with very cheap labour. British wages were then from three to four times as high as German and Swiss wages. Many British manufacturers, among others Cobden, believed that the competition of foreign countries could be met only by 'superior cheapness,' that it could be met only by reducing British wages, and that British wages could be reduced only by reducing the prices of food and of the other necessities of life. Therefore they agitated for the repeal of the Corn Laws, and they contributed enormous sums to the Anti-Corn Law League. Many British Free Traders, viewing business matters from the

point of view of the cosmopolitan idealists of pre-revolutionary France, saw, or pretended to see, in Free Trade a step towards the Brotherhood of Man. Cobden, for instance, said on January 15, 1846 :

‘ I see in the Free Trade principle that which shall act on the moral world as the principle of gravitation in the universe, drawing men together, thrusting aside the antagonism of race and creed and language, and uniting us in the bonds of eternal peace. I believe that the desire and the motive for large and mighty empires, for gigantic armies and great navies, for those materials which are used for the destruction of life, and the desolation of the rewards of labour will die away. I believe that such things will cease to be necessary or to be used when man becomes one family and freely exchanges the fruits of his labour with his brother man.’

Many of our Free Traders asserted that if England would adopt Free Trade, all other nations would follow our example. Cobden’s prophecy, that ‘ there will not be a tariff in Europe that will not be changed in less than five years to follow your example,’ may be dismissed as the talk of an irresponsible agitator. However, the then Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, himself held, or professed to hold, similar views, for he stated on January 27, 1846, in the House of Commons : ‘ I have no guarantee to give you that other countries will immediately follow our example. But depend upon it, your example will ultimately prevail.’

In common fairness, Protection could not be withdrawn from agriculture alone, and the manufacturers were quite willing to abolish all protection for the British manufacturing industries as well, because these were paramount in the world, and needed then no protection against their feeble foreign competitors. Thus the intoxication of great industrial success led, at the bidding of a handful of agitators and of economic theorists, to the complete reversal of that creative and imperial economic policy which had become

England's traditional policy, and with which the greatest statesmen of England, from Lord Bacon and Cromwell to Lord Chatham, had identified themselves, and which had created and built up England's industries and trade.

When Free Trade had been established, it had to be defended at all costs against the Protectionist reaction. Free Trade chairs of political economy were created ; and Protection was pronounced a heresy, and Free Trade an infallible doctrine, from every chair of political economy.

What is the legitimate and logical function of political economy ? Political economy is not a religion which must be believed implicitly. It is not a thing by itself, but a means to an end. It exists not merely to enable professors to give lectures on production, distribution and exchange in the abstract, and to write handbooks on economic theory for the use of their students, but to enable a nation to solve its practical, political and economic problems. Does British modern political economy, the individualistic, un-national and cosmopolitan economic policy which we associate with the names of Adam Smith, Mill and Cobden, and which makes for political anarchism, fulfil that task ? I am afraid that in the days of Adam Smith, and still more since the days of Cobden, statesmanship and political economy have drifted far apart.

The whole includes the part. The greater includes the lesser. Bacon taught in his 'De Augmentis': 'The art of Empire, or Civil Government, includes economics as a state includes a family.' Formerly political economy was a branch of practical statesmanship. Economics were subordinated to national policy. In matters of practical politics, the views of the statesman prevailed over those of the economic philosopher. Our political economists, firmly believing in the infallibility of their doctrine, have encroached upon the domain of the statesman. They have declared that the theory of Free Trade, being infallible, must not be disregarded by the statesman, and they have arrogated to

themselves the right to dictate to the statesman and to direct him, in accordance with the pure theory of individualism and cosmopolitanism, called Abstract Economic Science. Cossa says that 'Statesmanship, the science of good government, is an auxiliary to political economy.'

Our national and imperial needs, and the doctrines of our cosmopolitan political economists who ignore the existence of nation and empire, have become incompatible, and the question has to be put: Shall we any longer subordinate national policy to the abstract dicta of political economy? Shall the statesman or the professor of political economy direct the country and the Empire? Shall, in questions not of economic theory, but of economic practice and of economic policy, the professor of political economy direct the statesman, or shall the statesman be allowed to disregard the professor?

Great Britain's economic and political position has greatly deteriorated since the time when Free Trade was introduced. Great Britain possesses no longer the industrial and financial predominance which she exercised sixty years ago, and which enabled her to adopt Free Trade. With two or three exceptions, her all-powerful industries have declined. Her agriculture has utterly decayed, and its decay has caused a loss of about £2,000,000,000 of money and of many millions of our best citizens who have left the country. Great Britain has become dependent for her food on foreign countries which refuse to take her manufactures. Her position is serious, and is becoming grave.

The Free Traders of the forties saw in the Colonies an incumbrance to be got rid of, and they deliberately aimed at destroying the imperial connexion. Sir Howard Douglas, a distinguished colonial administrator, exclaimed on February 18, 1846, in the House of Commons: 'From the moment that the protective principle shall unhappily be extinguished, the colonial system itself will be virtually dissolved. Free Trade, the extinction of the protective principle, the repeal

of the differential duties, would at once convert all our colonies in a commercial sense into so many independent States.'

Although the Free Traders, in the pursuit of the policy of profits, succeeded in destroying the creative and imperial economic policy which Great Britain has steadfastly followed since the very dawn of her civilisation, they did not succeed in eradicating the Imperial idea from the hearts of the people and from the minds of their leaders. The ideals of Bacon and Raleigh, of Cromwell and Chatham were not lost. Disraeli said, in 1872: 'I cannot conceive how our distant colonies can have their affairs administered except by self-government. But self-government, in my opinion, when it was conceded, ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of an Imperial Consolidation. It ought to have been accompanied by an imperial tariff, by securities by the people of England, for the enjoyment of the unappropriated lands which belonged to the Sovereign as their trustee and by a military code which should have precisely defined the means and the responsibilities by which the colonies should be defended and by which, if necessary, this country should call for aid from the colonies themselves. It ought further to have been accompanied by the institution of some representative Council in the metropolis, which would have brought the colonies into constant and continuous relations with the Home Government. All this however was omitted because those who advised that policy—and I believe their convictions were sincere—looked upon the colonies of England, looked even upon our connexion with India, as a burden upon this country, viewing everything in a financial aspect and totally passing by those moral and political considerations which made nations great and by the influence alone of which men are distinguished from animals.'

Lord John Russell wrote in his 'Recollections': 'Great changes have been made; great changes are impending; amid

these changes there is no greater benefit to mankind that a statesman can propose to himself than the consolidation of the British Empire.

‘I am disposed to believe that if a Congress or Assembly representing Great Britain and her dependencies could be convoked to sit from time to time in the autumn, arrangements reciprocally beneficial might be made. In my eyes it would be a sad spectacle, it would be a spectacle for gods and men to weep at, to see this brilliant Empire, the guiding star of freedom, broken up.’

Lord Rosebery said : ‘The people will in a not too distant time have to make up their mind what footing they wish the colonies to occupy with respect to them or whether they desire their colonies to leave them altogether. It is, I believe, absolutely impossible for you to maintain in the long run your present loose and indefinable relation and preserve these colonies as part of the Empire.’

Professor Seeley, the historian of Imperialism, wrote in his ‘Expansion of England’ : ‘There is only one alternative. If the colonies are not, in the old phrase, possessions of England, then they must be a part of England ; and we must adopt this view in earnest. When we have accustomed ourselves to contemplate the whole Empire together and call it all England, we shall see that here too is a United States. Here too is a great homogeneous people, one in blood, language, religion and laws, but dispersed over a boundless space. If we are disposed to doubt whether any system can be devised capable of holding together communities so distant from each other, then is the time to recollect the history of the United States of America. For they have such a system. They have solved this problem. They have shown that in the present age of the world political unions may exist on a vaster scale than was possible in former times. Will the English race, which is divided by so many oceans, making full use of modern scientific invention, devise some organisation like that under which full

liberty and solid union may be reconciled with unbounded territorial extension ?'

The American federation, like the German federation, was created and cemented by the tariff. The individual States were attracted into the Union by becoming partners in a great and promising concern. They were attracted by the wish of sharing in the vast, reserved, secure and profitable market of a customs union and by the dread of economic isolation if excluded from that union. Both the American and the German federations were created with difficulty. Much educational work is needed to induce a State to merge itself into an Empire. 'We must learn to think continentally,' said Alexander Hamilton, the founder of the American Union; and 'We must learn to think imperially,' said Mr. Chamberlain.

Great Britain stands at the parting of the ways. Our greatly weakened and declining home industries require protection against their mighty industrial rivals more in the interests of the workers than in those of the manufacturers. Our scattered Colonies and possessions require protection against their mighty political and maritime rivals. We can defend our Empire only as long as our fleet is supreme. The longest purse can build the strongest fleet. We have no monopoly in maritime ability, and we cannot reckon upon having always a Nelson on our side. Our Empire is based upon wealth and defended by wealth in the shape of battleships. England's declining wealth suffices no longer to defend the Empire against all comers. The wealth and strength of the whole Empire must be united for the Empire's defence. To continue the policy of Free Trade will mean the utter decline of our industries, the impoverishment of the people, and the final break-up and loss of the Empire. Political and economic necessity compel us to return to our historical economic policy which we have rashly abandoned. Great Britain stands at the parting of the ways. We must create a mighty united empire, the

United States of Great Britain, of which Lord Chatham dreamt, and which is desired by many of the leading people belonging to all parties in Great Britain and the Colonies, or the Empire will founder in a sea of blood.

As regards our economic policy we can no longer be guided by our professors of political economy. We must disregard their abstract doctrine, the lumber of the age of Rousseau. But we must also not adopt the national systems of List and Carey, which may be good for continental nations such as Germany and the United States. We must follow a purely British economy, an economy which will bind four continents and countless islands together in a firm partnership, and we must again take up our traditional political economy which we have deserted in a fit of absence of mind and evolve from it a new economic policy : The Economy of Empire.

CHAPTER V

WILL THE COLONIES SECEDE OR BECOME PARTNERS IN
THE EMPIRE? WHY DID ENGLAND LOSE HER AMERICAN
COLONIES?

It is very widely believed in Great Britain that England lost her American Colonies through the mischievous activity of George III and of Lord North, and principally through the wrong-headedness and obstinacy of the former. That belief seems at first sight to be justified because the famous American Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, solemnly enumerates twenty or thirty grievances of our colonies each of which begins with words such as He (viz. King George III) has done so and so, whilst the English Parliament is never mentioned by name. Only once is the English Parliament alluded to in the significant words: 'He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution and unacknowledged by our laws—giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation.' Napoleon I's saying, 'History is a fable agreed upon,' is no doubt too sweeping, but to those who are familiar with the realities of American history it is quite clear that that saying may well be applied to the accounts of the loss of America current in Great Britain. George III and Lord North have been unjustly accused of having alienated the Americans from the Motherland.

History is apt to repeat itself. Earlier or later we may lose other great Colonies for the same reasons for which we lost our greatest colonial possessions in the eighteenth

century. Consequently an investigation of the causes which led to the secession of our American Colonies should be of the greatest interest and value to every British statesman and to every British citizen.

The following pages are based in the main on the best and most reliable American sources. Therefore they will give a better insight into the motives which prompted our colonists to sever the connexion with the Motherland than do most English histories. I intend firstly to describe the material and moral conditions of our American Colonies during the eighteenth century, and the differences between them and the Motherland which had existed during many years when as yet nobody in America thought of separation, and then to give a brief account of the causes which brought about the crisis and led to the Anglo-American War.

During the eighteenth century our American Colonies had been wonderfully prosperous. According to Chalmers and Bancroft the white population had increased from 875,750 in 1714 to 1,192,896 in 1754, and to about 2,000,000 in 1774, the year of the Declaration of Independence, whilst the white and black population had grown from 484,600 in 1714 to 1,425,000 in 1754, and to about 2,600,000 in 1774. America was not only the most important outlet for England's surplus population, but also England's most valuable market, the future potentialities of which seemed unbounded. We read in Anderson's 'History of Commerce,' which was published in 1764: 'How happy is the change in our national circumstances since we have had American plantations, the demand from whence of all kinds of merchandise having so greatly excited our people at home to the improvement and increase of our old manufactures and to the introduction of new ones. Our American plantations, by the vast increase of their people and of the commodities by them raised for our own use for our manufacture and re-exportation do undoubtedly at present more than ever demand of us the first and highest regard, preferably to any

other commercial consideration whatever. The commerce we now carry on with our said American plantations is probably already to equal in quantity and to exceed in profit all the other commerce we have with the rest of the world. Every white man in our colonies finds employment for four times as many at home. Near half the shipping of Great Britain is employed in the commerce carried on with her American plantations. A time may come that our colonies may prove so potent and populous as to be able to succour their mother-country both with troops and with shipping in case of an unequal war with her enemies even in Europe itself.'

A confirmation of Anderson's statement and forecasts may be found in Burke's speech on Conciliation with America.

Prosperity and success beget self-confidence in individuals and in nations. Clear-sighted Americans foretold the future greatness of their country provided that its peaceful development would not be interrupted by a French attack from Canada, which was very much feared. France possessed Canada and followed a policy of vigorous expansion by military means on the American continent. Friction between the French army and the American colonists was frequent, and the danger of French aggression was very real and very great. That danger was constantly in the minds of the colonists. The celebrated John Adams, who later on became President of the United States, wrote on October 12, 1755: 'All creation is liable to change. Mighty States are not excepted. Soon after the Reformation, a few people came over for Conscience sake. This apparently trivial incident may transfer the great seat of Empire into America. If we can remove the turbulent Gallies, our people, according to the exactest calculations, will in another century become more numerous than England itself. All Europe will not be able to subdue us.'

'The turbulent Gallies' held the American Colonies in constant awe and gave much trouble. War broke out

between France and England, and the American Colonies were successfully invaded by French troops. The English troops, blundering about in a strange and wild country and employing English barrack-square tactics against the wily enemy, were frequently defeated. They called for colonial assistance and American volunteers eagerly came to their aid. The colonials, being well acquainted with the peculiarities of their country and with forest warfare, saved the situation more than once, but they bitterly complained that they were treated as inferiors by the regular British officers and by the British Government, that they were rewarded for their services with indignity and contempt. Among the slighted officers who left the English service in disgust was George Washington.

These complaints were justified. The attitude of the British Government towards the Americans was dictated by distrust and suspicion. It was thought good policy to let the colonials feel their social and political inferiority and their dependence on the Mother Country. Besides, it was thought to be dangerous to allow them to win victories. Under these circumstances the colonial assemblies were not very willing to assist England with money, which was harshly demanded by Downing Street and which was sure to be ill spent.

Whilst British and Americans were quarrelling, one British defeat followed the other. It seemed likely that Great Britain would be supplanted on the American continent by France unless the Colonies should support Great Britain with all their might. In 1757 the elder Pitt became Prime Minister. Rejecting the small-minded policy of his predecessors, Pitt resolved to rely on the willing patriotism of the colonists. In December 1757 he obtained the King's order that every colonial officer of no higher rank than colonel should have command equal with the British officers. He also abandoned the menace of taxing the Colonies by the English Parliament, and invited the Colonies

of New England, of New York, and of New Jersey, each without limit, to raise as many men as possible, believing them 'well able to furnish at least 20,000,' for the expedition against Montreal and Quebec, while Pennsylvania and the southern Colonies were to aid in conquering the west up to the Mississippi. Pitt's policy worked wonders. The American people enthusiastically sprang to arms, the American Assemblies voted the moneys that were required, and the French were soon totally defeated. The Peace of Paris of 1763 gave all Canada to England. The spectre of French invasion was laid for ever. The American colonists could feel secure in their country, and needed no longer the protection of the English army and especially of the English fleet.

Fear breeds union, security disunion. Discerning statesmen saw that England had made a mistake in freeing her Colonies from the dread of the French invasion. Before the Peace of Paris had been concluded, Choiseul, the Foreign Minister of France, said to Stanley, 'I wonder that your great Pitt should be so attached to the acquisition of Canada. The inferiority of its population will never allow it to be dangerous, and, being in the hands of France, Canada will always be of service to you. It will keep your colonies in that dependence which they will not fail to shake off the moment Canada shall be ceded.' After the cession of Canada had taken place, the French ambassador, Vergennes, told various people, 'England will before long repent to have removed the only check which could keep her colonies in awe. Now they stand no longer in need of her protection. She will call on them to contribute towards supporting the burdens which they have helped to bring on her, and they will answer by shaking off all dependence.'

There was indeed much reason for believing that the American Colonies might shake off their dependence, for during many years they had felt that dependence very

acutely. The majority of Englishmen of the eighteenth century were cold-blooded utilitarians. In the words of Bancroft, the great American historian, 'they regarded colonies, even when settled by men from their own land, only as sources of emoluments to the mother-country, and colonists as an inferior caste.' The Hon. George Grenville, First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, cynically proclaimed, 'Colonies are only settlements in distant parts of the world for the improvement of trade.' Adam Smith taught about that time, 'If any of the provinces of the British Empire cannot be made to contribute towards the support of the whole Empire, it is surely time that Great Britain should free herself from the expense of defending those provinces in time of war, and of supporting any part of their civil or military establishments in time of peace!' Many Englishmen desired to get rid of the American Colonies because they thought such a step would be monetarily profitable.

Politically also the majority of Englishmen of the eighteenth century were dissatisfied with the American Colonies, whose claims to be treated not as inferiors, but as equals, to the Mother Country were thought to be impertinent. According to Bancroft, 'the idea of equality in political rights between England and the colonies could not be comprehended by the English officials of that day.'

The Parliament of England claimed to be an 'Imperial Parliament,' and to be entitled to bind by its decisions not only England but also the Colonies, although these were not represented at Westminster. Therefore the differences between the 'Imperial Parliament' and the colonial legislatures were frequent, and these differences were apt to be decided in a rather high-handed manner by the English Parliament, which relied rather on force or on precedent than on common sense and on justice, and which rarely took the trouble to investigate seriously the colonial claims and proposals.

As early as 1640 had Massachusetts petitioned that the Acts of the colonial legislature should not be disallowed by the English Parliament unless such Acts violated the principle of the colonial dependence upon the Mother Country. The Americans frequently claimed that, on general principles, it was as flagrantly wrong for the British Parliament to interfere with the special concerns of an American Colony as it would be for a colonial Parliament to interfere with the affairs of Great Britain. These arguments were quite unanswerable, but they fell on deaf ears. After all, one can convince only the intelligence but not the will. Although the colonists had protested continually against the assumption of the English Parliament to call itself an 'Imperial Parliament,' and to legislate for Colonies which were not represented in it and which had not authorised it to legislate on their behalf, it was only natural that the complaints contained in the American Declaration of Independence were directed not against the English Parliament but against the King. According to the letter of the Constitution the King was the head of the British Empire, and Parliament acted in his name. By complaining against the English Parliament the Americans would have admitted the supremacy of that body over the American legislature—a supremacy which they had strenuously denied. Hence all the complaints contained in the Declaration of Independence were directed against the King.

Although the Americans ostensibly protested against the acts of the King, their quarrel was with the English Parliament, and they had every reason to dislike that body. Bancroft tells us : 'Parliament esteemed itself the absolute master of America and, recognising no reciprocity of obligations, it thought nothing so wrong as thwarting the execution of its will. It did not doubt its own superiority of intelligence, and to maintain its authority and reduce every refractory body to obedience, appeared to it the perfection of statesmanship and the true method of colonial reform.'

The spirit and tone in which Parliament and the official classes in England treated the views of the colonists as expressed by their own elected representatives may be seen from the following characteristic passage: 'Your American Assemblies,' said Earl Granville, the President of the Privy Council, to Benjamin Franklin, 'slight the King's instructions. They are drawn up by grave men learned in the laws and Constitution of the realm; they are brought into Council, thoroughly weighed, well considered, and amended, if necessary, by the wisdom of that body; and when received by the Government they are the laws of the land, for the King is the legislator of the colonies.'

Long before the differences between America and England had become acute, there was among the Americans much dissatisfaction with England because the American Colonies had ceased to be unimportant settlements in savage lands which could be administered by routine and by order of Downing Street. The British Colonies of America had grown out of their old clothes. The organisation of the British Empire was no longer adequate and required modernisation.

Notwithstanding the dissatisfaction with the high-handed proceeding of the English Parliament and Government, the American Colonies had little desire to cut themselves adrift from the Motherland. On the contrary they clung to it with tenacious affection. Washington was convinced that 'not one thinking man in all North America desired independence,' and Benjamin Franklin wrote in 1768: 'There is scarce a man, there is not a single native of our country, who is not firmly attached to his king by principle and by affection. But a new kind of loyalty seems to be required of us, a loyalty to Parliament; a loyalty that is to extend, it is said, to a surrender of all our properties, whenever a House of Commons, in which there is not a single member of our choosing, shall think fit to grant

them away without our consent. We were separated too far from Britain by the ocean, but we were united to it by respect and love so that we could at any time freely have spent our lives and little fortunes in its cause ; but this unhappy new system of politics tends to dissolve those bands of union and to sever us for ever.'

To the American colonists the old colonial system of administration had become distasteful and unbearable. They had come to consider a change in their relations with the Mother Country to be necessary. Hence they saw themselves placed before the alternative either of entering into a closer union with Great Britain or of separating from the Mother Country, and they wished to do the former. The unification of the Empire seemed to them the safest way of abolishing friction between the Colonies and the Motherland. Therefore they desired that an Imperial Parliament in the true sense of the words, a Parliament representative not only of England but of the whole Empire, should be assembled in London, and the simplest way to create such a Parliament seemed to the colonists that representatives chosen by America should be allowed to sit at Westminster. On December 22, 1764, Benjamin Franklin sent a letter to Governor Shirley, in which he wrote : ' Since the conversation your Excellency was pleased to honour me with on the subject of uniting the colonies more intimately with Great Britain by allowing them representatives in Parliament, I have somewhat further considered that matter, and am of opinion that such a union would be very acceptable to the colonies provided they had a reasonable number of representatives allowed them.

' I should hope that by such a union the people of Great Britain and the people of the colonies would learn to consider themselves as not belonging to different communities with different interests, but to one community with one interest ; which I imagine will contribute to

strengthen the whole and greatly lessen the danger of future separation.

'It is, I suppose, agreed to be the general interest of any State that its people be numerous and rich; men enough to fight in its defence, and money enough to pay sufficient taxes to defray the charge, for these circumstances tend to the security of the State and its protection from foreign Powers, but is it of any importance to the State whether the manufacturer lives at Birmingham or Sheffield, or both places, since they are still within its bounds and their wealth and persons still at its command? And if there be any difference, those who have most contributed to enlarge Britain's Empire and commerce and to increase her strength, her wealth, and the numbers of her people at the risk of their own lives and private fortunes in new and strange countries ought, methinks, rather to expect some preference.'

Such was the attitude and these were the views and wishes of the leading Americans, but, although these wishes were reasonable, they were unfortunately unconditionally rejected by the ruling politicians of England, who meant to keep their usurped monopoly of political power. Soame Jenyns, a Lord of Trade, published in 1765 a pamphlet rejecting the American proposals on behalf of the Government, in which the supremacy of the English Parliament throughout the Empire was asserted and in which the Colonies were unconditionally denied a voice in matters political. In that official exposition of the English views regarding the proposed creation of an Imperial Parliament and Senate representative of Motherland and Colonies we read: 'By their charters the colonies are undoubtedly no more than corporations, and therefore they have no more pretence to plead an exemption from parliamentary authority than any other corporation in England.'

'One method indeed has been hinted at, and but one, that might render the exercise of this power in a British

Parliament just and legal, which is the introduction of representatives from the several colonies into that body. But I have lately seen so many specimens of the great power of speech of which these American gentlemen are possessed that I should be afraid the sudden importation of so much eloquence at once would endanger the safety and government of this country. In the end it will be much cheaper for us to pay their army than their orators.'

With ironical banter the Colonies were told that they ought never to expect to be treated by England as equals, that they would never be allowed to participate in the government of the Empire in which they formed so important a part.

Other Englishmen in high positions proclaimed with brutal directness that they would rather lose the Colonies than concede to the colonists a share in the government of the Empire. Charles Townshend, the First Lord of Trade and Plantations, one of the most influential statesmen of his time, declared, for instance, in 1765, 'sooner than make of our Colonies our allies, I should wish to see them return to their primitive deserts,' and Lord Chancellor Northington, going a step further, said: 'My lords, the Colonies are become too big to be governed by the laws they at first set out with. If they withdraw allegiance, you must withdraw protection, and then the petty State of Genoa or the little kingdom of Sweden may run away with them.'

Notwithstanding these slights, and the bitter provocations by word and deed which they constantly received, the colonists wished to retain the connexion with England. As late as 1774, when the conflict had come to its height and when all hopes of settling peacefully the Anglo-American difficulties seemed to have vanished, the great Samuel Adams said in his official instructions to Franklin on behalf of Massachusetts: 'Colony begins to communicate freely with colony. There is a common affection among them

and shortly the whole continent will be as united in sentiment and in their measure of opposition to tyranny as the inhabitants of this province. Their old good will and affection for the Mother Country are not totally lost; if she returns to her former moderation and good humour their affections will divide. They wish for nothing more than a permanent union with her upon a condition of equal liberty. This is all they have been contending for, and nothing short of this will, or ought to, satisfy them.'

Unfortunately the English Government and Parliament hardened their hearts, and, following a purely selfish policy, they were determined not to conclude with the American Colonies that 'permanent union upon the condition of equal liberty' which the colonists wished to conclude. All colonial offers made in that direction were haughtily rejected.

Now let us cast a glance at the British Parliament and Government of the time who claimed to possess the power to rule America, and let us especially examine their constitution, character and spirit.

It was a part of the Englishman's creed that the British institutions were the most perfect in the world. Every Englishman esteemed himself his own master. He obeyed no laws but such as he seemed to have assisted in making. Unchecked absolutism in other lands, insular ignorance, and an exaggerated idea of the theoretical perfection of English representative government had obscured the great practical shortcomings of the British Government and Parliament to most Englishmen. Power was with the few. The people were swallowed up in the Lords and Commons who, though claiming to represent the people and to act on behalf of the majority of the people, were guided chiefly by their own interests. It is true that the House of Commons was composed of men elected by the people, but they were elected by the ignorant. The 'great heart of the people' is not the best organ for

solving intricate political problems. Besides, in the eighteenth century the people were as much misrepresented in Parliament as they usually are. The ballot box is a most capricious instrument, and it seems to be beyond the wit of man to obtain by election a Parliament truly representative of the nation. Legislators are only human. As self-interest is the strongest human motive, it was not unnatural in the eighteenth century, as in other centuries, that personal interests and Party interests were apt to prevail in Parliament over national interests and imperial interests. Besides, the orating politicians were as vain and ambitious as they are now. In Bancroft's words :

'To promote British interests and command the applause of the British Senate, English statesmen were ready to infringe on the rights of other countries and even on those of the outlying dominions of the Crown.

'For them the applause at St. Stephen's weighed more than approval of posterity, more than the voice of God in the soul. That hall was the arena of glory, their battlefield for power. They pleaded before that tribunal, and not in the forum of humanity. They studied its majority to know on which side was "the best of the lay" in the contest of factions for office. How to meet Parliament was the minister's chief solicitude ; and sometimes, like the spendthrift at a gaming table he would hazard all his political fortunes on one position.'

This being the constitution, character, and spirit of the English Government and Parliament, it was only natural that the American Colonies were treated unfairly, unjustly and unreasonably in London. Governmental and Parliamentary decisions regarding the Colonies did not depend on the merits of the case, but on the party requirements of the moment. The American Colonies became a pawn in the parliamentary game. W. S. Johnson, the colonial agent of Connecticut, complained

in a letter to Pitkin, the governor of the colony, on February 12, 1767: 'America was the theme in all companies, yet was discussed according to its bearings on personal ambition. Justice and prudence were lost sight of in unreflecting zeal for momentary victory. Men struggled for present advantage more than for any system of government, and the liberties of two millions of their countrymen, the unity of the British Empire, were left to be swayed by the accidents of a parliamentary skirmish.' There was some truth in the complaint of the Hon. George Grenville, one of the leading statesmen of the time: 'The seditious spirit of the Colonies owes its birth to the factions of this House.'

To make confusion worse, a series of weak and incapable statesmen, of men who owed their position rather to their inoffensive weakness, to their pliability and to their knowledge how to please than to their ability and to their knowledge how to govern, guided the policy of Great Britain. At the most critical period of its history the British Empire was practically leaderless. If one compares the activity of Bute, Grenville, Rockingham, Grafton and Townshend, who between 1761 and 1770 directed the policy of Great Britain, it is difficult to decide who of these men was the feeblest, the most incapable and, as a statesman, the most contemptible; and which of these four administrations was the worst. All was confusion in the English Government, and Choiseul, the implacable enemy of England, exultantly wrote: 'May the anarchy of the British Government last for ages.'

Having examined the causes which during a long time had led to severe friction between England and her Colonies and had greatly embittered Anglo-American relations, let us now study the genesis of the crisis in those relations and investigate the causes which eventually brought about the outbreak of the war and America's secession.

With the conclusion of the Peace of Paris in 1763, the whole North American continent seemed secured to England, and a period of happiness and tranquillity seemed to be opening to the British Empire. 'Never,' in the words of the leading American historian, 'was there a moment when the affections of the colonists struggled more strongly towards England, or when it would have been easier for the Mother Country to have secured to herself all the benefits of their trade as well as the goodwill of their people.' Unfortunately the English Government, acting solely in the British interests, was short-sighted enough not to pay any attention to the sentiments and wishes of the Colonies.

The great Anglo-French war had cost much money, and the English Parliament, starting from the idea that it was supreme throughout the Empire and calling itself an Imperial Parliament, quite logically arrived at the conclusion that England should recoup herself for her heavy war expenditure by taxing the American Colonies. However, fearing to arouse America's opposition, the English Government abstained from laying heavy taxes upon the American trade and resolved to obtain money from the Americans by taxing not their commodities but their transactions by means of stamps which were henceforth to be attached to every document to make it valid. It was thought that such an indirect taxation would be less obtrusive and could besides less easily be resisted. On March 10, 1764, the English House of Commons adopted the resolution, 'That towards defraying the expenses of protecting and securing the Colonies, it may be proper to charge certain stamp duties in the Colonies.' The Hon. H. Seymour was the only member who at the time protested against the right of the English Parliament to tax the Americans.

The American Colonies protested vigorously against being taxed without their consent in this artful and underhand

manner. They appealed to Magna Charta, according to which taxation required the consent of the taxed, they proved that in the light of Magna Charta this proceeding of the English Parliament was illegal, and they reminded the House of Commons that according to the ruling of Chief Justice Coke, the father of English jurisprudence, 'An Act of Parliament contrary to Magna Charta is void.' However, the arguments and protests of the Colonies were unavailing. Practically the whole Parliament had resolved to tax the Americans.

To answer their objections the Opposition were publicly called upon to deny, if they thought it fitting, the right of the English legislature to impose any tax, internal or external, on the Colonies, and not a single person ventured to contradict that right. The English Parliament was determined to rely not on reason or on justice, but on paper rights and on force, in dealing with America. Everything was done to intimidate the colonists. They were apprised that not a single member of either House doubted of the right of Parliament to impose the Stamp Duty or any other tax upon the Colonies, and Charles Yorke, the Attorney-General, gave a very long and most elaborate defence of the Stamp Act, resting his argument on the supreme and sovereign authority of Parliament. The Colonies, he insisted with a vast display of legal erudition, were but corporations; their power of legislation was but the power of making by-laws, subject to Parliamentary control. Their charters could not convey to them the legislative power of Great Britain, because the prerogative could not grant that power. The charters of the Colonial governments were but the King's standing commissions. The people of America could not be taken out of the general and supreme jurisdiction of Parliament. Lord Mansfield, the Lord Chief Justice of England, argued: 'There can be no doubt, my lords, but that the inhabitants of the Colonies are as much represented in Parliament

as the greatest part of the people of England are represented. In all questions of property, the Americans have appealed to the Privy Council here, and such causes have been determined not by their law but by the law of England. The Colonies must remain dependent upon the jurisdiction of the Mother Country, or they must be totally dismembered from it.' The House of Lords accepted the arguments of Lord Mansfield as unanswerable, and it was decided as a question of law that irresponsible taxation was not tyranny but a vested right.

Unfortunately the English Parliament was judge in its own cause. The opinions given by its legal advisers were bad law and worse justice. John Adams protested against the doctrine of the omnipotence of the English Parliament which presumed to call itself an Imperial Parliament and to act as such, although it represented only England and none of the Colonies. He said: 'If the Parliament of Great Britain had all the natural foundations of authority, wisdom, goodness, justice, power, would not an unlimited subjection of three millions of people to that Parliament, at three thousand miles distance, be real slavery? The minister and his advocates call resistance to Acts of Parliament treason and rebellion. But the people are not to be intimidated by hard words; they know that, in the opinion of all the Colonies, Parliament has no authority over them, except to regulate their trade, and this merely by consent.'

In the House of Commons, 'less resistance was made to the Stamp Act than to a common turnpike bill,' and it was passed without a formal division. The Lords passed it without debate, protest, division or amendment, nobody opposing it. Both Houses of Parliament were practically unanimous in their resolution to tax the American Colonies against their will. 'We might,' wrote Franklin, 'as well have hindered the sun's setting.'

The King was too ill to ratify the Act in person. The character of his disease was concealed. According to Lord

Chesterfield the malady was no trifling one ; according to Walpole he was very seriously ill and in great danger. To a few only was the nature of his illness known. *At the moment of passing the Stamp Act George III was insane.* George III cannot be held responsible for the passing of that iniquitous measure.

The Stamp Act aroused the greatest indignation in America. Riots occurred, the stamps were seized and destroyed by the people, and the stamp officers had to flee for their lives. The English Parliament repealed the Stamp Act because taxation without representation violated the fundamental principles of the British Constitution and thus admitted the illegality of its action. However, with deplorable lack of logic, the repeal was preceded by an official declaration in which it was affirmed that 'the King in Parliament has power to bind the Colonies and people of America in all cases whatsoever.'

Soon another attempt was made to tax the American Colonies without their consent. In 1767 the English Parliament voted taxes on glass, paper, painters' colours, lead and tea imported into America. After the repeal of the Stamp Duty and the acknowledgment of its illegality, the renewed attempts to tax the Colonies without their consent was an outrage. The colonists began to look upon the English Parliament with contempt and hatred. 'Up to this time the colonists had looked to Parliament as the bulwark of their liberties ; henceforward they knew it to be their most dangerous enemy,' wrote Bancroft. The Americans resolved not to drink tea in order to escape being taxed against their will. American tea importers sent back the chests of tea which were landed in the American harbours. 'The duty upon tea, with a great army to collect it, has produced in the southern part of America only £294 14s. ; in the northern part it has produced nothing. For the sake of a paltry revenue,' cried Lord Beauchamp, 'we lose the affections of two millions of people.'

The English Government was determined not to be foiled by the Americans. In its blind obstinacy it resolved to compel America to drink tea. Orders were given to land tea by force, in the expectation that tea-drinkers would soon begin to buy it, but that step had unexpected consequences. Being continually harassed and ill-treated, seeing all their proposals of an imperial union by an Imperial Parliament rejected, and seeing no hope of receiving justice at the hands of the Motherland by patient representation, the Colonies were at last compelled by the English Parliament to meet force with force. The tea in Boston harbour which was to be poured down the throats of the Americans against their will was thrown into the sea. The English Parliament retaliated by billeting soldiers in Boston, and by shutting up its port until the tea destroyed was paid for. Bloodshed followed, and at last the outraged Colonies flew to arms to get rid of their tormentors. Thus were the American Colonies driven into rebellion by the action of Parliament.

The English Parliament had received many emphatic warnings, but it had refused to heed them. Benjamin Franklin, the greatest well-wisher to England, who acted as America's envoy in London, had in vain warned the Government and Parliament of the inevitable results of their provocative measures. His statements in the House of Commons were not believed. The French envoy reported in August 1768 to Choiseul: 'Franklin has for years been predicting to the Ministers the necessary consequences of the American measures. He is a man of rare intelligence and well-disposed to England, but fortunately he is very little consulted.' Franklin was treated with contempt by Government and Parliament, and notwithstanding his transparent honesty of purpose his words were not credited. Franklin wrote: 'The British Ministry over-reach themselves by not believing me. Speaking the truth to them in sincerity was my only *finesse*.' To the delight of her enemies England was destroying the Empire, and her

enemies hastened to assist in the process. After a conversation of six hours with a person intimately acquainted with America, Choiseul wrote to Du Chatelet in July 1768, 'We must put aside projects and must now act. My idea is to examine the possibility of a treaty of commerce both of importation and exportation between France and America, the obvious advantages of which might draw the Americans towards us. Will it not be possible to give them at the critical moment an inducement powerful enough to detach them at once from the motherland ?'

Encouraged and aided by England's enemies, the Americans began their resistance.

Up to that time the thirteen English colonies in America had been by no means united. Governor Shirley of Massachusetts reported in 1755: 'If it is considered how different the present constitutions of the respective governments are from each other, how much the interests of some of them clash, and how opposed their tempers are, a coalition among the American Colonies will seem highly improbable.' Benjamin Franklin had written to Hume in 1760: 'That their growth may render them dangerous, I have not the least conception. They have already fourteen separate governments on the maritime coast of the continent, and shall probably have as many more behind them on the inland side. Their jealousy of each other is so great that they have never been able to effect a union among themselves nor even to agree in requesting the mother country to establish it for them. If they could not agree to unite for their defence against the French and Indians, who were perpetually harassing their people, is there any danger of their uniting against their own nation which they all love much more than they love one another ?'

'Such a union is impossible without the most grievous tyranny and oppression. People who have in a country property which they may lose and privileges which they may endanger are generally disposed to be quiet, and even

to bear much, rather than hazard all. While the government is mild and just, while important civil and religious rights are secure, such subjects will be dutiful and obedient. The waves do not rise but when the winds blow.'

The war which began between the American Colonies and the Motherland was in reality a war between the American Colonies and the English House of Parliament. It was a national war on the part of America, but a parliamentary war on the part of England. The great Burleigh, Lord Salisbury's ancestor, had said more than three centuries ago: 'England can never be undone unless by its Parliament.' His saying proved true. Parliament alienated America.

It should be mentioned that during the latter part of the Anglo-American conflict, and especially on the outbreak of hostilities, George III wished to subdue America by force, and that Lord North, who in 1770 became Prime Minister, supported the King's policy. Nevertheless it cannot be doubted that Parliament caused the conflict, and was mainly responsible for it. Therefore the great Lord Chatham exclaimed in the House of Lords: 'The people of America look upon Parliament as the authors of their miseries,' and addressing the House of Commons he said: 'Power without right is a thing hateful in itself and ever inclining to its fall. Tyranny is detestable in every shape, but in none so formidable as when it is assumed and exercised by a number of tyrants.' So firmly was Lord Chatham convinced of it that the English Parliament had driven the Americans into revolt by its injustice that he said, addressing Parliament: 'Resistance to your acts was as necessary as it was just; and your vain declarations of the omnipotence of Parliament, and the imperious doctrines of the necessity of submission will be found equally impotent to convince or to enslave your fellow-subjects in America who feel that tyranny whether ambitioned by an individual part of the legislature or the bodies who

compose it is equally intolerable to British subjects.' Parliament, not the King, who was only partly responsible for his actions, lost the American Colonies to Great Britain.

It may be said that from the technical point of view, from the lawyer's point of view, the English Parliament was justified in its uncompromising and overbearing attitude towards the Colonies. It is true that from the days of King William III there was a steady line of precedents of opinion that America, like Ireland, should provide in whole, or at least in part, for the support of its military establishment. It is also true that, as we have seen in the foregoing, all the greatest English lawyers had maintained England's right to tax the Colonies. However, living men cannot be ruled by the doctrines, precedents, rules, decisions and views of the dead and buried past. America appealed to England not in order to obtain law but to obtain that justice and fair treatment to which she was entitled as a member of the British Empire. Replying to the legal advisers of the Crown and their strictly legal interpretations of the relations between Colonies and Motherland, Lord Chatham indignantly exclaimed: 'I distrust the refinements of learning which fall to the share of so small a number of men. Providence has taken better care of our happiness, and has given us in the simplicity of common sense a rule for our direction by which we shall never be misled.'

It is dangerous for a great nation to rely for guidance in political matters on the abstruse doctrines taught by a few scientists. Had the English Parliament and Government been guided by practical wisdom, it would have been struck by the curious fact that, whilst all the leading English lawyers proved the justice of England's policy, all the leading American lawyers proved equally strongly its illegality. In practical politics, and especially in great national questions, there is a better guide than the

scientist with his doctrines and laws which the next generation laughs at.

Unfortunately Lord Chatham's warnings, his prophecies of disaster and his passionate appeals to unify the Empire before it was too late, fell on deaf ears. In 1775, the year before the American Declaration of Independence, he implored the Government to satisfy the just claims of the colonists, and he said in the course of his speech : ' Such a national and principled union cannot be resisted by the tricks of office or Ministerial manoeuvres. Laying of papers on your table, or counting numbers in a division, will not avert or postpone the hour of danger. It must arise.'

Unfortunately English politicians of that time relied on the ' tricks of office ' instead of relying on justice and fairness, and in short-sighted selfishness they threw away the most valuable possessions of England. The hour of danger arrived, and the British Empire was dismembered. Will the reduced British Empire continue to exist in its present extent, or will a second dismemberment take place ? It is difficult to believe that such a second dismemberment can be avoided unless the Empire be unified and be directed by an Imperial Parliament and Cabinet representative of the whole Empire. Our Colonies claim, and rightly claim, to be given a voice and a share in the administration of the British Empire. They plead for unity, but their proposals are being ignored. Will the tragedy of Colonial secession be repeated ? The times are serious. A few years may decide the fate of the British Empire. Let us hope that the English Parliament will learn in time the lesson of history.

CHAPTER VI

BRITISH INDUSTRY, LABOUR, EMIGRATION AND POVERTY

FREE TRADERS never tire of telling us that the British workers are the happiest and most prosperous workers in the world. They tell us that Free Trade means high wages, that our workers receive the highest wages in Europe, and that these high wages go much further in this country than they would in any other country, because the cost of living is much lower in Great Britain than anywhere else, thanks to Free Trade. These assurances are, as a rule, supported by statistics according to which British workers earn on an average about thirty-five shillings a week, whereas the workers in protected countries, such as Germany and France, earn considerably less.

Unfortunately, the statements and statistics which are habitually given by Free Traders in proof of the prosperity of our workers are not in accordance with the facts. The high British wages which are usually quoted are the wages paid to a minority of our workers. They are paid to a relatively small number of Trade Unionists, who occupy an exceptionally favourable position among our workers, and in giving these high wage figures no allowance is ever made for frequent and prolonged spells of unemployment, which reduce the high nominal wages of our Trade Unionists to a substantially lower level.

Great Britain has more than 12,000,000 wage-earners. Of these only about 2,000,000 are Trade Unionists. Let us leave aside the deceptive Trade Union statistics, which

apply only to a favoured section—one-sixth, if not less—of our workers; let us examine the general national condition of labour in Great Britain, and let us then glance at the conditions of labour in other countries. Such an examination will show that our workers are not better off, but are probably much worse off, than are the workers in the great industrial and protectionist countries.

Adam Smith taught: 'In a country where the funds destined for the maintenance of labour are sensibly decaying, every year the demand for servants and labourers would, in all the different classes of employments, be less than it had been the year before. Many who had been bred in the superior classes, not being able to find employment in their own business, would be glad to seek it in the lowest. The lowest class being not only overstocked with its own workmen, but with the overflowings of all the other classes, the competition for employment would be so great in it as to reduce the wages of labour to the most miserable and scanty subsistence of the labourer. . . . The liberal reward of labour, therefore, as it is the necessary effect, so it is the natural symptom of increasing national wealth. The scanty maintenance of the labouring poor, on the other hand, is the natural symptom that things are at a stand, and their starving conditions that they are going fast backwards.' I am afraid that Adam Smith's description applies to a very large part of our workers.

We can easily ascertain whether, as the Free Traders assert, our workers are well employed, well paid, and prosperous, or whether they are not well employed, ill paid, and poor.

In a country in which wages are high and prices low there should be little poverty. Nevertheless, the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman told us on June 5, 1908: 'Thanks to the patience and accurate scientific investigations of Mr. Rowntree and Mr. Charles Booth, we know that there are about 80 per cent. of our population under-paid,

on the verge of hunger.' Free Traders have tried in vain to explain away that fearfully damaging statement of their leader, which rather understated than overstated the case. In the ninth volume of Mr. Booth's work 'Life and Labour of the People' we read on page 427 :

'The result of all our inquiries makes it reasonably sure that one-third of the population are on or about the line of poverty, or are below it, having at most an income which, one time with another, averages twenty-one shillings or twenty-two shillings for a small family (or up to twenty-five or twenty-six for one of larger size), and in many cases falling much below this level.'

I would draw attention to the fact that the average earnings of at most twenty-one shillings to twenty-two shillings apply not to one-third of our wage-earners, but to one-third of our wage-earners' families ; that the scanty income of twenty-one shillings to twenty-two shillings a week which is 'enjoyed' by one-third of our workers is earned by the united exertions of all the members of the family.

On page 21, volume II, of his work, Mr. Booth gives us the result of his investigations into the labour conditions of London in the following summary :

CONDITIONS OF POPULATION OF LONDON				Per cent.
In lowest poverty	.	.	37,610	0.9
Very poor	.	.	316,834	7.5
Poor	.	.	938,293	22.3
Working class (comfortable)	.	.	2,166,503	51.5
Middle and upper classes	.	.	749,930	17.8
				<hr/>
				4,209,170
				<hr/>
Inmates of Institutions (workhouses, hospitals, etc.)	.	.	99,830	
				<hr/>
				4,309,000

In explanation of the foregoing table, Mr. Booth writes in Volume I. page 33 : 'By the word "poor" I mean to

describe those who have a sufficiently regular, though bare, income, such as eighteen shillings to twenty-one shillings per week for a moderate family; and by "very poor" those who, from any cause, fall much below this standard. My "poor" may be described as living under a struggle to obtain the necessities of life and make both ends meet; while the "very poor" live in a state of chronic want.'

According to Mr. Booth's investigations no less than 8·4 per cent. of the people of London, or 854,444 men, women, and children, lived in chronic want, subsisting, at the time of Mr. Booth's investigations (between 1887 and 1892), on less than eighteen shillings a week per family, whilst 22·8 per cent. of the people of London, or 938,293 men, women, and children subsisted on less than twenty-one shillings per family. We can gauge the depth of the poverty of these people only if we remember that London is the most expensive town in Great Britain. As the real wages of unskilled labour have scarcely risen during the last fifteen years, I think that poverty has not seriously diminished in London since the time when Mr. Booth made his investigation; possibly it has increased.

In the autumn of 1899, at a time when, as Mr. Rowntree tells us, trade in York was unusually prosperous, that gentleman made, by house-to-house visits, a most painstaking investigation into the labour conditions of York—a town which, according to Mr. Rowntree, is 'fairly representative of the conditions existing in many, if not most, of our provincial towns.' He divided the cases of poverty into two classes: primary and secondary poverty. Families living in primary poverty are by his classification those 'whose total earnings are insufficient to obtain the minimum necessities for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency.' Mr. Rowntree arrived at the conclusion that of the total population of York, 9·91 per cent. were living in primary poverty and that 17·93 per cent. were living in secondary poverty.

Whilst Mr. Booth found that 30·7 per cent. of the people were living in poverty in London, Mr. Rowntree found that 27·84 per cent. of the people were living in poverty in York, and it seems more than a coincidence that both investigators, working on independent and different lines, and in different towns, arrived at so closely similar results. Indeed, Mr. Booth wrote to Mr. Rowntree on July 25, 1901 : ' I have long thought that other cities, if similarly tested, would show a percentage of poverty not differing greatly from that existing in London. Your most valuable inquiry confirms me in this opinion.' It should be borne in mind that both Mr. Booth and Mr. Rowntree exclude from their census of poverty the large army of the poorest of the poor who live in workhouses, lunatic asylums, and other institutions. If these be added, the percentage of people living in poverty would be very materially increased.

On page 117, Mr. Rowntree sums up the result of his investigations as follows : ' It was found that families comprising 20,802 persons, equal to 43·4 per cent. of the wage-earning class, and to 27·84 per cent. of the total population of the city, were living in poverty.' If, in autumn 1899, during ' unusually prosperous times,' 27·84 per cent. of the inhabitants, and 43·4 per cent. of the workers, in a representative provincial town were living in poverty, how great, then, must be the prevalence of poverty among our workers at the present moment, when employment is very bad !

Now let us look into British wages.

The Labour Department of our Board of Trade might properly be called a Trade Union Labour Department because, in respect of unemployment, wages, &c., it takes into its purview only the two million Trade Unionists, and takes practically no notice of the ten millions of unorganised workers. The wages statistics which are regularly issued by the Board of Trade are exclusively Trade Union statistics. However, some official estimates

of general wages are available which show the deplorable and pitiful state of our wage-earners as a whole. On page 10 of the Final Report of the Royal Commission on Labour, published in 1894, we read: 'Nearly 24 per cent. of men *in employment* receive wages not exceeding twenty shillings a week.' What will be the real average wage of these 24 per cent. of our working men if allowance is made for short time and unemployment?

The very conscientious Mr. Rowntree gives the following statement regarding labourers' wages in York in 1899, a year of unusual prosperity: 'Allowing for broken time, the average wage for labour in York is from eighteen shillings to twenty-one shillings; whereas the minimum expenditure necessary to maintain in a state of physical efficiency a family of two adults and three children is twenty-one shillings and eightpence, or, if there are four children, the sum required would be twenty-six shillings. It is thus seen that the wages paid for unskilled labour in York are insufficient to provide food, shelter, and clothing adequate to maintain a family of moderate size in a state of bare physical efficiency. The above estimate of necessary minimum expenditure (twenty-one shillings and eightpence per week) is based upon the assumption that the diet is even less generous than that allowed to able-bodied paupers in the York workhouse, and that no allowance is made for any expenditure other than that absolutely required for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency.'

Messrs. Cadbury and Shann write in their book 'Sweating': 'The average wage for an unskilled labourer in this country is from 17s. 6d. to £1 per week, so that even with regular work such a man cannot keep himself and his family above the poverty line. . . . Generally, in the United Kingdom an unskilled labourer does not obtain a wage to enable him to keep himself and family in a state of efficiency—that is, he is a sweated worker. . . . An unskilled woman's wage is about 10s. per week. . . . The present system tends

to continually recruit the ranks of the inefficient from the class above them. Their wages being so low leaves them no margin from which to make provision for sickness, unemployment, or old age.'

The foregoing statements and figures of Messrs. Booth, Rowntree, and others, which have never seriously been challenged, prove that poverty, appalling in magnitude and in severity, prevails among our workers, who, according to the Free Trade text-books, are the most highly paid and the most prosperous workers in the world, and that this poverty is largely due to the fact that the wages of our unskilled and unorganised workers are quite insufficient to provide the indispensable minimum of food, shelter, and clothing. They prove that millions of our workers can obtain better food, clothes, and shelter in the workhouse than they can provide by the work of their hands.

We have a standing army of 1,200,000 paupers, and our permanent and occasional paupers number together at least 3,000,000. Our paupers are maintained at a yearly cost of about £80,000,000 to the community, and were it not for the Draconic administration of our poor-laws all our workhouses would be overcrowded by workers who would gladly exchange freedom and starvation wages for the confinement of the workhouse. No other nation has an army of paupers similar to that of Great Britain.

Men who earn a precarious sovereign a week cannot save money for their old age. Hence the workhouse is the refuge of the old and the infirm. According to Mr. Booth's estimate in his work 'The Aged Poor,' 'amongst the working classes and small traders the rate of pauperism for all over fifty-five is not less than 40 to 45 per cent.' Is there any other country in the world where more than 40 per cent. of the workers are underfed, where there are 3,000,000 paupers, and where one-half of the veterans of industry have to live on charity? Can it be believed that wages are high and prices low in this country, seeing that

more than 40 per cent. of our workers are living in poverty? Can it be believed that more than 40 per cent. of German, French, or American workers are living in poverty? The Free Traders know quite well that their statements about the great prosperity of the British workers are contrary to fact. If the British workers enjoyed simultaneously high wages and low prices, if the British working men were those happy, well-fed individuals described by the Free Traders, the Free Traders would not be so foolish as to rely in their opposition to Tariff Reform on the 'big loaf' argument, a pauper argument which appeals only to men who live on bread and dripping and on an occasional herring or a piece of bacon or of cheese washed down with inferior tea. The prosperous working men would not be frightened by a highly problematical rise of a fraction of a penny in the price of the loaf, but laugh at the 'dear bread' cry.

Now, the question arises: How is it that more than 40 per cent. of our workers live in poverty? Is their poverty due to their own misconduct or to outer circumstances? Mr. Booth analysed with very great care 4076 representative cases of poverty, and the result of his analysis is embodied in the following table:

ANALYSIS OF 4076 CASES OF POVERTY

Loafers	60
Drink	553
Casual, irregular, and low-paid work	2546
Illness, infirmity, large families..	917
								<hr/> 4076

It will be noticed that the percentage of poverty which is due to drink is small, and it must be questioned whether more often poverty is the result of drink or drink the result of poverty. In the Report on Physical Deterioration we read: 'People who have not enough food turn to drink to satisfy their cravings, and also to support their

enfeebled hearts by alcohol. . . . The poor often drink to get the effects of a good meal. They mistake the feeling of stimulation after alcohol for the feeling of nutrition. They turn to it to blunt their sensibility to squalor.'

It will be noticed that out of 4076 cases of poverty, 2546, or 62·5 per cent., were due to casual, irregular, and low-paid employment. Mr. Rowntree analysed in York 1465 cases of great poverty, and he arrived at the result that 729 cases, or 57·10 per cent., were due to unemployment, irregular employment, and ill-paid employment. In winter 1905-6, the Charity Organisation Society investigated 2000 cases of distress in West Ham, and, if we allow for 12·6 per cent. of people who were found to be not in distress, it appears that 55·4 per cent. were in distress owing to 'slackness of trade.'

How is it, then, that a considerable part of our workers, the skilled Trade Unionists, receive very good wages whilst the large majority of our workers receive low and very low wages? I will let Lord Brassey, a very prominent Free Trader and a large employer of labour, furnish a reply. He wrote in his book 'Work and Wages,' on page 155: 'The rate of wages in England is limited by the necessity of competition with foreign manufacturers. Employers, in England as elsewhere, only employ labour on the assumption that they can realise a profit by their business.'

The wages in Great Britain are low in consequence of Free Trade. They are low in those industries in which foreign manufacturers and producers compete freely, and they are high in those industries which are naturally or artificially protected against foreign competition. The wages throughout our coal trade and our building trade are high. Our coal industry is protected against foreign competition, by the fact that the coal mines of foreign countries lie so far inland on the continents of Europe and America that the competition of foreign coal in the British market is at present out of the question. The building trade is still

more strongly protected by the fact that though one can import cement, bricks, and timber, one cannot import houses from abroad. On the other hand, in the engineering trade, cotton trade, woollen trade, chemical trade, &c.—trades in which foreign nations freely compete in the British market—general wages are low, ranging from eighteen shillings to twenty-five shillings for the large body of general workers, and they are higher in these trades only among those skilled men who, through the strength of their organisations, have created an artificial scarcity of their labour, and who, by limiting the number of apprentices, &c., have protected their members against that free competition which is the ideal of the Free Traders. It is therefore clear that practically in all cases where British wages are high, they are not high owing to Free Trade, but in spite of Free Trade—that they are high in consequence of Protection given in some form or other.

Free Trade, free competition, has not only the effect of levelling down wages to the level of the lowest wages of competing countries, but of converting our highly skilled and highly paid workers into badly paid unskilled labourers. This process was excellently described by one of our Free Traders, Mr. Russell Rea, M.P., an unwilling witness to the effectiveness of foreign Protection in creating unemployment and ill-paid employment in Great Britain, in a paper which he read before the recent Free Trade Congress. He stated : ‘ The nationalistic Protectionist politician decrees that a portion of the capital and labour of his country shall be diverted to particular industries. These industries come into existence. The articles invariably selected for a protective taxation are the particular articles which we English are supplying in the greatest quantities, and apparently with the greatest profit to ourselves. Thus one British manufacturer after another has seen many of his markets restricted, and some lost entirely. He has seen that foreign Protectionist Governments, by the imposition of Protectionist

tariffs, not only determine the distribution of capital and the employment of labour in their own country, but in our country too. In their own country they do this in a manner which their fellow-countrymen approve, as apparently to their advantage; but as regards our country they do it in a manner which is certainly an immediate, and sometimes a permanent, injury to individuals and individual trades; and their express and avowed object is to injure. . . . The direction of our activities has therefore been in considerable part determined by the action of others, and that the deliberately hostile action of Protectionist States.'

Foreigners determine, indeed, whether British workers should grow wheat in the sunshine or raise coal in the bowels of the earth, whether they should produce delicate manufactures and earn thirty-five shillings a week or load and unload goods at the docks and earn starvation wages.

Foreign tariffs are graduated in accordance with the labour contained in the various articles imported. For instance, the duties on cotton yarn are low, those on coarse cotton cloth are higher, and those on fine cotton goods are highest. Thus foreign tariffs give a progressive protection not to the capitalist, as we have been told, but to national labour. In consequence of this arrangement of foreign tariffs their effect is to shut out of protected countries our highly finished articles and to let in raw materials and those coarse articles of manufacture which are produced by coarse and ill-paid labour.

I will give an example of the effect of foreign tariffs which should interest Free Traders. Jam and pickles are two articles the growing exportation of which has triumphantly been pointed out by our Free Traders as an evidence of the success of Free Trade. Mr. Winston Churchill said in a speech which will be found on page 105 of his book 'For Foreign Trade': "Think," Mr. Chamberlain said, "of an Empire founded on jam and pickles." But, gentlemen, I still believe that the country in which the superfine processes

are performed is the country which possesses what may be called commercial leadership.' The superfine process of making jam and pickles is carried on mainly by girls who earn on an average the pitiful wage of from eight shillings to ten shillings per week.

If we study the list of our exportations to Germany, it appears that these consist mainly of raw materials and food, such as coal, gold, silver, copper, hides, wool, fish, and of manufactured articles of the coarsest kind, such as cotton and woollen yarn, unbleached cotton cloth, &c. Germany lets into her country chiefly colonial and foreign raw products which come *via* England and the produce of our unskilled labour, whilst we buy from Germany chiefly fully manufactured articles produced by her skilled artisans. Thus the Anglo-German trade has the tendency to raise a large number of highly paid artisans in Germany and to degrade the highly skilled artisans of Great Britain to the ranks of unskilled labour.

Foreign tariffs on the higher-grade articles produced by British workers lead in the first place to a restriction in our exports of these high-grade articles to foreign countries. The articles which used to be made in Great Britain for export are, in consequence of the tariff, made by our competitors. These obtain a monopoly in their protected markets, and when their production exceeds the requirements of their home market they invade with their surplus produce in the first place the market of Great Britain, which they can enter free of duty, and there they create additional unemployment among our skilled workers. Thus Free Trade causes more or less severe unemployment among the highly skilled workers of this country.

The way in which foreign tariffs cause, firstly, unemployment among our skilled workers, whom they drive into the ranks of unskilled labourers, and then bring about the decline and decay of our industries, is well described on pages xviii and lv of the 'Report on Depression of Trade,' which

states : ' We are disposed to think that one of the chief agencies which have tended to perpetuate this state of things is the protective policy of so many foreign countries. The high prices which Protection secures to the producers within the protected area naturally stimulate production and impel them to engage in competition in foreign markets. The surplus production which cannot find a market at home is sent abroad, and in foreign markets undersells the commodities produced under less artificial conditions. . . . We think that insufficiency of employment is the most serious feature of the existing depression ; and it is an important, indeed an anxious, question whether, in the face of the ever-increasing invasion of our home markets by foreign productions admitted duty free, we shall be able to command a sufficiency of employment for our rapidly growing population. The great difficulty consists no longer as of old in the scarcity and dearness of the necessities and conveniences of life, but in the struggle for an adequate share of that employment which affords to the great bulk of the population their only means of obtaining a title to a sufficiency of those necessities and conveniences, however plentiful and cheap they may be. The effect upon this country of foreign tariffs and bounties is to narrow the market for our manufactures, and so to cramp the exercise of our industries and to arrest their growth, to render the employment of those engaged in them partial and irregular and very seriously to limit our total production of exchangeable wealth. It is on many accounts impossible for those whose industry is thus checked to turn to the production of " something else " which will be accepted in exchange, but primarily for the simple reason that those tariffs are now applied to almost every exportable product of British industry. Nor can any efforts of producers, however intelligent or energetic, lessen these difficulties ; for every improvement made by them is at once appropriated by their foreign competitors through the purchase of English machinery and the engagement for a time of English

superintendents. On the contrary, it is inevitable that any industry which is engaged in a hopeless struggle against insuperable difficulties must sooner or later fall into a condition of languor and of decreasing ability to meet competition. Those engaged in it lose heart and hope ; capital and talent are gradually withdrawn from it ; and as it offers reduced remuneration and a diminished prospect of advancement to skilled labour, the quality of the labour employed in it tends continually to decline and its productions deteriorate.'

According to the theories of our Free Traders the labour displaced by free imports turns to 'some more profitable employment.' This is a ridiculous misstatement of facts. The floating capital put, let us say, into the woollen industry by way of a loan to a mill may be transferred to some more profitable branch without difficulty and without loss. It may, for instance, be used for financing a woollen mill in France, Germany, or the United States. The fixed capital invested in the buildings and machinery of British mills is largely lost through depreciation or through the closing of mills, and the workers who are dismissed do not turn to a more profitable employment, but drift into the ranks of unskilled and casual labour. After trying in vain to find work at other mills, the dismissed artisans take up any odd job. They become porters, general labourers, dock labourers, carmen, &c. Some sell bootlaces in the street and become loafers. Many of those who are young and strong emigrate.

The constant creation of unskilled labour in Great Britain causes a great superfluity of that labour. It causes a constant underbidding of workers and a decline of wages among these workers not merely to the level of competing countries, but to the minimum level of subsistence—to the starvation level. The consequence of this state of affairs is that the wages for unskilled labour are considerably lower in Great Britain than they are in Germany. According to

the last report of our Consul at Frankfort, the German chemical industries are transferring their works to Great Britain, not only because of the Patent Law but more especially because the chemical manufacturers have discovered that general wages are lower in Great Britain than they are in Germany. In its last report the Berlin Chamber of Commerce complained that the ready-made clothes trade was leaving Berlin for London because wages are lower over here than they are in Germany. The Free Traders who, desiring to extol the blessings of Free Trade, tell us that clothes are cheaper in Great Britain than they are in Germany or the United States, omit to say that these cheap British clothes are only too often made by sweated labour.

Wages are lowest and poverty is greatest among our unskilled workers, who, as dock labourers, porters, carters, &c., live not on production, but on trade, and especially on our foreign trade. Free Trade replaces our home trade by foreign trade; it converts the regularly employed skilled productive worker into a casually employed and miserably paid trader's help, a two-legged beast of burden; and it is a poor consolation for us to contemplate and admire the great growth of our foreign trade, a growth which is due to the decay of part of our industries. Our manufacturing industries must have a market somewhere. Before the time when Free Trade had destroyed our agriculture, our manufactured articles were exchanged for British corn and meat, and our foreign trade was small. Since our agriculture has decayed, British manufactures have to be exchanged for American corn and meat. Through the ruin of our agriculture our foreign trade has become large, and 'Look at our prosperity!' 'Enormous foreign trade!' 'Great Britain is rolling in wealth!' cries the Free Trader.

It must be doubted whether we were wise in lightly throwing away the security of our prosperous and expansive home market in order to gain scattered and precarious foreign markets, especially as international crises, which

occur periodically and which seem unavoidable, such as the one through which we have been recently passing, affect far more severely the very sensitive foreign than the sturdy home trade, especially when the home trade is protected by well-devised tariffs. Our exports to protected countries consist of raw materials, such as coal, hides, clay, &c., of coarse, partly manufactured goods, such as yarn and unbleached cotton cloth, and of fully manufactured articles. The raw materials and the partly manufactured articles which we export are necessities to foreign nations, and they are largely bought in good and in bad times, but many of our fully manufactured goods are luxuries to foreigners. For instance, an American who wants a suit of genuine Harris tweed will gladly pay two or three pounds more in times of great prosperity, but he will buy a cheaper American tweed suit in bad times. The same applies to machinery and many other fully manufactured articles of exportation. In good times, when everyone is making money and cost is not counted, foreigners may cheerfully pay more for British than for domestic productions, and the protective tariff becomes ineffective. But in bad times British exports, and especially exports of fully manufactured articles which are luxuries to protected foreign nations, are cut off as with a knife. Then the protective tariff becomes a prohibitive tariff. In times of international depression our industries can no longer export freely, the British home market becomes over-stocked with goods which cannot be sold abroad, prices fall, and, in addition, foreign surplus manufactures are sold in Great Britain at whatever they will fetch and depress prices still further. And whilst our 'consumers,' the men with money in their pockets, rejoice at the cheapness of things, our producers are thrown out of work by the hundred thousand, and unemployment means distress and starvation for them because the majority of our workers receive such low wages that they cannot save much for a rainy day. They pawn their belongings, break up their

homes to provide food and fuel, and destitution becomes terribly prevalent.

The different standpoints and interests of consumers and producers during times of depression are well described in the 'Report of the Royal Commission on Depression of Trade.' We read on page xi of that report: 'Those who may be said to represent the producer have mainly dwelt upon the restriction, and on the absence of profit, in their respective businesses. It is from this class, and more especially from the employers of labour, that the complaints chiefly proceed. On the other hand, those classes of the population who derive their incomes from foreign investments or from property not directly connected with productive industries, appear to have little ground of complaint; on the contrary, they have profited by the remarkably low prices of many commodities.'

Unfortunately, our Free Traders look at our economic problem chiefly from the point of view of the trader and of the moneyed private purchaser. They take a greater interest in our foreign trade, which is carried on by the few, than in our domestic production, which is carried on by the million. They take a greater interest in the cheapness of 'commodities' than in the welfare of those men who produce them.

Free Traders have the boldness to assert that there is much less unemployment in Great Britain than in protected countries such as the United States and Germany. I shall prove that unemployment has become chronic in Great Britain, in consequence of the policy of Free Trade which places cheapness above happiness, private profit above national power and security, and goods above men; which sacrifices the producer to the consumer and the health and strength of the nation to the 'profit' made in foreign trade. I shall prove that in no industrial country in the world is there such widespread and such permanent unemployment as in Great Britain, and that the prevalence of that

widespread unemployment coincides with the rise of Free Trade.

Adam Smith wrote in his 'Wealth of Nations': 'The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is the increase of the number of its inhabitants. . . . The value of children is the greatest of all encouragements to marry. . . . The demand for men, like that for any other commodity, necessarily regulates the production of men; quickens it when it goes on too slowly, and stops it when it advances too fast.'

Translating Adam Smith's epigrams into modern language, I would state: The chief cause of emigration is unemployment and ill-paid employment. Workers migrate from countries where employment is bad to countries where employment is good. Hence the state of employment in a country may best be measured by the emigration and immigration returns. Before the introduction of Free Trade emigration from Great Britain was small. Since the introduction of Free Trade about 12,000,000 British people have left this country, and of these about 10,000,000 people have remained in the United States and in our Colonies. Lately emigration from this country has been growing at an alarming rate. Net emigration from Great Britain—that is, emigration *minus* immigration—amounted in 1900 to 71,188, and, steadily rising every year, it increased to 189,865 in 1905, and to 287,204 in 1907. The significance of these figures can be seen only by comparison. The Boer war, which lasted three years, cost 20,000 lives. One may therefore say that in 1907 Great Britain lost a Boer war every month. Can Free Traders point to any other industrial country where emigration has taken place on a scale similar to that from Great Britain?

Free Trade means cheapness—especially cheap labour, cheap men. Our record emigration has been caused by record unemployment. Most of our 10,000,000 emigrants have passed through the ranks of the unemployed. Free

Trade has meant widespread, acute, and permanent unemployment for our workers.

Whilst people emigrate from Great Britain by the hundred thousand, immigration is habitually far greater than emigration not only in the United States, but also in Germany, although the German population increases by more than 900,000 a year, whilst ours increases only by about 400,000 a year. The demand for men regulates the supply of men. Whilst our population leaves this country in rapidly increasing numbers, in a veritable flight as from a stricken land, workers from the neighbouring countries migrate every year by the hundred thousand into Germany, where they find temporary work ; for Germany suffers, as a rule, not from unemployment, but from a scarcity of workers. In 1906, 600,000 foreign workers migrated into Germany, and in 1907 the number was even greater. During the last few years, the United States have found work for more than a million immigrants every year. Nevertheless, our Free Traders have the courage to assert that unemployment is habitually greater in the United States and in Germany than it is in Great Britain.

Let us now look at our emigration from the financial point of view. Parents and the community jointly bring up children at very heavy expense, and their emigration at a time when they might repay the cost of their upbringing by useful work means in the first place the loss of the cost of their upbringing to their parents and to the community. If we estimate the cost of bringing up a child at £200, it will be seen that Great Britain has, since 1846, lost through emigration £2,000,000,000, and, in 1907 alone, she lost £47,000,000 in that way. We are not man-eating cannibals, still we are paying for our foreign imports with the flesh and blood of our best citizens. The Moloch of Free Trade demands a yearly sacrifice of men. Nations which choose to rely for their food on foreign countries, and which cannot export a sufficient quantity of manufactures to pay for them,

have to export men. Men are the largest of our 'invisible exports,' but these are never mentioned by our Free Traders when they explain to us how our foreign imports are paid for. Since the introduction of Free Trade we have presented foreign countries and our Colonies with 10,000,000 of our best workers, and we have saved to them the £2,000,000,000 which otherwise they would have had to spend in bringing them up from babyhood. Free Trade means cheapness. We pay a very high price for the cheapness of 'commodities.'

My calculation considers only the cost of bringing up children, and therefore greatly understates the actual loss which this country has suffered by the unnecessary emigration of millions of its inhabitants. The greatest wealth of a country lies not in the possession of coal, gold, a large foreign trade, bank balances, and shares, as the Free Traders try to make us believe, but in the productive labour of numerous well-employed and well-paid workers. Children when grown up become producers of wealth, and become taxpayers as well. Our taxation amounts to about £6 per head of population. Therefore every million emigrants means an additional taxation of £6,000,000 to the taxpayers who are left behind.

Our weakest industries were the first to suffer from the effects of Free Trade. Agriculture, and especially Irish agriculture, became unprofitable. In 1846 Ireland had about 9,000,000 inhabitants. Now it has only about 4,500,000 inhabitants, notwithstanding the rise of great manufacturing industries in Ulster which nourish several hundred thousand people. After rural Ireland came rural Scotland and England. Our agricultural labourers went to America by the hundred thousand. Our agriculture decayed. Mr. Palgrave estimated in 1905 the loss of agricultural capital which this country has suffered at £1,700,000,000, a sum which almost equals the sum total of our foreign investments. Then the canker of Free Trade attacked our manufacturing industries. Since our rural

parts have been depopulated, our emigrants consist chiefly of industrial workers from the towns. Rural Ireland, which used to supply the largest quota of our emigrants, supplies now only a small portion, and the majority of Irish emigrants come now from industrial Ulster.

Our emigrants not only weaken our home industry by diminishing the number of skilled workers, but they raise competitors to our home industries in foreign lands. Before the Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade, Mr. Thomas Edward Vickers said: 'There has been a great emigration from Sheffield to the United States. The emigrants to America remain there. The new steel industries of America will be chiefly established upon skill imported from Sheffield.' A visit to the great steel-works of America will confirm the foregoing statement. An American author, Mr. Curtiss, wrote on the same subject: 'There cannot be the slightest doubt that the chief cause which has driven out of England so many of her skilled artisans, ingenious and enterprising citizens, has been that fiscal policy which reduces prices to the lowest level, which destroys profits, and, as profits disappear, drives down wages to starvation point.'

Free Trade, the policy of heartless mammonism, does not endeavour to find a remedy for unemployment. The champions of Free Trade and profit comfort our unemployed worker with economic conundrums and feed him with statistics. They bid him behold our magnificent foreign trade and the increase in the income of other people as shown by the income-tax returns, instead of giving him work. 'The only way by which to counteract the misleading teachings of the Tariff Reformers is to give the working man a solid grounding in the broad principles of political economy,' wrote the 'Free Trader' of April 1908. Classical British political economy is the economy of the trader and of the capitalist. It is not the economy of the worker, the producer.

Emigration or the workhouse are the two alternatives

which the Free Traders offer to our displaced workers. But emigration is no remedy for the fearful amount of unemployment and consequent poverty which Free Trade has created. The Royal Commission on Labour reported on this point: 'Depressions of trade produce a relative superfluity of labour for a longer or shorter time. Where an industry is declining without any apparent hope of recovery the temporary condition passes into the permanent. In such an industry the supply of labour may be permanently in excess of the demand, unless it drift away in equal measure elsewhere. . . . Emigration may be a remedy in certain cases, but one serious objection to it from the present point of view is that the shiftless and incapable are not fit to emigrate; and if the emigrants are to be drawn from the better class, this is in effect to remove the more capable in order to lighten the competition of the less capable.'

Free Trade, after having created widespread unemployment and poverty in Great Britain, leads to the deterioration of the workers and of the race. Free Trade is converting Great Britain into a country dotted with workhouses and peopled with paupers. Free Trade has had an effect upon our industries similar to that which the expulsion of the Huguenots has had upon the industries of France. The former was as criminally foolish as the latter, and the chief difference is that Free Trade was a mistake on an incomparably larger—indeed, a gigantic scale.

Through unemployment and hunger the workers of Great Britain have been compelled to become the champion strike-breakers to all continental countries. Whenever there is a great strike on the Continent, British unemployed workers are successfully called upon to act as blacklegs. On September 9, 1908, at the Trade Union Congress, Mr. J. Sexton pointed out that 'whenever there was a dispute on the Continent, England was made a recruiting ground of blacklegs on behalf of the employers. Thousands of Englishmen had been sent to Germany and Sweden on this

disgraceful business. Many of them were strong and capable workmen, driven to accept anything in the way of a job by the pangs of hunger. Unemployment, therefore, was the root of the evil, and that problem must be solved.'

Mr. J. H. Wilson, M.P., said : 'There was a time when British trade unionists were held in high esteem upon the Continent ; but at Antwerp recently, during a strike, he saw a bill upon the walls which described a worker from this country as a "British louse." When they were described in that way it was time they made some effort to remove the cause of offence. Only this year over two thousand men had been sent from England to the far north of Sweden to take the place of the dock labourers there.'

The foregoing extracts are taken from the official report of the Congress. Strike-breaking is apparently becoming an increasingly important British industry. Through permanent and widespread unemployment the British workers, who used to be the proud aristocrats, are being degraded to the place of pariahs among the workers of Europe, as was pointed out to them at the Socialist Congress at Stuttgart. The tree is known by its fruit, and Free Trade is known by its result.

Will fiscal reform, the deliberate protection of British labour, improve employment, raise wages, and better the conditions of our workers ? I have no doubt that it will. The foregoing sketch shows that the condition of our workers, a small minority excluded, is habitually very bad. It can scarcely be worse than it is at present, when unemployment has grown to an unparalleled extent. Besides, the experience of other countries, especially Germany, shows that fiscal reform improves employment, and improved employment will mean better wages. Fiscal reform will certainly also mean better profits for our manufacturers, as the Free Traders so often point out ; but as wages are paid out of profits, wages can be large only when profits are large. It is vain to expect large wages in unprofitable, stagnant, or

decaying industries. Many of our manufacturers have lost heart through a long series of losses which free imports have caused to them. The first effect of fiscal reform will be a moral one. It will give new courage to our manufacturers and stimulate enterprise.

Free Traders have told us that it is unscientific to protect the British workers by means of a tariff against the fearful sufferings which are being inflicted upon them by foreign tariffs. I am afraid our Free Traders are insufficiently acquainted with their text-books, and I would draw the attention of our Free Trade professors to the following passage, which occurs in Book V. chapter iv. paragraph 6 of John Stuart Mill's 'Political Economy': 'A country cannot be expected to renounce the power of taxing foreigners unless foreigners will in return practise towards itself the same forbearance. The only mode in which a country can save itself from being a loser by the revenue duties imposed by other countries on its commodities, is to impose corresponding revenue duties on theirs.'

During sixty years Great Britain has followed an unnational economic policy—a policy which benefits the consumer, the merchant, and the capitalist. Her standpoint and outlook have been those of a petty and petty-minded tradesman. Her ideal has been the pursuit of 'profit' in the sense which the tradesman attaches to the word. Her motto has been that unworthy tradesman's motto of Cobden, in which he summed up the essence of Free Trade: 'Buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market.' Only the purchaser, the man with money, was to be considered. Nobody cared what became of the producers, the workers. Nobody cared what became of the nation and the Empire.

The dawn of a new era is breaking. Great Britain's economic policy of the future will no longer be the policy of the narrow-minded shopkeeper. Her economic policy will be guided by statesmanlike considerations. It will be a national

and an Imperial policy. It will protect British workers against unfair foreign competition, and it will endeavour to secure for them regular work with good wages. It will endeavour to re-create the industries which Free Trade has destroyed. It will strive to strengthen the Mother Country, to consolidate the Empire, and to elevate and unite the race. It will place the welfare of the people above the profit of the moneyed individual, and its watchword will be, 'British work for British workers.'

CHAPTER VII

UNEMPLOYMENT

At the present moment the question how to help the unemployed is on everybody's lips. It is generally agreed upon that unemployment is a grave social disease, that prevention is better than cure, that temporary assistance to the unemployed, in whatever form it is given, is not a remedy, but at best a very unsatisfactory palliative. If we wish to find a cure for unemployment we must study it in the same manner in which doctors study a disease.

Unfortunately, opinions differ as to the prevalence and extent of unemployment in this country. Some say that unemployment is an unavoidable evil, which is common to all industrial nations, and which afflicts Great Britain less than other countries. Others assert that unemployment is more severe and more widespread in Great Britain than in other industrial States. In order to arrive at a correct diagnosis of British unemployment, we must first of all solve the question whether Great Britain suffers from unemployment in a mild or in a malignant and acute form. Therefore we must compare unemployment in Great Britain with unemployment in Germany and the United States, countries which, by the magnitude and the high development of their industries, can alone be compared with Great Britain.

Hitherto most investigators have tried to measure the prevalence of unemployment in various countries by comparing merely the percentage of workers who are reported as being unemployed by various trade unions. These trade

union statistics of unemployment are valuable and interesting in themselves, but they do not give a faithful and adequate picture of the conditions of the national labour market as a whole. After all, only a small minority of workers, and not a representative minority, both in Great Britain and abroad, are enrolled in trade unions. Besides, the statistics of unemployment published by the trade unions in various countries are not absolutely comparable, for two reasons. In the first place, they are not drawn up in accordance with uniform rules. In the second place, they do not refer to identical occupations. Therefore, the statistics of unemployment published by the trade unions in various countries must be used with the utmost caution, and with full knowledge of the different conditions under which they have been drawn up, and these trade union statistics should be supplemented by other statistics of a more comprehensive and more general type.

The ebb and flow of the national labour market, as distinguished from the trade union labour market, may be gauged to some extent from the ebb and flow of the people across the frontiers of the State, and from the ebb and flow of the money in its savings banks.

Broadly speaking, it may be said that workers emigrate from countries where employment is bad to countries where employment is good. Unemployment and ill-paid employment are no doubt the principal causes of emigration, whilst good employment and well-paid employment are the chief causes of immigration. Therefore, the emigration and immigration statistics give a most valuable indication of the state of the national labour market in its entirety, as compared with the purely sectional trade union labour market. Besides, workers who are well employed and well paid are able to save much, whilst workers who are ill employed and ill paid can save but little. Consequently, in countries where workers are well employed and well paid, savings banks deposits should increase rapidly, whilst in countries

where workers are badly employed and consequently badly paid, savings banks deposits should be stationary or even retrogressive. Hence, the state of employment among the workers of a nation may further be gauged by observing the business transacted by the savings banks.

The foregoing shows that unemployment may be measured by three different tests: the trade union unemployment test, the immigration and emigration test, and the savings banks test. Normally, all three should agree, that is, the indications as to the state of employment furnished by one of these tests should be confirmed by the two remaining tests. Now let us, at the hand of these three tests, first compare unemployment in Great Britain and in Germany, and then compare unemployment in Great Britain and the United States.

PERCENTAGE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG TRADE UNIONISTS.

Years.				In Germany. Per cent.	In Great Britain. Per cent.
1903	2·7	5·1
1904	2·1	6·5
1905	1·6	5·4
1906	1·1	4·1
1907	1·5	4·2
January to June 1908	..			2·8	7·4
July	2·7	8·3
August	2·7	8·9
September	2·7	9·4

It will be observed that during the period 1903-1908—the official German unemployment statistics were first issued in 1903—unemployment among trade unionists was, as a rule, from three to four times as large in Great Britain as it was in Germany. However, there is an irreducible minimum of unemployment in every country, a minimum which arises from the fact that workers leave one situation on a Wednesday and enter another one on the following Monday or on Monday week, without being in the meantime unemployed in the usual sense of the term, although they

may be reported as being unemployed by their trade unions. Besides, voluntary holidays, illnesses, &c., cause absence from work, but not unemployment strictly so called. If we allow, let us say, one per cent. for this irreducible minimum of purely technical unemployment, it would appear that between 1903 and 1908 unemployment among trade unionists was about four times as great in Great Britain as it was in Germany, that for every unemployed trade unionist in Germany there were, as a rule, no fewer than four unemployed trade unionists in Great Britain.

Now let us see whether the emigration and immigration figures and the savings banks statistics confirm or contradict the foregoing statement.

		Emigration from Germany.	Gross Emigration from Gt. Britain.	Net Emigration from Gt. Britain.
1900	..	22,309	168,825	71,188
1901	..	22,073	171,716	72,016
1902	..	32,098	205,662	101,547
1903	..	36,310	259,956	147,036
1904	..	27,984	271,435	126,854
1905	..	28,075	262,077	139,365
1906	..	31,074	325,137	194,671
1907	..	31,696	395,447	237,204

The foregoing figures show that between 1900 and 1906 gross emigration, that is, emigration which does not allow for immigration, was absolutely from seven to ten times as large from Great Britain as it was from Germany. However, it must be borne in mind that the population of Germany is, roughly, 50 per cent. larger than the population of Great Britain. If we allow for that difference in population, it follows that emigration was relatively from ten to fifteen times as large from Great Britain as from Germany, that for every German emigrant there were from ten to fifteen British emigrants. Consequently, we may say that the pressure which causes emigration was from ten to fifteen times as great in Great Britain as it was in Germany.

The foregoing figures show a constant, rapid, and very

disquieting increase in the outflow of population from this country—an increase which, proportionately, becomes still greater when we look into the figures of British net emigration. These figures show how many British people have left these shores when the number of all British immigrants is deducted. In comparing gross and net emigration from this country, we find that gross emigration from Great Britain increased between 1900 and 1907 by, roughly, 280 per cent., whilst net emigration from Great Britain increased during the same time by 330 per cent. The inclination of our emigrants to return to their old home is apparently growing smaller from year to year, presumably because they find British conditions of employment more and more unsatisfactory.

Whilst Great Britain loses every year an enormous number of her people by emigration, a loss compared with which the loss of 20,000 lives in the South African War seems but a trifle, Germany gains every year on balance a considerable number of citizens through immigration. Unfortunately, I have no figures relating to the immigration of Germans into Germany. If these figures could be given, it would probably appear that the German population of Germany is rapidly increasing in numbers through the inflow of German Americans, of whom many return to the old country. At all events, it is clear that Germany is gaining on balance in population through the immigration of foreigners. At the census of 1900, 757,151 foreigners were counted in Germany. At the census of 1905, 1,007,179 foreigners were counted in that country. Hence, Germany has gained in foreigners alone 250,028 people between 1900 and 1905, whilst she has lost during the same time only 168,849 of her own people through emigration.

A comparison of the British and German emigration and immigration figures seems to indicate that employment is considerably better in Germany than in Great Britain, and

that consequently unemployment is considerably smaller in the former than in the latter country. The objection that it is natural that British emigration is greater than German emigration because Great Britain is more densely populated than Germany, is irrelevant as regards this investigation, which inquires merely into actual conditions, but not into causes. Besides, the fact that the population is denser in Great Britain than in Germany is not by any means a sufficient explanation for the great and constantly increasing outflow of our people. Great Britain is densely populated only in parts. The country contains large, very thinly, and very inadequately populated districts, which might be filled up if our industries were flourishing. Ireland, for instance, which sixty years ago had about 9,000,000 inhabitants, had at the last census only 4,458,775 inhabitants. Furthermore, the population per square mile is 70 per cent. larger in Belgium than it is in the whole of Great Britain, and it is even 6 per cent. larger in that country than it is in densely-populated England and Wales. Lastly, people emigrate from this country by the hundred thousand not because there is not enough room, but because there is not enough work, and I do not think that it can be maintained for a moment that there is not enough work in Great Britain because there is not enough room. Great Britain, with her extended coast-line, numerous harbours, and plentiful coal, has probably room enough for factories and workshops to maintain more than a hundred million people, and she has room for the additional dwelling-houses, &c., which would be required if there be a sufficiency of markets for the wares which these additional factories and workshops might produce.

Now let us apply the savings banks test to Great Britain and to Germany.

The latest figures available relating to the German savings banks are those for the year 1905, and the savings

banks deposits in Great Britain and in Germany compare as follows for the period 1900–1905 :—

SAVINGS BANKS DEPOSITS.

		In Germany.			In Great Britain.
1900	..	£441,929,000	£181,574,000
1905	..	633,756,000	204,834,000
	Difference	+£191,827,000			+£23,260,000

The foregoing table shows that in 1905 the deposits in the German savings banks were more than three times as large as the deposits in the British savings banks, without allowing for the important fact that in 1905 the German savings banks had accumulated a reserve fund of £39,175,000, which might properly be added to the deposits, whilst the British savings banks have no reserve fund.

A comparison of the growth of the savings banks deposits gives evidently a better insight into the state of employment in the two countries than a comparison of the sums total deposited in the British and German savings banks. The foregoing table shows that between 1900 and 1905 the German savings banks deposits have grown more than eight times as fast as the British savings banks deposits, and if we allow for the fact that the population of Germany is about 50 per cent. larger than the population of Great Britain, it appears that the deposits in the German savings banks have grown about six times as fast as the deposits in the British savings banks; that for every £1 deposited by the British working classes between 1900 and 1905 the German working classes have deposited £6.

As a matter of fact, the British savings banks deposits have not grown, but they have remained practically stationary between 1900 and 1905, for their apparent increase is entirely due to the interest added, withdrawals

having been equal to deposits. This state of stagnation has lately changed for one of ominous retrogression.

During the three years 1905-1908, the British savings banks deposits have grown by only £6,000,000, or by £2,000,000 a year. As the interest paid on our savings banks deposits exceeds £5,000,000 per annum, it follows that during the last three years withdrawals have actually exceeded deposits by more than £3,000,000 a year. Rightly considered, our savings banks deposits have not increased, but have decreased by more than £3,000,000 during every one of the last three years. During the same years, the German savings banks deposits have grown more than twenty-five times as fast as the British savings banks deposits have nominally grown, that is, for every £1 deposited during the last three years in Great Britain, there have proportionately been deposited £25 in Germany.

The growth of the German savings banks deposits is all the more remarkable when we remember that the working masses in Germany have the greatest facilities for acquiring freehold cottages, houses, and agricultural land, that millions of German peasants are owners of freehold land and houses, and that by far the largest part of the savings of the German masses is invested in fields, and in bricks and mortar. Apart from the enormous savings banks deposits, which now amount to about £750,000,000, the German workers have about £100,000,000 in the Imperial insurance societies, to which they contribute at present about £18,000,000 per year, and they are largely interested in prosperous and wealthy co-operative societies, building societies, &c. Hence, it cannot be doubted that the German working masses are considerably better off than are the British working masses.

In comparing German and British savings banks deposits, some allowance must be made for the fact that many German savings banks accept considerably larger deposits than £200, which is the maximum deposit allowed

by the British savings banks. However, of these larger sums, a considerable proportion consists of the collective holdings of workers in various forms, and it may be estimated that about 80 per cent. of the German savings banks deposits, or about £600,000,000, come within the British limit of £200.

The interest paid by the German savings banks, which is usually $8\frac{1}{2}$ to $8\frac{1}{4}$ per cent., is certainly considerably higher than the fixed interest of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. paid by the British savings banks, but relatively both rates of interest are practically equal. German Government stocks yield about 4 per cent., whilst British Government stocks yield only about 3 per cent., to the investor. Hence, the savings banks pay in both countries about $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. less than the rate which is obtainable on Government stocks. Consequently, it cannot be said that the German savings banks deposits are more than three times as large, and that they increase from eight to twenty-five times as fast, as the British savings banks deposits, because the interest paid is higher in Germany than in Great Britain.

I am also not of opinion that the huge amount and the rapid accumulation of deposits in the German savings banks, as compared with the small amount and the slow growth of deposits in the British savings banks deposits, is chiefly due to the fact that Germans are more thrifty than Englishmen. The greater thrift of the Germans is largely off-set by other influences which diminish German, but not British, savings. The German workers have, on an average, a larger number of children, and therefore larger expenses, than have Englishmen of the same class, and education is not gratuitous in Germany, as it is in this country. Besides, the German children are longer at school than British children, they go to work later in life, and they have therefore to be maintained during a longer period by their parents than English children. Lastly, military service is compulsory and universal in Germany, and the pay of the

soldier is so low that it is usually supplemented by small sums which the parents send regularly to their sons who are serving. All these circumstances, and various others which I might enumerate, tend to entrench upon German savings.

The comparative tables given in the foregoing pages as to unemployment among German and British trade unionists, as to emigration from Germany and Great Britain, and as to British and German savings banks deposits, corroborate and confirm each other. All these tables point unmistakably to the fact that employment is, as a rule, very considerably better in Germany than in Great Britain, and that, consequently, unemployment is less prevalent in the former than in the latter country. They point to the fact that, in consequence of better employment, the great mass of the working population is considerably better off in Germany than in Great Britain. The greater prosperity of the German working masses is eloquently proclaimed by the German savings banks statistics.

The fact that the members of certain British trade unions receive higher nominal wages than the members in the corresponding German trade unions does not contradict the foregoing conclusions. In Great Britain the trade unions are almost as old as are the manufacturing industries themselves. In Germany the trade unions are of yesterday. The German trade unions have not yet succeeded in conquering for themselves a privileged position, and 'standard union wages' are practically unknown in Germany. Although nominal trade union wages in Great Britain are in many instances higher than are the corresponding trade union wages in Germany, it cannot be concluded therefrom that general wages are higher in Great Britain than in Germany. On the contrary, the general level of wages is probably as high in Germany as in Great Britain, and is very likely higher in that country than over here. The migration of German industries to England is not only due to the new

Patents Act, but also to the fact that German manufacturers have discovered, as the British Consul at Frankfort pointed out in his last report, that general wages are lower in Great Britain than they are in Germany. The comparisons of German and British trade union wages, which have repeatedly been made by the British Board of Trade, err very seriously in two respects. In the first place, no allowance is made, as a rule, for the fact that very heavy insurance premiums have been deducted from the German wages previous to payment. Therefore German wages, as usually stated, appear considerably smaller than they are in reality. In the second place, no allowance is made, as a rule, for the fact that unemployment is much greater in Great Britain than in Germany. Hence, British wages appear substantially larger than they are in reality.

All the foregoing facts and figures point unmistakably in the same direction. They allow us to conclude that unemployment is usually very small in Germany as compared with this country. That conclusion is amply confirmed by the complaints about scarcity of workers which may be found in numerous reports of the German Chambers of Commerce, and of the German Chambers of Agriculture, as well as in the reports of many manufacturing and mining enterprises of Germany. These complaints have found an echo in the reports of many British Consuls, especially of the Consuls in Berlin, Hamburg, Dantzig, and Frankfort.

At the time of the last General Election in Germany, on January 15, 1907, the Social Democratic Party issued an election manifesto which stated: 'We have in Germany not too large, but too small, a number of workers. This may be seen from the fact that every year foreign workers are imported into Germany by the hundred thousand.' That statement was by no means an exaggerated one. In 1906 Germany imported no fewer than 600,000 workers

from abroad, of whom 240,000 were occupied in agriculture, and 860,000 in the manufacturing and mining industries. However, that huge immigration was apparently quite insufficient, for the Chamber of Commerce at Mannheim sent to the Government a petition which prayed that foreign workers should be allowed to be imported into Germany more freely, so as to relieve the great scarcity of labour. That interesting document stated: 'A scarcity of male and female workers has prevailed in our district during some considerable time, as reference to the yearly reports of this Chamber for 1904, 1905, and 1906 shows. Since several years the scarcity of workers is constantly increasing. This scarcity has, in the course of this year, grown to such an extent that various industries have been very seriously hampered in their operations, and have suffered considerable loss and damage. Experience has shown that that scarcity of workers cannot be remedied by offering higher wages. The workers know that labour is scarce. An increase in wages does not increase the output. On the contrary, employers are seriously complaining that their workers produce less and less, knowing that they are the masters of the situation.'

The petition from which the foregoing extract is taken—many similar statements are on record—is dated November 18, 1907, a time when employment was very bad in Great Britain, when our trade unions reported that 5 per cent. of their members were unemployed, when the British papers were as full with information about unemployment and consequent distress as they are at present, and when relief works for the unemployed were demanded all over the country. Commenting on the petition of which an extract has been given, the Mannheim Chamber of Commerce stated in its last report: 'The causes of the permanent scarcity of workers are sufficiently known. The continuous growth of our industries and trade requires a large additional supply of workers, a supply which is

not forthcoming through the natural increase of our population.'

In view of the fact that the natural increase of the German population comes to the enormous figure of 910,000 a year, whilst the British population has a natural increase of only 880,000 a year, and is nevertheless suffering constantly from widespread unemployment, and consequent emigration, the foregoing complaint that the natural increase of the German population is insufficient is very remarkable.

The state of employment in Germany may be measured to some extent by the sick fund figures, which are published every month, and which show how many workers are insured against disease with the State Insurance Societies. By comparing the number of insured workers during the present and the previous year, and by allowing for the natural increase of workers, Richard Calwer, a prominent German statistician, has calculated in the *Wirtschaftliche Korrespondenz* that in autumn 1908, 880,000 workers, out of a total of about 14,000,000 wage-earners, were unemployed in Germany. If his careful calculations, which have been endorsed by the German Press and the German Parliament, were correct, it would follow that 2·7 per cent. of the German workers were then unemployed. Reference to the foregoing pages shows that unemployment among German trade unionists came also to 2·7 per cent. Apparently, unemployment in Germany is equally great among union and non-union workers. In this country it is usually assumed that the percentage of unemployed among our unorganised workers is considerably higher than it is among our trade unionists, the aristocrats of British labour. However, assuming that unemployment among our non-union workers is no higher than among our trade unionists, it would follow that in autumn 1908 unemployment in Germany was trifling if compared with unemployment in Great Britain. Whilst unemployment among our trade unionists came to 8·9 per

cent. in August, and to 9·4 per cent. in September of 1908, it came to only 2·7 per cent. among all the German workers. Assuming, in opposition to the opinion which is generally held by experts, that unemployment is as a rule no greater among our non-union workers than it is among unionists, it would appear that unemployment in this country compares with unemployment in Germany approximately as thirty-five to ten; that for every ten unemployed workers in Germany there are thirty-five unemployed workers in Great Britain. These figures make no allowance for the 'irreducible minimum' of unemployment already referred to. Everyone acquainted with labour statistics must admit that this estimate is a very moderate one.

Let us now compare unemployment in Great Britain with unemployment in the United States.

Various Cabinet Ministers, and among them the Prime Minister himself, have lately repeatedly asserted in Parliament and elsewhere that unemployment is considerably greater in the United States than in Great Britain, and they have in several instances quoted very high percentages relating to unemployment in America during the present and during past years. In America no national statistics of unemployment, comparable with those available for Great Britain and Germany, are published, but some of the individual States of the Union, especially New York and Massachusetts, issue regularly statistics of unemployment among the members of certain trade unions within their territories. Acquaintance with the New York State unemployment statistics shows that the ministerial statements, according to which unemployment is usually far greater in the United States than in Great Britain, were based upon the very fragmentary statistics of unemployment published by the Department of Labour of the State of New York. Let us now compare the unemployment statistics of New York State

with the unemployment statistics relating to Great Britain.

UNEMPLOYMENT IN NEW YORK STATE						UNEMPLOYMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN.
Idle continuously for 3 months, January, February, March.			Idle on the last day of March.		Average per year.	
	Number.	Per cent.	Number.	Per cent.		
1897 ..	35,381	24·8	43,653	30·6	3·5	
1898 ..	18,102	10·1	37,857	21·0	3·0	
1899 ..	22,658	13·1	31,751	18·3	2·4	
1900 ..	22,895	10·1	44,336	20·0	2·9	
1901 ..	26,841	11·3	42,244	18·5	3·8	
1902 ..	16,776	6·2	36,710	13·6	4·4	
1903 ..	19,310	5·5	41,941	12·1	5·1	
1904 ..	55,710	14·6	103,995	27·2	6·5	
1905 ..	31,638	8·7	54,916	15·1	5·4	
1906 ..	24,746	6·5	37,237	9·9	4·1	
1907 ..	65,624	13·8	77,270	19·1	4·2	
1908 ..	101,466	26·3	138,131	35·7	7·4	

The foregoing table shows that unemployment among trade unionists is habitually from two to six times as large in New York as it is in Great Britain. Now the question arises : Can we conclude from these figures that, as a writer on economic subjects recently put it, ' In America from 10 to 80 per cent. of the workers are habitually unemployed even in the best years ' ?

In the United States there are about 20,000,000 wage-earners. The foregoing statistics relate only to from 150,000 to 400,000 workers, or to from 1 to 2 per cent. of the whole wage-earning population. This fact alone shows that the New York statistics of unemployment among trade unionists cannot be safely used as a reliable index to the state of employment in the United States. Besides, the State of New York occupies an altogether exceptional position in the United States. In the first place, about 80 per cent. of the foreign immigrants who go to the United States land in New York harbour, and a large number of these remain in New York State, where they often supplant

native workers. Hence, trade union employment is not very steady in New York. In the words of the British Consul in New York, 'When there is such an immense monthly flow of new men, the unions are to a great extent paralysed.' Thus New York occupies an altogether exceptional position. New York stands approximately in the same relation to the other American States in which the East End of London stands to the rest of Great Britain, and it is as absurd to estimate the number of unemployed in the United States by the percentage of unemployed in New York, as some of our ministers have done, as it would be to estimate the number of Jews in Great Britain by the percentage of Jews in Mile End, Whitechapel, and Bethnal Green. In the second place, New York is the centre of the seasonal trades of America. The ready-made clothes trade, for instance, is centred in New York for the same reason for which, in Great Britain, it is centred in the East End of London. In both the East End of London and in New York, tailoring is carried on by emigrant Jews from Eastern Europe. Besides, New York has so severe a winter that every year during many months building operations are almost at a standstill. In the words of the Eleventh Special Report, issued by the Commissioner of Labour at Washington, 'Weather conditions interfere with out-of-door work, reducing considerably the number of days worked in twelve months. In New York, for instance, it is estimated that bricklayers are able to work during only 150 to 175 days in the year.'

It is worth noting that among the trade unionists who report on unemployment to the Labour Department of New York State, the workers engaged in the building trade and the clothing trade—two trades which are essentially seasonal trades—form by far the largest contingents.

British workers have, on the whole, little cause to pity the American unemployed. Let us take the case of the New York bricklayer, who is occupied during only 150 to 175

days in the year. His average wages amount, according to the statistics furnished by the Labour Department in Washington, to 70 cents per hour, and to double that sum per hour for overtime. Hence, a New York bricklayer will earn in a normal eight-hours' day 5·60 dollars, or £1 8s. If he works nine hours he will earn £1 9s. a day, and if he works ten hours he will earn £1 15s. a day. The report of the Mosely Commission of 1908 contains the following statements by Mr. H. R. Taylor of the Operative Bricklayers' Society and by Mr. M. Deller of the National Association of Operative Plasterers: 'The bricklayer in America receives a wage ranging from two and a quarter to three and a half times the highest wage paid to a bricklayer here, the highest rate in England being 10½d., or 21 cents per hour, whilst the lowest wage paid in any of the towns and cities I have visited was 45 cents, or 1s. 10½d. per hour, at Niagara, and as high as 75 cents, or 8s. 1½d. per hour, in New York; whilst for tunnel or sewer work the recognised rate is 75 cents per hour, or 25s. per day in the Niagara and Cleveland districts, and as high as 9 dollars or £1 17s. 6d. per day of eight hours, in New York. The wages paid to plasterers in New York are at the present time 5 dollars (£1 0s. 2d.) per day.'

Such are the wages among the men in the building trade of New York, who notoriously suffer most severely from statistical unemployment, as shown in the foregoing table. However, New York bricklayers earn during the six or seven months whilst they are at work more than English bricklayers can earn in eighteen months. Moreover, during the long spell of winter, when building operations are at a standstill, and when the bricklayers are statistically unemployed, they work, many of them, at another trade. They earn frequently good wages in winter in the gas-works, which then have their busy season. However, that fact does not, of course, prevent these men being reported as unemployed at their trade by the secretary of their union.

The foregoing suffices to show that the statistics of unemployment among trade unionists issued by the Department of Labour of the State of New York are deceptive, and that it is quite inadmissible to assume that the New York percentage of unemployment may be applied to all workers, organised and unorganised, throughout the United States. It is, perhaps, not unnatural that irresponsible journalists have informed the British public that 'one man out of three is out of work in America,' or 'in Free Trade Great Britain only 8·2 per cent. of the workers are unemployed, whilst in Protectionist America from 10 to 30 per cent. of the workers are habitually unemployed even in the best times.' However, it is very much to be regretted that Mr. Asquith and other members of the Cabinet should implicitly and explicitly have endorsed these grossly misleading statements—statements which they ought to have known to be not in accordance with fact.

Now let us see whether the two remaining tests of employment and of unemployment, the emigration and immigration tests, and the savings banks test, confirm or contradict the very rudimentary trade union unemployment test given in the foregoing.

		Gross Emigration from Great Britain.	Net Emigration from Great Britain.	Immigration to the United States.
1900	..	168,825	71,188	448,572
1901	..	171,715	72,016	487,918
1902	..	205,662	101,547	648,743
1903	..	259,956	147,036	857,046
1904	..	271,435	126,854	812,870
1905	..	262,077	139,365	1,028,499
1906	..	325,137	194,671	1,100,735
1907	..	395,447	237,204	1,285,349

It will be noticed that between 1900 and 1907 emigration from Great Britain and immigration into the United States have both grown threefold, that the people are fleeing from this country in rapidly increasing numbers as from a stricken land, whilst the United States are getting more

and more attractive to workers who wish to 'better themselves.'

It cannot be argued that the enormous exodus of people from Europe to the United States is due chiefly to the activity of the emigration agents and the shipping companies, or that it is a chance movement, a passing craze, or a fashion due to some migratory instinct or to the unjustified hopes of emigrants who are attracted to America by visions of boundless wealth. The American Department of Labour, a department the functions of which are similar to those of our own Board of Trade, has by means of exhaustive inquiries ascertained that the vast majority of immigrants have set out to America because they have been advised to do so by relatives or friends of theirs who have settled in America and who have prospered. In a very large number of cases foreign immigrants have their passage paid for them by their friends and relatives in America. As soon as prosperity diminishes, foreigners settled in America advise their relatives and friends living in Europe not to come over because employment is bad. Hence, the immigration statistics are considered to be an excellent, and almost an infallible, index to the state of employment in the United States.

In view of the foregoing record figures it is quite clear that between 1900 and 1907, when employment grew steadily worse in Great Britain, it became steadily better in the United States. In fact, employment was so good over there during the period 1900-1907 that workers were scarce in America notwithstanding the immigration of millions of willing workers. The reports of the American Chambers of Commerce, of many American undertakings, and of our own Consuls testify to the fact that the United States suffered up to the summer of 1907, not from a scarcity of work, but from a scarcity of workers. The Consular report for New York, issued in May 1907, speaks, for instance, of 'constant complaints of shortage of labour, notwithstanding an

immigration exceeding 1,000,000 persons.' Another Consular report, relating to the United States, No. 3876, issued in July 1907, states : ' Notwithstanding the fact that considerably over 1,000,000 immigrants came into this country, there was in certain industries a serious scarcity of labour.' Consular Report No. 8777, on the trade of Maryland, states : ' Complaints were constantly made by the large wholesale houses that they were unable to get goods from the manufacturers, and the manufacturers plead that the dearth of workmen prevented them from complying with the demands that were made upon them. Indeed, everywhere, both in the country and in the cities, there was a constant cry for labour, skilled and unskilled.'

The immigration and emigration test clearly shows that employment was excellent in America between 1900 and 1907, and that consequently unemployment must have been practically non-existent in that country.

The American workers have £740,000,000 in their savings banks, whilst the British workers have only £210,000,000 in our savings banks. However, it would not be fair to apply the savings banks test to the whole of the United States and to Great Britain. In the United States, and especially in the agricultural parts, the workers invest their savings chiefly in land and houses. Similar facilities for investment do not exist in Great Britain. In New York State and Massachusetts, on the other hand, industrial and commercial States in which the vast majority of workers are town dwellers, the workers have comparatively few opportunities for investing money in real estate, and thus they are compelled to put their savings into the savings banks. In view of the fact that in New York State from 10 per cent. to 80 per cent. of the workers are, according to the trade union statistics, habitually unemployed, it will be particularly interesting to compare the savings banks deposits in Great Britain and in New York State.

			Deposits in the Savings Banks of New York State.	Deposits in the Savings Banks of Great Britain.
1895	£128,774,715	£143,181,656
1900	184,416,319	187,005,562
1905	222,179,452	204,834,576
1906	233,629,741	209,005,745
1907	278,859,207	209,694,077
Increase during last twelve years ..			+£150,084,492	+£66,512,421
Increase during last three years ..			+£56,679,755	+£4,859,501

The foregoing figures are startling indeed. They show that the 8,000,000 inhabitants of New York State have now a considerably larger sum in their savings banks than have the 44,000,000 inhabitants of the whole of Great Britain. If we allow for the difference in population, we find that for every £1 deposited in the savings banks by the average Englishman, the average citizen of New York State has £8 deposited in the savings banks. They show, further, that during the years 1905-1907 the average New Yorker added £7 to his savings banks deposit, whilst during the same time the average Englishman added only two shillings to his savings. In other words, for every £1 put by during the last three years by the average British worker, the average worker in New York State put by £70. The foregoing figures confirm the fact that in the United States employment must have been excellent and unemployment practically *nil*, and that employment was perhaps best in New York State, notwithstanding the large, but purely nominal, unemployment figures furnished by the trade unions of that State. The emigration and immigration figures and the savings banks statistics incontestably prove that the American workers must have passed through a long period of unparalleled prosperity.

New York State, like Great Britain, is a small and very densely populated State which subsists chiefly on

trade and industries. Therefore it is worth while to inquire a little more closely into the state of employment over there. For this purpose let us look into the censuses of 1900 and 1905—censuses which did not merely enumerate and classify population, but which were industrial censuses as well. These censuses give the following picture of the state of employment in New York State:—

WAGES AND SALARIES IN NEW YORK STATE.

	Number of wage-earners.	Wages paid.	Average wages per head per year.	Average wages per week.
1900 ..	726,909	\$337,323,585	\$464=£92 16 0	£1 15 8
1905 ..	856,947	430,014,851	502=100 8 0	1 18 6
Increase+	130,038	+\$92,691,266	+ \$38= £7 12 0	+£0 2 10

	Number of salary-earners.	Salaries paid.	Average salaries per head per year.	Average salaries per week.
1900 ..	68,030	\$76,740,115	\$1,113=222 12 0	£4 5 7
1905 ..	98,012	111,145,175	1,144=228 16 0	4 8 0
Increase+	29,982	+\$34,405,060	+ \$31= £6 4 0	+£0 2 5

It will be noticed that between 1900 and 1905 New York State found work for an additional army of 130,038 wage-earners and 29,982 clerks, &c., to whom, roughly speaking, additional wages of 127,096,826 dollars, or £25,419,265, per year were paid. These figures suffice to show that employment has been excellent in New York State. They show a surprising expansion in employment, and they prove that wherever unemployment existed in New York State it could scarcely be due to lack of work. The expansion of business in New York State is further illustrated by the

increase in the value of real and personal taxable estate, which have increased as follows :—

REAL AND PERSONAL TAXABLE ESTATE IN NEW YORK STATE.

1895	\$4,292,082,167
1900	5,461,302,752
1905	7,738,165,640
1907	8,565,379,394

It will be noticed that during the last twelve years the wealth of New York State, as measured by the value of real and personal taxable estate, has exactly doubled. This enormous increase in wealth has made possible the great increase of employment which is shown by the census figures.

Of late we have frequently been told that unemployment and consequent distress are very great in Germany and the United States. It is quite true that the United States and Germany have been, and still are, passing through an industrial crisis, accompanied by a considerable amount of unemployment. It is true that in these two countries a great reaction has taken place—a reaction which was only to be expected after the prolonged and unprecedented boom which preceded it. However, there is a material difference between unemployment in the United States and Germany, and unemployment in Great Britain. In Germany and the United States full employment is the rule ; in Great Britain it is the exception. In the United States and in Germany unemployment is usually unknown ; in Great Britain it is permanent, and it varies only in degree. Pathologically considered, the United States and Germany suffer at present from unemployment in an acute form, whilst Great Britain suffers from chronic and malignant unemployment which is constantly increasing, and which has lately become very acute. The fragmentary employment statistics relating to the United States may be said to be not a sufficient criterion to decide whether unemployment is

greater in America or in Great Britain, but the comprehensive employment statistics of Germany suffice to show that unemployment in that country is trifling if compared with unemployment in Great Britain, and that it is less severe during times of acute unemployment in Germany than it is in Great Britain during times when employment is considered to be normal.

CHAPTER VIII

OUR MILITARY NEEDS—A PLEA FOR A NATIONAL ARMY ¹

Among the branches of military science, military policy is, no doubt, the most important, for it provides the subject matter to the military organiser and administrator, and furnishes the sword to the strategist. Every statesman ought to have some considerable knowledge of military matters, because, in the words of a military classic, 'War is merely the continuation of political action by different means,' ² and he ought, before all, to study military policy, as the military policy of the State is directed rather by the civil than by the military power. At the present moment, when the military system of Great Britain is in a state of transition, and when the nation is hesitating in the choice of a military policy, it is most important to consider the aspect of the various military systems from the points of view of the strategist, the statesman, the economist, and the citizen, so that we may learn what military policy this country ought to follow.

All armies may be divided into two classes: the National and non-National ones. National Armies are composed of the voluntarily united citizens of the whole nation; non-National ones are composed of those citizens who are compelled to enlist against their will, either by force or by poverty, for it seems immaterial whether the fear of imprisonment or the fear of starvation is the compelling

¹ A paper read on Wednesday, February 27, 1907, at the Royal United Service Institution, Field-Marshal the Right Hon. Earl Roberts, V.C., K.G., &c., in the chair.

² Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, Vol. I. 29.

factor. Compulsory service, when cheerfully accepted by practically the whole nation, creates a National Army. The armies of Germany and France are National Armies, whilst the Russian Army is not a National Army. Voluntary enlistment, which is a misnomer when destitution supplants free will and drives men into the ranks, does not create a National Army. Let us carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of National and non-National Armies against each other.

THE EVIDENCE OF HISTORY

Military science, like every practical science, is based upon experience. As no history of military policy and no satisfactory general history of the art and institutions of war exists—the works of Jähn, Carrion Nisas, Delbrück, Rüstow, Gallitzyn, and others are unsatisfactory—I will take a bird's-eye view of the military history of the world, which will make it clear that National Armies are superior to non-National Armies, and that many of the greatest and most prosperous States have perished because they lacked a National Army.

Ancient Egypt was a powerful and very wealthy State. Her defence was entrusted to a National Army of 400,000 men who formed one of their great castes similar to the Samurai of Japan. Like the Samurai, the Egyptian warriors were given farms for their subsistence, for according to Diodorus, the Egyptians thought it dangerous to leave the defence of their country to men who had no interest in its preservation.¹ As long as Egypt trusted to a National Army she preserved her wealth and power. However, in the seventh century before Christ, King Psammeticus formed an army of Greek mercenaries from Ionia and Caria, presented them with lands, and ill-treated the Egyptian soldiers. The majority of the Egyptian warriors, 240,000 in number, emigrated to Ethiopia, and Egypt had to rely chiefly on

¹ Diodorus Siculus, I.

foreigners for her defence. The Persians, who were originally a poor and hardy race of mountaineers, attacked Egypt for the sake of plunder with their National Army, and a single battle, that of Pelusium in 525 B.C., destroyed the greatness and power of Egypt, and ever since the country has been ruled by foreigners.¹

The Persians, having conquered the rich lands of Asia Minor and Egypt, became exceedingly prosperous. Their ancient discipline was relaxed, their National Army was replaced by soldiers taken from the slums² and by levies from the subject nations. When Xerxes attacked Greece no less than fifty-six different nations were represented in his army, in which Persians formed a small minority.³ These vast hordes were easily shattered by the National Armies of Greece.

At that time all Greek citizens bore arms. They considered military service to be not a burden but a privilege. All freemen, high and low, rich and poor, fought side by side, and the best citizens were the best soldiers. Practically the whole population, from twenty to sixty years old, was trained for war. Soon after the Persian wars, Persian customs corrupted Greece. Having broken the power of Persia, and believing themselves henceforth secure from all aggression, arms were neglected, and hired troops recruited from the proletariat replaced the citizen armies. The Peloponnesian War, which broke out about fifty years after the battle of Salamis, was, according to Thucydides, fought chiefly by mercenaries. A hundred years after the battle of Salamis, Isocrates complained: 'Formerly mercenaries were unknown with us, but now our position is such that it is far easier to raise an army of vagabonds than a citizen army.'⁴ The Greek States relied on their wealth for their defence. Philip II of Macedon attacked Greece

¹ Herodotus, II. 152, 154, 164, 168; III. 11, 13.

² Xenophon, *Institutions of Cyrus*, Book VIII.

³ Herodotus, VII. 59, 100.

⁴ Isocrates, *Eighth Oration*.

with his National Army. The mercenary troops of Greece were routed, and the greatest heroism of the enthusiastic but ill-trained national volunteers—I would instance the total destruction of the sacred band of Thebes at the battle of Charonea—could not save the situation. The Greeks, who, as Aristotle had rightly said, were by nature qualified to rule the world,¹ became, like the Egyptians and Persians before them, a subject race, and have since then been ruled and plundered in turn by Macedonians, Romans, Goths, Byzantines, Turks.

Phœnicia was the greatest maritime and colonial power of antiquity. Her citizens had, no doubt, gained their predominant position in the world by their own arms. When Phœnicia was at the summit of her prosperity she relied for her defence on her fleet and on subject races and colonial troops. Persians, Libyans, Lydians, and others garrisoned the great Phœnician towns.² The mighty neighbours of Phœnicia despoiled her of wealth and power, and Alexander the Great completed the ruin of the country by the capture and destruction of the island city of Tyre. The desperate resistance of the Phœnician volunteers at the siege of Tyre was useless.³ The rich fled by sea to Carthage, a Phœnician colony, the poor were killed or sold as slaves, and Carthage became the heir of the great Phœnician world-empire in the same way in which, after a crushing defeat of Great Britain, the United States might become the heir of the British Empire.

Carthage ruled the sea and was exceedingly wealthy; Rome was poor. The struggle for existence caused war to break out between these two Powers, and, notwithstanding the genius of Hannibal, Carthage was defeated because, as Polybius, the foremost authority on the Carthaginian wars tells us, 'the Carthaginians employed mercenaries, whilst

¹ Aristotle, *Politics*, IV. 7.

² Ezekiel xxvii. 10, 11.

³ Arrian, I.; Diodorus Siculus, II.

Rome fought with a national army.'¹ In the words of a modern historian : ' Rome trusted to itself and its sword ; Carthage to its gold and its hired soldiers. The greatness of Rome was founded upon a rock ; that of Carthage upon sand and gold-dust.'² The Carthaginians possessed a huge army of native volunteers for home defence, but their heroic resistance could not save Carthage from destruction.

After the fall of Carthage Rome became the mistress of the world and exceedingly wealthy. Believing her position unchallengeable she neglected her army. Vegetius tells us : ' The security of a long peace altered the dispositions of the Romans, drew them from military to civil vocations, and created among them a love of ease and idleness. Military discipline, after having been neglected, disappeared entirely.'³ Universal service fell into abeyance. The Roman soldiers were recruited from the starving proletariat of the overgrown towns, and from allied and foreign nations.⁴ The barbarians invaded Italy, and meeting with feeble resistance, plundered the country. The Roman Emperors removed, for the sake of safety, the centre of the Empire to Constantinople, in the same manner in which, after a successful invasion of Great Britain, the Imperial Government and the centre of the British Empire might be removed from London to Montreal.

The huge East Roman Empire, with Constantinople as a capital, relied for defence on a Voluntary Army, recruited from the slums and reinforced by foreign mercenaries. Attacked by the National Armies of the Turks, Constantinople and the East Roman Empire fell in the fifteenth century.

During the sixteenth century Spain became the greatest and the wealthiest Power in the world. She possessed the strongest navies and armies, and the richest colonies. Her

¹ Polybius, I. 6 ; VII. 3.

² Heeren, *Historical Researches*, Vol. I. chap. viii.

³ Vegetius, *De Re Militaire*, I.

⁴ Tacitus, *Historia*, IV. 14 ; Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* ; Herodian, II. 6, 7.

wars were fought with mercenaries. The Netherlandish provinces of the Spanish Empire revolted against Philip II; war ensued, and the military power of Spain was destroyed by the national levies of the Dutch.

World-empires usually arise on the ruins of their predecessors. The wealth and the colonies of Spain fell into Dutch hands. Pursuing a commercial policy and confiding in the impregnable position of their water-girt and strongly fortified provinces, the supremacy of their navy and their glorious military past, the Dutch neglected their land armies. The defence of the country was left to Dutch paupers and foreign mercenaries. The Dutch were attacked by Louis XIV, and the Netherlands, which, when weak and poor, had, with a National Army, resisted Spain during eighty years of war, were overrun by French armies in less than forty days. The Dutch World-Empire crumbled to pieces, England became the heir of the Netherlands, New Amsterdam was re-christened New York. Had the Dutch possessed a national policy and a National Army, the world might have become Dutch instead of Anglo-Saxon.

The foregoing sketch history is, of course, very imperfect, for various causes, apart from military ones, contributed to the fall of the great and prosperous States mentioned. At the same time, it cannot be denied that nearly all the world-empires of which we have knowledge succumbed—and usually they succumbed after a single blow—because they had entrusted their defence to non-National Armies instead of relying on their own strength.

Let us now leave ancient history and consider the more modern methods of army organisation and warfare in order to understand the conditions and requirements of modern war.

Up to the time of the French Revolution war was waged by hired soldiery. In the words of Frederick the Great: 'Armies were composed only of the dregs of the nation, of loafers, drunkards, vagabonds, and other worthless subjects, who shunned work and sought a life of licence and

adventure.’¹ Enlistment being largely voluntary, armies were small and costly, and wars were, as a rule, long drawn out. They were rather trials of endurance than trials of strength between nations. A glance at the warfare of Frederick the Great will help us to understand the difference between pre-revolutionary and modern warfare and military policy.

Frederick the Great had an excellent standing army of about 200,000 professional soldiers. A large portion of these, from one-third to two-thirds, were foreigners. His troops were exceedingly well trained, discipline was cruelly severe, the soldier was an instrument, the army was a machine. There was practically no trained reserve. ‘One could replace the men lost in battle—supposing that a sufficient number of recruits could be obtained—as regards numbers, but one could not replace the soldiers as regards quality.’² Frederick the Great had to economise his force to the utmost. Consequently he tried to defeat his opponents rather by manœuvring than by battle, and fought on an average only one or two battles per year during the Seven Years’ War. The change from the cautious, slow, and laboured Frederickian warfare to the lightning-like warfare of Napoleon was due to a change in military policy. Frederick the Great commanded in battle only from thirty to forty thousand men, whilst Napoleon commanded in battle from one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand men. Owing to the size of his armies, Napoleon could, after a victorious battle, march straight upon the enemy’s capital, detaching half his forces for defending his line of communication. But Frederick the Great could obviously not defend his line of communication with twenty thousand or thirty thousand men, and march with an army of similar strength upon Vienna, although the distance which separated

¹ Frederick the Great, *Anti Machiavel*, chap. xii.

² Frederick the Great, *Histoire de la Guerre de Sept Ans*, Introduction.

him from Vienna was trifling. Lacking sufficient men, his battles had to be fought within easy reach of his magazines, exactly as Wellington's battles, also for lack of men, had to be fought within easy reach of the English Fleet. Frederick the Great was situated like a shopkeeper with an insufficient working capital.

When the French Revolution broke out practically all Europe made war upon France in the slow Frederickian method. France was, at the same time, invaded from all sides and torn by the great Vendean rising. The number of volunteers was insufficient for the defence of the country. The position of France was desperate. A heroic remedy was applied. By the edicts of August 28 and September 7, 1793, conscription was introduced. All able-bodied Frenchmen were called to arms, and with incredible rapidity fourteen armies and 1,200,000 men were raised. Necessity had created the nation in arms. The enormous armies of France easily scattered the foreign invaders and carried the war into the heart of the enemy's country, and, having an unlimited number of men, the thrifty, pennywise strategy of cautious moves and counter-moves could be thrown aside.

Whilst France had created a National Army, Prussia had preserved her non-National one, having religiously adhered to Frederickian traditions and the Frederickian policy. In 1799 Scharnhorst wrote: 'The French have the immense advantage that they can make war with their whole able-bodied population whilst other nations fight with only one-tenth of their able-bodied population.'¹ Seven years later, on April 12, 1806, Scharnhorst wrote in a memoir: 'Only by arming the whole mass of the people can a small nation obtain some sort of equality of power when defending itself against the attacks of a larger state. In no state can a National Militia be organised more easily than in Prussia. Unfortunately we have come to value more the art and technique of war than military virtues.

¹ Lehmann, *Scharnhorst*, I. 332.

Through that mistake the great nations of all times have perished. Courage, self-sacrifice, intrepidity are the foundation of national independence. Without these we shall be lost, even if we should be victorious in battle.’¹ The warnings of Scharnhorst, and of other Prussian patriots, that Prussia was no longer abreast of the times, that a thorough reform of her military organisation was required, were not heeded. Six months after the foregoing remarkable phrases were penned war broke out between Prussia and France, and on November 5, 1806, at the battle of Jena, Prussia, which had resisted the whole continent of Europe during seven years, succumbed at one blow and was dismembered.

After this terrible defeat Prussia recognised the value of Scharnhorst’s advice and resolved to create a National Army. On August 31, 1807, Scharnhorst drew up a reorganisation scheme. The first article of that interesting document stated: ‘All inhabitants of the State are bound to defend it.’ The celebrated General Gneisenau added to Scharnhorst’s scheme a ‘Memoir Regarding the Military Organisation of Schools,’ in which he recommended: ‘A strict military discipline should be introduced into all schools, every one of which should be supplied with a drill-master. The use of arms should be practised, and companies be formed, scholars should themselves elect their captains, and the principles of discipline should be taught. The bodies of the scholars should be hardened by appropriate gymnastic exercise preparatory to war.’² Prussia introduced the policy lately recommended to Great Britain by Lord Roberts. Wishing to break her fetters, Prussia converted the country into a huge camp, created a National Army, attacked, in 1813, Napoleon, and reconquered her independence. Having learnt by bitter experience the value of a National Army as a means of defence, she preserved universal compulsory service, which originally had been

¹ Lehmann, *Scharnhorst*, I. 379.

² *Militär-Wochenblatt*, Beiheft, 1854, 82, 94.

introduced only with the object of throwing off the intolerable yoke of France.

The endless wars of Napoleon had created wide-spread dissatisfaction in France. The National and Voluntary Army of the Revolution had, by the weariness of twenty years' warfare, become a compelled and non-National one. The military enthusiasm was gone. Desertion and self-mutilation of recruits were frequent. When Napoleon fell, France cried for relief from conscription, and in 1814 Louis XVIII issued an edict which stated, 'the conscription is abolished. The Army is recruiting by voluntary enlistment.' That edict was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm.

After 1860 the relations between Prussia and France became strained. Prussia, after having conquered for herself the hegemony in Germany, strove to create a united Germany and to acquire the hegemony in Europe, which hitherto had been held by France. A war between Prussia and France seemed unavoidable. Whilst Prussia had preserved and improved her National Army, which the disaster of Jena had called into being, France had denationalised hers. France had an excellent intelligence officer in Prussia—Baron Stoffel, who was military attaché to the French Embassy. His reports of the Prussian Army are classical. In one of them he shows that 'war is inevitable between France and Germany,' and under the heading, 'Want of Foresight of France—Fatal Consequences,' he writes: 'The North German Confederation will dispose of one million trained, disciplined, and strongly-organised soldiers, while France has barely three hundred thousand to four hundred thousand men. Whilst the German federal army embraces all the manhood, all the intelligence, all the *vis viva* of the nation full of faith, energy, and patriotism, the French Army is almost entirely composed of the poorest and the most ignorant portion of the people.' After having spoken of the torpor and degeneration of France, he urges the need of systematically regenerating the nation, writing: 'Chief

among the regenerative institutions there are two : compulsory military service and compulsory education.' However, Baron Stoffel thought the chance of introducing the former very small, for, ' Infatuated with itself and perverted by egotism, the nation will, with difficulty, conform to an institution of which it does not even suspect the strong and fruitful principle, the application of which requires virtues which France does not possess, such as self-denial, self-sacrifice, love of duty. Nations, like individuals, correct nothing in their lives unless taught by bitter experience, and do not reform their institutions unless compelled to do so by disasters—a Jena was necessary to teach Prussia to reform herself.' ¹

Eleven months after these remarkable words were written France experienced her Jena at Sedan. Baron Stoffel was a prophet crying in the wilderness. Misled by the delusive arguments of some eloquent politicians, and preferring ease to duty, the French nation did not listen to the voice of the experts. The Franco-German War again proved the superiority of the National over the non-National Army. After her disastrous defeat, France reformed her army and reintroduced universal military service.

In the Boer War a National Militia, not a National Army, fought the united forces of the British Empire, and an almost tenfold numerical superiority was required to crush the stubborn farmer-soldiers. Had the Boers possessed a National Army instead of a Militia, had their troops possessed a military organisation, discipline, and cohesion, they would very likely have defeated the British Empire and conquered South Africa. Had the Boers, as they were told, marched straight upon Durban and Cape Town, disregarding Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking, and had they cleared the country of all rails, and ' salted ' cattle and horses, the reconquest of South Africa might have been impossible for the British Empire. In the Russo-Japanese War, again,

¹ Baron Stoffel, Report, August 12, 1869.

a National Army defeated a non-National Army of the compulsory type.

CAUSES OF SUPERIORITY OF NATIONAL ARMIES

The foregoing examples seem clearly to prove the superiority of National over non-National Armies in ancient history and in modern war. What are the causes of that superiority?

The superiority of National over non-National Armies arises from three causes :—

1. A National Army possesses far more moral value than a non-National Army.
2. A National Army possesses far greater numerical strength than a non-National Army.
3. A National Army possesses far greater intelligence and a far better physique than a non-National Army.

Let us consider these three causes one by one.

THE MORAL FACTOR

In the words of Clausewitz : ' The most valuable lesson which the strategist can derive from the study of history is this, that it shows the incredible influence of the moral factor ; that it shows that military virtues are to the soldiers what genius is to their general.'¹ In the words of the late Colonel Henderson, who might have become another Clausewitz had he lived long enough : ' The first thing is to realise that in war we have to do not so much with numbers, arms, and manœuvres as with human nature. Moral force, said Napoleon I, is to physical force as is three to one.'² In the words of Brasidas, the great Spartan general : ' Three things are required in a soldier : firmness of will, sense of shame, and obedience to orders.'³ In the

¹ Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, Vol. I. 212, 217.

² Henderson, *Science of War*, 174.

³ Thucydides, V.

words of Julius Cæsar : 'Modesty and self-restraint are as precious in soldiers as courage and high-mindedness.'¹ 'An army is an organism, not a machine. In all periods of war, under all conditions of arms, the moral forces which affect armies have been the great determining factors of victories and defeat.'² In the words of Prince Bismarck, who possessed military knowledge and intuition to the highest extent : 'In war moral power and discipline is everything.'³

Historical experience tells us that the moral value of non-National Armies is a very low one. Beholding the ruin of the Roman Empire, which had fallen because it had entrusted its defence to hired soldiers, the father of military science wrote more than fifteen hundred years ago : 'On the careful choice of recruits depends the welfare of the State. The men to whose hands the defence of the Empire and its whole future are committed should be respectable men of high moral standing, for such men will be good soldiers. Their sense of honour will make them high-minded and victorious, but little good can be expected from men of a low type, even if they are well drilled and have been on active service. An army composed of inferior recruits never distinguished itself, and by terrible experience have we learned that there lies the source of our misfortune.'⁴ Seeing Italy overwhelmed by foreign nations, which had easily defeated the non-National Armies of the Italian Republics, Machiavelli wrote, four centuries ago : 'Those soldiers are little to be depended upon who have no other motive for fighting than their pay, for their small pay does not, and cannot, suffice to make them fight bravely and die willingly for the country which has hired them. Soldiers who do not fight from love for their country will make but a feeble resistance if vigorously attacked, and as self-sacrifice and heroism cannot be expected in mercenaries,

¹ Cæsar, *De Bello Gallico*, VI.

² General Maurice, in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Vol. XXIV. 343.

³ Poschinger, *Tischgespräche*, II. 435.

⁴ Vegetius, *De Re Militaire*, I.

the rulers of kingdoms and republics ought above all things to create National Armies, as all great nations of the past have done.' ¹ Beholding the decline of England under Charles II and James II, Sir Algernon Sidney wrote, two centuries ago: 'No State can be said to stand upon a steady foundation except those whose strength is in their own soldiery and the body of their own people. Such as serve for wages often betray their masters in distress, and always want the courage and industry which is found in those who fight for their own interests and are to have a part in the victory. The business of mercenaries is so to perform their duty as to keep their employment, and to draw profit from it, but that is not enough to support the spirit of men in extreme danger. The shepherd who is a hireling flies when the thief comes.' ²

The history of all time proves the moral inferiority of hired soldiery. At the beginning of the war between Parliament and Charles I, 22,000 men were impressed by the former. 'Clergymen, scholars, students at the Inns of Court and Universities, the sons of esquires, persons rated at £5 goods or £8 land, and servants of Members of Parliament, were excepted.' ³ The Parliamentary Army was an armed mob composed of 'decayed serving men and tapsters, and such kind of fellows,' as Cromwell picturesquely put it, ⁴ and it was miserably beaten by Charles I. Like every great general, Cromwell attached the highest value to the moral factor in war. Seeing in the spirits of 'these low and mean fellows' the cause of the numerous defeats of the Parliamentary troops, Cromwell raised a National Army, composed of substantial freeholders, who defended their country, their faith, and, let it not be forgotten, their property, against Charles I, and these men 'made some

¹ Machiavelli, *Discorsi*, Book I. chap. xliii.

² Sir Algernon Sidney on Government, chap. ii. 21.

³ Firth, *Cromwell's Army*, 21.

⁴ Cromwell's Speech, April 13, 1657.

conscience of what they did and were never beaten.’¹ In the Franco-German War of 1870-71, the French Army was easily defeated by the German Army, largely in consequence of the superior moral force of the latter. Nominally every Frenchman had to serve, but as those who could afford it were allowed to furnish *remplaçants*—a substitute could, in 1869, be obtained for 2,400 francs—the soldiers belonged almost exclusively to the poorest, lowest, and least intelligent section of the population.² The army was a caste in the nation.³ The burden of military service rested upon the poorest, the least instructed, and the least healthy section of the people.⁴ The soldiers were the pariahs of French society, paupers who, according to Bazaine, were generally considered only fit to be food for powder.⁵ The moral weakness of the French troops converted every defeat into a rout, every retirement into a wild flight, every non-success into a disaster, dissolved all bonds of discipline, and converted the regiments into a raving mob, which wreaked its vengeance upon the officers. Zola’s ‘*Débacle*’ gives a faithful picture of the frightful moral breakdown of the French Army. Cromwell’s soldiers, the Germans when fighting against Napoleon I and Napoleon III, the Boers, and the Japanese, fought for hearth and home; armed paupers and adventurers, who have no hearth and home, fight merely for their pay. They fight, not for their country, in which they have no stake, but for their more prosperous fellow-citizens, who are unwilling to fight themselves. Hence a so-called Voluntary Army is a Pauper Army, which possesses all the pauper characteristics. It is chronically dissatisfied, and is apt to refuse fighting at the moment when its services are most needed. The fall of Carthage was accelerated, if not caused, by the revolt of the

¹ Cromwell’s Speech, April 13, 1657.

² *Les Causes de nos Désastres*, 91.

³ Boulanger, *L’Invasion Allemande*, I. 36.

⁴ Lehautcourt, *Histoire de la Guerre*, II. 56.

⁵ Bazaine, *Episodes de la Guerre*, XXV.

mercenaries described by Polybius.¹ In 1797, during the war with France, a strike of the sailors for higher pay twice laid up the British Fleet at a most critical moment. If Great Britain preserves her Voluntary Army, she must be prepared to see history repeating itself when the enemy is imperiously knocking at the gate. A non-National Army possesses little moral value, and is unreliable, especially in adversity.

It is true that some non-National Armies, such as those of Hannibal, Marlborough—who was a second Hannibal—and Wellington, have shown the greatest heroism, but these armies fought for exceptional men. The mercenaries who served under generals such as Hannibal, Marlborough, and Wellington, saw in them their cause and their country. Such leaders arise hardly once in a century, and though they are able to fashion excellent armies out of the worst material they cannot do so quickly. In modern war blows fall with lightning speed. Therefore it is now hardly possible to improvise armies after the outbreak of war. The futile resistance of Gambetta's armies in the Franco-German War has made that point clear. France was not given the time to draw on her latent resources and to 'organise victory,' as in the times of Carnot.

NUMBERS IN WAR

Clausewitz, Jomini, and Hamley teach that the whole art of war consists in striking with greater strength the right point at the right moment. 'Providence,' Napoleon used to say, 'usually fights on the side of the big battalions.' The great numerical superiority of National Armies is certain to give them the victory over non-National ones. Victories such as those of Charles XII of Sweden over the Russians happen nowadays only between white men and savages. The armament and tactics of all European nations are

¹ Polybius, I. 3, 5, 6, &c.

practically uniform. Therefore, modern wars between white people are apt to be decided by superior numbers. In 1870 France was swamped by the vast hosts of Germany, which bore all before them. At the beginning of August France had 382 battalions, Germany 474 battalions ; France had 220 squadrons, Germany had 382 squadrons ; France had 780 guns, Germany had 1,584 guns.¹ In the great numerical superiority of the German Army Napoleon III saw the direct cause of his defeat, for he told us in his 'Œuvres Posthumes' : 'The troops we might have to face would be either 380,000 men of Prussia alone, without the Southern States, or 480,000 men of united Germany, against which we were able to oppose 400,000, if the calculations of the Minister of War were correct, and if there had been sufficient time to get them together. Thus, although according to official data the number of fighting men was 588,000, there were reckoned only 385,000 for the Army of the Rhine. It seemed, therefore, as if a very large allowance had been made for unfavourable eventualities. What a bitter deception the chief of this Army must have experienced when, at the end of three weeks, the eight army corps sent to the frontier did not furnish more than about 220,000 men ! This inconceivable difference between the number of men present under the colours and those who ought to have been there is a most striking and deplorable example of the vicious character of our military organisation. The transition from a peace establishment to a war establishment was far more protracted than was expected, and this was the chief cause of our reverses.

' Instead of having in line, as might have been expected, 385,000 men to oppose the 480,000 of Northern Germany combined with the Southern States, the Army, when the Emperor arrived at Metz on July 25, amounted only to 220,000, and, moreover, not only were the effectives not up

¹ *Generalstabswerk*, 1*, 30.*

to their full complement, but many indispensable accessories were wanting.' ¹

On paper the German and French forces stood approximately in the proportion of two to one. If the moral factor be taken into account, the German and French forces stood in the proportion of three to one. Therefore, the war was lost for France before it was begun. At Weissenburg 50,950 Germans defeated 5,300 Frenchmen, and 144 German guns played upon but 18 French guns; at Wörth 97,650 Germans attacked 48,550 Frenchmen, and 342 German guns easily silenced the 167 French guns opposed to them; at Spichern (Forbach) 34,600 Germans, with 108 guns, routed 27,600 Frenchmen with 90 guns; at Gravelotte 187,600 Germans with 782 guns defeated 112,800 Frenchmen with 520 guns; at Sedan 154,850 Germans with 701 guns defeated 90,000 Frenchmen with 408 guns.² Germany's successes in the war were due, perhaps, not so much to superior generalship as to superior numbers and superior *morale*—factors which her National Army supplied. On August 4 the German attack commenced. On August 6, two days later, when the battles of Weissenburg, Wörth, and Spichern had taken place, the war was, according to a competent French writer, lost for France.³ In two days the mighty French Empire was humbled to the dust. When a National Army meets a non-National one, the first encounter is frequently decisive, as may be seen by the battles of Jena, Eckmühl, and Königgrätz.

INTELLIGENCE AND PHYSIQUE

National Armies being composed of men of every class, rank, occupation, and profession possess greater intelligence than armies composed of paupers and adventurers. When recruits are drawn almost entirely from the lowest stratum

¹ Napoleon III, *Œuvres Posthumes*, IV. V. VI.

² *Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften*, 1889, Part XII. 837.

³ *Les Causes de nos Désastres*, 65.

of the population, every desire of progress and every reform is hampered by fears that it may unfavourably affect recruiting. Therefore, non-National Armies stand still whilst National Armies advance. Whilst non-National Armies are constitutionally conservative, and are military machines directed by routine, National Armies and Militias have brought about nearly every progress in intelligent warfare and nearly every improvement in tactics. The British National Army, which fought at Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt; the Hussites, who fought at Deutschbrod, Aussig, and Taus; and the Swiss National levies, who fought at Morgarten, Sempach, Granson, and Morat, destroyed the power of mailed knighthood and created modern infantry. The revolted Americans and the soldiers of the French Revolution destroyed the linear tactics and created the modern loose formations. The latest revolution in tactics and the latest improvements in field fortifications and permanent fortifications were invented by the Boers.

The physique of National Armies is better than that of non-National Armies of the same race, as a comparison of German and English recruits will show. The causes of this difference are obvious. The Germans can pick their recruits from the whole population, whilst the British Army can pick its recruits only from the stunted and underfed youths who voluntarily enlist. Therefore a British Army seems unlikely to be able to compete with a National European Army in marching power and endurance, two most important factors in modern warfare.

The foregoing shows that non-National Armies are greatly inferior to National Armies in moral force, that is in courage, fortitude, devotion, and obedience; in numbers, in intelligence, and in physical strength and endurance; and it follows that the British Army compares very unfavourably with the armies of other nations, against which it may have to fight.

DISADVANTAGES OF THE BRITISH MILITARY SYSTEM

It may be objected : ' It is true that a National Army is, generally speaking, far superior to a non-National Army. Nevertheless, in the case of Great Britain, an army raised by voluntary enlistment is sufficient and, on the whole, preferable to a National Army ' :—

1. Because Great Britain has hitherto done very well without a National Army.
2. Because no nation threatens this country.
3. Because Great Britain rules the sea and can rely on her fleet for her defence.
4. Because this country has allies who possess powerful armies.
5. Because International Arbitration is likely soon to abolish war.

Let us examine these arguments one by one.

As regards the first objection, I think Great Britain has hitherto not done very well, but has done very badly because she lacked a National Army. Had she possessed a National Army, the American Revolutionary War would probably never have occurred, firstly, because the American Colonies would have been too weak to resist a British National Army ; secondly, and principally, because universal military service is a most powerful argument in favour of peace. An army of mercenaries, a Voluntary Army, can be used for any war, one might almost say for any crime, because such an army obeys blindly, but a National Army can be used only for a National purpose. An unpopular war cannot be carried on by a National Army. The British Parliament would have been juster to the claims of the American colonists had the brothers and sons of Cabinet Ministers, and of Members of both Houses of Parliament, been obliged to shoulder a rifle and fight the Americans. At the time of the American Revolution the British Army was to the men

in Parliament merely the executioner of their will, and they hired Hessians and other German troops to do the fighting for them. Had Great Britain had a National Army she might have preserved her American Colonies, and might have saved to the tax-payers £200,000,000, the cost of the war. We may now trace the loss of our most precious Colonies to the lack of a National Army, and may not similar, and perhaps greater, disasters arise in the future from the same cause?

Owing to our lack of a National Army, Napoleon I was at liberty to devastate the continent of Europe during twenty years. Had Great Britain been able to land 800,000 men at Dieppe, and march with 150,000 men upon Paris—the distance could easily have been covered in less than a week—Napoleon would never have ventured to march upon Berlin, Vienna, Madrid, and Moscow. By a cheap demonstration, by merely assembling a fleet of transports at Portsmouth, Napoleon's activity might have been stopped and the peace of Europe been maintained. The military weakness of this country let Napoleon loose on Europe. The Napoleonic wars needlessly devoured several million human lives, and cost this country approximately £1,000,000,000. These fearful losses might have been avoided had Great Britain been strong on land.

Lastly, owing to the absence of a National Army, the Boer War cost Great Britain 20,000 lives and £250,000,000. Had this country possessed a National Army, the Boers would never have ventured to go to war with Great Britain. It is not true that Great Britain has hitherto done very well without a National Army.

As regards the second objection, it must be admitted that no nation threatens Great Britain *at present*, but we cannot foresee the future. Ten years ago no one would have thought it possible that Great Britain would require 500,000 men to defeat the Boers, or that Japan would defeat Russia, or that France and England would be friends notwithstanding Fashoda, or that Germany would make

a determined bid for the rule of the sea. The political situation is apt to alter as suddenly as the weather in April. Therefore, it is as foolish to ask : ' Against which nation do we require a National Army ? ' as it is to ask : ' Against which burglar do we require a bolt on the front door ? ' It is usually too late to fix a bolt on one's door when one knows against which burglar it is required. Armies are living organisms of very slow growth, and they cannot be improvised when we have the misfortune to know against which Power they are required.

As regards the third objection, it is true that Great Britain rules the sea now, but she may not always rule it. Wealthier nations may secure the rule of the sea, and, unless the British Empire be unified, Great Britain alone, with her almost stationary population, may financially be unable to maintain her naval supremacy against the United States or even against Germany. Besides, history teaches us that the foremost naval Powers have been defeated either by coalitions and the defection of allies, as were the Phœnicians and Venetians, or by surprise, as were the Genoese and the Dutch. Forty years ago the Austrians destroyed by surprise the far more powerful Italian Fleet at Lissa, and the Japanese, also by surprise, inflicted serious damage on the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur. Naval supremacy may further be lost by new inventions. The *corvus* of Duilius destroyed the maritime supremacy of Carthage in a few hours, and in the American Civil War a single ship of a new type, the ' Merrimac,' destroyed the weak squadron of old sailing-ships opposed to her. A new electrical invention may conceivably have similar consequences to Great Britain. Lastly, this country may be invaded at a time when the fleet is busy in a distant quarter of the world, for it cannot permanently be kept in home waters. The history of Phœnicia, Carthage, Venice, and the Netherlands, which once ruled the sea, teaches us that it is dangerous for a nation to entrust its fate entirely to its

ships. Let us, therefore, put the utmost trust in the Blue Water School, but let us, at the same time, provide an alternative means of defence. It would be insane to stake the existence of Great Britain on a single card.

As regards the fourth objection, it is true that Great Britain has powerful allies, but let us not forget that no one helps those who do not help themselves. The binding force of treaties is precarious, the reliability of allies uncertain, and the number of broken treaties beyond counting. A great nation can rely only on its own strength. A nation which is believed to be strong can always get allies. A nation in distress is usually deserted. Foreign nations conclude alliances not with the British nation but with the British Fleet.

As regards the fifth objection, let us hope that Compulsory International Arbitration will cause the wolf to lie down beside the lamb, but let us not entrust our national possessions to the benevolence of other nations until Compulsory International Arbitration has been actually, and very firmly, established. Until then let us trust in God and keep our powder dry. War is, no doubt, a great evil, but it is apparently a necessary, or at least an unavoidable, evil. Since the time of the Amphictyonic Council, innumerable attempts have been made to decide differences between nations by arbitration, but hitherto all these attempts have failed because the strongest motive of individuals and of States is self-interest, and because nature is ruled by the law of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest and strongest. Therefore, we can hope for universal peace only if the universal law of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest be abolished. Until then we ought to believe with George Washington: 'If we desire to avoid insult we must be able to repel it. If we desire to secure peace, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.'¹

¹ Washington, Fifth Annual Address, December 3, 1793.

SUPPOSED ADVANTAGES OF THE BRITISH MILITARY SYSTEM

Those who believe that Great Britain ought not to change her military policy, that she ought to preserve her Voluntary Army, may argue: 'It is true that, considered from the historical, political, and military point of view, in short, from national considerations, the British military system is to be condemned, but, looked at from the economic and social points of view, from the point of view of the individual tax-paying citizens and workers, it possesses great compensating advantages, namely:—

1. Our Voluntary Army is cheaper than would be a National Army.
2. Our Army is a splendid refuge for the unemployed.

Let us look into these arguments.

It is often stated that a Voluntary Army, such as ours, is much cheaper than a National Army; that militarism is a crushing burden and a curse to the nations on the Continent. Let us examine that statement. Germany has not only the strongest army, but also the second strongest, if not the strongest, navy on the Continent. Therefore, we ought to find in Germany unmistakable evidence of the ruinous effect of militarism, especially as her natural resources, such as geographical situation, sea-border, harbours, coal, climate, fruitful soil, &c., are exceedingly poor if compared with the magnificent natural resources of Great Britain. Yet we find that there are in the German savings banks £650,000,000, as compared with but £210,000,000 in Great Britain; that the German savings banks deposits increased during the last six years by £170,000,000, whilst ours increased by only £17,000,000; that only from 20,000 to 30,000 people emigrate yearly from Germany, whilst between 200,000 and 300,000 emigrate yearly from Great Britain; that in Great Britain the number of unemployed is enormous, whilst Germany has practically none; that

the national income of Prussia subject to income tax has, between 1892 and 1905, increased by about 75 per cent., whilst it has increased by but 15 per cent. in Great Britain; that apparently Germany is much wealthier than Great Britain. The foregoing figures, which are taken from official statistics, prove that militarism is certainly not a crushing burden to Germany.

Measured by the money actually spent, the British Army is apparently a little cheaper than the German Army, but it is in reality far more expensive. Great Britain spends on an inefficient and unready army of a few hundred thousand men about £30,000,000 per annum, whilst Germany spends on an efficient army of several million men £35,000,000 per annum. Per head of population and per tax-payer the British Army is actually more expensive than the German Army. Whilst Great Britain spends about 15s. per head per year on the army, Germany spends only 11s. per head per year on her army. In other words, militarism presses more heavily upon the average British than upon the average German tax-payer, and whilst we receive a very unsatisfactory article, Germany receives an excellent article for the money spent.

It is true that, whilst the British Army withdraws only about 200,000 youths, mostly loafers, from the streets, the German Army withdraws about 600,000 youths from active production. However, the marvellous progress of all the German industries indicates that German production cannot be suffering severely from this withdrawal of 600,000 hands, and I venture to affirm that the German industries are not harmed, but greatly benefited, by the military training received by every worker. The working capacity, and with the working capacity the earning power, of every man depends, in the first place, upon his health and strength, which are his most valuable possessions, and these are greatly increased by two years of strenuous

open-air life, free from all anxiety about his daily bread. The two years which every German worker devotes to hard and continued bodily exercise set him up for life. They not only improve his health and increase his strength, but inculcate in him habits of discipline, cleanliness, orderliness, thrift, self-reliance, and mutual helpfulness. The German Army is the largest and the best school in Germany. Knowing the German Army from within, and having a considerable knowledge of German industrial and commercial life, I have no hesitation in asserting that Germany's industrial success is due, in the first place, to universal military training. Whilst the British race is undoubtedly physically deteriorating, the physique of the German race is equally undoubtedly improving. A comparison of English crowds with German crowds makes it clear to the most superficial observer that the German race is now by far the sturdier of the two. It is true that, as may be read in old books, Englishmen used to have the finest physique in Europe, but now things have changed. Universal and strenuous bodily training in the one country through three generations, and almost universal bodily neglect in the other country—only an infinitesimal percentage of Englishmen can afford regular bodily exercise in the open air, and long holidays in the country—has wrought this remarkable change.

Lastly, it is an illusion that the British Army is a refuge for the unemployed. Although unemployment is fearfully prevalent in this country, and although almost 800,000 British people expatriate themselves every year through lack of work, the army cannot obtain a sufficient number of recruits. Apparently only a very small percentage of the unemployed enters the army, and as those who enter the army must be able-bodied, most of them ought to be able to find work outside the army. Besides, the British Army is primarily not a charitable institution, but an institution for the defence of the country and the Empire.

I think the foregoing proves that from the point of view of economy and hygiene, from the financial and social points of view, from the points of view of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the tax-payer, and the working-man in shop and factory, universal military service is not a curse but a blessing. An army is an institution which should give the greatest fighting power and the greatest possible security against foreign attack to the nation at the minimum price. The British Army is an institution which gives an insufficient fighting power and insufficient security to the nation at the maximum price.

Let us now consider

GREAT BRITAIN'S POSITION IN CASE OF WAR WITH A COUNTRY POSSESSING A NATIONAL ARMY

It is evidently not impossible that the British Army may have to fight a National Army. London is the key to the British Empire. Great Britain's insular security rests, in the first place, upon her naval supremacy, and in the second place, upon the preservation of the balance of power in Europe. Philip II, Louis XIV, Louis XV, and Napoleon I tried to make themselves masters of the Continent and attacked Great Britain. History may repeat itself. Even if Great Britain be not attacked directly by a nation striving to master the Continent, she cannot allow that nation to occupy Belgium and Holland whence an invasion would be comparatively easy. The Napoleonic wars may have to be fought over again. What will be Great Britain's position in case of such a war, or of any other war with a State possessed of a National Army ?

Great Britain, which, in the time of Napoleon I, was a military Power of the second rank, is now only a military Power of the third rank. Her army, though immensely costly, stands on a level with those of Switzerland, Belgium,

Holland, and Bulgaria. She has but a small number of soldiers, and these are of inferior *morale* and inferior physique if compared with those of her possible antagonists. Great Britain cannot safely pit a small number of boy-soldiers against an overwhelming number of men, and as Great Britain has practically no reserve of trained soldiers, a single defeat might wipe out the British Army. A State possessing a National Army may risk losing a battle, but Great Britain dare not incur such a risk, and therefore she would, in such a war, be compelled still to fight in the pre-revolutionary style and to employ the antiquated and inefficient strategy of Frederick II, which Wellington had to use against his will. If such a war be fought on foreign soil, the British commander would have always to keep within easy reach of his ships. He would be able to operate only in a safe corner far away from the vital spot, as did Wellington. However, he may not be able to repeat Wellington's feats in the Peninsula, as railways and telegraphs have abolished space. Therefore, though he may annoy the enemy at a safe distance, he cannot strike at the seat of power and the centre of national vitality.

Great Britain is not an aggressive Power. She requires an army only for defence. But let us not forget that the best defence is the attack. The British Army, as at present constituted, is only an Imperial police force, and an instrument for passive defence. It can demonstrate against a National Army, but cannot hit it hard. Therefore, future wars in which this country might be engaged may be almost interminable and exceedingly costly, as were most of our past wars. If Japan had had an army similar in character to our own, if she had been able to land only 100,000 trained soldiers on Asiatic soil, she would have had to fight Russia in far-off corners rather by manœuvring than by battle, and the Russo-Japanese War would probably still be going on.

Opinions are divided as to whether an invasion of Great Britain is possible, but so much is certain, that such an operation must be most tempting to foreign strategists, who, by risking merely the capture, not the destruction, of a small fraction of their army may gain an unusually tempting prize. At all events, it seems by no means impossible that Great Britain may earlier or later have to fight for her existence with her army, and then she may find her weak military force a reed to lean on.

It is true that our army can be reinforced by 800,000 citizen soldiers, but I think it would be murder to send them against a well-trained National Army. It is also true that, in case of need, Great Britain might rise like one man, form an enormous National Militia, and fight as heroically as the Americans did. However, I am afraid Great Britain cannot rely on an untrained militia as do the United States. The position of the two countries is totally dissimilar. In the first place, Great Britain has not the backwoodsmen and countrymen who were the backbone of the American militia in war; and in the second place, she has no continental distances to protect her, and give her time for organising her defence. Besides, according to Moltke, 'Wars fought by Militias have the peculiarity that they last much longer and are for this reason far more costly in money and lives than are other wars.'¹ The American War of Secession cost 800,000 lives, whilst the Franco-German War, which was fought by a number of men more than twice larger, cost only 200,000 lives. Therefore the American Civil War was eight times more deadly than was the Franco-German War.

Lastly, militias have been very greatly over-valued. Washington, perhaps the greatest military authority in America, has unconditionally condemned their use. On September 24, 1776, he wrote to the President of Congress: 'Experience, which is the best criterion to work by, so fully, clearly, and decisively reprobates the practice of

¹ Moltke, Speech, February 16, 1874.

trusting to militia, that no man who regards order, regularity, and economy, or his own honour, character, or peace of mind will risk them upon this issue. The evils to be apprehended from a standing army are remote, and, situated as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one is certain and inevitable ruin. This contest is not likely to be the work of a day; and to carry on the war systematically you must establish your army upon a permanent footing.¹ Colonel Henderson also is very sceptical as to the value of an insufficiently trained militia, for he writes: 'A mob, however patriotic, carrying small-bore rifles is no more likely to hold its own to-day against well-led regulars than did the mob carrying pikes and flint-locks in the past. Non-professional soldiers are likely to fail in discipline, and it would appear that at the beginning of the campaign they are more liable to panic, less resolute in attack, less enduring under heavy and great hardships, and much slower in manœuvre than professionals.'²

I think the foregoing proves that from the points of view of the strategist, the statesman, the economist, and the citizen Great Britain requires a National Army. Therefore two questions arise:—

1. What kind of National Army does Great Britain require?
2. How can she obtain the required army?

Formerly we were told to copy the German Army, and now we are told to copy the Japanese Army. A National Army is not a dead machine which can be copied, but a living organism. To those who say: 'Let us copy the Japanese Army,' I would answer: 'Give me the Japanese history and I will give you the Japanese Army.' Englishmen are neither Germans nor Japanese. A British National Army must before all be National.

¹ Bancroft, *History of the United States*, Vol. V. 412.

² Colonel Henderson in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Vol. XXXIII. 747.

Military service of two or three years is probably unnecessary. In the continental barracks an incredible amount of time is wasted on traditional trivialities and unnecessary housemaids' work, whilst war training is neglected. Six months' training followed by short manoeuvres should suffice to make a soldier. The Prussians who defeated Napoleon I under Blücher had had only six months' training. Since then weapons and tactics have become far more complicated, but Colonel Pollock has shown that average recruits may be converted into good soldiers in six months. The ideal type of the British Army can be settled only by the careful deliberations of the best military brains, and it seems highly desirable that the Government should appoint a small commission to study this question and to draw up a plan.

Three centuries ago, Sir Edward Cecil, then the greatest living English general, wrote in a memoir on the defence of the British coasts against invasion, 'The danger of all is that a people not used to war believeth no enemy dare venture upon them which may make them neglect it the more for that their ignorance doth blinde them.'¹ This is unfortunately still the attitude of the British nation. Is a Jena or a Sedan required to wake up the people?

Great Britain requires a National Army, or at least a large National Militia, thoroughly trained for war. Every Englishman should possess the necessary training to enable him to defend his country. The public gives little thought to the army problem because it does not know that a strong British Army is the best guarantee for national and international peace and that universal military training would be a blessing to the people. Therefore it seems to me that the first step towards obtaining a satisfactory military force for the defence of Great Britain and the Empire should consist in informing the people that a National Army is a necessity for Great Britain. Hence the educational

¹ Dalton, *Edward Cecil*, Vol. II. 402.

propaganda of Lord Roberts seems to me to be of the very greatest value, and I think that every officer who has the future of the country at heart, and who supports Lord Roberts in his mind, should also support him by deeds to the best of his ability.

CHAPTER IX

PHYSICAL DEGENERATION AND THE INFLUENCE OF MILITARY TRAINING UPON THE NATIONAL PHYSIQUE ¹

THE report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration of 1904 was in many respects a very disappointing document. It supplied a vast quantity of interesting facts regarding the very unsatisfactory state of the health and of the physique of the people, but it left unanswered the question whether the national physique had or had not actually deteriorated. The report declared :—

That no sufficient material (statistical or other) was at present available to warrant any definite conclusions on the question of the physique of the people by comparison with data obtained in past times ; that a partial investigation, as for instance into the condition of the classes from which recruits are at present mostly drawn, might be very misleading, however carefully conducted, and might give rise to erroneous conclusions on the general question unless checked by expert knowledge. ('Deterioration Report,' Vol. I, p. 1.)

Sir William Taylor, the Director-General of the Army Medical Service, confirmed the foregoing statement, for he wrote :—

'I consider that it is impossible to obtain reliable statistical or other data regarding the conditions that have

¹ A paper read in the Section of Public Health and Forensic Medicine, at the Annual Meeting of the British Medical Association, 1908.

existed in the past, and consequently, as no reliable data are obtainable for the purposes of comparison, I do not see how the question can be dealt with from the progressive deterioration point of view.' ('Deterioration Report,' Vol. I. p. 100.)

The report was an inconclusive one. The Committee returned the verdict 'Not proven.'

Although direct evidence showing that the national physique has deteriorated in Great Britain is wanting, circumstantial evidence is at hand which points unmistakably to the fact that the change of Great Britain from a principally agricultural to a principally industrial country is responsible for that unsatisfactory state of the physique which we observe in the population of our large towns. As some prominent medical men who gave evidence before the Inter-Departmental Committee tried to prove that the town physique in Great Britain is as good as the country physique, that therefore town life is as healthy as country life, I have to prove my assertion that the transference of the people from the country to the towns has led to the deterioration of the national physique in Great Britain. As British anthropometrical statistics elucidating the past of the race are not available, I have to rely for proof of my statement upon the German recruiting experience and statistics. If I succeed in showing that the industrial occupations and town life have brought about deterioration of the national physique in Germany, I think we may conclude from that fact that a similar deterioration has most likely, with the rise of the manufacturing industry, taken place in this country as well, for similar causes have, as a rule, similar effects.

The Germans have no doubt that the change from agricultural to industrial pursuits, from country life to town life, has led to a deterioration of the national physique. The great German standard work on hygiene says on this point: 'At the beginning of last century the question of

bodily degeneration and fitness for military service came to the front. As early as 1828 General von Horn reported to the Prussian Government that the Rhenish province was no longer able to raise its usual quota of soldiers because the population had bodily degenerated through working in the factories. That report has had historical importance, inasmuch as it was the cause of the labour legislation which has taken place in Prussia and in Germany.' (Weyl, 'Handbuch der Hygiene,' Vierter Supplement-Band, p. 746.)

Let us now turn from opinions to facts. From the German recruiting statistics we learn that on an average of a number of years in the principal agricultural provinces of East Prussia and of West Prussia about 70 per cent. of the men of military age come up to the standard of fitness for service, whilst in the kingdom of Saxony, where the manufacturing industries prevail and which is the oldest manufacturing district of Germany, only about 50 per cent. of the young men come up to the military standard. In other words, about 30 per cent. of the male population in East Prussia and West Prussia, the pre-eminently agricultural parts, are below the military standard, whilst as much as 50 per cent. are below the military standard in the pre-eminently industrial parts of Germany.¹ It seems that the militarily unfit are about 50 per cent. more numerous in industrial Saxony than in the agricultural provinces of Germany.

The contrast between town physique and country physique becomes still more striking if we look into the recruiting statistics of individual towns. Berlin is one of the healthiest towns in Germany. Yet we find that 'In Berlin the percentage of men fit for military service is particularly small. According to Dade, the military fitness of the population of Berlin compares with the population of the largely industrial province of Brandenburg, which

¹ *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich.*

surrounds Berlin, and with that of the chiefly agricultural province of East Prussia as follows : Berlin 84, Brandenburg 57, East Prussia 69. It has to be borne in mind that among the men called up in Berlin at least from 85 to 40 per cent. were born in the country. These are the results for a town which has every reason to be proud of its health and of its sanitary arrangements.' (Weyl, 'Handbuch der Hygiene,' Vierter Supplement-Band, p. 751.)

The fact that the physique of the male population, as measured by the military standard, is 70 per cent. better in largely industrial Brandenburg than in Berlin, and 100 per cent. better in agricultural East Prussia than in the German capital, should give us food for thought.

Those who maintain that the town physique is as good as the country physique point to the magnificent specimens of manhood among town workers, such as navvies, brewers' men, and other labourers, but they forget that these are picked men, that they are few in number, and that many of them are country-bred. Besides, they do not know that the town-born children of these magnificent specimens of manhood do not always inherit the good physique of their fathers. The progressive deterioration of the town population is, as regards Germany,¹ clearly shown by the following tables, which are taken from the 'Politisch-Anthropologische Revue':—

RECRUITING STATISTICS RELATING TO BREWERS' MEN, BUTCHERS, CLERKS, AND ARTISANS.

	No. of Recruits Inspected	Per- centage of Fit	Average Girth of Chest	Average Height
			Inches	Inches
Brewers' men and potmen	46	76.0	32.9-35.9	65.4
Butchers	58	69.0	32.4-35.5	64.3
Clerks and servants	52	61.6	32.0-34.8	65.1
Tailors	176	56.7	31.0-34.0	64.1
Artisans	462	47.2	31.5-34.4	64.9

**RECRUITING STATISTICS RELATING TO THE SONS OF BREWERS' MEN,
BUTCHERS, CLERKS, AND ARTISANS.**

	No. of Recruits Inspected	Per- centage of Fit	Average Girth of Chest	Average Height
			Inches	Inches
Brewers' men and potmen	60	43.2	31.5-34.4	64.5
Butchers	21	38.1	31.3-34.1	64.0
Clerks and servants	157	51.0	31.6-34.4	64.9
Tailors	163	47.2	31.2-34.3	64.5
Artisans	196	43.9	31.5-34.4	64.3

(Dr. C. Böse, Beruf und Militärtauglichkeit, 'Politisch-Anthropologische Revue,' 1906, pp. 145-146.)

A comparison of the first and second of the foregoing tables points to the fact that there is a decided deterioration in the physique among a large part of the men engaged in the industrial occupations which are carried on chiefly in towns. It shows not only a serious numerical falling off in military fitness in the second generation of town workers, but it shows also that the militarily fit of the second generation are on the whole inferior to the militarily fit of the first generation as regards chest measurement and height. If we now turn to the country population, we find a striking contrast with the foregoing figures, for it appears that the second generation among country men is physically as fit as was the first. This may be seen from the following remarkable figures, which also are taken from the 'Politisch-Anthropologische Revue':—

	No. of Recruits Inspected	Per- centage of Fit	Average Girth of Chest	Average Height
			Inches	Inches
Agricultural workers	897	62.5	32.0-35.1	65.3
Sons of such workers	1,128	62.5	31.2-35.0	65.4

The foregoing shows that agricultural workers and the sons of agricultural workers furnish to the army apparently

the identical percentage of recruits, and that the agricultural recruits of the first and of the second generation have practically identical measurements as regards height and size of chest.

The following tables will confirm the impression that the country physique is superior to the town physique, and that country-bred men deteriorate when living in town :—

RECRUITS CALLED UP IN TOWN.

	Men Born in the Country			Men Born in Town		
	No.	Fit	Per Cent.	No.	Fit	Per Cent.
Halle (town)	2,222	1,400	58.8	1,102	667	60.5
Hanover (town)	4,320	2,600	60.2	2,121	1,240	58.0
Uelsen (town)	1,056	606	57.4	463	256	55.3
	7,758	4,606	59.4	4,747	2,863	60.3

RECRUITS CALLED UP IN THE COUNTRY.

	Men Born in the Country			Men Born in Town		
	No.	Fit	Per Cent.	No.	Fit	Per Cent.
Halle (country)	2,226	1,991	89.0	219	121	55.3
Hanover (country)	1,000	646	64.6	114	60	52.6
Uelsen (country)	1,672	1,122	67.1	67	37	55.2
	5,558	3,759	67.6	400	218	54.5

(Weyl, 'Handbuch der Hygiene,' Viertes Supplement-Band, p. 749.)

The foregoing facts and figures should suffice to show that a transference of the people from the country to the town leads—in Germany, and probably also elsewhere—to a serious deterioration of their physique. After all, that consequence is only to be expected.

So strongly are the Germans convinced that town life leads to the deterioration of the race that the handbook of the German Liberal Party says :—

'The discussion as to the military fitness of the population in town and country has been finally decided. The country furnishes proportionately more recruits, and these are of a better physique, and where an exception to this rule takes place it is caused by the fact that many workers are emigrants from the country.' ('Handbuch der Nationalliberalen Partei,' 1907, 22.)

Now, if that deterioration is very marked in Germany, where the manufacturing industries and great towns are of very recent growth, and where at present more than 20,000,000 people live in the country and are mostly engaged in agricultural pursuits, how serious, then, must be the physical deterioration in Great Britain, where the peasant is practically extinct, where agricultural labourers are few, and where huge and ancient manufacturing towns preponderate? I think there can be no doubt that a very serious physical degeneration has taken place in this country. The question now arises: How can this degeneration be converted into a physical regeneration?

Sir L. H. Ormsby, M.D., in giving evidence before the Committee on Physical Deterioration, described a large section of British town workers as follows: 'In the lower strata of society in large towns I consider their surroundings and domestic home life are in a very depressing condition; there is a total neglect of every hygienic and sanitary rule of life; and those conditions, I say, are, perhaps, made up of the insanitary dwellings, the insufficient and improper food, insufficient clothing, and breathing and rebreathing from week's end to week's end the same polluted and contaminated air; and then they have no means of recreation or athletic exercises to throw off these effects.' (Physical Deterioration Report, Vol. II. p. 462, 12564.)

This description is, unfortunately, only too true.

Everybody knows that health and strength are promoted by good food, good air, and adequate bodily exercise. The young men who serve in the army get all three in

plenty. Hence the effect in military training upon the health and strength of the recruits should be very noticeable. It is, of course, foolish to measure health and strength merely by those popular standards height, weight, and circumference of chest. Organic changes cannot be measured with an inch tape. One might as well try to measure the intelligence of people by the size of their hats. Unfortunately, the measurements which have been taken in various armies apply mainly to height, weight, and girth of chest. However, let us see what these somewhat elementary measurements will teach us.

GERMAN ARMY

Dr. Fetzner measured 392 recruits four times. He measured them for the first time shortly after their joining. He measured them a second time when the men had been from three and a half to four months in the army. He took a third measurement when they had been between seven and eight months in the army, and a fourth measurement when they had almost been a year in the army. It should be noted that the smaller part of the men came from Stuttgart and its surroundings. The larger part came from the Black Forest, the inhabitants of which are sturdy men with strong bones and muscles. One-half of the men were engaged in agriculture and one-half in industry. I take from his book the following interesting table, which illustrates not the comparatively unimportant size of the outside of the chest, but its inside measurement, the capacity of the lungs.

CAPACITY OF LUNGS OF GERMAN RECRUITS.

Cubic Centimetres	On Joining the Army.	After 4 Months	After 7½ Months	After 1 Year
	Per Cent.	Per Cent.	Per Cent.	Per Cent.
2,000 to 2,500	18.6	9.9	8	8.1
2,500 to 3,500	67.3	70.4	65.6	63.5
3,500 and more	16.1	18.8	26.4	28.4

During the year the volume of respiration of the recruits increased on an average by no less than 500 cubic centimetres. In other words, the capacity of the lungs increased by 18·2 per cent., or by a little more than an eighth. The increase in lung capacity was most rapid during the first few months of service. Dr. Fetzer writes on this point :—

‘As the increase of the respiration capacity of the men was particularly great in the course of the first three months, we must assume that the exercises taken during the first three months of military service, such as running, quick marching, gymnastics, fencing, were particularly favourable to the development of the lungs. The increase of the volume of respiration is proportionate to the increase in the difference between the breathing-in and breathing-out measurements. These also increased most during the first three months of service. The growth of the depth and width of the chest of the man shows clearly that not only the contents but also the framework of the chest has grown in the man examined.’ (Fetzer, ‘Ueber den Einfluss des Militärdienstes,’ 1879, 92.)

FRENCH ARMY

Measurements similar to those taken by Dr. Fetzer were taken by Dr. Frilley, of the French army. He examined 6,495 men of all arms—infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineers, and army service—on joining and after six months’ service, and I extract from his report the following figures :—

MEASUREMENTS OF FRENCH RECRUITS.

	Height	Weight	Circumference of Chest
	Inches	lbs.	Inches
When joining, Dec. 1886	64·9	123·66	33·9
In July 1887	65·0	126·89	34·4
Difference	+0·1	+3·23	+0·5

In 1888 Dr. Frilley examined 5,999 men of all arms on joining and six months later. He obtained similar results to those shown in the foregoing table, and, on examining the changes which had taken place in individual soldiers, he came to the interesting but only natural conclusion—a conclusion which is confirmed by other investigators—that:—

‘The weakest men gained most in weight and in girth of chest.’ (‘Archives de Médecine et de Pharmacie Militaires,’ Paris, Vol. IX. No. 2, and Vol. XI. No. 2.)

JAPANESE ARMY

I would now draw attention to the result of careful measurements of 7,880 soldiers of all arms of the Japanese army, which were taken in 1900 and the three following years. The results of these measurements are briefly summed up in the following table:—

MEASUREMENTS OF JAPANESE RECRUITS.

				Height	Weight	Chest Girth	Chest Expansion
				in.	lb.	in.	in.
1901	64.12	126.2	33.12	3.62
1902	64.23	131.8	33.77	3.86
1903	64.34	133.6	34.0	3.86
1904	64.34	131.1	34.0	3.86

(‘Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps,’ April 1906, p. 535.)

The German and French armies are fighting machines of the conventional type. The men are trained in the mass. The individual soldier receives comparatively little attention from the instructors in gymnastics. Besides, the French and Germans are not sporting people by instinct. They do not take as eagerly to physical exercise as do Englishmen or Americans. Hence the German and French recruits do not receive a scientific all-round physical training, designed to develop methodically all the muscles and organs of the men to their utmost extent, but merely a very superficial

routine training, which leads only to a rudimentary and partial development of the body. In the American army physical exercise is, I think, somewhat more energetically cultivated than in the Continental armies, and I would now draw your attention to a table giving some of the results of a training of three and a half months of American recruits at Columbus barracks.

	Weight	Expansion of Chest	Size of Chest Inflated	Waist	Upper Arm Natural	Upper Arm Muscled
	lb.	in.	in.	in.	in.	in.
Average on arrival at dépôt ..	145·07	28·04	36·53	30·18	10·41	13·05
Average at departure from dépôt	147·88	28·410	37·18	29·19	10·85	13·66
Average gain or loss ..	+2·81	+0·606	+0·65	-0·99	+0·44	+0·61

(Munson, 'Theory and Practice of Military Hygiene,' 1901, p. 42.)

The substantial average increases in weight, circumference of chest, play of chest, and size of upper arm, accompanied by a substantial reduction in the size of the waist, are very interesting.

The Japanese figures given in the foregoing show that the physique of the recruits improves very considerably during the first year of service, and that it remains practically unchanged during the three following years. The German, French, and American figures given in the foregoing show that the greatest improvement in the physique of the men takes place during the first few months of military training, and my own observation of the result of army training shows that the physical improvement among the recruits is most noticeable and more vigorous, not during the first three months, but during the first six or eight weeks of service.

I have frequently observed recruits growing out of all their civilian clothes within two months from their joining, and I know of a few cases where recruits have grown out of their very shirts. This most important point—the fact that military training has its greatest effect on the physique

during the first two or three months of service—should be of very considerable interest to those medical men who wish to see some sort of universal military training introduced in this country with a view to improving the physique of the masses, and who fear that six months' training—which, I think, is usually recommended—might not be sufficient to affect the deteriorated physique. After all, a cure of three or four weeks often works wonders in patients. Hence a few months of a simple but strenuous life passed in the open air, accompanied by an entire change of scene and of occupation, is bound to have a very far-reaching influence on the millions of townspeople who, stewing in factories, offices, and cramped dwellings, day by day, year in year out, are quite unused to open-air life and exercise—for the townsman takes his holiday loafing.

Although the tables given in the foregoing show that military service leads to an unmistakable improvement in the physique of recruits, as measured by height, weight, and circumference of chest, they do not by any means show the all-round influence which national military training has on the national physique, so far as it can be ascertained by the inch-tape. The military authorities in Germany, France, the United States, Japan, and elsewhere do not train soldiers with a view to increasing their height, weight, and girth of chest—a growth which is a purely casual phenomenon—but with a view to making them efficient parts of the national fighting machine. The larger part of the soldier's time is at present, and in all the armies with which I am acquainted, taken up in housemaid's work and valeting in barracks. Of the remaining part of their time only a small fraction is spent in physical exercise. Besides, the physical exercise taken in the various armies is not directed towards the development of height, weight, and chest circumference, for the army trains men, not for wrestling and heavy-weight lifting, but for marching and shooting. In the words of a German text-book on military hygiene :—

‘The bodily exercises of the soldier aim at the preservation and the greatest possible increase of his physical powers for purposes of war.’ (Kirchner, ‘Lehrbuch der Militär-Hygiene,’ p. 869.)

The majority of the soldiers serve on foot. Battles are often won by out-marching the enemy, and as the infantry of various countries carries, whilst marching, from 60 lb. to 66 lb. in arms and accoutrements, the parts most developed by military training are no doubt the legs. Unfortunately, the legs are not measured by the medical men whose figures I have quoted in the foregoing. However, a German army surgeon, Dr. Leitenstorfer, was sensible enough to study the growth of the legs among recruits, and he tells us :—

‘The measurements I have undertaken have shown that among recruits the muscles of the leg increase in any case, whilst the muscles of the arm do not always increase. My measurements show that the average growth during the first three months’ training of the recruit is 0·5 cm. for the upper arm, that it is 1 cm. for the calf, and that it is 2·5 cm. for the thigh. Increases of the thigh of from 3 cm. to 4 cm. have been observed. The vigorous growth of the legs of recruits which occurs during the first three months of service proves that during these first three months the muscles of the leg grow at the cost of the other muscles of the body. Notwithstanding an average increase of weight of recruits of 3·20 kilos (7 lb.), the chest-measurement in breathing-out shows on an average a decrease of 0·92 cm. However, this decrease has occurred not in the capacity of the lungs, but through the decrease of muscles and fat on the chest. One may therefore say that the growth in the weight of the body by 3·27 kilos, and the decline in the measurement of the chest, have been put into the arms, and especially into the legs, of the recruits.’

The result of military training is graphically described by Dr. Leitenstorfer as follows :—

‘Men who are too well nourished and who are not used to

bodily exercise lose weight without exception, and that loss in weight is often very considerable. For instance, I saw a recruit who was a merchant by profession, who was so fat that he was almost unfit for military service. Within four weeks his weight fell from 184 lb. to 155 lb. He lost 29 lb. in twenty-eight days, and his waist shrank from 108 centimetres to 88 centimetres, a decrease of 15 centimetres, or 6 in. Notwithstanding this rapid decrease in weight, the recruit felt in the best of health. He had never before been in so fit a physical condition.'

Dr. Leitenstorfer sums up the result of military training upon the national physique as follows :—

'The lasting advantages of a sensible military training are—

· '(1) Suppleness of joints.

'(2) The growth of muscles in thickness, which lasts for many years, provided very moderate exercise is taken, unless the soldier suffers afterwards from habitual under-feeding.

'(3) The increased co-ordination of muscles—that is, a general suppleness for exercise of every kind, and the "training of the memory" of the muscles, so that the movements taught can after many years be performed immediately, or can at least rapidly be learned again. For instance, if swimming has been learnt in the earliest youth, the complicated movements of swimming will not be forgotten, even if swimming has not been practised during several decades.

'(4) The enlargement of the capacity of the lungs, the increase of the power of the heart, and the facilitation of the flow of blood to and fro in the organs which are stimulated by exercise. In short, a bracing influence upon the development of the whole system, and an increase of its vitality.

'(5) The moral strength which lies in the knowledge of the individual of being a trained man, and of being able to

meet heavy duties in after life like an open antagonist, not like an invisible enemy.

‘In one word, military service leads to a pronounced increase in the ordinary strength, efficiency, and endurance of the men, qualities which at will and at any moment can be brought up to their highest and most energetic development.’ (Leitenstorfer, ‘Das Militärische Training,’ 1897, p. 74, ff.)

Military service benefits the national physique not only directly, but also indirectly, by improving not only the bodies but also the habits and mode of life of the recruits. A German text-book on military hygiene tells us :—

‘The majority of soldiers come from a class of the population who in their education at home have not been taught sufficiently the necessity of taking care of their bodies, and who, in consequence of their occupation, do not always keep themselves sufficiently clean. Therefore, the recruits must be taught on joining the army not only to clean their arms and accoutrements, but also to cleanse thoroughly their bodies. Every non-commissioned officer must see that his men wash not only face and neck, but their whole body, with soap, and that they clean carefully their nails, their teeth, &c.’ (Roth and Lex, ‘Handbuch der Militär-Gesundheitspflege,’ 1877, p. 216.)

NATIONAL MILITARY SERVICE AND NATIONAL CLEANLINESS

Military service teaches not only cleanliness, but also order, tidiness, self-control, sense of duty, mutual helpfulness. It promotes abstinence from excess in eating and drinking. It teaches the men the value of fresh air, of a sensible diet, and of common-sense cooking. Hence men who have served in the army will insist in their houses of the observance of those rules of sanitation and on that cleanliness, tidiness, and those general rules of housekeeping which they have been taught in the army, and with which their wives are often unacquainted. In the words of a German medical

man : ' The great national importance of military service lies in this, that the able-bodied of the entire male population acquire in the army not only health and strength, but also manifold skill and ability and a strong sense of duty. A comparison of the men when joining as recruits and when leaving the army shows most plainly the beneficial effect which military service has had not only upon their body, but also upon their ways and manners. Hence it is only natural that among those who apply for situations the men who have served in the army are favoured. Army service is a twofold recommendation ; it is a guarantee of good health and a guarantee of good behaviour.' ¹

Lately several deputations of British workmen have visited Germany, in order to study economic and social conditions over there. These deputations have practically unanimously spoken very favourably of the physique and the general appearance of the people in Germany, and they have attributed their good physique and bearing, and I think rightly, to the universal military training which they receive. The report of the Birmingham brassworkers, for instance, says of the inhabitants of Berlin :—

' One cannot help being struck with the superior physique and bearing of the soldier, whether in uniform or out of uniform, in observing the populace of Berlin. The effect of the training is seen in the people as distinctly as the effect of the cleaning and washing is noticeable in the streets. There is not the physically deteriorated, untrained, unmended look about the people. Whether one-year or two-year men, they emerge from the army with a stamp upon them that lasts for life. They have to get up early and be out on the exercising grounds between five and six in the morning. The brain is rested, but the physical side of the men is now developed ; good food, plenty of exercise, fresh air, baths and cleanliness, neatness and orderliness, are his daily associates. He learns to hold himself uprightly, to march

¹ Häller, *Die Gesundheitspflege des Heeres*, 1906, p. 251.

forward, and to keep his hands out of his pockets ; and if a young man has not already learned deportment and obedience, he does so during his military service.' ('The Brass-workers of Berlin and Birmingham,' 1905, pp. 17 and 18.)

I think the foregoing makes two points clear :—

(1) That the British population must have physically very seriously deteriorated through Great Britain having become an industrial nation.

(2) That if universal and compulsory physical training on a military basis should be introduced, it would very likely lead to a physical regeneration of the people, seeing that at present the majority of our workers receive practically no open-air exercise whatever.

In view of the fact that the British nation has physically, in all probability very greatly, deteriorated, and that Englishmen possess strong sporting inclinations, I think that the effect of universal and compulsory physical training on a military basis would be more marked in Great Britain than in other countries, where sport is less cultivated, and where the physical deterioration of the race has probably been less serious than over here. My surmise that military training would benefit the British people more than it has benefited those nations which at present have a national army is supported by what, I think, is unmistakable evidence. There cannot be a greater contrast than that afforded by a comparison of our recruits, many of them under-sized, under-developed, and half-starved weaklings, taken from the ranks of the unemployed and born in the slums, and of our Indian battalions and reserve battalions, which are filled with tall, broad-shouldered, muscular men, the very finest specimens of British manhood. If one compares the average recruit at a recruiting depôt with the average soldier who takes his discharge, one finds it difficult to believe that the one has grown into the other. Unfortunately, no statistics exist, as far as I know, which summarise the physical changes which are effected among our soldiers whilst

serving in the army. Therefore I would strongly urge upon all medical men who wish to promote the improvement and the regeneration of the race, and especially upon our military authorities, medical and non-medical, to take these measurements. This can be done with little expense, provided intelligent help is given by some well-organised assistants.

The question of physical deterioration is, I think, an urgent one for this country. Unfortunately, it will take many years to trace the progressive physical development of recruits from the time of their joining the army to that of their leaving it. Therefore I would urge that, preliminarily, recruits freshly joining and soldiers of three months', six months', a year's, and several years' service should be simultaneously measured, so that at least a rough comparison of their average measurements and of their average growth whilst serving may enable us to form some opinion as to the physical changes which are caused by the present and, I regret to say, somewhat unscientific, bodily training our soldiers receive. I dare say the publication of these figures may prove a revelation to the public, and may incidentally prove a stronger and a more popular argument in favour of universal military training than the invasion argument.

CHAPTER X

THE MODEL ARMY OF ENGLAND

AMONG the greatest soldiers of the world, Oliver Cromwell undoubtedly occupies a foremost position, and there is no reason to place him second to any soldier with whose achievements we are familiar, be that soldier Marlborough or Wellington, Frederick the Great, or Napoleon. In fact, if the names of Alexander the Great, Hannibal, and Cæsar were not surrounded by a halo of glory, which is due, perhaps, more to the traditional admiration of their achievements and to the absence of reliable and exhaustive accounts, than to a critical estimation of their military ability, it might be found that England has produced not only the greatest poet, but also the greatest soldier, known to history. As a strategist and as a tactician, as a cavalry leader and as an organiser, Oliver Cromwell has certainly not had a superior, and perhaps not even an equal. Yet the envy and calumny of his contemporary detractors, the hatred shown to Cromwell, the regicide and usurper, by later writers, the absence of a good account by a first-class military writer, and the apathy and indifference displayed by the public, have so far prevented an adequate appreciation of him in his military capacity, in which his greatness is beyond question. Hœnig, Firth, and Baldock have written interesting but not entirely satisfactory books on Cromwell the soldier, of which the ablest, that by Hœnig, which is unfortunately somewhat dry and bulky, has not yet been translated from the German. The military history of

Oliver Cromwell and his time remains still to be written by a soldier-writer, speaking with the authority of a Napoleon, a Jomini, a Clausewitz, or a Mahan. Meanwhile, it would seem interesting and timely to consider, though of necessity but superficially, the achievements of Oliver Cromwell as the organiser of the celebrated New Model Army. Our humiliations in South Africa, resulting from the defects of our army, are still fresh in our memories. If we wish to remedy those defects, and desire some guidance in order to attain that end, we may learn much from Oliver Cromwell, the organiser of England's invincible army, which may, indeed, be held up as a model army for all time.

The military forces which existed in England before the outbreak of the Civil War were, as regards their training, armament, tactics, and *morale*, beneath contempt. England's strength lay then, as it does now, in her fleet, but even her fleet had been allowed to fall into decay after the victory over the Armada. Owing to the long peace which followed the stirring times of Elizabeth, the people had been lulled into a feeling of security, the nation had become unaccustomed to war, the army was little better than a sham, and England's military records had become extremely humiliating. In 1628, Sir Edward Cecil, who was then considered the greatest military authority in England, said, with much justification: 'Peace hath so besotted us that we think if we have men and ships our Kingdom is safe, as if men were born soldiers.'

The state of the armed forces of England before the Civil War was deplorable. The expedition against Cadiz in 1625 became a disgraceful failure, owing to general mismanagement and the complete absence of discipline amongst the soldiers. After much hesitation, the ill-armed troops were landed, at the wrong time and at the wrong place, without any provisions in their knapsacks. At the end of the first day's march they came across a store of wine, plundered it, and became so drunk that, according to

Dalton, 'all the chiefs were in hazard to have their throats cut.' With such men warfare was impossible, and the troops were hastily marched back to the ships, and sent to England. On the way to the ships they encountered some three hundred Spanish musketeers, and, according to contemporary accounts the soldiers 'made few or no shots to any purpose, blew up their powder, and could hardly be persuaded to stand from a shameful flight.' Yet, out of 10,000 men sent on that expedition, 1,000 died from disease. Two years later, 1627, Buckingham undertook an expedition against the Isle of Rhé. Through his incredible incapacity and dawdling, an assault by surprise on the commanding fortress of Saint Martin became impossible, and after besieging it in an amateurish way during four months, he withdrew his decimated army, fell into an ambush of the French, and his force was cut up while it was retiring to the ships. The expedition had been not only fruitless, but also disastrous. Out of 8,000 men landed, only about 3,000 returned to England. In 1628, an English fleet, under the Earl of Lindsey, was sent to assist La Rochelle against the King of France, and that expedition also failed, owing to the incapacity, if not cowardice, of the commander, and the lack of discipline and of soldierly spirit amongst the officers and the men. Again, in 1639, Charles I collected at the Scotch border an army of 15,000 men, consisting mostly of trained bands, of whom Sir Edmund Verney says: 'I dare say there was never so raw, so unskilled, and so unwilling an army brought to fight.' In view of its composition, it was, perhaps, not unnatural that Charles' army ran away from the Scots at Berwick in 1639, and again at Newburn in 1640, before any blood was spilled.

Before the Civil War the body of the English army was not a national force, but an unruly armed mob, without cohesion, discipline, patriotism, or proper military training, in which the crimes of desertion, plunder, and outrage on peaceful inhabitants were common, and even the murder

of officers not infrequent. The officers of that army belonged to a different world. They were noblemen and courtiers, chivalrous, well-mannered, and full of courage, expert in fencing, in riding, and in single combat, but on the whole quite ignorant of warfare, out of touch with their men, and therefore quite unfit to command. Since Elizabethan times a craze for luxury had grown up in England. At no time did men possess more numerous and more costly dresses, and at no time was society more lascivious and trifling. As regards picturesqueness and gorgeousness of attire, Charles I's officers outshone those of all times. Their chief topics of conversation were dress and women; the serious business of war hardly entered into their consideration. However, what the officers lacked in military ability they tried to make up for in reckless courage and in heroic devotion to the King. Therefore they and their immediate followers, the feudal part of the army, had some military value, and as the majority of the noblemen, some of whom had gained military experience abroad, took the part of Charles I, the outlook for the Parliamentary forces, which were recruited from the trained bands and volunteers, was not very encouraging.

Such was the pitiful state of the armed forces of England before the advent of Cromwell. Yet, in a few years, one might almost say in a few months, he, the inexperienced civilian, who had already arrived at the ripe age of forty-two years, and who had probably never thought of taking part in war, and still less of assuming military leadership, created out of peaceful citizens unused to war the best army in Europe, and raised England's military prestige higher than it has ever been before or since his time. At a time when England's military reputation had sunk to the lowest ebb, Cromwell's genius created, with marvellous celerity, and out of a distinctly unmilitary population, the best soldiers of his time, an achievement which stands unparalleled in history.

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Parliament raised a large force against Charles I, and most of the politicians and not a few professional soldiers were under the delusion that a number of armed men were synonymous with a reliable army. Confident in the number of the armed men fighting for Parliament, and of the weakness of the king in men and war material, all on the side of Parliament thought, as Baxter tells us, that 'one battle would decide the war.' In reality the Parliamentary forces were little better than the troops which had disgraced themselves at Cadiz and the Isle of Rhé, at Berwick and at Newburn, as Cromwell had prophesied in Parliament.

If the Parliamentary army had been raised on a national basis it might have become a national force, representative of the national spirit in bravery and discipline. However, the narrow-minded class prejudice of the politicians robbed it of that distinction from the outset, and merely substituted for a rabble raised by the King a rabble raised by Parliament. The vicious army system was not reformed.

When, by order of Parliament, 22,000 men were impressed in London and in the counties, clergymen, scholars, students at the inns of court and universities, the sons of esquires, persons rated at £5 goods or £8 lands, and even the servants of members of Parliament, were exempted. In the language of Beaumont and Fletcher, the soldiers were considered as 'the scavengers of the realm,' and the Parliamentary army was made representative, not of the nation, but of the proletariat.

Owing to its composition, the Parliamentary army greatly resembled the mob army of Cadiz and the Isle of Rhé, of Berwick and Newburn, by being, according to Cromwell, largely recruited from 'decayed serving-men and tapsters, and such kind of fellows,' though its character was somewhat improved by an admixture of enthusiastic volunteers and of English mercenaries who had seen war on the Continent. Therefore it was but natural that

part of the Parliamentary army behaved like a frightened mob before the feudal soldiers of Charles I. At Powick Bridge the Parliamentary troops fled in confusion before Prince Rupert's cavalry, with hardly an attempt at resistance. At Edgehill the Parliamentary cavalry turned and fled in a wild panic, without even waiting for Prince Rupert's charge, and only the headlong unending pursuit of the Parliamentary cavalry by the whole of the Royalist horse saved the Parliamentary army from destruction. At the Battle of Stratton, 5,400 Parliamentary soldiers were beaten by 2,400 Royalists, and lost 2,000 in killed and prisoners. Commenting on the hopeless composition of the Parliamentary army, Cromwell said at the beginning of the war to his cousin, Hampden: 'Do you think the spirits of such base mean fellows will ever be able to encounter gentlemen that have honour and courage and resolution in them? You must get men of a spirit that is likely to go as far as gentlemen will go, or else you will be beaten still. To cope with men of honour you must have men of religion.'

From the moment when Cromwell began his military career as an independent guerilla chief, and raised, in January, 1642, his troop of thirty to forty men for the defence of the counties, the modest nucleus of the celebrated New Model Army, it was clear to him that mere numbers were only a source of weakness, an encumbrance, and an impediment in war, and that impressed half-starved hirelings, and good-for-nothing volunteers, the outcasts of the population, could not be turned into soldiers by putting uniforms on their backs, arms in their hands, and giving them some military drill. He recognised that a soldier must have a higher motive to fight for than pay or plunder, and that true heroism cannot be expected from military hirelings. Convinced that only men with a soldier's spirit in them, and with a true love of their cause, would fight bravely against a brave enemy, he changed the prevailing

system, and began recruiting his men in accordance with his views. Looking back on his military activity, he said, with justifiable pride, on April 13, 1657, 'I raised such men as had the fear of God before them, as made some conscience of what they did, and from that day forward they were never beaten.'

Cromwell was convinced that a reliable army can only be formed of men who not only love the soldier's life, and who fight from conviction, but who also possess resolution and intelligence, and strength of body and of mind. Therefore he recruited his men chiefly from farmers and freeholders, healthy, well-fed, substantial countrymen, robust bodily and mentally, who were used to riding and to open-air life, and who became soldiers not from necessity, nor from the lust of adventure or plunder, but from the ardent desire to fight for religious and political liberty. Consequently, his men always 'made some conscience of what they did,' as he expected.

In the beginning all his men were Puritans, to whom Charles I and his party were the enemies of their religion. Furthermore, the Court was a horror and an abomination to them on account of its loose morals. Thus Cromwell's men fought not only with the natural skill and resourcefulness of yeomen, but also with the enthusiastic and irresistible determination that is found only in men who fight with the zeal of conviction for a great cause. They were representative of the best elements of the nation, a homogeneous body with one character, one will, and one mind. Compared with these men, the Royalist troops, excepting the noblemen and their followers, and the large remainder of the Parliamentary troops, were, on the whole, a mercenary rabble induced by sordid motives to bear arms.

The commencement of the campaign proved Cromwell's wisdom in the selection of his men. According to Fiennes, Cromwell's soldiers never stirred, and fought to the last moment at Edgehill. Furthermore, his troops kept

excellent order and discipline, whilst the Royalist and other Parliamentary regiments were unmanageable, mutinous, and plundering.

Up to Cromwell's time the officers were aristocrats, the men the pariahs of society. The polished, perfumed officers with long curls, dressed in velvet, frills, and laces, whose dandified appearances Vandyck and Lely have so well portrayed, had nothing in common with the 'scavengers of the realm.' The officers fought for glory and their King, the rank and file for bread or for plunder. Therefore the character of the army was partly royalistic and aristocratic, and partly proletarian, but in neither case truly national. As ready as were the officers to lay down their lives for the King, as ready were the men to run away and save their skins, to kill the officers, or to plunder the well-to-do, were they enemies or friends. Waller wrote, in 1644, 'the men of Essex and Herts attacked their own captain. Such men are only fit for the gallows here and hell hereafter. Above 2,000 Londoners ran away from their colours.' Evidently the army greatly resembled Falstaff's celebrated company.

Owing to tradition, the soldiers were recruited from the dregs of the population, and, also owing to tradition, the armament and tactics of the army were largely out of date. The pike still prevailed, though it had been superseded abroad, and the tactics of infantry and cavalry were of a most elaborate kind, as may be seen from the ancient regulations; the exigencies of war were sacrificed to appearances on the parade-ground, and the drill of the men was rather complicated and showy than practically useful. Here again Cromwell showed his military master-mind. Uninfluenced by the prevailing ideas of armament and tactics, he immediately adopted the armament, uniform, drill, and tactics which he considered most conducive to success in war, and though he profited to some extent from the advice of English officers, such as Colonel Cook, and from the experience gained abroad during the Thirty

Years' War, he relied chiefly on his common sense for guidance, and he obtained the best results.

The relations between Cromwell and his men were most satisfactory. Whilst other commanders in the Royal and in the Parliamentary army could hardly obtain obedience from their men, the character of his carefully selected men, and his own personality enabled Cromwell to enforce an iron discipline from the beginning, and to exact the utmost services from his men, who did, without grumbling, as they were ordered. His soldiers being of a better stuff than those which were to be found in other regiments, Cromwell could afford to treat them as his equals as men, and as his inferiors only in rank, and his kindness was appreciated, not misunderstood. Like Napoleon and Frederick the Great, he showed the greatest care and consideration for his men, his ear was open to every complaint, he studied their comfort, and saw in them his children. He took the greatest interest in their clothing and boots, and he established an excellent medical and hospital service. His letters to Parliament and to his friends are always full of kindly thought for his 'poor soldiers,' his first thought after the glorious day of Naseby was for his men. Therefore he wrote to the Speaker : ' Sir, they are trusty men ; I beseech you in the name of God not to discourage them.' Whilst in other regiments the soldiers' pay was, as a rule, unsatisfactory and in arrears, Cromwell did his utmost to have his troops well and punctually paid, and did not hesitate to spend freely his own money or money borrowed from friends, in order that his soldiers should not be in want. Naturally, his solicitude and soldierly affection for his 'lovely company,' as he fondly called it, was rewarded with the enthusiastic devotion of his men, who would try the impossible in order to please their beloved commander.

Besides having his men well clothed and well paid, Cromwell saw that they had the best arms, believing, as he wrote in November, 1642, that ' if a man has not good

weapons, horse, and harness, he is as nought.' Thus, after having obtained for his army the best human material that the country could yield, he provided his men with the best equipment, pay, and arms, which could be procured. His other war material also was of the best description. Though artillery was in its infancy, he introduced most powerful siege guns and mortars, throwing shells up to 12 in. and 14½ in. diameter, to the terror of the besieged, and breached, in a few days, walls which, with inferior ordnance, could have been battered in only after weeks of bombardment.

Though Cromwell treated his soldiers as gentlemen, he did not allow the liberty which he conceded to them to degenerate into licence, and did not tolerate any breach of discipline. Punishments, unless the offence was dishonourable, were not dishonouring to the offender, and bodily punishment was unknown in his army. Incredible as it may seem, bodily punishment was reintroduced by Cromwell's benighted successors, and was maintained as a means of discipline in the army until a comparatively recent date.

Cromwell's orders show that he knew how to stimulate the sense of honour in his men, and that he relied more upon their sense of honour than their fear of punishment in order to maintain discipline. Therefore, his orders often sound as if they were addressed to soldiers of the present day or of the future, and not to those of the seventeenth century. In 1648, he wrote to Squire, 'Tell Captain Russell my mind on his men's drinking the poor man's ale and not paying. I will not allow any plunder; so pay the man and stop their pay to make it up. I will cashier officers and men if such is done in future.' Again he wrote to Squire, in the same year, 'If the men are not of a mind to obey this order I will cashier them, the whole troop. Let them do as Parliament bids them, or else go home.' To this letter Squire put a footnote, 'They obeyed the order.' Under Cromwell's elevating influence the despised soldiery seem to have behaved far more honourably than the cavaliers

themselves, and an old newspaper wonderingly relates of Cromwell's army: 'Not a man swears but he pays his twelve pence. No plundering, no drinking, no disorder, or impiety is allowed.' It would really seem as if Cromwell's soldiers attained to the ideal set to soldiers by Lord Roberts.

Crimes which Cromwell considered dishonourable to a soldier were not treated with similar leniency. Plundering, which was common in the Royal, as well as in the Parliamentary, army, and mutiny, were punished by Cromwell with the shameful death on the gallows, in view of the army. However, such rigorous punishment was rarely necessary.

In consequence of the careful selection of officers and men, the high moral tone of his army, the justice done to the men, and the certainty of punishment in case of transgression, Cromwell's soldiers were as orderly in war as they were in peace, and wherever they went the country folk had confidence in them. With justifiable pride Cromwell wrote, in his Irish Declaration of January, 1650: 'Give us an instance of one man since my coming to Ireland not in arms massacred, destroyed, or banished, concerning the massacre or destruction of whom, justice has not been done or endeavoured to be done.' This declaration distinctly reminds one of a celebrated proclamation made by Lord Roberts in the South African war.

Besides elevating the *morale* of his soldiers as men, Cromwell knew how to elevate their *morale* as soldiers to the highest pitch, by his example, his administration, and his Articles of War, which were by no means an empty letter. The following extracts convey a clear picture how by the Articles of War discipline was maintained, how the efficiency of the army, in training, on the march, in quarter, and in battle, was assured, how transgressors were punished, and what influence they must have had upon the spirit of the army:—

'A captain that is careless in the training and governing of his company shall be displaced of his charge.

' Drunkenness in an officer shall be punished with loss of place ; in a common soldier with such penalties as a court martial think fit.

' No soldier, either horse or foot, shall presume in marching to straggle from his troop or company, or to march out of his rank, upon pain of death.

' None in their march through the countries shall waste, spoil, or extort any victuals, money, or pawn, from any subject, upon any pretence of want whatsoever, upon pain of death.

' None shall presume to let their horses feed in sown grounds whatsoever, or to endamage the husbandman any way, upon severest punishment.

' Whosoever shall in his quarter abuse, beat, fright, his landlord, or any person else in the family, or shall extort money or victuals, by violence from them, shall be proceeded against as a mutineer, and an enemy to discipline.

' No man shall fail wilfully to come to the rendezvous or garrison appointed him by the Lord General, upon pain of death. No officer, of what quality soever, shall go out of the quarter to dinner or supper, or lie out all night, without making his superior officer acquainted, upon pain of cashiering.

' A sentinel or perdue found asleep or drunk, or forsaking their place before they be drawn off shall die for the offence without mercy.

' None shall save a man who has his offensive arms in his hands upon pain of losing his prisoner.

' None shall kill an enemy who yields and throws down his arms.

' If a town, castle, or fort be yielded up without the utmost necessity the governor thereof shall be punished with death. If the officers and soldiers of the garrison constrain the governor to yield it up . . . they shall cast lots for the hanging of the tenth man amongst them.'

Burning and sacking without orders, flight, and throwing away of arms or ammunition, were also punished with death.

Peculation had been common in the army and in the navy before the Civil War, and had greatly diminished the efficiency of both services. To increase the fighting value of his army, and to protect his men against the frauds practised by civilian contractors and by their accomplices in the service, Cromwell applied the following articles against their nefarious activity, which articles might well be revived at the present time :—

‘ No victuallers shall presume to issue or sell unto any of the army unsound, unsavoury, or unwholesome victuals, upon pain of imprisonment and further arbitrary punishment.

‘ No provider, keeper, or officer of victual or ammunition shall embezzle or spoil any part thereof, or give any false account to the Lord General, upon pain of death.’

It would not have been astonishing if, in Cromwell's revolutionary and essentially democratic army, the officers should have been selected either by Cromwell from the rank and file, without any regard to birth and family, as in the army of Napoleon, or that they should have been chosen by the soldiers from amongst themselves, as usually happens in revolutionary armies. However, Cromwell was too wise to make experiments which would no doubt have been popular, but which might have proved dangerous. Though a certain number of his officers were of humble origin, and rose from the ranks by merit alone, Cromwell fully appreciated the additional value which education and good breeding give to an officer, in front of the enemy and with his men. Promotion to the higher commands in the New Model Army went by merit, but was influenced to some extent by the parentage and education of the officer, and by his seniority. In the troop or company a greater influence upon promotion was wisely conceded to seniority. Examinations for officers' positions in topics

unconnected with military service were unknown. For the book-worm officer Cromwell had no sympathy. On the whole, Cromwell kept the promotion, as well as the nomination of officers, absolutely in his own hands, though he frequently took the advice of his trusted commanders about the officers serving under them, or endorsed their recommendations. Being, like most great commanders, an excellent judge of men, he rarely made a mistake in his appointments, but if an officer proved incompetent his career was immediately cut short. Improper influences upon promotion seem to have been unknown in the New Model Army.

Cromwell's views as to the qualities required in officers and men, and as to the influence exercised by good officers over their men, may be seen from a memorable letter written by him on September 1, 1648, to Sir William Spring and Mr. Maurice Barrow, in which he says: 'I beseech you be careful what captains of horse you choose, what men be mounted; a few honest men are better than numbers. If you choose godly, honest men to be captains, honest men will follow them, and they will be careful to mount such I had rather a plain russet-coated captain that knows what he fights for and loves what he knows than that which you call "a gentleman," and is nothing else.' These lines might with advantage be written in golden letters upon the walls of every war office in the world.

When we remember how carefully Cromwell had selected his officers and men, with an eye to their inborn military spirit, how well they were treated, how perfectly they were trained, armed, and equipped, and how their sense of soldierly honour had been roused, we cannot wonder that his troops performed feats of bravery which filled the whole world with admiration. A few years before the advent of Cromwell, English troops were known to the world as a cowardly armed mob. In 1657, Cromwellian troops,

operating in Flanders, proved to the Continent that the reformed English army was an army of heroes. 'Tis observable,' said the Duke of York, describing a charge made by his troop of horse on English infantry at the Battle of the Dunes, 'that when had we broken into this battalion, and were got amongst them, not so much as one single man of them asked quarter or threw down his arms, but everyone defended himself to the last.'

Similar instances of heroism were by no means rare in Cromwell's soldiers. Before the Battle of Dunbar, 23,000 splendid Scotch troops had surrounded Cromwell and his weary, exhausted force of 11,000 Englishmen, which had been compelled to retreat from the Scotch, and which had been reduced from 14,000 by its terrible privations and the ravages of disease. Nevertheless, the courage of the English force was unbroken, and it inflicted on the Scotch a smashing defeat, perhaps less owing to the genius of its leader than to the fortitude of the men.

Cromwell greatly abbreviated the tedious and circumstantial business connected with formal sieges, which he rarely undertook. Disregarding the traditional operations, he preferred to take by assault fortresses, which probably no other troops in the world could have taken in that manner. Thus, nearly all fortresses taken by Cromwell in the campaign of 1646, were taken by storming. By this vigorous, though perhaps 'unscientific,' innovation he much shortened his campaigns, and struck terror into the heart of the enemy, who, even in the strongest fortresses, felt no longer secure. Therefore many powerful and well-garrisoned strongholds were surrendered to Cromwell without an attempt at defence.

If we survey Cromwell's campaigns it would seem that no army has ever performed greater deeds of valour than that of Cromwell, excepting perhaps some armies of remote antiquity, whose feats, such as the battles of Thermopylæ, Marathon, &c., create a suspicion that either the antagonists

were matched like British troops and Soudanese, or that the historians have greatly exaggerated.

In training his men, Cromwell strove, before all, to make them self-reliant, and enterprising, resourceful and many-sided. This may be seen from his first warlike enterprise, the raid upon Lowestoft, which was not only a masterpiece of guerilla warfare, and of the greatest credit to Cromwell as a cavalry leader, but was also a splendid proof of his ability as a drill-master of his men, who, in marching power, endurance, scouting, resourcefulness, and versatility, seem to have equalled, if not surpassed, De Wet's men, though Cromwell's men had been soldiers for only one year. Starting from Cambridge, on March 11, 1648, Cromwell arrived in Norwich on March 18, and, in order to prevent information reaching Lowestoft, immediately gave orders that nobody should leave the town. He started at five o'clock next morning, and rapidly marched to Lowestoft with his men. Arrived before that town, he took with his dismounted men the guns and barricades which defended the approaches, by a rush, captured a large number of noblemen and cannon, and so well was the raid planned and executed that not one man escaped.

If we consider that Cromwell's cavalry covered, in that raid from Cambridge to Lowestoft and back again, no less than 250 miles in nine days, that his men acted as cavalry and as infantry after only one year's training, that he raided Lynn and Thetford in a similar way during the same expedition, and that perfect secrecy was maintained and absolute success achieved, we must agree with Hœnig that this enterprise is tactically exemplary and a model for all time, besides being a proof of the resourcefulness and many-sidedness of Cromwell's cavalry, of which many more examples are on record.

At the opening of the campaign of 1645-6, Cromwell undertook a most daring raid in the rear of the Royal army, destroyed the King's three best cavalry regiments at Islip,

drove all the cart horses out of the country, and thereby made it impossible for the King to advance and to move his baggage. By doing so he disturbed the concentration of the Royal army, and inflicted an irreparable loss on the King, before the campaign had opened. During this raid, which has not been equalled by De Wet, Cromwell's men displayed a wonderful mobility, covering on an average thirty miles a day.

Later on, when Cromwell had advanced from a leader of cavalry to the command of an army, we find in the infantry under his command the same ability for individual fighting which distinguished his cavalry. Cromwell evidently taught his musketeers to take the greatest advantage of cover, and to fight in a way very similar to that of the Boers, in order to enable them to defeat superior numbers by superior tactics. In 1651, after the Battle of Worcester, Cromwell writes: 'We beat the enemy from hedge to hedge till at last we beat into Worcester.' In 1657, Reynolds, one of Cromwell's officers, offered to Turenne to attack the whole Spanish army with his 6,000 infantry, if they were supported by but 2,000 French cavalry, 'thinking that number of horse sufficient in that enclosed country, and relying on the bravery of his English foot, who had been accustomed to hedge fighting, to supply their want of numbers.'

The excellent scouting and the great mobility to which Cromwell had educated his men in many a small guerilla enterprise, such as those mentioned, were to prove later on of the greatest value in more important engagements. Cromwell anticipated De Wet's tactics by 250 years, with the difference that he did not catch in his traps small isolated parties, but the biggest armies of his time, by combining the guerilla's wile with the strategist's wisdom. A classical example of his guerilla strategy, if one may call it so, is furnished by the Battle of Preston. In 1648 the Scotch invaded England with an army of 24,000 men,

to which Cromwell could oppose only 8,600 men. By their vast numerical superiority, the Scotch had already a great advantage over Cromwell, which was still further increased by the fact that they marched down the west coast, where the broken country did not lend itself to cavalry tactics. Thus Cromwell saw himself deprived of the use of his best weapon, with which he had gained the victories of Marston Moor and Naseby, and his position seemed extremely serious. But Cromwell was not the man to despair. Whilst the Scotch army, an immense host for the time, was slowly moving southward, Cromwell was lying quietly between Leeds and York, far off their line of march, being apparently not disposed to risk an encounter. However, six regiments of cavalry, under Lambert, had been ordered by Cromwell to watch closely the Scotch army, never showing more than single horsemen to the enemy, and to keep Cromwell constantly posted up as to the movements of the Scotch. Evidently Lambert's cavalry succeeded in surrounding the Scotch army during many days as with a screen, for it marched along without suspicion. Cromwell followed from his camp every movement of the enemy, and at last dashed forward. In a few rapid marches he covered the distance of sixty miles separating him from Preston, and there fell upon the Scotch army at the moment when it was extended on the road to a length of about twenty-five miles, and divided in two by the River Ribble. Taking possession of the bridge, Cromwell could deal separately with the disjointed halves, and he not only defeated, but annihilated, the Scotch army.

If we remember that in the seventeenth century roads and means of communication were bad, and that consequently a distance of sixty miles was practically very much greater than it appears now, we cannot but marvel at the excellence of Cromwell's information, at the accuracy with which he calculated the movements of the Scotch, at the mathematical precision with which he timed his attack, and

at the marching power shown by his troops. If we further remember that the Scotch army remained up to the last moment in profound ignorance of the proximity of Lambert's large body of cavalry, and of Cromwell's approach, we must admire the splendid training of every single officer and scout, whose combined intelligence and ability kept the Scotch army isolated from the outer world, and enabled Cromwell to reap this splendid victory against overwhelming numbers.

However, this and other great successes were not only due to the excellent training in scouting and guerilla warfare which Cromwell gave to his troops, but also to the splendid services of his Intelligence Department, working under a 'Scout-Master-General.' Cromwell seems to have originated this important department, for Sir James Turner says of the Scout-Master-General, in his 'Pallas Armata': 'I have known none abroad.' The Scout-Master-General was not only master of the scouts, but he had also to collect military intelligence, and to supply information by spies and otherwise. The Scout-Master-General was often a civilian, who received high pay, and was provided with a large staff. This institution was apparently the seed from which, after more than two centuries, sprang Moltke's Generalstab, of which our own Intelligence Department is a somewhat unsatisfactory copy.

Cromwell's intelligence organisation seems to have splendidly fulfilled the purpose for which it was created, as may be seen from the perfect arrangements which were made beforehand for every expedition, from the smoothness with which enterprises, such as the Battle of Preston, were carried out, and from the absence of 'unfortunate occurrences,' with which we have been made only too familiar. A brilliant example of the completeness of these preparations is furnished by Cromwell's Irish war of 1649. Before crossing, Cromwell's army was divided in three parts, which were to be transported on different days, so that in

case of a storm at least two-thirds of his army should arrive safely. Moreover, every ship was provided with so much food for man and horse, hospital appliances, ammunition, &c., that it was practically self-supporting for a long time, and that the expedition could not be endangered, or even appreciably weakened, if one or several ships should have been driven out of their course. Each ship had sealed orders, which were to be opened after its departure, and not one man in the army knew before starting the point of debarkation. Consequently the Irish were easily deceived about the place of landing, and the expedition was a complete success.

The circumspection and foresight with which Cromwell's enterprises were undertaken show that the maxim of Frederick the Great, '*Aimez donc les détails*,' and Moltke's principle, '*To work out during peace, in the most minute way, plans for the concentration and the transport of troops, with a view to meet all possible eventualities to which war may give rise*,' were anticipated and applied by an Englishman long before the time of Frederick the Great and of Moltke.

Another innovation, apparently made by Cromwell, was a troop of picked orderlies, mounted on picked horses, of whom a large number was always round the commander. These men were trained to receive and transmit verbal orders according to their meaning, a task which is by no means easy on account of the turmoil of battle, and of the lack of clearness with which such orders are frequently given by an excited and much-occupied commander. The great importance of reliable orderlies was not sufficiently recognised before Cromwell's time, as it is not even now in many armies, including our own. A good orderly should be able, besides reporting correctly, to give an intelligent account of the state of the battle and the condition of the ground. To fulfil those tasks satisfactorily, it is not enough that he is possessed of general intelligence, courage, sense

of locality, and good horsemanship ; he should also have a general's grasp of the military situation before him, in order not to mistake the meaning of an order which may have been unclearly expressed, and so describe correctly what he has seen. The lack of reliable orderlies has led to confusion and disaster in many wars, the South African included. Consequently, it is not astonishing that that great commander, General Lee, perhaps the ablest officer who fought in the American War of Secession, recreated an organisation similar to that initiated by Cromwell.

Cromwell's arrangements for marching were as perfect as were all other arrangements in his army. According to contemporary witnesses, Cromwell's army marched like one man, and was free from stragglers—a splendid proof of its discipline on the march. Far from the enemy the men were allowed to sing. If the enemy was near, they marched in absolute silence, and the officers gave their orders by signs during the day, and by whispers at night. No wonder that the awe-stricken country folk, who saw Cromwell's army pass by, likened it to a phantom army. To guard against a surprise, the cavalry used to march far in advance of the army during the day. At night it was placed behind the infantry, in order to prevent confusion in case of a sudden attack.

With such a splendid organisation for the supply of information, for scouting, and for the transmission of orders, and with such perfect arrangements for a rapid, safe, and noiseless march, it is not surprising that Cromwell was never defeated or ambushed, and that he could effect more than one surprise attack and destroy thereby the overwhelming numbers of a brave and stubborn enemy.

At the beginning of the Civil War we admire Cromwell as a master of partisan warfare, and see him training his soldiers individually, and making all-round fighters of them. Hence it came that Charles I rashly assumed that Cromwell was merely a guerilla leader. But he was

mistaken, for Cromwell clearly recognised that a war can only be rapidly decided by battles, and that battles are not won by guerilla fighting. Therefore he strove to make his men as efficient in battle as they were in guerilla warfare, and accomplished a feat which has hardly ever been achieved before or since his time ; he succeeded in making his men superior to all other troops then existing, both in fighting in masses on the field of battle, and in independent guerilla warfare.

As a rule, we find that an army is either an excellent 'fighting machine,' like the German army, which works with precision by the perfect drill of the men, and by their blind obedience to a single will, whereby the individuality of the single fighter is killed, or that it is merely a loose conglomerate or excellent resourceful guerillas, whose very self-reliance and independence incapacitate them from tolerating the irksome restraint of discipline, and from rendering that blind obedience which is required to move a mass of men by a single will towards a purpose which is not always clear to the individual soldier, and which sometimes seems to him utterly wrong. The Boers are an excellent illustration of the latter kind of army ; their very independence and resourcefulness, which made them such splendid fighters in guerilla warfare, caused them to be impatient of discipline, and made it impossible for their generals to perform large strategical or tactical movements, the utility of which was not always clear to the individual Boer. Probably for this reason the Boers did not march on either Cape Town or Durban at the beginning of the war, as they had been advised to do by continental strategists, nor did they follow up a reverse inflicted on our troops by an energetic pursuit, which would have turned a defeat into a rout, if not into an annihilation, of our forces.

In Cromwell's army the individual enterprise of the men was evidently not killed by the strictness of the discipline.

Instead, the mobility, independence, and resourcefulness displayed by the Boers were found in Cromwell's army, side by side with those precise large movements executed by masses of men with startling rapidity, with which the Germans in 1870 won such great successes.

The cavalry tactics which prevailed in Cromwell's time were somewhat peculiar. Effective firearms were of comparatively recent introduction, and, like most new arms, were held in exaggerated esteem by those soldiers who constitutionally over-value the importance of the mechanical factor in warfare, as compared with the human factor. For the smashing impact of solid masses of cavalry, complicated 'scientific' tactics, which allowed of a greater use of firearms, were substituted. According to Ward's '*Animadversaries of Warre*,' a book which appeared three years before the outbreak of the Civil War, the following manoeuvre was executed: 'We fire upon the enemy by ranks and so fall off into the rear so that all the ranks shall come up and give fire by degrees upon the enemy.' This pretty manoeuvre was no doubt very effective against helpless pikemen, but almost useless against any other foe. When a charge was made, it was made, according to Ward, at a slow pace: 'A cuirassier usually giveth his charge upon the trot, and very seldom upon the gallop.' Even these charges 'upon the trot' were often interrupted in order to enable the cavalry to use their pistols, and thus the irresistible impetus of the shock at top speed was sacrificed to toying with pistol fire. Cromwell quickly recognised the futility of those artificial tactics, and resolved to use his cavalry in battle like a sledge hammer of irresistible driving power. He therefore relieved his Ironsides of their carbines, and concentrated the training of his cavalry *en masse* upon the perfect execution of grand and simple shocks, whereby he rolled a series of huge waves of cavalry against the enemy's position, sweeping the opposing forces from the field 'as a little dust,' as he puts it. Thus Cromwell

inaugurated those cavalry tactics which were, later on, applied with such conspicuous success by the two other great cavalry leaders, Frederick the Great and Napoleon.

The application of these splendid shock tactics, which appear so easy to the outsider, and which are so extremely difficult to execute, was only possible owing to the iron discipline which prevailed in Cromwell's army. His cavalry never got out of hand when charging, notwithstanding the difficulty of maintaining a closely knitted line in the attack on the firing enemy, and the strong temptation which every horseman and every horse feels, after a charge has succeeded, to pursue the fleeing, in the wild enjoyment of the chase, until they are run down. By making an absolutely obedient instrument of his cavalry, it became a sledge hammer in Cromwell's hand, with which he could deliver a number of crushing strokes with incredible rapidity and terrible results: a feat which requires the highest training of men and horses, individually, and in masses.

Two months after his raid on Lowestoft, in May 1648, Cromwell encountered, at Grantham, a force of Royal cavalry double the strength of that under his command, and there he put his shock tactics for the first time to the test. During half an hour desultory firing was maintained on both sides, and then, as Cromwell puts it, 'They standing firm to receive us, our men charged fiercely upon them, and by God's providence they were immediately routed.' Naturally, when Cromwell came again across Royal cavalry at Gainsborough, two months after the encounter at Grantham, he no longer hesitated before charging, but immediately charged, according to his own account, 'all keeping close order, routed this whole body, and our men pursuing them had chase and execution about five or six miles.' From that time the charge by compact masses of cavalry moving at a gallop became a part of Cromwell's tactics, and was constantly used by him, and the importance of his innovation soon became generally

recognised in England and abroad. Already, in 1644, Vernon recommended the 'close interlocking' of the charging men. In 1677 Lord Orrery wrote in his 'Art of War': 'When the squadrons advance to charge, the troopers' horses and their own knees are as close as they can well endure. The close uniting of the ranks is so necessary to make the charge effectual.'

Though in the beginning of the Civil War the Royal cavalry was greatly superior to the Parliamentary cavalry in both horses and men, owing to the presence of a large contingent of noblemen, this initial advantage was soon lost by the absence of that iron discipline which alone can make cavalry a really effective instrument in battle. The very dash of the Royal cavalry caused the loss of the battles of Edgehill, Marston Moor, and Naseby, and thereby the overthrow of the King. The Royal cavalry got out of hand every time their slovenly charge had been successful, and raced after the Parliamentary horse in a wild chase, as the hunt follows the fox. It stopped only when horses and men were utterly exhausted and useless for the day, or when an opportunity for plundering occurred. Clarendon, the contemporary historian, describes clearly the difference between the gallant but undisciplined Royal cavalry and that of Cromwell: 'Though the king's troops prevailed in the charge, and routed those they charged, they seldom rallied themselves again in order, nor could they be brought to make a second charge the same day, whereas the other troops, if they prevailed, or though they were beaten and routed, presently rallied again and stood in good order till they received new orders.'

At Edgehill the Parliamentary cavalry fled before Prince Rupert without waiting for his charge, and overthrew four regiments of Parliamentary infantry in its flight. Whilst the Royalists madly raced after the fleeing horsemen as far as Kineton and started plundering, the wavering Parliamentary infantry braced themselves up, defeated

the Royal infantry, and the battle ended undecided. There is no doubt that, if Rupert had stopped his men immediately after the charge, and turned them upon the staggering infantry, he might have annihilated the Parliamentary army, and London would have stood open to the King.

At Marston Moor the right wing of the Parliamentary army was charged by the Royalist cavalry under Goring, and utterly routed. Fairfax, the commander of the Parliamentary right wing, and Skippon, the commander of the centre, were wounded, the Yorkshire infantry in the centre and the Scottish reserve had been overthrown; the outlook for the Parliamentary forces seemed desperate. However, whilst Goring's victorious men galloped after the fugitives as far as their camp, and plundered the baggage, instead of returning to battle, the Royal army, denuded of a large part of its cavalry, was smashed by Cromwell's irresistible, but carefully restrained, charges made with a solid mass of 4,000 horse. Here, as at Edgehill, the King's cavalry failed at the critical moment, not from lack of dash, but from lack of discipline. The turning-point of the battle, and the miraculous change from apparently inevitable annihilation to victory, is well described in a contemporary ballad, which also shows in what veneration Cromwell was held by his men :—

They are here ! they are gone ! we are broken ! we are gone !
Our left is borne before them like stubble on the blast ;
Oh Lord, put forth thy might ! Oh Lord, defend the right !
Stand back to back in God's name and fight it to the last.

Stout Skippon has a wound, the centre has given ground—
Hark ! Hark ! what means the trampling of horsemen on our rear ?
Whose banner do I see, boys ? 'tis he, thank God, 'tis he, boys !
Bear up another moment—brave Oliver is here.

At Naseby the King's infantry had defeated the Parliamentary infantry, the cavalry on the right wing under Prince Rupert had routed the opposed Parliamentary cavalry under Ireton, and, as usual, intoxicated with their

success, the Royalist horse pursued as far as the village of Naseby, where they took to plundering the houses and the Parliamentary baggage. Whilst Rupert was far from the field of battle, Cromwell, who commanded the cavalry of the left wing, had smashed the King's cavalry, and the whole of the Royalist infantry, in three consecutive charges. The battle was practically ended, and the Royalists were fleeing, when Rupert returned from his breakneck chase. His horses and men were exhausted, and all his squadrons in hopeless confusion, a mounted crowd, not a body of cavalry, when they were swept out of existence by a fourth charge of Cromwell, who had wisely reserved the strength of men and horses for the supreme moment. Then only, when victory was assured, Cromwell ordered the pursuit, which was mercilessly continued for no less than fourteen miles, until the walls of Leicester put a stop to Cromwell's men. Through the lack of discipline in the cavalry, the King's army was annihilated. Out of 6,000 Royalist horsemen who had ridden into battle, only 200 remained at the end of the day.

Cromwell's object in battle was not merely to defeat and to disperse the army of the enemy, but to destroy it as a military force. In order to attain this end, he delivered, with the smallest expenditure of strength possible, a series of rapid blows, which either crushed the enemy, or at least brought disorder into his ranks. Then, when the enemy was either broken up or wavering, he threw his cavalry with full force upon the staggering masses, broke them up, and converted an intended retreat of the enemy into a rout, if not into annihilation.

A decisive victory should always be crowned with a destructive pursuit. Cromwell understood this maxim, as is clear from the frequency of his annihilating battles. Apparently he always succeeded in accomplishing his settled purposes to destroy, not merely to defeat, the enemy.

How well Cromwell knew to reserve the strength of man and horse towards the decisive moment, in order to crush the enemy out of existence, can be seen from a few examples. At Preston, Cromwell pursued the Scotch for thirty miles, in spite of the most fearful weather, which had turned the roads into morasses. He wrote that not one man would have escaped him if he had five hundred men of fresh cavalry and five hundred fresh infantry at his disposal. At that battle, and during the pursuit, Cromwell, with only 8,600 men, killed 2,000 men, and made 10,000 prisoners, out of 24,000 men who had opposed him in battle. At Dunbar, Cromwell pursued the Scotch for eight miles, though his army had been decimated and weakened by disease. Out of 23,000 Scotch, 8,000 were killed, and 10,000 made prisoners, by Cromwell's army of 11,000 men. At Worcester, only 1,000 Scotch escaped out of 16,000 who fought against Cromwell. Evidently Cromwell knew how to gain more than one Sedan. These smashing defeats which Cromwell regularly inflicted prove not only his genius as a soldier, but they prove also the sterling worth of his army, in human material, training, and discipline.

When we review, in its entirety, the activity of the ever-victorious New Model Army, in England, Ireland, Scotland, and on the Continent, we cannot help being struck with admiration at its glorious achievements, which appear all the more wonderful if we compare its heroic deeds with the despicable performance of the pre-Cromwellian armies at Cadiz, the Isle of Rhé, Berwick, and Newburn. Our admiration for Cromwell as an organiser must become still greater if we remember that, under his guidance, not only did the English army, within a few years, rise from its deepest disgrace to its greatest glory, but that the neglected fleet also was reorganised, and attained the greatest efficiency, under Cromwell's colonels, Blake, Dean, Popham, and Monck. Owing to its reorganisation by army officers, who had learned the art of organisation

and of war from Cromwell, the English navy won the glorious victories over De Ruyter, Van Tromp, and De Witt, and destroyed fleets in fortified harbours, such as Tunis and Santa Cruz, which were considered impregnable—successes which have probably not been surpassed even in Nelson's time. In fact, it seems not unlikely that the victor of Trafalgar and his men would willingly have ceded the laurel to Colonel Blake, the 'general of the navy,' who, when fifty-two years old, went with his musketeers on board ship, and gained with them victory after victory over the greatest Dutch admirals.

It is but just to attribute these great successes of the army and navy to Cromwell's genius, but it seems a mistake to believe that only the genius of a Cromwell could have raised the English army and navy from their former degradation to such greatness, and that no other general could have done the same. Men of great military ability are probably numerous, but they die often in obscurity. Without the Revolution, Cromwell might never have been more than an honest farmer and brewer; if he had selected a military career he would probably not have advanced further than to the rank of captain in the infantry, or, at the most, of a colonel, for his original views on military matters, his unpolished manners, and his lack of title, would have cut short his career. Cromwell owes his successes not only to his military genius, but also to the circumstances which gave him the unfettered use of his military genius.

Nearly every great event in old and modern history has brought forth a great commander. Consequently, it may be assumed that great soldiers are less rare than is generally supposed, but that they are not always able to prove themselves great commanders from lack of opportunity. England has produced a great number of extremely able soldiers, who performed miracles with ill-armed and ill-trained scratch armies, and some of our generals might

have outshone Cromwell if they had had similar opportunities : an army of their own organisation, and a free hand. Who knows whether Lord Kitchener or General French might not prove a greater soldier than even Cromwell if he were given a free hand to administer, train, and command our army ?

A great soldier can only prove himself a great commander if full power is given him to organise and administer the army according to his own views, but as the civil power is most reluctant to give a free hand to a soldier, however able he may be, great soldiers can hardly ever prove themselves commanders of the first order, except when they are born to a throne, like Alexander the Great, Frederick the Great, Gustavus Adolphus, or Charles XII, or when they acquire supreme power in a revolution, as did Cæsar, Cromwell, and Napoleon. Let it also be remembered that lack of power was evidently the cause of Hannibal's downfall, for his military views were constantly overruled by the unmilitary views of the Carthaginian politicians. If Hannibal had been given full power over his army, he would probably have conquered Rome.

A spirited soldier is extremely impatient of civilian interference, especially as civilian politicians have always shown a remarkable lack of understanding of military matters. Civilian meddling with Hannibal's plans, and the niggardly supplies voted for his army by the politicians, destroyed Carthage, and from Hannibal's time onward the politicians' disastrous interference in military matters is constantly met with. During the Civil War, Parliament, in its wisdom, appointed the Earl of Manchester an army commander, not because of his military genius, but because of his great political and social position. As the politicians were aware of Manchester's military incapacity, they gave him their ablest officer, Cromwell, as an *adlatus*, a kind of unofficial mentor. The result naturally was that Manchester was offended, and hated Cromwell, that Cromwell's

advice was disregarded by the incompetent and stubborn commander, and that both generals were set against one another, to the harm of the Commonwealth. In a similar way, another army was deprived of its usefulness by placing it under the command of two men, Waller and Essex, on the principle *divide et impera*. When Cromwell demanded material for the siege of Pontefract in 1648, Parliament voted half the supplies which Cromwell had declared to be necessary. Similar examples of the politicians' clumsy interference and penny wisdom in military matters might be cited from both later, and the latest, military history of this country.

A characteristic of most modern armies is that they are conservative, if not reactionary, in spirit, and that the highest commands are filled by men possessed of mediocre ability. The reason for these phenomena is not far to seek. Soldiers of the first rank, such as Cromwell, have trusted remarkably little in detailed regulations for the administration and training of their armies, because they see in the army a living organism which grows and progresses continually, and believe that resourceful individualism, in officers and men, is more important than the mechanical copying of precedent cases and the unthinking adherence to established rules. The elaborate regulations with which most armies are cursed, and which were devised by dry-as-dust bureaucrats with or without epaulets, but not by soldiers, have substituted the 'fighting machine' for a living organism, have killed the vitality and initiative of armies, and have, besides, made it easier for men of social position and wealth to attain to the highest commands, by the easy claims of seniority and the passive merits of 'correctness,' than for plain men of military genius. Furthermore, the dead-weight of these regulations has made it impossible for a soldier of genius to reform the army when he has at last arrived at the highest command as an old man who has spent his best energy, and who longs for rest.

Whenever great army reforms have taken place, they have been carried out by a soldier endowed with far-reaching powers, and when civilian politicians or red-tape generals, two classes equally devoid of military understanding, have not been allowed to molest him in his work. Conspicuously successful army reforms, such as those initiated by Cromwell, Napoleon, Scharnhorst, Moltke, or that of the Egyptian army by Lord Kitchener, were the work of one man, and they were only possible because those commanders had a free hand, ample time, and chose their own methods and their own men. On the other hand, the reform of the French army after 1871 has not been satisfactory, partly because the republican and monarchical politicians who took part in the reorganisation were unable to sink party differences and to regard the organisation of the army merely from a soldier's point of view, partly because ministers of war and commanders-in-chief are appointed in France not solely from military considerations, but largely according to party requirements, and are so frequently changed that the military policy of France lacks continuity and her army cohesion.

The crying need of reform in the British army has been proved again and again, but nevertheless our politicians have not given to our most competent soldiers sufficient power to reorganise the army in accordance with their vast experience. Instead, numerous committees, composed of well-meaning civilians and decayed generals, have, from time to time, been appointed to inquire into those defects of the army with which all our great soldiers are perfectly familiar, and which only soldiers left to themselves, not politicians and well-meaning amateurs, can thoroughly remedy.

Since the time when Cromwell overthrew Parliament, our generals have been deprived of nearly all power over the army, and have been so closely bound and muzzled by the politicians that our army has virtually become

a civilians' army and a politicians' army, and is no more a soldiers' army. Hence its constant unreadiness and inefficiency. The fear of the military usurper, which dictated the policy of withdrawing all power over the army from Cromwell's successors, was no doubt justified at the time of the Restoration; the continuance of that policy at the present time is not only unjust towards our generals, but it sacrifices the efficiency of our armed forces, and the safety of the country and of the Empire, to a baseless suspicion.

The armies of some of our possible enemies count by millions, and consequently it has been assumed that, in case of a war with a military Power of the first rank, British armies would henceforth play a merely passive part. As long as we slavishly copy continental organisations, which, as often as not, are unsuitable to British conditions, under the guidance of an amateur soldier at Pall Mall, and learn tactics from the Franco-German War, this assumption is correct. At present our regulars are of about equal quality with the average of continental troops, they receive a similar training, follow nearly identical tactics, and possess almost similar arms and equipment. With all these factors practically alike, it may be concluded that victory will lie in the end with the larger number of soldiers brought in the field. Without national military service we cannot compete with our possible continental enemies in numbers, and consequently we must either consider our army, in case of a great war, as a weapon for passive defence, and must be prepared for all the grave disadvantages, and even dangers, which spring from that passivity, or we must strive to create an army which makes up in quality for what it lacks in numbers.

Oliver Cromwell has shown us how to reorganise the army, and how to defeat vastly superior numbers of a brave enemy, with a small but highly-trained force, and the late Boer War has confirmed his teaching. If we go on

copying continental institutions, and do not give sufficient power for reform and administration to our ablest soldiers, our army will continue to be a costly sham and a danger to our national existence ; if we give once more a free hand to an able soldier to recreate a new model army on a national basis, it seems not unlikely that, in case of a war, British military prestige will rise as high as it rose in Cromwell's time, and that the Empire will be as safe from foreign attack as it was then. But whether that consummation will be arrived at seems doubtful. The military views of English politicians have changed remarkably little during the last three hundred years, and the saying of Sir Edward Cecil seems as true now as it was in 1628 : ' The danger of all is that a people not used to war believeth no enemy dare venture upon them.'

CHAPTER XI

THE COLLAPSE OF FRANCE IN 1870 AND ITS LESSON TO ENGLAND

ON August 1, 1870, the French and German armies stood facing one another on their frontiers. No engagement had yet taken place, and in the great duel that was impending Europe expected the triumph of France, who then stood at the zenith of her power and prestige. The French thought their army invincible, as we now think our navy. The arms of France had been victorious in Mexico and in the Crimea, in Italy and in Africa. She was by far the wealthiest, and was generally regarded as being the strongest, Power on the Continent, and all the sovereigns flocked to Paris to pay homage to Napoleon III, whose every pronouncement was a political event of the first magnitude. France was considered to be the arbiter of Europe, and Prussia was held to be a secondary Power, notwithstanding her remarkable successes in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866.

On September 1, 200,000 French soldiers were shut up in Metz ; 120,000 men, with the Emperor, were surrounded at Sedan. In one short month France had been defeated in six battles, and the whole of her regular army had been swept from the field.

On February 1, 1871, five months later, all was over ; 700,000 prisoners, the French capital, the most important fortresses, 7,500 guns, nearly 1,000,000 rifles, the Emperor, and the best French generals, were in German hands. France, utterly vanquished, had to submit to mutilation,

and even now, though almost forty years have passed since 'L'Année Terrible,' she has not regained the place in the world which she used to occupy, and may possibly never regain it. Posterity will perhaps regard her defeat by Germany in 1870 as the turning-point of her history, and as the cause of her decline.

It seems desirable to investigate the causes which led to the collapse of the French army, especially as such an investigation will yield us some most valuable lessons.

THE FRENCH ARMY AND THE NATION

The French army was by no means representative of the French nation. According to General Boulanger, 'L'Armée était une caste dans la nation,' and this spirit of caste was to be found not only amongst the officers, but also amongst the men. The officers were the darlings, and the men the pariahs, of society. Universal compulsory service existed in France only in name, for the State found *remplaçants* for those willing to serve. The Government dealt in *remplaçants* like a merchant, and the price of substitutes fluctuated like that of any commodity. In 1869 a substitute could be obtained for 2,400 francs, and in the yearly levy of that year, comprising 75,000 recruits, no less than 42,000 were *remplaçants*. It was easy for those who were unwilling to serve and able to pay to shift the duty of defending their country upon the shoulders of poorer men, and the sons of substantial citizens were therefore seldom found in the ranks of the army. The defence of the country was left to the proletariat, and the chief interest taken in the army by taxpayers and voters was a monetary one. Marshal Bazaine tells us in his 'Episodes de la Guerre' that the expression 'Nous les payons pour qu'ils aillent se faire tuer' was on everybody's lips, the citizens considering the soldiers as food for powder. General Thoumas wrote in his book 'Les Capitulations': 'War was considered to

be a misfortune in the abstract that did not touch the individual citizen, or as the glorious task of the army which was followed with patriotic pride and admiration. War was regarded as an object for thought only in so far as it gave occasion for praise or blame.'

As the chief interest of the citizens in the army was centred in their pockets, the official classes thought it most important to keep the taxpayer in good temper by dazzling his eye with the splendour of costly uniforms and showy reviews, and by exalting his mind with the vision of an invincible army. The latter effect was produced by extravagant official statements which were more elating than the prosaic, and sometimes unpalatable, truth. Patriotic reformers who pointed out the weakness of the army were described as irresponsible croakers and unpatriotic panic-mongers, and their justified exposures of the unpreparedness of the army were silenced with ridicule and wilfully deceptive statements such as the following, which Marshal Randon, the then Minister of War, made in 1866: 'What! Can it be said that a nation like France, who in a few weeks can assemble under the colours 600,000 soldiers, who has in her arsenals 8,000 pieces of field artillery, 1,800,000 muskets, and powder enough for a ten years' war, should not be always ready to maintain by arms her injured honour and her disregarded rights? Can it be said that the army is not ready to enter upon a campaign when it includes in its ranks the veterans of Africa, Sebastopol, and Solferino? What army is there in Europe which contains the like elements of experience and energy?'

A man who continually and emphatically tells the same untruth ends by believing it himself, and the deception continually and deliberately practised upon the public by the French War Office and generals at last engendered in their minds a delusion as to the real state and strength of the French army. Only a state of auto-suggestion can explain the fact that the warnings of prominent soldiers,

such as Generals Bazaine, Trochu, Ducrot, Froissart, and Colonels Stoffel, Lewal, and others, who were amongst the ablest men in the army, were officially pooh-poohed or pigeon-holed, and that General Trochu fell into disgrace through having told, in the most modest language, the truth about the army in his book '*L'Armée Française*,' which was published in 1867. Nothing but the overweening conceit born of ignorance and fortified by continual emphatic boasting can explain the words of the *Journal Officiel*, which, on August 16, 1869, only ten months before the outbreak of the war, wrote : ' An army of the line of 750,000 men ready for war, in addition nearly 600,000 men of the *garde mobile*, instruction in all branches carried to an extent hitherto unheard of, 1,200,000 small arms made in eighteen months, fortresses put in preparation, arsenals filled, an immense *matériel* sufficient for all eventualities—all these are the great results obtained in two years.'

Needless to say, there was no foundation for the figures given, not even on paper, and they emanated solely from the official imagination, being produced in order to lull to sleep the just apprehensions of the nation. Napoleon's proclamation to the army on the eve of the war betrayed a similar fatuity. It said : ' The beginning of the war will be long and fatiguing, for it will take place in a country bristling with natural obstacles and fortresses . . . but whichever route we may choose *outside our frontiers*, everywhere we shall find glorious reminiscences of our fathers.'

The possibility that the theatre of war might perchance be *inside* the French frontiers was, apparently, considered to be too remote to be taken into account.

Whenever any defect of the army came to light it was rather hushed up than reformed, partly because the short-sighted War Office considered the impression made by the army on the taxpayer as all-important, partly because official torpor hated to be disturbed. Official explanations and juggling with facts and figures were easier than reform.

This was inaugurated only at the last moment when it had become quite unavoidable, and was purely symptomatic. Half measures and quarter measures were therefore greatly in favour. Praise without stint was showered on the army by the Emperor and his generals, for criticism was, evidently, out of place with an army of which it was continually asserted that everything was in the most perfect order and in the most satisfactory condition. 'Nous sommes toujours prêt' was a catchword amongst the highest commanders, and this catchword was improved by the Minister of War, Le Bœuf, at the outbreak of the war into his celebrated assertion, 'Nous sommes archiprêt—jusqu'au dernier bouton!' The wisdom of the proverb '*Pessimus inimicorum genus laudantes*' and the danger of bestowing upon the army and its officers indiscriminate but undeserved praise was never considered by the military authorities.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ARMY AND THE WAR OFFICE

The administration of the French army was self-centred, bureaucratic, over-centralised, and completely out of touch with the army. Pierre Lehautcourt, a prominent military writer, from whose admirable book on the Franco-German War much information contained in the following pages is taken, says: 'The Minister of War was principally an administrative official who rather looked after matters connected with the Budget than after the army. Like the Emperor he had no real authority over the army, which was ruled by the fluctuating, uncertain and capricious decisions of various tradition-bound departments and committees and by the shifting influences of certain decorative but nominal commanders. Hence the absence of unity of purpose and of logic in military decisions.' The author of '*Les Causes de nos Désastres*' says: 'Everything ended or began at the War Office, but centralisation stopped at its

doors, for the departments acted each on their own account, according to the will of a staff which had elevated routine to a dogma. At the outbreak of war the difficulties increased tenfold. The orders given by the various departments went into the smallest details, and the numerous small mistakes which were made caused endless inquiries requiring equally endless replies. Everything went at cross-purposes and everybody's work was complicated.'

A passing comparison with the working of the Prussian War Office is instructive. We read in the 'Denkwürdigkeiten' of Count Roon, the then Prussian Minister of War: '... the mobilisation machine worked with such exemplary exactitude, and so completely without friction, that Roon and the War Office had not to reply to *one* inquiry of the commanding generals or of other commanders. This was the case though the order for mobilisation was given without any previous warning, and though many commanding generals and staff officers were on their summer holiday, and a good number of them were even abroad.'

How great was the muddle at the French War Office caused by its over-centralisation and how great the consequent chaos at the front, may be seen from the fact that large numbers of the troops arrived at the frontier without cartridges. Others lacked camping materials, baggage train, artificers, bakers, and provisions. No one in the army had a map of Alsace-Lorraine, and the troops lost their way in their own country, but the officers possessed excellent maps of German territory which were useless to them. According to General Ambert, the last telegram which General Douay sent to the War Office before his death on the battlefield was: 'I have not a single map of the country where I am.' The official account of the war by the French General Staff relates: 'Orders to place the frontier fortresses in a state of defence were not given until the 27th July, twelve days after the outbreak of the war, and as late as the

30th July nothing had been done for the defence of Strasbourg, which was separated from Germany only by the Rhine. No guns were on the ramparts.' None of the French frontier fortresses had sufficient provisions to withstand a siege; most of them, including Strasbourg, had been built two centuries ago by Vauban; they possessed no outlying forts, and the antiquated fortifications had in no way been modernised. In spite of the boasts of Marshal Randon and the *Journal Officiel*, and of all the official apologists, the shortage of all war material was most deplorable. The fact that at the end of July 1870 the French army could oppose only 768 inferior guns to the 1,410 excellent guns of the German army of invasion, and that of the famous 8,000 guns, of which Marshal Randon boasted, the vast majority were utterly antiquated, some dating as far back as the time of Louis XIV, is characteristic of the quality and the quantity of the entire French war material. The rifles only were good, but even they were quite insufficient in number.

General Lewal, the talented soldier who foresaw the fate of France, wrote in 'La Réforme de l'Armée': 'Each department of the War Office was a small ministry in itself. Over them all ruled the Minister of War, whose decisions clashed at every moment with those of the departments. Therefore he was powerless. Each department followed the policy that had been established by routine, and gave its orders independently. Consequently the orders given by one department were often found to be contradictory of those given by another. It was a complete system of disorder, and mutual antagonism took the place of united effort. Each department kept its secrets in order to make itself indispensable and to escape supervision. Everything was organised for peace, nothing for war. In carrying out the smallest movement, enormous difficulties had to be encountered. One department could not give batteries, another could not supply the remounts, and veritable negotiations were necessary to bring the departments into line.

'The staff of the War Office was largely composed of civilians who had entered it after an examination. They passed their whole lives without acquiring any practical knowledge of military matters, and they knew the army only by correspondence. The chiefs of the departments were aged and had passed the largest part of their lives as clerks. In that occupation they had contracted ideas and habits of thought from which they could not easily free themselves. Bureaucratic regularity did not take kindly to innovations and change, and tradition and precedent were elevated into a dogma. Things had always been done in a certain manner, therefore they must continue to be so done.'

The effect which a War Office so constituted had upon new officials, even if they came fresh from the army and showed the greatest zeal, can only be described as blighting. Says Pierre Lehautcourt: 'After some years' occupation at the War Office, officers became almost civilians, and, living completely outside military life, lost their sense of discipline; with advancing age they became either professorial or bureaucratic.' The French War Office had become a rigid, unthinking machine, and to it not only forethought and energy, but even patriotic duty and honour, were words without meaning. General Lewal says in '*La Réforme de l'Armée*': 'Ministers often forgot that some officer or the other had clear rights, not merely a claim. Nevertheless, his rights were trampled under foot.' According to General Wimpffen's account in '*La Bataille de Sedan*': 'Excessive and exasperating formality was characteristic of the administration, and its unpopularity increased from day to day.' General Lewal, one of the most talented officers in the army, who at the outbreak of the war was chief of one of the departments in the French War Office, was well qualified to criticise the performance of that office and its attitude towards progress and reform. He says: 'Nobody can imagine, unless he has had practical experience, how many obstacles were placed in one's way

if one brought forward a new and sensible idea. The most incredible objections were raised, and officialism went even so far as to treat a man who made a good suggestion as a dreamer, a malcontent, or a fool; for the War Office considered it to be folly to change a bad practice for something better.'

Besides being stupid, torpid, and unfair in its administration, the War Office exercised a tyrannical and pernicious influence over the commanders by its constant meddling. 'Cavalry colonels,' says General Lewal, 'dared not give sufficient drill to their men for fear of breaking down a few horses and getting into trouble with the War Office.'

The officers of the army and the War Office were entirely out of touch, but nevertheless the self-centred, unthinking administrative machine continually encroached upon the province of the executive branch of the service, which became its tool, and was humiliated into a bureaucracy glorified with gold lace. Generals were turned into clerks to the War Office and had to devote their time to endless correspondence on administrative futilities and trifles of account instead of spending their energy in training their troops and themselves for war. General Lewal tells us in '*La Réforme de l'Armée*': 'The self-centred existence of our army and too much centralisation have caused our generals to get out of touch with military affairs. They knew nothing about the organisation of the army, its administration, the artillery, and other technical matters. They were never consulted by the War Office, and therefore they took no interest in these matters. Their functions were limited to transmitting orders and to giving replies regarding the details of the service. They were allowed neither initiative nor power. It is true that generals were occasionally asked for their opinion, but not much notice was taken of their views. The opinion of a War Office official was always more weighty than the advice of a general.'

THE ORGANISATION OF THE ARMY AND ITS PREPARATION FOR WAR

General Ducrot wrote a memoir dated January 28, 1868, which was submitted to the Emperor, in which he stated : ' The only thing for which I envy the Prussian army and which gives it its strength is its excellent organisation, which makes its mobilisation so easy and so rapid that Prussia can in forty-eight hours concentrate 120,000 men in Mayence and Coblenz. As things are at present we should require several weeks in order to obtain a similar result.' His warnings, like those of many other generals, were considered troublesome, being likely to disturb official indolence and to expose official nonchalance and ignorance and its unwarranted optimism. At the Emperor's table Ducrot was mercilessly mocked by his brother generals who were acquainted with his pessimistic views, and he was treated as a ' malcontent.' It was so much easier to silence the general, who was by nature somewhat awkward, than to tell the truth and to institute reforms !

The attitude of the people towards the army and the spirit which prevailed at the War Office were jointly responsible for the bad organisation of the army and its lack of preparation for war. Napoleon himself describes the organisation of his army in the following way : ' Our war organisation is like a complicated machine, of which all working parts are skilfully separated, and are kept stored at various workshops. If it becomes necessary to put it in motion, the work of getting it ready is slow and troublesome, for all the single wheels and cranks have to be found and connected. In fact the whole machine has to be put together, from the simple nut to the most complicated part.' His opinion is borne out by General Lewal in his book ' La Réforme de l'Armée,' which significantly begins with the phrase : ' The vice of a double organisation, one for peace and the other for war, is too

evident to require demonstration. Only one organisation is needed, namely, that for war.' The ill-starred General Wimpffen in 'La Bataille de Sedan' sums up the causes of the French disasters in one sentence: 'Whilst in France everything was left to chance, in Prussia everything was regulated by calculation, intelligence, and science.' Napoleon III says in his 'Œuvres Posthumes': 'This inconceivable difference between the number of men present under the colours and those who ought to have been there is the most striking and deplorable example of the vicious character of our military organisation. . . . The transition from a peace establishment to a war establishment was far more protracted than was expected, and this was the chief cause of our reverses.

'Instead of having in line, as might have been expected, 885,000 men to oppose the 480,000 of Northern Germany combined with the Southern States, the army, when the Emperor arrived at Metz on the 25th July, amounted only to 220,000 men, and moreover, not only were the effectives not up to their full complement, but many indispensable accessories were wanting.'

General Lebrun describes in his 'Souvenirs Militaires' the practical working of the two independent army organisations, one for peace and one for war, and the cumbrous and laborious conversion of the unprepared army from the peace footing to the war footing: 'The lengthy and complicated labour which devolved upon the War Office, owing to the neglect of preparations and the numerous difficulties to which that neglect gave rise, might have been avoided if, in time of peace, army corps had been organised possessed of a composition identical to that which they would have in war, but, unfortunately, the War Office had had the unhappy idea to change in the last minute the whole organisation of the army when there was no longer any time for re-organisation. If everything had been prepared, generals and troops would at least have known one another, the

commanders of brigades and divisions would have seen that each corps was completely supplied with necessities of war before moving them out of their garrisons, and they would have assured themselves that everything had been prepared to receive the reservists.' The Duc d'Audiffret Pasquier expressed a similar opinion before the Committee of the National Assembly: 'Among the causes of defeat were the improper distribution of the contingents and their want of instruction, the slowness of the reserves in joining the corps, the improvised formation of corps d'armée in time of war; the system which took a divisional officer at Lille, a brigadier at Perpignan, and an intendant in Algeria, placed these officers, called from the four points of the compass, in common combined action, without any indication of their character, their reciprocal aptitude, and without a chance of duties performed in conjunction having given them that confidence in each other which is necessary to enable them to share their common responsibilities; and this when, in a few days, they must be in front of the enemy.'

His opinion is borne out by the astonishing experiences of Colonel Patry, described in his book '*La Guerre telle quelle est*': 'I had never seen the face of our brigade general; I knew my division commander by sight because I had happened to meet him in Sierok, but I had neither seen him on the march nor in camp. As regards the commander of the corps, no one even knew his name.'

The experience of Colonel Patry was typical, and the weighty corroborative evidence cited can leave no doubt as to the viciousness and danger entailed by a double organisation, one for peace and one for war. The organisation of the French army was essentially a peace organisation, ill adapted for rapid mobilisation. Its conversion to a war footing caused the greatest disorder, and, owing to its unpreparedness, the army was bound to find itself at a grave, and almost irreparable, disadvantage in any serious war.

It is a well-known fact that France would not have stood alone against Germany had she not succumbed at the first blow, owing to her unreadiness. Marshal Bazaine, the commander-in-chief of the French army, in his book 'Episodes de la Guerre,' makes the following interesting and painful statement: 'I wish to state in the most emphatic manner that the first and greatest advantage of Germany has been the promptitude of her mobilisation, whereby she was able to take the offensive against us. If we had been allowed a fortnight more time we could have collected everything that was indispensable for our armies, and our troops would have been well fed and enabled to march and fight. In that case the chances of war would have been changed and any reverse which we might have experienced would not have had the most serious consequences. With a better military organisation our country would have been saved.'

The French War Office had been forewarned by some of its own members, but their warnings were not heeded. The official account of the war by the French General Staff tells us that General Lewal, who was then a colonel in the War Office, had in his official capacity reported that the maximum time required for the mobilisation of Prussia would be twenty-two days, and, indeed, twenty-two days after the declaration of war the German troops crossed the frontier. No notice had been taken of Lewal's report.

THE STAFF OF THE FRENCH ARMY

In France the intellectual guidance of the army and the supplying of military intelligence was not in the hands of a powerful organisation, but was left to chance and circumstance. No department existed whose duty it was to collect systematically all the facts of interest to France regarding foreign countries and foreign armies, to watch their progress,

to prepare detailed plans of campaign in time of peace, to solve the many strategical, mechanical, and administrative problems which require solution, and to educate the officers in the art of war. There was no thinking department, and important problems were either shelved (which was the favourite method), or dealt with in a haphazard fashion by the overworked and insufficiently informed War Office, which was quite incompetent to decide whether the pessimistic forecasts of Colonels Stoffel and Lewal or the optimistic views of Marshals Randon and Le Boeuf, which were supported in their writings by numerous 'dashing' young officers, such as Lafouge, Smeth, Costa de Serda, Loizillon, Bourelly, Méquillet, Derrécagaix, and Fay, were correct. Not unnaturally it decided that the opinion of the highest dignitaries was bound to be right, and disregarded the views of Stoffel and Lewal, who received no thanks for their pains. A department called General Staff certainly existed in France, but its functions were chiefly mechanical and bureaucratic, and it fulfilled in no way the purposes which it should have served. It is useful to recall Moltke's words regarding some of the duties of a general staff in making those preparations for war which were utterly neglected in France: 'One of the principal duties of the General Staff is to work out during peace in the most minute way plans for the concentration and the transport of troops, with a view to meet *all* possible eventualities to which war may give rise.

'When an army first takes the field the most multifarious considerations—political, geographical, as well as military—have to be borne in mind. Mistakes in the original concentration of armies can hardly ever be made good in the whole course of a campaign. All these arrangements can be considered a long time beforehand, and—assuming the troops are ready for war and the transport service properly organised—must lead to the exact result which has been contemplated.'

The routine of the War Office had also infected the French General Staff, and staff officers, who should represent the highest intelligence in the army and whose occupation should be entirely intellectual, were made the bureaucratic drudges of the officers in command. General Lewal states in '*La Réforme de l'Armée*': 'Staff officers became clerks, and copied orders, letters and circulars. Their clerical position humiliated them and disgusted them with their career. Besides, they learned to see too clearly the incapacity of the commanders to whom they were attached, and became sceptical of the advantage gained by knowledge and exertion.'

Pierre Lehautcourt tells us: 'Staff officers outside the War Office found no better occupation for their abilities than to devote their official existences to signing receipts, writing letters, and transmitting orders.'

The staff of the French army was an elaborate sham, and most generals had only a hazy idea of the value of a staff, and they would not have known how to make use of a good staff had it existed. No special aptitude was required in staff officers, for they were only clerks and supernumeraries. Besides, the staff officers did not possess any special qualifications for their duties. In consequence of its composition and of its bureaucratic intellect-killing occupation, the General Staff, as well as the army corps staffs, proved almost valueless in war. General Wimpffen complains in '*La Bataille de Sedan*': 'The officers of the numerous staffs did not know the language of the enemy. We had no maps, though the War Office was full of maps.'

If a great soldier had been placed at the head of the General Staff and had been given ample powers, he might have created an active brain to the army that would have rejuvenated the War Office and the whole service, and prepared the army in all respects for war. But staff officers' positions were filled from a narrow circle of mediocrities

instead of being thrown open to the free competition of all the best brains in the army. In this connexion Marshal Bazaine's words regarding the selection of staff officers are well worth quoting : 'Taking in a position at a glance is not an art which can be taught. It is a natural gift which can be perfected by experience. Hence, officers, who have to fulfil the important duty of directing the movements of troops and choosing positions favourable to each arm, of studying those parts of countries which may become the theatre of war, must have a complete grasp of all the requirements of an army, and must possess an activity of mind and body that is proof against fatigue. Those officers cannot therefore be selected from among the pupils of a school, but must be chosen from the most capable officers of the whole army who possess the greatest natural talent for those duties.' After the war had broken out the War Office woke up from its torpor and began to work in feverish haste, vainly attempting, at the eleventh hour, to improvise organisations which, with reasonable forethought, would have been created in peace time. According to the official account of the war by the French General Staff, the Minister of War directed, on July 17, two days after the outbreak of war, 'that it is necessary to organise *immediately* an intelligence service in order to supply continually information regarding the enemy and the country in which we shall have to operate.' Naturally enough it was impossible either to organise at the last moment an adequate intelligence department, or to obtain much valuable intelligence through the scratch staff that was organised, or to turn to good account the scraps of intelligence which were received. Similarly, on July 28, eight days after the declaration of war, Napoleon sent a lengthy memoir to the Minister of War in which he recommended a large number of elaborate reforms and new organisations, as if it were possible to improvise at the last moment organisations which it required years to create and to set working. The Emperor might just as

well have tried to save a drowning man by recommending him to take swimming lessons.

It can hardly be doubted that if a powerful intelligence organisation had existed in France, the war would either not have broken out, or it would have found France prepared. At any rate it is impossible to improvise at the outbreak of war an intelligence department, the usefulness of which can only consist in knowledge and information acquired during years of patient labour.

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Napoleon III, who acted as commander-in-chief of the French army in peace and war, was little qualified for that position. His ignorance of warfare and of all connected with it was as notorious as was his rashness. We have it from Marshal Castellane that, during the Crimean War, the Emperor was about to send an expedition to the Baltic in order to take Cronstadt, not knowing that Cronstadt lies on an island, and a map had to be fetched to convince him. Moreover, the Emperor was too much occupied with other matters which diverted his attention from military affairs, too good-natured and too weak, and his weakness was continually exploited by courtiers, generals, and especially by certain ladies who exercised considerable influence in the army.

THE ARMY COMMANDERS AND THE GENERALS

Kleber has said that a good general in command of a mediocre army is better than a mediocre general in command of a good army, and that saying has been true ever since the time of Hannibal and Cæsar. Consequently it might have been expected that the nephew of the great Napoleon and the historian of Julius Cæsar would have exercised some care in the selection of his generals. However, this was not the case. Generals did not always owe

their position to their conspicuous ability, and the unjustifiable appointments which were made gravely compromised the efficiency of the army and undermined its discipline. Intrigue was often a better aid to obtaining a command than conspicuous merit. Pierre Lehautcourt writes: 'Officers amongst themselves laughed about appointments which placed at the head of the cavalry an officer who could not ride, or at the head of an army corps a clever engineer officer who, during his whole life, had never commanded a division, a brigade, a regiment, or even a battalion.' From General Lewal we learn: 'Officers approached the Emperor and did not blush to ask for promotion. Each high official and officer had his friend at Court. The first thought of officers was to please, and everyone in the army knew the influences which had been instrumental in causing this or that promotion.'

The vicious and dangerous practice of giving high commands to personal favourites without sufficient regard to their military capacity prevailed not only in peace but unfortunately also in war. General Lewal states in '*La Réforme de l'Armée*': 'At the outbreak of a war commands were given not to those who were considered most capable but to those to whom a promise of command had been made beforehand.' When in 1870 eight army corps were formed on the frontier, the commands of the 2nd, 5th, 6th, and 7th Corps, and that of the Guards, were given to five personal aides-de-camp of the Emperor, men who were more distinguished as courtiers than as generals. On the other hand, we learn from General Lewal that 'General Pellissier, renowned through the Crimean War, in which he had been commander-in-chief, received no command after his return; General Montauban, who had made his mark in China, and who was supposed to be the ablest general, received no command in 1870. Therefore it was said in military circles that the Emperor was jealous of superior merit, and that his sympathies were with mediocrities.'

General Wimpffen says : ' Base rivalry and childish jealousy influenced the distribution of high commands.'

To be 'un bel homme,' 'un homme spirituel,' 'un danseur indéfatigable,' was a great recommendation for military employment, as papers found at the Tuileries have proved.

The Emperor was aware of these abuses and the dangers springing from them, yet he deliberately closed his eyes to them, for favouritism had become an established custom difficult to uproot. The Emperor was a weak man, and Society had become stronger than he, the War Office, and the executive combined. The most trivial pretexts were considered sufficiently strong to demand a favour from him. General Ambert mentions in 'Sedan' that a colonel asked the Emperor to be changed into another corps. 'Why?' asked the Emperor. 'Because my regiment is bad,' answered the colonel. 'Monsieur,' answered Napoleon, 'I have no bad regiments, only bad colonels.'

The Emperor's favour was, however, not sufficient to secure the promotion of a favourite officer, as elaborate counter-intrigues were set on foot by highly placed personages in the interests of their own *protégés*, and their objections were of the most trifling kind. General Ambert tells us in his book 'L'Invasion' : 'I could name two French marshals who opposed the admission of a colonel to the Imperial Guard because he was considered to be too strict a disciplinarian. Personal and financial relations, relatives in high places, and flighty Parisian manners were great aids to promotion, and often sufficed where ability was lacking.'

Courtiers, flatterers, and their hangers-on, and the *protégés* of society ladies pushed themselves by sheer insolence into high military positions, and whilst those sycophants had their sway and succeeded in hiding their incapacity with brazen assurances of the excellence of the army, no minister had the courage to tell the Emperor that, as General Lewal says, 'the efficiency of an army is

impossible when it is more in the interest of every officer to make himself agreeable to his superior than to do his duty.' Many meritorious officers who disdained to clamour for promotion, or to fawn on their superiors, and those were often the best men, were neglected and passed over in promotion, and they finally left the service full of bitterness.

There were, however, other influences unfavourable to the efficiency of the generals quite apart from the fact that they were not selected solely by merit. General Ponchalon states in his '*Souvenirs de la Guerre*': 'Our army commanders were paralysed by a higher power, and their liberty of action was circumscribed by requirements of policy.' Marshal Marmont's saying, 'A general should rather resign his command if no liberty of action is given to him than submit to the direct interference of the Government,' may have been remembered by some of the generals, but resignation offers little inducement to a general if he knows that he will be quickly replaced by a man of inferior ability, that he will harm only himself, and that there is no hope that his action will lead to reform in the service. Resignation under such circumstances would mean only useless self-sacrifice.

In consequence of this state of affairs it is not astonishing to hear from the author of '*Les Causes de nos Désastres*': 'What strikes the observer at once is that the generals were not familiar with the functions which they were supposed to exercise, being ignorant alike of their duties and of the powers given to them. Most of them were in reality no better than colonels.'

Indeed, where could they have learned to handle troops? War was an exception, and manœuvres consisted only of parade evolutions. The commanders of divisions came into contact with their troops only during reviews, and had never cause to study maps and the ground. Hence a general inexperience was to be found among the higher

officers, who were incapable of executing the smallest operation without orders. They possessed no initiative and were afraid of responsibility.

The French generals were hampered not only by the disorganisation of the army, by their insufficient ability, and by the constant interference of the War Office, but also by the jealousies engendered in the numerous intrigues in which they were engaged and to which they largely owed their positions. We read in General Derrécagaix's book '*La Guerre Moderne*': 'At the commencement of operations in 1870 the rivalry of our commanders more than once contributed to our reverses.' General Lewal confirms the opinion of this distinguished military scientist, stating: 'Often enough an officer, instead of helping a comrade who was hard pressed, said, "Let him help himself if he is so clever."'

At the outbreak of the Franco-German War Napoleon III was very ill, suffering excruciating pain through stone in the bladder, from which he finally died. Nevertheless, he took the field with his generals, chiefly in order to preserve some union amongst them, as he had in former campaigns received unmistakable proofs of their dangerous rivalry, which had gone to the duelling point. Fearing their jealousies, he did not group his army corps into armies, but left them isolated, thereby gravely hampering combined action. Only on August 5, after the serious defeat of Wörth, when incalculable harm had already been done, were the scattered army corps under his nominal command hurriedly grouped into three armies. Here again we see the fatal instability of purpose and vacillation which we meet everywhere in the French army.

The state of the intrigue and bureaucracy ridden army, its helplessness and its hopelessness in face of the enemy, is clear from General Wimpffen's description: 'All the corps were isolated, and without cohesion or solidarity. There was no possibility of mutual assistance and they

were not united by any tie except by their common headquarters, which was far away, badly informed, and incapable not only of giving orders but even of supplying useful information. In reality, under the deceptive outward appearance of unity, anarchy of command reigned supreme.'

THE OFFICERS

'Soldiering was first a profession, then it became an art, now it is a positive science. In order to succeed in war thorough knowledge is required.' This maxim, given here in the words of General Lewal, had already been frequently expressed by Frederick the Great and Napoleon I, and it was well known, though little heeded, in the French army. 'Our young officers,' says the same general, in '*La Réforme de l'Armée*,' 'had plenty of personal courage, but not that professional keenness in the service which counts for so much. On every occasion they hastened to take off their uniform, and considered an officer's position mainly as a desirable complement of a brilliant marriage.' The vanity and luxury of the officers was very great. General Ambert complains: 'The luxury of baggage passed all bounds, and made our army resemble that of Darius.'

The military schools, which should have supplied a good military education and training and fostered the military spirit, were utterly worthless. General Wimpffen tells us: 'The spirit which ruled at Saint Cyr was that of a badly managed private school, not of a military establishment. Discipline was maintained with difficulty and revolts were frequent. The staff college was a college only in name. The studies were puerile, and the choice of professors, the way of tuition, and the programme proved that no importance was attached to it.'

The pupils of the military schools were young gentlemen, not officers. They evinced a profound contempt for knowledge, remained ignorant, and made the lives of the

studious a burden to them. No wonder that according to General Wimpffen : 'Able young men who had entered the army in the hope of finding an honourable career in it were soon discouraged and tried by all means to re-enter a civil occupation.' Coming from such schools and having imbibed a profound contempt of studies, officers had come to acclaim ignorance of military science and disdain of all intellectual occupations a military virtue. General Ambert said in his book 'Sedan' : 'The French army did not even read what was published in Germany on its work and progress. Some few staff officers wrote short papers, which were treated with contempt by the chiefs of the army. The army did no intellectual work because knowledge did not lead to promotion.'

Easy victories over savage enemies were to a great extent responsible for the superficiality of French officers, and for the contempt in which not only military science but all serious occupation with military matters was held. As Pierre Lehautcourt tells us : 'The African school enjoyed the greatest prestige and ruled everywhere. Its contempt of studies was shared by the highest in command ; a new word was coined by that school and became its motto, "On se débrouillera." ' This phrase translated into English means 'We'll muddle through somehow.' The easy successes obtained over a brave but savage African enemy were a bad preparation for European war. According to General Lewal, 'the attack with cold steel was considered the last word in military matters. Scouting, the movement of troops over difficult ground and outpost duty were not considered subjects worthy of attention.'

Promotion went by seniority, and, consequently, there was little inducement for the officers to excel. All they could do in order to get on was to play a waiting game and behave 'correctly' towards officers of a higher grade, or to ingratiate themselves with personages who possessed influence at Court or at the War Office. General Lewal

states: 'Owing to the promotion by seniority pure and simple a premium was offered to laziness and incapacity,' and General Derrécagaix even asserts: 'Merit had become an obstacle to advancement, and the excessive centralisation left no other outlet to the professional zeal of officers than office work.'

The encroaching spirit of the bureaucratic War Office had introduced into the French army a centralisation which is illogical, and which is opposed to, and altogether incompatible with, military efficiency. The exaggerated centralisation and the constant reference to the War Office which was required before the smallest step could be taken, together with the absence of individual responsibility, had killed the initiative of officers, and converted them into helpless automatons who were afraid to act for themselves, and who ever waited for the War Office or somebody in authority to pull the string.

Many of the most talented officers wasted their years in barren office work, as did General Lewal. Constantly bent over their books, accounts, and letters, with their attention fixed on the countless minute rules and regulations of the War Office, the intelligence of these men, their ambition, and their very soldierly instincts, were killed by the intolerable petty tyranny of unnecessary formalism. Marshal Bazaine tells us in his '*Episodes de la Guerre*': 'Many officers who had lived away from active service had lost the necessary ability and activity,' and General Trochu says in his '*Œuvres Posthumes*': 'Officers were employed for duties of detail which, at the best, should have been entrusted to sergeants.' Thus occupied and leading the lives of clerks, officers grew old in purely mechanical employment, ignorant of their profession, dissatisfied with their career, indifferent to their duties, and callous as to the welfare of the army. General Montaudon says in his '*Souvenirs Militaires*': 'In 1867 I

found that in the troops of my brigade the average age of captains was forty-five years, and that of lieutenants thirty-seven years. Some officers were rather slow in their ways and possessed no initiative, evincing a kind of moral apathy resulting from the monotony of the daily service which was alternated only by the amusements of the town.'

Advancement outside the usual rotation and apart from favouritism was granted for acts of conspicuous bravery, but such promotion is distinctly dangerous. Its dangers are well described by General Lewal in 'La Réforme de l'Armée': 'An act of brilliant courage or daring which has occurred in war and which has had happy results should not by itself be a sufficient claim to promotion. It is no doubt a recommendation for an officer, but such a success does not guarantee his real capacity as a leader. Experience as well as reflection prove that. The disregard of this fact has brought into the forefront of our army mediocrities, and the results were worst where the rank was highest. Energy and bravery suffice as qualifications up to a certain point for officers of the lower grade, but when it is a question of operations on a greater scale capacity becomes indispensable and must be proved.'

Unfortunately some of the high commanders in the French army had arrived at their position by acts which were described as conspicuous bravery in fighting against a very inferior enemy—acts which would have been more correctly described as wanton foolhardiness, had it not been for the fortuitous incident of that incalculable factor—good luck. But recklessness avails little against a European army. Misapplying their *élan* against well-armed and well-prepared troops, the same officers who had been so conspicuously successful in Africa only succeeded by their dash in uselessly sacrificing thousands of lives in the war against Germany.

THE RANK AND FILE

The rank and file of the army was largely recruited from the lowest strata of society, owing to the vicious system before described, which enabled not only sons of the well-to-do, but also the sons of prosperous peasants and working men to purchase freedom from military service for a moderate sum. Being largely composed of the idle, thriftless scum of the city slums, it was only natural that the bearing of the army was in accordance with its composition. Furthermore, garrison life was extremely monotonous and unmilitary, as the chief occupation of the soldier consisted chiefly in constantly cleaning his uniforms and barracks—work which is hateful to every soldier. Their activity with the scrubbing brush was varied with aimless and mechanical drills and parades, and tedious sentry duties. Purely military training, which would have elevated the spirit of the soldiers, was greatly neglected, and the shooting in the French army was deplorably bad.

The officers led a life apart from that of the men, and their lack of education and the spirit of vanity and flightiness which animated them, which was their only bond of union, and which took the place of a true *esprit de corps*, was instrumental in depriving them of all influence and authority over their men. Therefore, the moral tone of the army was not improved by the officers, but remained low, and the discipline was extremely bad. An insufficient meal or any slight grievance sufficed to provoke a riot. Discomfort on the march quickly caused the men to throw away their rifles, cartridges, and knapsacks, and slight fatigue made them fall out of the ranks in large numbers. During the Franco-German War the route of march of the French army was always littered with arms and accoutrements which had been wantonly thrown away, and the roads swarmed with stragglers.

The uneducated, dandified, and incapable officers were neither feared nor respected by their men. They were made fun of in their absence and often in their presence, military disobedience was common, and the transgressions of the men had frequently to be overlooked because they became too frequent to allow of punishment. Cowed by the unruliness of their men, depressed by the attitude of the War Office, which gave them neither a suitable occupation nor authority, nor full responsibility for their command, nor promoted them by merit, the officers tried to humour the men in order to maintain some semblance of order. It was almost impossible to execute any movement in the field at an early hour or to secure efficient scouting, owing to the unwillingness and passive resistance of the men, and many surprises by the German troops and consequent disasters are directly traceable to the unchecked self-indulgence and lack of discipline of the French soldiers.

THE TACTICS OF THE ARMY

It was only natural that in an army which was ruled by a chance combination of party influences, society influences, favouritism, and an ossified bureaucracy, in which responsibility was ill defined or was non-existent, in which no real discipline was observed, and in which the vital problems of war received neither serious thought nor study, tactics also were neglected, and were quite out of date. Military disasters are frequently attributed by the personages responsible for them to some extraneous influence, and so it was explained that the new arms had revolutionised warfare. Since the time of the Greeks and Romans the implements of war have been improved from year to year, and when an army ruled by conservatism was beaten by a progressive army which had adapted its tactics to its new arms, the unfortunate commander has frequently tried to exonerate himself by blaming for his defeats not himself, but

the revolution in warfare, which he certainly did not foresee, but which was foreseen by his more progressive opponent. Napoleon I had already said in his '*Pensées sur la Guerre*': '*Il faut changer la tactique de la guerre tous les dix ans si on veut conserver quelque supériorité.*' Nevertheless the French army had not allowed ten years but fifty years to pass by without any adequate modification in their antiquated tactics. It is true that Marshal Niel had written some valuable tactical handbooks, but they were not read. *Élan* and *arme blanche* were the catchwords of the army, but its heroic attempts to overthrow the enemy by hurling itself against the German troops resulted only in its unnecessary self-destruction. In fact, the French tactics were those of which Napoleon I had already said, '*C'est magnifique—mais ce n'est pas la guerre.*'

Not only were the tactics of the French army of the crudest, but furthermore the bureaucratic influences which encroached everywhere upon the executive of the army had effectually drilled the natural common sense and self-reliance out of the officers, and had converted them into helpless, timid nonentities, military bureaucrats, who always waited for instructions, who always were surprised by the enemy, and who always stumbled into traps, the existence of which had not been notified in advance in their instructions. The army had indeed been turned into a fighting machine, and fought with the intelligence of a machine, but without its precision. Officers sent out five miles to reconnoitre would rather return without any information than go a mile further when they would have seen the enemy; regiments were decimated without returning fire because they had no orders to shoot; mechanical obedience had everywhere been substituted for self-reliance and intelligent discretion. Pierre Lehautcourt says: 'The tendency to centralise everything and to kill all initiative is found in the orders for march or battle. By presuming to foresee everything, the worst results were obtained.'

The movement of the 2nd Corps against Saarbrück on August 2, ordered by General Faily, is classical in this respect. The order covers eight pages, and goes into the smallest details. But whilst matters of detail, which might have been safely left to the individual commander, were carefully regulated in advance by the general, who, from his desk, tried to play the part of Providence in the military scheme, the essential points were often overlooked. The official account of the war by the French General Staff says with regard to the order previously mentioned: 'The order gives no information regarding the whereabouts of the enemy, it gives no instructions for the cavalry division, no advance guard is formed, the whole army corps deploys against some outposts. Nobody knows where the commander is to be found in action. On the other hand, the order gives many details which should be left to subordinate officers. Everything is regulated in advance as if the troops were about to make an evolution on the parade ground.'

General Wimpffen writes in his book 'La Bataille de Sedan': 'At Sedan the whole staff of the army, excepting two captains, returned to town when Marshal MacMahon was wounded, leaving his successor alone on the battlefield.' Evidently the French officers were utterly helpless when left to themselves.

From the foregoing it is clear that simple tactical evolutions which were decided upon in many cases did not succeed owing to the defective tactical training of the officers, whereby intelligent co-operation had been made impossible. Officers of all grades considered it their duty rather to stand by idly when their assistance was of vital importance than to take a necessary and logical step which any private would have taken if left to himself without precise instructions. Colonel Patry reports in his book 'La Guerre telle quelle est': 'The enemy fled at the gallop. Why did we not at least speed him with a good volley? No doubt everybody was waiting for somebody else to give the order

to shoot. We were so accustomed to do nothing without precise orders that the men would have waited for an order to draw their swords if attacked with cold steel.'

Colonel Pinget tells of similar experiences in his '*Feuilles de Carnet*': 'The troops struck camp, carried everything a few hundred yards away, put their tents up again, prepared their cooking, and before their soup was ready moved on again without knowing why. Suddenly they are deployed for battle without any consideration of the formation of the ground, but the lines are as rigidly enforced as if the men were on the drill ground.'

The same indolence of thought and aimlessness of purpose, the same confusion in action, and the same blind reliance on written orders, behind which shelter could be taken, and respect for which was habitual, that were so much in evidence at the War Office, were also to be found on the march and on the battlefield. Consequently nearly every mistake that could be made was made by the French army.

THE DIPLOMATIC PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

It was one of the duties of French diplomacy to know the strength of France and of her possible enemies, and to prepare against an attack by a stronger Power by an alliance, the conclusion of which would have offered little difficulty before the war. Denmark smarted under her defeat by Prussia in 1864, Austria thirsted for revenge after her defeat by Prussia in 1866, and Italy owed a debt of gratitude to France for her regeneration. The possibility of a quadruple alliance against Prussia was contemplated and often dwelt on by Napoleon, and it would have been easy for French diplomacy to delay the outbreak of the war by negotiations until binding arrangements with other States had been concluded.

There was solid ground for the belief that such a quadruple alliance lay within the sphere of practical politics. We

read in the official account of the war by the French General Staff: 'In March 1870, Archduke Albert of Austria, the hero of Custoza, who was considered one of the foremost soldiers in Europe, travelled through France and thoroughly studied her resources, arsenals, fortresses, &c., and at the end of April Napoleon III told General Le Brun that the Archduke and himself had drawn up a common plan of campaign. Shortly after General Le Brun was sent by Napoleon to Vienna in order to arrange with the Austrian military authorities for their co-operation, and on June 28 he returned to Paris to submit Austria's definite plan of campaign to Napoleon. Before it could be adopted the war broke out.'

French diplomacy was evidently as unready, as amateurish, as ignorant, and as frivolous, as was the French army, and it is characteristic that the declaration of the Minister of War, General Le Bœuf's '*Nous sommes archiprêtre*,' was paralleled by the pronouncement of the Prime Minister, Emile Ollivier, before the Chamber, that he went into the war '*le cœur léger*.' Ollivier was a politician, but not a statesman. He had made his mark as a brilliant lawyer, eloquent writer, and able journalist, and evidently thought a command of the phrase a sufficient qualification for conducting the policy of a great State.

Granmont, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, brought no capacity to his office, and Bismarck remarked that he could hardly conceive how Napoleon came to select him. Politicians occupied positions which ought to have been held by statesmen.

Napoleon III and his diplomatic advisers showed the same insouciance and the same supreme trust in the good luck of France that was to be found in his generals. Whilst Bismarck was developing his political ideas to Napoleon at Biarritz the Emperor said in an undertone to Prosper Mérimée, on whose arm he was leaning, '*C'est un fou*,' and when Bismarck took leave of Napoleon, the Emperor

remarked to his cousin, 'C'est un brave homme. Seulement il ne connaît pas l'Allemagne.'

We read in Trochu's '*Œuvres Posthumes*': 'On July 18, three days after the declaration of war, Napoleon III asked Trochu for his opinion on an expedition to Denmark, for which neither an expeditionary corps nor the navy had been prepared, nor even diplomatic steps been taken in view of such a contingency. At that time French diplomacy was considering the conclusion of a Danish-French defensive and offensive alliance.'

French statesmen evidently hoped to improvise alliances at the last moment in the same way in which they counted upon improvising armies, generals, staffs, and everything else required for war, and the Emperor continued negotiations for an alliance after he had joined his army. His first defeat naturally shattered all hope of foreign assistance or interference and sealed the fate of France.

THE LESSONS OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR

When we look impartially at the Franco-German War we cannot help being struck with the utter hopelessness of the French cause. The armies of France had not only to contend with overwhelming numbers. The German armies were better armed, better equipped, better trained, better officered, animated by a more military spirit, and able to fall on the French before they were ready. Therefore it would seem that though the German army was, no doubt, excellent, its victory was due, perhaps, less to its excellence than to the inferiority of the French army.

The state of the French army before the war of 1870 has, so far, received comparatively little attention at the hands of military students, but it would seem that its study should be at least as profitable as that of the achievements of the German army, for it teaches many valuable lessons. Before 1870 France was much richer than Germany, and

possessed of almost inexhaustible latent military and financial resources. This was proved by the *levée en masse* and by the ease with which she bore the tremendous expenses of the war. However, latent resources of wealth and patriotism, though they are very fine on paper and in the mouths of orators, are often as useless to a nation for defence against a ready enemy as is a hypothetical revolver against an actual and determined burglar. War is a trial of strength, not as a rule of latent strength, but of readily available strength, and no amount of casuistry by the advocates of peace and unpreparedness will alter that fact.

The British Empire has been victorious in the late South African War, perhaps less owing to the latent resources and to the patriotism of the Motherland and the Colonies than to the lack of strategical understanding on the part of the Boers, through which we were allowed the necessary time to convert our latent resources into armies. If the Boers had marched straight upon Cape Town and Durban, as they were advised to do by continental strategists, and had driven the live-stock into the interior and demolished the railways, instead of sitting aimlessly round Kimberley, Ladysmith, and Mafeking, it would have been impossible for us to save those garrisons. The Dutch in Cape Colony would have risen, and an army even of 500,000 men might have been unable to reconquer South Africa. In South Africa our latent resources have stood us in good stead because we were mercifully given time to create armies, but a wise and energetic enemy, an enemy who is better prepared for war than were the Boers, will certainly give us as little chance to draw on our latent resources as did the Germans to the French in the Franco-German War. We must, therefore, be ready for war, for preparedness for war is the best security for peace.

The defeat of France is attributable to a number of causes, among which is foremost the lack of seriousness which pervaded the whole official and political life of the country

and indeed the entire upper classes. We find the same levity in the Emperor, the Prime Minister, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of War, and in most of the generals, who behaved more like ignorant, reckless gamblers than like conscientious and capable statesmen and commanders. The leading military and civil officials were apparently not even capable of overlooking the vast machinery which they were called upon to direct. They were hardly able to master the routine work and still less to administer control and reform the service. Society influences had a decisive influence on the most important appointments, which were considered sinecures, and which were demanded as a right by men who politically and socially had, perhaps, some claim to recognition, but who had not the slightest claim to offices which they were in no way fitted to occupy. As soon as a man had succeeded in obtaining an office which he coveted, he considered himself 'un homme arrivé,' applied the minimum of exertion to his work, and confined himself to doing exactly as his predecessors had done. To increase the ease of office, responsibilities were shirked or formally abolished. The arts of evasion, misrepresentation, and deceit were used to meet justified criticism and to avoid inaugurating necessary, but troublesome, reforms; and no powerful directing influence was felt anywhere in the departments of State. The departments, more and more left to themselves, at last freed themselves from all control, and the chiefs of the departments became mere figureheads. Lawlessness was universal. Officials in high places, who admittedly had proved their incompetence, were not called to account if they had powerful protectors. Capacity, the sense of justice, of true patriotism and of duty had disappeared from high office, and had given place to incompetence, fawning, idling, shirking, and trifling, covered over with a mantle of systematic deception. The administration of the country had become an elaborate and expensive sham and a fraud upon the taxpayer. No effective supervision

was exercised over the various departments by the Emperor, the Prime Minister, or by public opinion. Ministers, marshals and ambassadors even abused their positions, and their knowledge of State secrets, for financial gain at the Stock Exchange. Matters of State of the greatest importance were treated *in camera* with the greatest levity, scandals were hushed up, and inquiries were stifled.

The public services of Great Britain are better and far more honestly administered than were those under the Second Empire. Nevertheless, the system which places at the head of a great public department a man who is absolutely ignorant of the working of that department and often quite unfit for the duties which he is supposed to fulfil, a man who owes his administrative position not to administrative ability but to rhetorical skill or to fortuitous circumstances, to social or political influence, position or personal connexions, is dangerous to the State, unless reliable safeguards exist which ensure the competent administration of the departments notwithstanding the frequent incompetence of their amateur chiefs, and which make it dangerous to delude the nation with deceptive statements. Such safeguards can be found and must be found, for it cannot be doubted that incapacity or indolence in a minister whose actions are not supervised, whose responsibility is purely nominal, and who is able to deceive the nation by muzzling the experts and by making misleading statements in the House of Commons, may even be more harmful to the State than gross dishonesty and corruption.

Napoleon I used to say that even the most difficult problems can easily be solved if one goes down to, and tackles, the main cause. Many excellent suggestions have been put forward for the reform of our army, but the chief cause of its unsatisfactory condition has so far not been pointed out with sufficient emphasis.

The Secretary of State for War with his civilian staff and the military commanders have to co-operate, although

they are about the most ill-adapted sets of persons which can be chosen for co-operation. This strange and unnatural partnership is probably the main cause of the defects of our army, for it renders it impossible both for the administration and for the executive to fulfil their allotted tasks, and has created a dualism throughout the army, and a friction which is fatal to co-operation, efficiency, and economy. The military commanders, the great military experts, reign but do not govern; the Secretary of State for War, who is an amateur, governs but does not reign. Hence arises constant friction, dissatisfaction, misunderstandings, explanations, delays, reproaches, and stagnation. After much interference, correspondence, and squabbling, a truce is often established by the exhaustion and collapse of all parties. Departments remain without control, and become dilatory and obstructive, and in the stress of the daily routine the most important questions of military policy, reorganisation and methodical preparation for all the contingencies of war, are apt to remain unattended to or are forgotten.

A system which subordinates the whole military organisation to a civilian who is unacquainted with war, a system which enables the civilian to overrule the competent soldier, to encroach upon his department, to do things which the soldier thinks bad for the army, and to leave things undone which the soldier declares to be absolutely necessary, is illogical and vicious. It is doubly vicious when the complaints and the wishes of the soldier are only heard *in camera* by a party politician, when his representations and statements are suppressed, coloured, or distorted in Parliament and in the Press, when inquiries are held in private, when the soldier is muzzled and cannot defend himself, and is blamed for the mistakes made by his political chief, and is liable to be made responsible even for the blunders of his political chief which he tried in vain to oppose.

CHAPTER XII

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE

In the year 1511—when the Spaniards and Portuguese were discovering and conquering the New World, and were building up vast colonial empires in both Indias, in North and South America, and in all parts of Africa; when the names and the deeds of Columbus, Cortez, Pizarro, Prince John of Portugal, Balboa, Magellan, Amerigo Vespucci, Vasco da Gama, Diego Velasquez, Bartolomeo Diaz, Albuquerque, and of Giovanni Cabotto, the Genoese, who is better known under the name of John Cabot, of Bristol, were on everybody's lips; and when the division of the New World between the Spaniards and the Portuguese by the celebrated bull of Alexander VI was still discussed by all European diplomats—Henry VIII joined the Holy League against France, and prepared for war against that country. According to Lord Herbert of Cherbury, his advisers then urged the King: 'Let us, in God's name' [they said] 'leave off our attempts against the *terra firma*, as the natural situation of these islands seems not to suit with conquest of that kind. . . . The Indias are discovered, and vast treasure wrought thence every day. Let us, therefore, bend our endeavours thitherwards; and if the Spaniards and Portuguese suffer us not to join with them, there will yet be region enough for all to enjoy.'

The councillors who, four hundred years ago, told Henry VIII that England's greatest interest lay outside of Europe

have proved seers and prophets, and from 1511 to the present day British statesmen and countless leaders of public opinion in this country have held that Great Britain has no political interest on the continent of Europe. Consequently, a large section of the public in this country has always condemned, and condemns still now, all interference on our part in the politics of the Continent. Even when, a century ago, Great Britain fought against Napoleon I for her national existence, there was a very powerful party in this country which strenuously opposed that war, condemning it as wanton interference.

Unfortunately, we are not in the happy position in which are the United States. Although our most valuable possessions lie far away from the continent of Europe, the 'silver streak' is so narrow that it gives us only some protection, but not complete security, against the attacks of continental nations and against possible invasion. Our possessions in far-away India and elsewhere may easiest be attacked in the English Channel, and our geographical position requires us to keep constantly an eye on those nations which, with unsleeping vigilance, are watching us across the narrow waters, biding their opportunities.

Whether the balance of power in Europe, which has been maintained, at the cost of countless wars, for many centuries, is a blessing to the continental nations, may well be doubted. They would probably be happier if some strong nation either ruled the whole of the Continent, or if it possessed at least an absolute and unchallengeable supremacy among continental States. If the Continent had but one master, the nations of Europe might be able to disarm, and only rare civil wars could be expected to occur on the so often battle-stricken mainland of Europe.

The rise of an absolutely supreme Power on the Continent, which, considered in the abstract, may appear highly desirable from the continental point of view, would be the reverse of desirable for this country. A nation which had

the mastery of the Continent could hardly allow a strong Great Britain to maintain an independent existence. Owing to our strong strategical position on the flank of Europe, the lord of the Continent would consider this country a permanent menace to his continental supremacy. He would exclaim with Napoleon I: 'Let us destroy England and then Europe will be at my feet.' Therefore it cannot be doubted that a Power which had acquired the supremacy on the Continent would eventually attack this country in order to consolidate and to secure its possessions, even if it should not covet our Colonies. Hence it is clear that a Power which aspires to become supreme on the Continent indirectly threatens the national existence of Great Britain, although it need have no hankering after our wealth, our trade, and our Colonies and possessions.

Our position in Europe is secure, and will remain secure, only as long as the various Powers or groups of Powers in Europe are so nearly equal in strength that no Power or group of Powers is able to obtain that supremacy which, earlier or later, would cause it to attack Great Britain. For these reasons it has, since time immemorial, been the object of British diplomacy to maintain what is known as 'The Balance of Power in Europe.'

When practically the whole Continent was ruled by one Power, Great Britain lost her liberty. Rome's supremacy on the mainland of Europe inevitably led to the invasion of this country on Cæsar's plea that the Britons had assisted the Gauls against Rome, and to centuries of national servitude. The lesson of the Roman conquest and occupation has never been forgotten. Therefore, when Spain, France, and Russia in turn tried to obtain the supremacy in Europe by land, and when Holland tried to obtain the supremacy in Europe on the sea, each of these nations came into collision with this country, and each was prevented by Great Britain from attaining that supremacy which would, undoubtedly, have endangered our national existence.

The preservation of the balance of power, or rather of the balance of Powers, in Europe is, and will continue to be, the first condition of our national independence and safety. Therefore the preservation of the balance of power in Europe is, and will always remain, the vital interest of this country. Great Britain has fought all her great wars for the preservation of the balance of power on the Continent, and she may soon again have to fight, at least diplomatically, in defence of her traditional policy.

Divide et impera was the maxim of Imperial Rome. *Divide ut pacem habeas* would be Rome's advice to Great Britain. However, although we are interested in the preservation of the balance of power, we need not, and we should not, go so far as to sow dissensions among the States of Europe, for the balance of power is not by any means an artificial creation, as has so often been asserted by would-be conquerors.

Through the differences in language, religion, race, character, and aims, the co-existence of a number of independent, approximately equally strong, and mutually divided and opposed nations, is the natural condition of Continental Europe. This natural condition of division, of conflicting interests and ambitions and of permanent tension between the nations of Europe is the best guarantee of our safety. The duty of self-preservation, which is the first law of Nature, not jealousy, absolutely compels us to preserve and to perpetuate these natural divisions and dissensions in Europe, and thus to maintain the balance of power. Hence, the often-heard accusation that perfidious Albion has always endeavoured to make mischief between the European Powers and to set them against one another in order to benefit from their quarrels, is an audacious and malicious invention and a deliberate perversion of historic truth, for which those are responsible whose ambitious plans of universal dominion have been foiled by this country.

From the foregoing it is clear that the preservation of

the balance of power in Europe is most important to this country. It is certainly more important to Great Britain than is the Monroe Doctrine to the United States.

Of late years we have heard surprisingly little of the balance of power in Europe ; but the fact that many British politicians and publicists have, for some considerable time, been anxiously discussing the possibility of an invasion of this country, and that some of our leading statesmen and military experts are seriously considering the necessity of introducing universal compulsory military service in some form or other in these islands, is sufficient to show that the position of Great Britain towards the military Powers of Europe is not satisfactory, and that that balance of power on the Continent, which hitherto has been considered indispensable for our national security, fails to give us the wanted protection ; that, in fact, the balance of power has been disturbed.

Prevention is better than cure both in medicine and in politics. If we wait till an ambitious Power, or group of Powers, has actually become paramount on the Continent, a great, dangerous, and costly war between Great Britain and that Power will, sooner or later, become inevitable.

In a war between ourselves, who wish merely to preserve our property and our liberty, and an ambitious continental Power, which strives to acquire our property and to destroy our liberty, we should be at a great disadvantage, because the risks run would be totally different and out of all proportion. The continental aggressor would merely risk defeat, whilst we should risk national annihilation ; our continental opponent would hope to make enormous territorial acquisitions at our cost, a price which would make the risk run seem insignificant ; whilst we, if we should be victorious, could not hope to indemnify ourselves either by seizing territory on the Continent or by exacting an adequate monetary compensation. Our struggle for liberty against Napoleon I cost this country more than a thousand million pounds.

A repetition of that struggle would cost several thousand million pounds. Evidently, everything that can be done should be done in order to prevent the occurrence of such a war. History teaches us how to avert this danger.

In the year 1789, a few months before he came to the throne, Frederick the Great wrote a most interesting book, the 'Anti-Machiavel,' in which he summed up his views on statecraft, and in which he also gave a programme of his policy. In the last chapter of that remarkable treatise the following passage occurs, which is in so far most noteworthy as it contains not only the crowning thought of the book, but also that principle of political conduct by which Prussia has constantly been guided since 1740, when she was a third-rate Power with barely three million inhabitants, down to the present day, when she is at the head of the strongest nation in Europe. Frederick the Great was as prominent as a diplomat as he was as a soldier. Hence his advice, which contains the essence of Prusso-German diplomacy, is well worth heeding. He says: 'When the excessive aggrandisement of one Power threatens to break all bounds and to overwhelm all others, it is wise to oppose barriers to its encroachments as long as there is time to stay its progress and as long as it is manageable. When clouds are seen to gather, and lightning announces the approaching storm, the sovereign who is unable to contend against it alone will, if he is wise, unite himself with all those who are menaced by the same common danger, for their interests are identical. If Egypt, Syria, and Macedonia had combined against the Roman power, they would not have been overthrown. A wisely-framed alliance and an energetic war would have preserved the ancient world from the chains of a universal despotism.'

The counsel of Frederick the Great, which is the counsel of common sense, ought constantly to be kept in mind by British statesmen. It should be the unalterable policy of this country never to support the strongest and most ambitious Power on the Continent, but always to take sides

with the natural opponents of that Power. If we ally ourselves with the strongest and most ambitious Power, our position may appear for the moment absolutely secure ; but we foolishly assist at the same time in making that Power overwhelmingly strong, to our danger. On the other hand, if we ally ourselves with the opponents of the strongest Power, we take its preponderance away from it, and check it in its otherwise irresistible progress.

Our safety lies with the weaker Powers of Europe, and if the maxim ' Always support the weaker Power or Powers of Europe against the stronger ' should constantly be adhered to, those ambitious and powerful States which strive to obtain the mastery of the Continent will find their progress automatically arrested. They will not be able to grow all-powerful, and many great wars which otherwise might devastate the continent of Europe will remain unfought, to the advantage of the Continent and of ourselves. Thus the restraint exercised by the balance of power would prove a blessing to humanity.

On the other hand, if we assist the strongest Power to become supreme, fancying that to be allied with the strongest Power in Europe means safety, and putting our trust either in paper promises, or in the uncertain tie of dynastic or racial relationship, we help to strengthen the wolf which some day will devour us.

Before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the balance of power in Europe was absolutely perfect. The Triple Alliance, the countries of which approximately cover the enormous Empire of Charlemagne after the separation of Gaul, and the Dual Alliance by which it is flanked, were considered to possess militarily almost equal weight and value.

The number of soldiers of France and Russia combined was about equal to the armed forces of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Owing to the greater concentration of forces, and to various other favourable circumstances which it would lead too far to enumerate, the Triple

Alliance was probably the stronger of the two combinations. Still, the difference was considered to be so small that a war between the two groups of nations offered quite incalculable risks to either. On the sea, likewise, France and Russia on the one hand, and the Powers of the Triple Alliance on the other hand, possessed almost equal strength. In fact, the two national combinations balanced one another to a nicety, and this exact balancing, one might almost say this equipoise of Powers, acted as a deterrent to all the allied Powers, and was, therefore, the strongest guarantee of peace in Europe, and at the same time the best safeguard of our national security. Hence peace reigned in Europe for an unusually long period, and Great Britain found herself in the enviable position that she could act as the balance-holder, being able, if she was so minded, to direct and to control the policy of Europe by throwing, or by threatening to throw, her weight and influence sometimes into the one and sometimes into the other scale. If Great Britain did not sufficiently utilise this most favoured position for her own ends as she ought to have done, it was due to lack of grasp or lack of enterprise on the part of her statesmen. Owing to this exact balancing of Powers, the various attempts which were made to raise a coalition against this country at the time of the Fashoda crisis, the Jameson Raid and the South African War, were bound to prove abortive. Not the peaceful or friendly disposition of one or the other monarch or statesman, nor the skill of British diplomacy, but the balance of military and naval power in Europe, preserved Great Britain thrice within a decade from the calamity of a great war.

The exact balancing of military and naval power, which ensured peace in Europe for such a long time, was impatiently borne by those nations whose impulse of expansion is stronger than their instinct of preservation. Hence, unceasing attempts were made by various diplomats to give to their combination a distinct preponderance over the rival group of Powers in order to obtain a free hand for action. To

attain this end, attempts to induce Great Britain or the United States to take sides with one of the allied groups were constantly made by diplomats and monarchs, and diplomatic manoeuvres which aimed at weakening the opposing combination either by sowing distrust between its members or by involving one of its members in war were constantly noticeable.

That the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 was caused by Bismarck has been proved by German writers and historians, and it is not astonishing that it has been asserted that the Russo-Japanese War also was caused, or at least brought about, by the action of a third and so-called 'friendly' Power. German publicists have accused Great Britain of having brought on the war with British gold, and British publicists have retaliated by accusing Germany of having incited Russia to attack Japan. As yet, nothing positive is known on this most interesting subject, and history will perhaps never lift the veil which covers the *causa causans* of the Russo-Japanese War; but so much is sure, that British diplomacy would have acted with perfectly incredible stupidity if it should have incited Russia or Japan to enter upon a war which was certain either to greatly strengthen Russia, to the danger of our Indian possessions, or to greatly weaken Russia, whereby the balance of power in Europe would be destroyed, to the danger of Great Britain. Under these circumstances it seems quite impossible to believe that British diplomacy tried to bring about a war which it was bound to discountenance in its own interest, and which it was bound to oppose with every means in its power.

The course of the Russo-Japanese War has profoundly affected the balance of power in Europe, and the peace of Europe and of this country may consequently be endangered in the near future. Although Russia has fought bravely, the signs of her exhaustion are unmistakable. The prestige and confidence of her hitherto unvanquished army

have been destroyed, her fleet has been shattered, her financial position is seriously compromised, her people are impoverished and dissatisfied, and have become less manageable. For at least ten years Russia will be reduced to playing a passive part in European politics. For at least ten years Russia will be unable to conduct a war outside her own frontiers. For at least ten years Russia will, therefore, be considered as a *quantité négligeable* by her neighbours in the West. For at least ten years the Triple Alliance will rule the Continent.

However, Russia may disappear from the concert of Europe for a much longer time than ten years. The ferment, the dissatisfaction, and the revolutionary movement among the masses in Russia, which is unprecedented in that country, may profoundly, and possibly permanently, alter Russia's character as a nation. Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia has essentially been a conquering and aggressive military Power. Her failure against Japan, and the growing impoverishment, dissatisfaction, and rebelliousness of her population so greatly endanger the very foundations of the State and the very existence of the autocracy that Russia may resolve to confine her attention exclusively to domestic affairs. She is so immensely strong for defence that she hardly requires an army, especially as no nation covets Russian territory. Consequently Russia may, and possibly will, at some time or other, reduce her army to a police force, cut down her navy, and break off her engagements with foreign Powers which may oblige her to engage in wars which she will avoid at all costs. She may, therefore, resolutely shut herself up in her frontiers, stay at home, and devote all her energies to the arts of peace, disregarding all events outside her own frontiers.

Through Russia's misfortunes, the balance of power in Europe has at least temporarily, but possibly permanently, been destroyed. For all practical political purposes Russia has ceased to count. The Dual Alliance is a source of

anxiety, but not of strength, to France, for Russia would not be able to fulfil her treaty obligations to her ally, even if she wished to do so. Besides, *ultra posse nemo obligatur* is a guiding principle of every Government. No nation can be expected to commit political suicide for the sake of its ally. France will, therefore, stand for a time, but may soon stand permanently, isolated on the continent of Europe, and one cannot help remembering Bismarck's prophecy that the next great European war may mean the wiping out of France from the map of Europe.

Owing to the temporary disappearance of Russia from the political stage, the Triple Alliance is absolutely supreme on the Continent. Being a defensive alliance against the attacks of France and Russia combined, it has, through the collapse of the Colossus of the North, lost its *raison d'être*. The nations of the Triple Alliance may therefore, singly or combined, embark upon a more active and more adventurous foreign policy, if they feel inclined to do so, for they need no longer fear to come into collision with the Powers of the Dual Alliance.

The restraining influence of the sense of common danger and of mutual responsibility has likewise disappeared. No longer will warnings be addressed by one Power of the Triple Alliance to one of its partners not to compromise its ally by some dangerous enterprise. Hence, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy find themselves in a position of greater freedom and less responsibility.

Through the breakdown of the balance of power, the States of the Triple Alliance have obtained a greater liberty of action in Europe than they have enjoyed for a very long time, and they may be expected to use the fleeting opportunities of the present to their best advantage. Consequently, it seems likely that the prolonged period of European peace through which we have been passing has come to an end, and that we may stand at the opening of a period of political unrest which may convulse Europe.

The collapse of Russia, which has made the Triple Alliance all-powerful and which has set its forces free, is a matter of more serious concern to France than it is to this country, which is, to some extent, protected by its insular position. Consequently, France may have to bear the brunt in the political developments which may possibly soon take place. Her position is not a comfortable one, for France can, without an ally, hardly be expected to hold her own against Germany. In fact, France is becoming weaker from day to day, if compared with Germany, because her population remains stationary, whilst that of Germany is rapidly increasing. How seriously France has been losing ground, and what her position in the future will be, may be seen when we compare the growth of the population in France and in Germany since the Franco-German War. The following table shows the relative positions of France and Germany at a glance :—

	Population of France	Population of Germany	Excess of German Population
1873	36,108,000	41,230,000	+ 5,122,000
1876	36,908,000	43,089,000	+ 6,181,000
1881	37,673,000	45,428,000	+ 7,755,000
1886	38,319,000	47,184,000	+ 8,865,000
1891	38,543,000	49,782,000	+ 11,239,000
1896	38,618,000	52,783,000	+ 14,165,000
1901	38,962,000	56,862,000	+ 17,900,000
1906	39,353,245	60,641,378	+ 21,288,133
1909	(estimated) 39,550,000	(estimated) 63,800,000	+ 23,750,000

From the foregoing figures it appears that the population of France was almost equal to that of Germany after the Franco-German War. At present the population of Germany is considerably more than fifty per cent. greater than is that of France, and in twenty years it should be twice larger than that of France. In Germany more than 2,000,000 children, but in France less than 850,000 children, are born every year. Moltke spoke truly when he said : ' The French lose every day a battle,' for every day 8,150 fewer children are born in France than are born in Germany. If we further

remember that the proportion of men able to bear arms in Germany is probably greater than in France, that the Germans are supposed to make better soldiers than the French, and that Germany has, through her powerful wealth and arms-creating industries, an enormous advantage over chiefly rural France, it is clear that the present position of France is very precarious, and that it becomes more precarious from year to year.

The sense of her growing weakness has completely altered the character of the French nation. Her rulers and the people think less of glory than they used to. France is no longer a military nation. She no longer aspires to rule the Continent. She has become a peaceful and conservative nation which will do everything she can do to avoid war.

Thoughtful Frenchmen cannot help considering the downfall of Russia and the consequent isolation of France with grave concern, and they cannot help feeling that France must have a strong and reliable ally in Europe. Without a strong and reliable ally, France would be condemned to a purely passive policy. Enormous changes of the map of Europe may soon take place, which would still further compromise the position of France, and which, eventually, would threaten the independence of this country. France might with open eyes watch the development of events which would reduce her to a second-class Power, and yet she would be unable to lift her hand. She would be condemned to remain a spectator when standing alone. In future she might have no more influence upon European politics than has Belgium or Holland. France might be unable to do more than defend her own frontiers against attack.

Under these circumstances, it is natural that France has turned towards this country, and that her people instinctively feel that their safety lies in a close understanding with Great Britain. The *entente cordiale* comes, as far as the French nation is concerned, from the heart.

For preserving the *status quo* in Europe and for preserving peace, an Anglo-French understanding is good, but an Anglo-French alliance would be better. If British statesmen are of opinion that a strong France is necessary in Europe, that France is the natural defender of the independence of Belgium and Holland, that France is a continental bulwark and a *tête-de-pont* to this country, it clearly follows that Great Britain cannot, under any circumstances, allow France to be, either directly or indirectly, further weakened. If it is the view of the British statesmen that a strong France is indispensable for preserving the *status quo* in Europe, it would seem advisable and, indeed, necessary that an Anglo-French alliance should be substituted for a vague Anglo-French understanding, which does not give a sufficient guarantee of mutual assistance and of national security either to Great Britain or to France.

An open alliance between Great Britain and France, such as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Triple Alliance, has a great advantage over a vague understanding or a secret alliance. A public alliance is a serious and solid fact, which is taken seriously by all whom it may concern. It cannot be explained away by either contracting party, and it is an unmistakable warning to all would-be trespassers not to trespass. On the other hand, a vague understanding leaves much room for involuntary or deliberate misunderstandings. A vague understanding, backed with most excellent intentions on the part of our present statesmen, will allow weak statesmen who may guide British policy later on, and will even allow the same statesmen who at one time possessed such excellent intentions, to explain away their obligations at a critical moment. Therefore the uncertainty of the binding force of an understanding or a verbal agreement will enable third parties to speculate upon the weakness or foolishness of one of the contracting parties, and will leave room for ceaseless and most dangerous intrigues. For these reasons the Anglo-French understanding,

although it may have been reinforced by excellent verbal undertakings, seems hardly a sufficient guarantee of the European *status quo*. A formal written treaty between Great Britain and France, which is confirmed by the Parliaments of the two countries, seems absolutely necessary for the safety of the two countries.

Recent history supplies a warning against vague understandings and furnishes an example which should be borne in mind by British and French statesmen. In 1859 Napoleon III had fought for Italy, and had procured for that country its liberty and independence. In 1864 Denmark was crushed by Prussia, and in 1866 Austria-Hungary was humbled and defeated by the same country. Italy owed, therefore, a heavy debt of gratitude to France, whilst the feelings of Austria-Hungary and of Denmark against Prussia were naturally those of hatred and revenge.

Napoleon III, who was, of course, well aware of the sentiments which animated Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Denmark with regard to France and to Germany, thought these three countries so firmly tied to him by their sentiments, and he felt so certain of their support against Germany, that he thought that no written treaty with these countries was necessary. In the mind of Napoleon III Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Denmark figured as his faithful retainers in war against Germany, who were ready to put on their armour as soon as called upon.

In 1870, only four years after the Austro-Prussian War, war broke out between France and Germany. Napoleon III, who previously might easily have concluded an alliance with those Powers which were hostile to Germany, and who had offers of alliance absolutely thrust upon him by those Powers, fancied that he had an understanding with Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Denmark, but he was deserted by these Powers at the critical moment. Although the sympathies of Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Denmark were undoubtedly with France, these Powers did not even try to save France from the

greatest disaster in her history. The understanding which Napoleon III imagined he possessed with these Powers proved, owing to Bismarck's action, a delusion and a snare.

Before the Franco-German War broke out, Bismarck had taken the precaution to find out whether a secret alliance existed between France and those countries which might be expected to stand on the side of France, and it cannot be doubted that he decided on war only when he felt assured that France possessed no formal alliance with Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Denmark, her natural allies.

Many of Napoleon's advisers, who foresaw the Franco-German War, had, since 1866, urged the Emperor to conclude a quadruple alliance against Germany, with Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Denmark, and preparatory steps for concluding such an alliance were actually taken by the Emperor. However, Napoleon III was a dreamer. He could not make up his mind to sign a formal treaty. He was vaguely afraid of sharply-defined engagements, seeing in a formal alliance the source of uncertain entanglements. Therefore he refused the formal alliances which were offered to him, and when, in the hour of trial, he anxiously sought for help in every quarter, relying merely on sympathy for support, he received sympathy everywhere, but nowhere assistance.

The lack of support on the part of those nations which Napoleon rightly considered to be the natural allies of France, which were the natural allies of France, and which were anxious to conclude an alliance with France and to help her against Germany, led to France's downfall. If a defensive alliance had existed between France and some of Germany's natural opponents, the Franco-German War of 1870-71 would probably never have been fought.

Various objections may be raised against formal alliances in general, and against a formal alliance between Great Britain and France in particular, and it is worth while to consider the principal objections which may be brought forward.

Those politicians and political writers who are better acquainted with Parliamentary politics than with foreign policy, and who judge of every measure by the standard of its popularity, are apt to think with a vague dread of 'entanglements' as soon as they hear the word 'alliance.' Alliances and entanglements are synonyms to them, and the risk of signing an alliance is to their minds similar to the risks of taking a lottery ticket. To these people an alliance seems a vague and dangerous speculation with unlimited risks, but not a sober and well-defined business proposition. Happily, the demand of those who see in an alliance the fruitful source of uncertain and dangerous entanglements, and who judge of political measures by their popularity, can easily be satisfied, for the political instinct of nations is so fine that a good alliance is always popular, whilst a bad alliance is always unpopular. The Venezuela affair and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance are cases in point, and it cannot be doubted that an Anglo-French Alliance would be as popular as is the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

An unpopular alliance is nowadays unthinkable in any country, least of all in a democracy, and an alliance which may be able to engulf a nation in unforeseen pitfalls and dangers is equally unthinkable. The following definition of the Triple Alliance, which Prince Bismarck gave on February 6, 1888, before the German Parliament, is worth recalling, inasmuch as it gives the characteristics, the aim, and the scope of a good alliance, and as it defines the nature of the engagements entered into in the fewest words. He said :—

'We are bound to our ally Austria-Hungary not only in the love of peace and by the bond of sentiment and of friendship, but also by the most urgent interests, for preserving the balance of power in Europe and for safeguarding our own future.

'I think it was absolutely necessary to have concluded that alliance. If we had not yet done so we should have to conclude it to-day.

‘Our alliance possesses the most distinguished feature of an international treaty, which is that it is the expression of the common and permanent interests both of Austria-Hungary and of Germany.

‘No great Power can, for any length of time, be tied by the wording of a treaty which is opposed to the interests of the people, and if it has done so it will eventually be compelled openly to declare, “The times have altered. I cannot do it,” and it must justify its action before the people and before its ally as best it can. But to ruin its own people by fulfilling one’s treaty duties to the letter, that is an action which no great Power can assent to. However, this is by no means demanded in any treaty. . . .

‘Treaties are only the expression of a community of aims and of risks run by the treaty-concluding Powers.’

Evidently concluding a treaty cannot well be compared with taking a lottery ticket, as is so often done in this country. A good treaty cannot possibly lead to unforeseen entanglements, nor can an ally trap and trick his partner under the text of a treaty, as is so often believed.

Those who do not wish for an Anglo-French alliance, and who would like to see Great Britain and France keeping apart, have frequently declared that France can never be England’s ally, that France will never forget that England deprived her of her colonies, and they will remind her of Canada, of Egypt, and of Fashoda. No doubt this country has done much harm to France by conquering her colonies through the accident of war, but France has done even more injury to this country in our own colonies. We have conquered colonies which at the time were of little value to France, but France has deprived us of our most valuable possessions. Had it not been for the action of France, the United States would never have made themselves independent, and, by a strange coincidence, the first shot against the French in North America was in May 1754 fired by the same George Washington who, twenty-two years later,

signed the Declaration of Independence. Although France has suffered much at our hands, we have suffered more at hers. We have deprived her of colonies, but she has deprived us of an empire. Surely the two nations can afford to cry quits.

Fifty years ago France and Great Britain fought side by side in the Crimea, and forty-five years ago the troops of both countries fought together in China. But since then the two countries have often quarrelled with one another. Misunderstandings and mutual jealousies over trifles were responsible for part of our recent differences with France, but the strongest cause of friction between the two countries lay probably in Bismarck's action. It was Bismarck's deliberate policy to sow dissensions between France and her possible allies, a policy which was clearly expressed in his dispatch of December 20, 1872, to Count Harry von Arnim, who, at the time, was Ambassador in Paris. In that dispatch the German Chancellor wrote: 'We want France to leave us in peace, and we have to prevent France finding an ally if she does not want to keep peace. As long as France has no allies, she is not dangerous to Germany.'

Bismarck's special aim was to keep Great Britain and France asunder by encouraging France to extend her colonial empire in those parts where she was likely to come into collision with this country, and he succeeded admirably in accomplishing his purpose. To Busch, Bismarck said quite openly: 'It is in our interest that the French quarrel with the English, and when they have trouble in Tunis they forget the Rhine.'

It seems idle to speculate about what has happened in the past between Great Britain and France. Such investigations belong more to the province of the historian than to that of the statesman, who has to consider the problems of the present and of the future. Besides, alliances, like other business agreements, are arranged on grounds of practical utility, not on grounds of historical differences or

of personal predilections. Hence, mutual recrimination about the past is vain and foolish if two States wish to transact business. For these reasons the attempt of those who, for reasons of their own, wish to weaken Great Britain and France, or at least to keep them asunder, by appealing to their history or to their prejudices, should prove unavailing.

Thanks to the far-seeing action of His Majesty the King, who has opened a new era in British foreign policy, the relations between France and Great Britain greatly improved immediately on his accession, and they have now become most cordial. The time when Douglas Jerrold could coin the then much-applauded witticism, 'The best thing which I know between France and England is the sea,' is past. Both nations have happily lost many of their ancient prejudices, and have learned to esteem one another. The ancient argument that French and British are totally incompatible, mutually antipathetic, and that they can never agree is no longer true.

Another objection against an Anglo-French alliance will probably be raised by those people who for a long time have been advocating an Anglo-Russian alliance. That Russia seemed a desirable ally to those British statesmen who considered her invincible, such as Sir Charles Dilke, is natural, but the present moment seems hardly appropriate for advocating the Anglo-Russian alliance. An Anglo-Russian alliance appears to be out of the question for many reasons which it would lead too far to discuss in this place, but it might be mentioned that alliances cannot be picked up like blackberries, and it is difficult to discover the common interest which an Anglo-Russian alliance could defend. Above all, there seems no wish in Russia to conclude such an alliance. Therefore the advocates of an Anglo-Russian alliance are preaching to deaf ears.

Great Britain need have no alliance, but she may well continue her good understanding, with Russia, by frankly supporting her in her European policy where she comes

into collision with the Powers of Central Europe, and by delimiting the British and the Russian spheres of interest in Asia. For decades our policy towards Russia, both in Europe and in Asia, has been fitful, capricious, inconsequent, incalculable, and incomprehensible. Therefore it cannot be wondered at that Russia has hitherto looked upon this country with distrust as well as with dislike.

Great Britain is a World-Power, and the safety of our scattered Colonies and possessions requires that the balance of power be preserved not only in Europe, but all the world over. Our interests in Asia are sufficiently safeguarded by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in Australia and in Africa we have little to fear, but in North America the British Empire is exceedingly vulnerable. The relations between the United States and Great Britain are, happily, of the very best, and it is sincerely to be hoped that Anglo-American relations will remain unclouded. Nevertheless, Great Britain cannot afford to consider the United States as a potential ally and treat that country as a *quantité négligeable* in her political calculations. Germany and the United States are rapidly building enormous navies, which are, at present, intended to be secondary only to the navy of Great Britain. In a very short time the fleets of the United States, Germany, and France will be equally strong, and British diplomacy must reckon with the possibility that a naval triple alliance may be formed against this country with the object of wresting from it the rule of the seas and despoiling it of its Colonies. There are many historical precedents for such a united attack. Venice, the England of the sixteenth century, was attacked in 1509 by France, Spain, Germany, and the Pope. The Netherlands, the England of the seventeenth century, were unprovokedly attacked in 1672 by England, France, and some minor German potentates. In both attacks the motive was envy, the object plunder, and Great Britain may be exposed to similar attack on similar grounds.

Whether the financial resources of Great Britain, or the British Empire, will suffice to guarantee our continued superiority against the three strongest naval Powers may be doubted. Therefore we must constantly be on guard against the conclusion of a naval triple alliance which could be directed only against Great Britain, and have the spoliation of our Colonies for an object. Happily our relations with France and the United States are the best. Nevertheless, the two-Power standard cannot be abandoned, for no understanding and no alliance can be expected to last for ever.

The fact that Germany has, for some time, assiduously made advances to France and the United States, the strongest naval Powers after Great Britain, should give food for thought. In this connexion it might be mentioned that Dr. Guttman, a prominent German journalist, published in 1905, immediately after having had an interview with Prince Bülow, an article in *Das Freie Wort*, in which he recommended a Franco-German alliance as the best security for preserving peace. As Germany is not threatened by any powerful and aggressive neighbour, such an alliance could hardly bear a defensive character, and one is inclined to inquire what the aims of such an alliance could possibly be, and why the desire for such an alliance should be found in Germany. At present the likelihood of a Franco-German alliance appears somewhat remote, but as this country could not look with equanimity upon such an alliance, the development of Franco-German relations should be closely watched.

Since the time when Dr. Guttman recommended the conclusion of a Franco-German alliance, the Morocco incident has occurred. Germany has deliberately and determinedly crossed the path of France in Morocco, and is opposing France's legitimate ambitions in that country with considerable vigour. Therefore people have been wondering what was Germany's aim. Some writers have

conjectured that Germany wished to test the solidity of the Anglo-French understanding, whilst others have drawn ominous comparisons between the Morocco incident and the well-known episode of the Hohenzollern candidature to the throne of Spain which brought about the Franco-German War of 1870-71. However, both explanations seem erroneous and far-fetched.

It appears unlikely that German diplomacy wished to test the true inwardness of the Anglo-French relations by challenging France somewhat brusquely over Morocco, a proceeding which might be likened to that of testing the tone of a piano with a sledge hammer. It seems still more unlikely that the German Government was frivolous enough to think of making the Morocco question the pretext of a European war. Therefore it can only be assumed that Germany wished to impress upon France in the most unmistakable manner the value of Germany's good will, the danger of Germany's opposition, and the great advantage for France of a close understanding with Germany, with the object of detaching France from Great Britain and attaching her to Germany as an ally. This assumption was strengthened by the attitude of the German semi-official Press, which, with surprising unanimity, chided France, 'more in sorrow than in anger,' whilst, according to the *Times* of April 5, 1905, a friend and confidant of Count von Bülow declared to a French journalist: 'Here we have considerable doubt as to the sincerity of England, who takes your part against us. I am afraid that, according to a popular French expression, you will sit between two stools if you put too much confidence in England. The British sailors will fraternise with yours, but that is all you will get, and it would be much better for you to come to terms with us.'

If it was the object of Germany's action in Morocco to drive a wedge between Great Britain and France, and to prepare the way for an eventual Franco-German alliance, she has not succeeded in her attempt. Instead, Germany's

policy has caused people on both sides of the Channel to ask themselves : Why does Germany try to disturb the good relations between Great Britain and France, two peaceful and conservative countries which only wish to defend what they own and which do not threaten anyone ? Why does Germany wish to force France against her will into an alliance with her ? What would be the object of a Franco-German alliance, and against which nation would such an alliance be directed ? Under these circumstances it is only natural that Germany's unexpected and rather abrupt, if not startling, proceeding in Morocco has filled many serious and peaceful people both in France and in Great Britain with concern, if not with alarm, as to Germany's ultimate aims, and that in consequence the feeling in favour of an Anglo-French alliance has been considerably strengthened. The meeting between King Edward and President Loubet during the Morocco crisis was probably not merely a friendly meeting, but a political event of the very greatest international importance.

Some time ago various writers eloquently recommended that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be renewed in the form of an unrestricted and long-termed offensive and defensive alliance, which, especially if the United States should join in, would prove an irresistible combination. The idea of an offensive and defensive Anglo-Japanese or of an offensive and defensive Anglo-American-Japanese alliance strongly appeals to a lively imagination, but it is to be feared that it will remain a picturesque, but very unpractical, idea.

The United States are so strong for their defence, and they need so little fear attack, that they require no alliance whatever. Consequently the United States would hardly be prepared to conclude an alliance either with Great Britain or with Great Britain and Japan combined, as they could not see the advantage of such an alliance. The United States are the only nation in the world which can afford

to live in splendid isolation, and they have no reason to tie themselves to any Power or combination of Powers and thus hamper their freedom of action.

An unrestricted and long-termed Anglo-Japanese offensive and defensive alliance would unfortunately prove unpractical. Such an alliance would no longer be a limited and clearly defined partnership for the settlement of some definite business, but it would be an unlimited one. It would make both Great Britain and Japan mutually responsible for every action of the other. If Japan should be involved in war with France, we should, under the terms of an unrestricted offensive and defensive alliance, have to attack France; if Japan should fall out with the United States, we should have to fight the United States for the sake of Japan. Are those who so strenuously recommend an unrestricted Anglo-Japanese offensive and defensive alliance prepared to fight at the side of Japan all comers, inclusive of France and the United States, or will they guarantee that a war between Japan and France, or between Japan and the United States, will not occur during the term of the unrestricted Anglo-Japanese offensive and defensive alliance which they recommend? If an offensive and defensive Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded, Great Britain would be compelled to support Japan everywhere in the East, and Japan would be obliged to identify herself with all British interests in all parts of the world. Hence she would have to support us not only in Asia, but in Europe and America as well. Do those who so earnestly plead for an Anglo-Japanese offensive and defensive alliance seriously expect that Japan is willing to send her army and navy against a great Power on the European continent, say Germany, with which we may be at war, or against the United States? If a combination of the greatest naval Powers should suddenly attack England in the same manner in which Venice and the Netherlands were attacked in former centuries, or if a

powerful enemy should succeed in effecting the landing upon our shores, the assistance of the Japanese army and navy, under the terms of an offensive and defensive alliance, would, of course, be invaluable to us ; but, owing to the long distance which separates England from Japan, that invaluable help would, at the critical moment, unfortunately prove unavailable. The war would probably be decided by the time when our Japanese allies could bring us succour.

An unrestricted and long-termed Anglo-Japanese offensive and defensive alliance is, no doubt, a chimera. Such an alliance is not possible between two nations which have to grapple with totally different problems and which live at the opposite ends of the earth. However, a defensive alliance, and perhaps a defensive and offensive alliance, although hardly an unrestricted one, is possible, and appears necessary between two nations such as Great Britain and France, who are neighbours, who have identical interests, who are both peacefully inclined, who run the same risks, and who share the same dangers. For these reasons Great Britain and France could be, should be, and, I think, eventually will be, allies.

The downfall of Russia is for both Great Britain and France an unfortunate event, and it may conceivably become a calamity to France, or even to both nations. The consequences of Russia's disappearance from the political stage, even if that disappearance be but temporary, are incalculable, and Europe may soon be convulsed by the action of the more ambitious nations on the Continent which are no longer restrained by the balance of power. The statesmen of Great Britain and France are able to avert what may possibly be a disaster of the greatest magnitude by timely action, and it is to be hoped that they will be alive to the requirements of the time. King Edward has, with marvellous political sagacity and skill, shown them the way, and has made their task easy by preparing their path. May they follow his lead !

CHAPTER XIII

SEA-POWER AND CONTINENTAL WAR

THE Franco-German War of 1870-71 brought to a close a lengthy period of great and purely continental wars. These wars were fought for a great purpose. They effected the unity of Germany and also of Italy, the relations existing between the continental Great Powers were completely rearranged, and the chief consequence of that rearrangement was that the leading position among the continental Powers had to be ceded by France to Germany. During the thirty-five years following the great Franco-German struggle, the Great Powers of Europe have kept peace among themselves. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877, the Servo-Bulgarian War of 1885, and the Turco-Greek War of 1897 hardly affected the relations between the continental Great Powers. These wars, although they were fought on European soil, were for all practical purposes as much colonial and extra-European wars as were the Spanish-American War of 1898, our own South African War of 1900, and the recent Russo-Japanese War.

The rearrangement of the national forces on the Continent, ending with the Franco-German War, seemed to have brought an element of permanence and stability, almost finality, into the formerly unstable political situation on the Continent. Since 1871 the centre of political interest and of political danger was situated no longer in Europe, but sometimes in America, sometimes in Asia, sometimes in Africa. Continental politics were frankly tedious,

and the peaceful development of this country was almost permanently threatened through the extra-European ambitions of the various continental Powers which found no scope for expansion in Europe.

The late Russo-Japanese War would appear to have ended the chapter of colonial wars and continental peace. Apparently, we stand before a period during which the relations between the great continental Powers may again be considerably modified, and perhaps completely recast. During the next few years the map of Europe may undergo considerable alteration through one or several great continental wars.

A great European struggle appears, no doubt, to be of considerable advantage to this country from the point of view of the shopkeeper and of the superficial politician who speculates from day to day, but whether such a struggle and the rearrangement following it will ultimately be of benefit or of incalculable disadvantage to Great Britain and the Empire will probably depend on the armed power of this country, and upon the wisdom and energy with which that power is wielded by our statesmen. The present political position on the Continent is exceedingly grave and disquieting, and in the following an attempt will be made at analysing it, at making a forecast of the consequences to which it may give rise, at showing that this country at the present moment holds the future of the Continent in its hands, and at sketching out the duties which Great Britain owes to herself and to other nations with regard to continental affairs.

The Franco-German War of 1870-71 created a powerful and united Germany in the centre of Europe, and Bismarck's skill, aided by the natural course and drift of political events, caused Austria-Hungary and Italy to gravitate towards Germany. Austria-Hungary felt threatened by Russia, Italy felt threatened by France. Both Powers turned to Germany for protection, and both

became the supporters, one might say almost the satellites, of Germany. Russia, on the other hand, had supported Prussia in her struggle with Austria-Hungary and France, rather in the hope of seeing her western neighbour weakened than unduly strengthened. Therefore, she observed with dislike and distrust the rapid and marvellous increase of Germany's power, and logically she became the defender of France in order to prevent Germany from becoming all-powerful on the Continent. The Dual Alliance was the natural consequence of the Triple Alliance, but even before the Dual Alliance was formally concluded, Russia was determined, as Germany found out in 1875, not to allow France to be further weakened. That determination constituted one of the chief elements of the safety of France. Ever since 1871, but especially since 1875, when Russia prevented a German attack upon France, Bismarck had reckoned with the possibility that Germany might have to fight France and Russia simultaneously. Thus, since 1871, Europe became divided into two vast military camps.

The two groups of Powers opposed to one another had almost the same number of soldiers and of guns, almost the same arms and tactics, and almost equal wealth and naval strength. Therefore, the States of both groups considered the risk of a collision between them so great that both were unwilling to break the peace. The German camp and the Franco-Russian camp being considered by many to be about equally strong, an almost perfect balance of power was established on the Continent, and owing to this almost perfect balance of power, a European war among the Great Powers had become almost impossible, and their armaments seemed ridiculous and unnecessary. In consequence of this balancing of the military forces maintained on the continent of Europe, the diplomats of the two groups alternately tried to draw Great Britain into their combination in order to use her as an auxiliary, and thus to secure the superiority over the rival

combination ; they gave scope to their ambitions outside of Europe in countless colonial enterprises, and they occupied themselves in endeavouring to weaken the rival group by sowing discord among its members, and especially by trying to bring them into collision with third Powers. The greater skill and the greater activity, or perhaps the greater unscrupulousness, in these attempts at causing mischief, were evinced by the diplomats of the Triple Alliance, and especially by the diplomats of Germany. France and Great Britain were alienated from one another, and were repeatedly pushed to the brink of war over some suitable colonial object of contention which had been baited by what is technically called a 'friendly' Power. Russia and Great Britain were cleverly set against one another over India or China, and numerous 'irreconcilable differences' were skilfully created between them. By sap and mine, Bismarck and his successors endeavoured to weaken and to destroy the purely defensive position occupied by Russia and France, and to cause the downfall of these countries.

Since 1871 it was Bismarck's deliberate and confessed aim to isolate France, and to weaken all those Powers which possibly might support France against Germany. Among these Powers Russia stood foremost, and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 was Russia's reward for her services to France in 1875, for it can be proved that the Russo-Turkish War was brought about by Bismarck. The Anglo-French estrangements over various colonial questions and the Anglo-Russian troubles in Central Asia also were largely brought about by Bismarck's hand. After all, it was only natural that Bismarck endeavoured to maintain the great and at first, perhaps, somewhat precarious position which he had conquered for Germany by weakening all possible future enemies of his country. That policy was particularly necessary during the time when Germany was financially exhausted through her wars, and when

the unity of the Empire was of too recent a date to appear quite assured. However, the solidification of the Imperial institutions of Germany, the creation of the Triple Alliance, Germany's rapid advance in prosperity, the rapid increase of the German population and the still more rapid increase of the German army, soon gave to Germany such an enormous military preponderance on the continent of Europe that she no longer had to fear an attack from any quarter, for during the last ten or fifteen years the balance of power had turned very distinctly in Germany's favour. Therefore, some years ago, the late Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee, who was designed to be the commander-in-chief of the armies of Germany in case of a war, declared at a military club, before a number of officers, that Germany was strong enough single-handed to hold her own against France and Russia combined. That opinion was shared at the time by many German generals.

The boundless confidence which Germany had in her military strength may be seen from the detailed plans which were drafted by the German General Staff for a possible war with Russia. According to reliable information, the German army was not merely to occupy some fruitful districts in Western Russia and gradually to weaken that country, as Great Britain and France had done in the Crimean War, but the German forces were to advance directly upon St. Petersburg. This daring plan was drawn up, although German diplomacy considered it a certainty that in case of a Russo-German war France would come to Russia's assistance. From the strong defensive positions which have been prepared everywhere in Alsace-Lorraine, which have converted that country into a huge prepared battlefield, and from the powerful fortifications along the whole of the Rhine, from Wesel on the Dutch frontier down to a spot opposite Basle on the Swiss frontier, it appears that, in case of a war with France and Russia, Germany contemplates acting at first towards France on the defensive

and attacking Russia, and that she means, after having crushed Russia, to throw herself upon France.

Notwithstanding the fact that Germany considered herself militarily strong enough in case of need single-handed to meet France and Russia combined, and notwithstanding the fact that she could, in case of a war against France and Russia, under the terms of the Triple Alliance, reckon upon the unconditional support of Austria-Hungary and Italy, Germany has ever since 1871, but especially during the last twenty years, persistently endeavoured to weaken France and Russia, although these Powers did not threaten Germany, and were considered by Germany as Powers little to be feared.

In spite of the eccentricities of the Emperor, Germany pursues on the whole a sober national policy. Therefore, we cannot possibly assume that Germany endeavoured to bring France and Russia into collision with third Powers and to cause the downfall of these countries merely for the pleasure of watching a big fight. Hence, we must necessarily conclude that Germany, in endeavouring to weaken France and Russia, whom she thought her inferiors in strength, pursued some definite and important political aim. What is that aim?

If Germany had been satisfied with the *status quo* which the war of 1870-71 had created, she would have welcomed the establishment of that balance of power on the Continent which came into being soon after the war, for that balance of power was the best possible guarantee against the outbreak of another European war. If she had been bent on peace, and on the preservation of the position which she had gained in the world, she would have seen in the counterpoise of the Franco-Russian Alliance a most desirable means of curbing the ambitions of her own military men and of her militant statesmen. The fact that Germany, ever since the war of 1871, constantly endeavoured to cause the downfall of France and Russia, and to destroy that balance

of power which ensured peace on the Continent, in order to give to the Triple Alliance, and especially to herself, a decided military superiority in Europe, shows that Germany was not satisfied with her great position, that she found the restraining influence of the balance of power irksome, that she wished to have her elbows free. Yet she did not fear the two Powers which were distinctly inferior to the Triple Alliance, and the fact that Germany has for many years worked and plotted to destroy the strength of Russia and France, two countries which Germany considered she could easily defeat with the help of her allies, and possibly even without their help, proves—unless we believe that Germany has, since 1871, pursued a policy of wanton and criminal intrigue—that Germany's political aims are such as to cause her to believe that, in the pursuit of her ambitions, she would meet with the opposition not only of France and Russia, but even with that of her allies. Germany's constant attempts to involve France and Russia in war with third parties prove that Germany's policy is a policy of conquest, not a policy of preservation.

Modern Germany, Prusso-Germany, has become great by conquest. The Hohenzollerns, who originally ruled a small Slavonic country outside the borders of Germany proper, gradually forced their way into Germany; they subjected, one by one, German States and provinces to themselves, and they have at last become the recognised champions of Germanism, not only among the Germans in Germany, but among the Germans in Austria-Hungary as well. Many years ago, when Germany was merely a geographical expression, when there existed only a chaotic and incoherent mass of German-speaking States, but no German State and no German nation, the poet Arndt, in his celebrated song, said that all those countries belonged to Germany where German was spoken. This ancient song is now the most popular song in Germany, and it has become the battle-song of Pan-Germanism. It is daily

sung all over the country, and it has completely ousted the 'Watch on the Rhine' and the Prussian anthem, which are no longer considered to be up to date. The great German public, not unnaturally, considers that the Germans who live outside Germany ought, by rights, to be joined to Prusso-Germany; that it is an anomaly that millions of Germans should live under what all Germans consider to be alien rule in Austria-Hungary and in Switzerland. Besides, it has not been forgotten, and it is taught in all the schools, that Switzerland and Holland were, at one time, German countries which cut themselves adrift from ancient Germany. Therefore, Germany has, no doubt, an excellent sentimental and historic, though a bad legal, claim to the possession of both Holland and Switzerland.

However, Germany is guided in her foreign policy not by sentimental and historic considerations, but by reasons of practical advantage. She wishes to expand, as all vigorous and growing nations do, not so much for the sake of glory as in order to secure outlets for her abundant population and in order to add to her strength and to increase her wealth. At the same time, she cannot altogether disregard German national sentiment in the pursuit of a foreign policy which may lead to war, for her army is a national army.

Bearing in mind these considerations, which guide Germany in her foreign policy, it is perfectly clear that Russia and France possess little that Germany has reason to covet. A war with France for the possession of the French colonies, or for the possession of the Meuse, would be unprofitable, and would be distinctly unpopular in Germany. It is true that Toul and Verdun were at one time in German hands, but the population of that district is thoroughly French. Such a war would not raise the popular enthusiasm in Germany which at once arose when Germany went to war with France in 1870 with the intention of reconquering

German Strasbourg and regaining a large German population in Alsace-Lorraine.

A great war waged with the object of conquering the Baltic provinces of Russia, or of taking another slice of Poland, would be still more unprofitable and still more unpopular. The Baltic provinces, although there is a sprinkling of Germans to be found in them, have little value, and Germany has already more Poles than she wishes for.

On the other hand, a war for breaking the power of Great Britain and taking her commerce and her Colonies, or for conquering Holland or Switzerland, or for joining the German parts of Austria-Hungary to Germany, would powerfully appeal to the imagination of the masses, and such a war would not only be immensely popular all over Germany, but it would, if successful, be exceedingly profitable to that country. As the German fleet is not yet strong enough to challenge the British Navy, and as France is not prepared to place her fleet at Germany's disposal, it is evident that Germany's expansionist ambitions should logically be directed, at least at present, towards Holland, Switzerland, and Austria-Hungary.

The possession of Holland would give to Germany 5,500,000 industrious and wealthy citizens, some valuable colonies and coaling stations, the mouth of the Rhine, the control of the port of Antwerp by the possession of the mouths of the Scheldt, which at present belong to Holland. Last, but not least, the possession of Holland would give to Germany a number of excellent harbours, of which she stands greatly in need, both for her navy and for her merchant marine, and she would, at the same time, obtain a most valuable strategical position which would be of the greatest service if ever she should wish to strike at this country. If Germany could place her fleet into the Dutch harbours, only six hours of sailing would separate the German army from our shores.

The possession of Switzerland would profit Germany but

little from the economic point of view. On the other hand, it should be remembered that Switzerland is an important strategical centre both for the defence of Germany and for an attack upon France and Italy. Switzerland is like a powerful fortress, able to dominate the South of France and the North of Italy. Lastly, the possession of the chiefly German part of Austria-Hungary would give to Germany 20,000,000 new citizens and some excellent harbours on the Mediterranean, and in the possession of these Germany might be in a position to acquire Constantinople.

If Germany and Austria should be joined together, and no doubt they could be united, owing to the powerful Germanic element, and the strong Philo-German movement, in Austria—the Austrian Germans sing ‘The Watch on the Rhine’ and ‘Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles’ as loudly, and perhaps even more loudly, than do even the Germans themselves—the Greater German Empire would rival the Empire of Charlemagne, and might soon exceed it. A German Empire stretching across Europe from Hamburg to Trieste would dominate not only the continent of Europe, but Asia Minor as well. Such an empire would be able to threaten Constantinople, Egypt, and India, and it might legitimately aspire to the domination of the Mediterranean, of Asia Minor, and of North Africa.

Those who have followed the policy of Germany, not the policy of the Pan-Germanic League, cannot have the slightest doubt that Germany is seriously bent on the acquisition of Holland. Whilst the German Emperor has made the warmest advances to the present Queen of Holland, and has done everything to ingratiate himself with the leading Dutch people, his Government has, at the expense of many millions, built the Dortmund-Ems Canal, with the avowed object of diverting the Rhine traffic from the Dutch harbours to Emden, a town which lies close to the Dutch frontier. The harbour of Emden, which was opened only in 1901, has proved

so prosperous and so effective in drawing the stream of traffic away from Holland that it is to be immensely enlarged, and a scheme for effecting this enlargement will very shortly be laid before the Prussian Diet. By the construction of the Rhine-Ems Canal, by preferential railway rates, and, if needs be, by still more drastic measures, Germany intends to damage the very valuable through traffic of Holland, which contributes greatly to the wealth of that country, to such an extent as to force Holland into a customs union with Germany, which would be the first step towards an organic union with that country. Those who doubt that this is Germany's plan will find an ample confirmation of these views in the official arguments which were raised when the construction of the Dortmund-Ems Canal was decided upon, and in the numerous inspired utterances of the leading semi-official papers, such as *Die Grenzboten*, which, from time to time, have appeared.

Holland is a pear which may gradually ripen and then fall into Germany's lap without much exertion. Germany need therefore be in no hurry if she wishes to acquire Holland, especially as it will be wiser to gain her by gradual economic pressure than by the violence of war. Besides, the possession of Holland will not help Germany much in acquiring the Austrian domain. On the contrary, the precipitate acquisition of Holland would not only cause lasting dissatisfaction with German rule in the Netherlands, but such a step might also bring Germany into collision with Great Britain, and such a collision would prove absolutely disastrous for Germany's commerce and industries.

On the other hand, if Germany should succeed in joining Austria to herself in some form or other, and if she should also succeed in placing a Prussian prince on the Hungarian throne—this is said to be a favourite plan of the present Emperor, who would like to see one of his sons become the ruler of Hungary—Germany would become so immensely powerful and acquire so great a prestige on the Continent

that she might occupy Holland without causing much commotion in the world.

At present Germany has 64,000,000 inhabitants, whilst France, which is considered to be the second strongest military Power in Europe, has 40,000,000 inhabitants. If, through the acquisition of the larger part of Austria, the population of Germany should increase to 80,000,000, France would militarily, and probably economically as well, sink to the rank of a second- or third-class Power as compared with Germany. She would become another Belgium, and would no longer be an effective counterpoise against Germany; and if Germany, after having strengthened herself by the absorption of Austria, should proceed to the acquisition of Holland and perhaps of Belgium as well, France, single-handed, would be powerless to resist, and she could do no more than raise a feeble and ineffectual protest against Germany's encroachments. To avoid any commotion, Germany might agree with France upon a division of Belgium and Holland between the two countries—a division which, in reality, would only mean that Germany would 'lend' Belgium to France until the latter would receive Germany's notice to quit.

From the foregoing short sketch it appears that Germany has practically no inducement whatever for attacking either France or Russia, because neither Power possesses anything which makes such an attack worth Germany's while. It further appears that Germany never had any serious apprehension of a Franco-Russian attack, seeing that the forces of the Triple Alliance were stronger than those of the Dual Alliance before Russia was crippled in Asia. Lastly, it appears that Germany's true interests lie, at least for the present, perhaps not so much in gaining the command of the sea and acquiring by force Great Britain's commerce and Colonies, as in making her position on the Continent all-powerful and therefore absolutely secure. She can do so by greatly increasing her population, and, with her

population, her armed strength. Backed by a greatly increased army, she can easily acquire the harbours which she lacks, for her present harbours have not sufficient space to accommodate the enormous fleet which she is building. When Germany once has from 80,000,000 to 100,000,000 inhabitants, a standing army of 1,000,000, and a war army of 5,000,000 men, and a large number of excellent harbours ; in short, when her position on the Continent is absolutely secure against her neighbours, she can with her flourishing industries soon build a fleet sufficiently strong to defeat the British Navy. An industrial population of 100,000,000 Germans must necessarily have a larger purse than an industrial population of 40,000,000 Englishmen. Imperial federation and the drawing together of Great Britain and the United States, which seems likely to take place, and which probably would follow the creation of a Greater Germany dominating the continent of Europe, may frustrate Germany's maritime ambitions.

If Germany should become the ruler of the continent of Europe, Great Britain would become the outpost and the sentinel of Anglo-Saxondom. She would have to be in constant readiness for war, watching with sleepless vigilance a gigantic and aggressive military and naval Power, ruling the continent of Europe, and she would have to be ever prepared to bear the brunt of a formidable and sudden German attack. Great Britain's post would be a post of honour, but her position, though exceedingly honourable, would be very far from being either profitable or comfortable. In fact, Great Britain would have to face a situation similar to that which prevailed a hundred years ago ; but a German Emperor ruling the Continent would be a far more firmly established sovereign and a far more dangerous antagonist than was Napoleon I, for the German Emperor's power would be more solid. Besides, there would be this great difference, that Great Britain was able to capture the trade of the world during the Napoleonic wars. If a

repetition of the Napoleonic wars should be enacted, the trade of the world would be captured not by Great Britain, but by the United States.

Not the peacefulness of William I, or of William II, or of Prince Bismarck, or of Prince von Bülow, or of the German nation, but the automatic action of the balance of military power in Europe, has preserved peace in Europe since 1871, but now the balance of power, which is the best, or rather the only safeguard of peace on the Continent, has been destroyed by the downfall of Russia. For many years to come Russia will be unable actively to intervene in the affairs of the Continent, for her army hardly suffices to keep order in the ruined, rebellious, and distracted country, and she has neither the strength nor the means for conducting a great war. Besides, she has at present not even enough ammunition in her magazines.

More than a hundred and fifty years ago Frederick the Great, the prince of diplomats, wrote in his 'Anti-Machiavel': 'The tranquillity of Europe rests principally upon the wise maintenance of a balance of power by which the superior strength of one State is made harmless by the countervailing weight of several united States. In case this equilibrium should disappear, it is to be feared that a universal revolution will be the result, and that an enormous new monarchy will be established upon the ruins of those countries which were too weak for individual resistance, and which lacked the necessary spirit to unite in time.'

Since the remotest ages it has been a matter of common occurrence that a European nation which through warlike successes had become more powerful than its neighbours, has endeavoured to dominate or to rule the whole continent of Europe. Rome at one time succeeded in ruling the Continent, and the Roman mastery of the continent of Europe naturally led to an attack upon Great Britain, whose independent position seemed to endanger Roman rule in

Gallia, the present France, as we may read in Cæsar's 'Bellum Gallicum.' The destruction of the balance of power by Rome inevitably led to the invasion and conquest of Great Britain, and brought with it several centuries of Roman rule in this country, and history will probably repeat itself, if Europe, or at least the larger part of Central Europe, should again be subjected to one master.

An independent and powerful Great Britain is, and must always be, a danger to a Power which rules the larger part of the Continent, or which aspires to ruling it. Hence, when Spain under Philip II, and France under Louis XIV and Napoleon I, strove to destroy the balance of power on the Continent, and to establish a world-empire, they felt threatened, or at least impeded, in their freedom of action, by the existence of this country and by its independence. Therefore, they attacked it, and if we study our history we shall find that our greatest wars during the last three centuries had to be fought for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. If Germany should rule the Continent, or aspire to ruling the Continent, the war against Napoleon I may have to be fought over again, and we may have to call in the United States to redress the balance of power in Europe.

William II is said to be ambitious, and to be exceedingly anxious to be an 'augmenter of the country,' as were all the Hohenzollerns. His restless activity seems to confirm the estimate of him which is generally held. However, even if Germany had a most unambitious ruler, she might, and very possibly would, endeavour to utilise the great opportunities which have been created by the breakdown of the balance of power. After all, history is made not so much by great and ambitious men as by average men who use great opportunities, or rather, history is made by great opportunities and by those irresistible currents which are created by these opportunities, and which are apt to sweep rulers and ruled off their feet.

The existence of exceedingly strong and exceedingly aggressive expansionist tendencies among the leading men and among the broad masses of Germany cannot be denied. The fact that the rulers of Germany have for many years past deliberately worked for a reunion with Austria and for the acquisition of Holland cannot be doubted, and it is probable that Germany's rulers may consider that the best way to the acquisition of maritime preponderance lies *viâ* Holland, and that the best way to Holland goes *viâ* Vienna. Therefore, we must be prepared to see Germany move towards Vienna. But at the same time we must remember that political ambitions can rarely be realised in accordance with a programme previously drawn up, although it may have been drawn up with the very greatest care.

Diplomacy, though pursuing certain aims in a certain sequence and in accordance with a certain plan, has to deal with problems which are totally different from an algebraic problem. It must largely be guided by momentary constellations and opportunities which, as a rule, are brought about by chance. However, we must also remember that opportunities can frequently be created, and a skilful diplomat ought always to be able to produce a plausible and useful *casus belli* at very short notice. The ever-present Balkan question, or some other unimportant dormant matter, may suitably be worked up in a short time, and a situation may quickly be created which will afford to the German Government that pretext for action in one direction or another, which political decency and diplomatic custom rather than political morality requires. If the will to act is there, Germany will easily find a pretext in order to be able to make use of the present opportunity which Germany has striven for decades to bring about. The mastery of Europe is a stake worth playing for, and Germany's chances, if she wishes to effect a great *coup*, appear not unfavourable.

Austria-Hungary is weak because it is racially a disunited

State. The people are poor and heavily taxed, and the Austro-Hungarian army is supposed to be very inferior to the German army. Many Austrian Germans would welcome a war with Germany, or any other event which would be likely to lead to the establishment of German supremacy in Austria-Hungary. For these reasons, Austria-Hungary would not be able to offer a serious resistance to Germany. A German army could rapidly reach Vienna, which lies only a hundred miles from the German frontier, and no great fortress would stop Germany's progress, for Austria has fortified all her frontiers with the exception of the German one. Besides, the Austro-Hungarian army is not sufficiently prepared for war, whilst the German army is ready for immediate action. For these reasons, an Austro-German war may be a walk-over, and may be ended in a few days, and the German Emperor might be acclaimed with rapture in Vienna by the populace before the other Powers have come to an agreement as to the action to be taken.

Italy would certainly not like to see the Germans established in Trieste, but her acquiescence might probably be bought either by liberal 'assurances' or by a territorial *quid pro quo*, especially as Italy is too poor to stand the financial strain of a great war, notwithstanding the recent improvement of her finances. Besides, Italy's army is small and weak compared with that of Germany. Russia is at present no more dangerous to Germany than is Holland. Therefore, Europe, apart from Germany, is for all practical political purposes composed of but two Powers—France and Great Britain. From the diplomat's point of view, France and Great Britain constitute at the present moment the non-German part of Europe.

France alone would hardly oppose Germany unaided. A Franco-German war would, according to careful estimates made by undoubted authorities, actually cost the two nations about £1,000,000,000, and the defeated State would have to pay this huge sum, and perhaps more—if possible.

Very likely the vanquished Power would become bankrupt. If France should be defeated it would mean *Finis Gallie*, and the French statesmen are scarcely prepared to stake their all, the very existence of their country, upon the preservation of Austria-Hungary. Even if Germany, instead of attacking Austria-Hungary, should more directly threaten and damage France by taking Belgium and Holland, France would hardly move against Germany if she was alone, but she might oppose Germany in order to redress the balance of power in Europe, if she had Great Britain's unconditional support, if she were sure that Great Britain would aid her with all her might.

In these circumstances it appears that Great Britain has the destiny of Europe in her hands, and the question arises: What should Great Britain do if Germany should strive to use her opportunities by an attack on Austria-Hungary or on Holland, and endeavour to become all-powerful in Europe?

Let us hear the advice of two of our greatest and most experienced statesmen. The great Earl of Chatham said, on December 1, 1748: 'I must lay this down as a maxim which this nation ought always to observe, that, though it be our interest to preserve a balance of power in Europe, yet, as we are the most remote from danger we ought always to be the least susceptible of jealousy, and the last to take the alarm.' Similar views were occasionally expressed by Lord Palmerston. For instance, he said in May 1860: 'The policy of Great Britain, subject to exception in special cases, is to keep free from prospective engagements, and to deal with events when they happen, according to the circumstances of the moment.' These are wise and weighty words, but can we apply these two pronouncements, which embody our traditional policy, to the present political situation on the continent of Europe?

During every period of her history there has been an active and aggressive State in Europe, which has grown

exceedingly powerful through its military successes and which has striven to grow still more powerful at the expense of the peace-loving and conservative nations surrounding it. From the time of Richelieu to that of Napoleon III, France was the chief factor of restlessness in Europe, but now Germany has taken the place of France. However, in former times, when a situation similar to the present situation arose on the Continent, there was always some kind of a balance of power in existence, and there were always some Powers which were willing to step into the breach and to offer an effective resistance to a Louis XIV, to a Louis XV, and to a Napoleon I. Great Britain was, therefore, able to keep in the background, waiting to see whether her assistance would be required. Therefore, she could at the psychological moment, when her help became indispensable for preventing Europe from falling under one master, step forth and throw her weight into the balance. Thus Great Britain has more than once saved Europe from tyranny.

Now matters are different. Through the complete collapse of Russia the balance of power on the continent of Europe has been absolutely destroyed, and Germany's advance in one direction or another might encounter no more formidable opposition than a few cautiously worded diplomatic protests. We might find the Powers of Europe acquiesce as easily in the *fait accompli* of an enormous German expansion as they did in Russia's declaration of 1871 that she would no longer be bound by the chief stipulation of the Treaty of Paris. Therefore we cannot afford to wait for the *fait accompli*, but must in this instance deviate from our traditional policy of conservatism and caution, and we must decide how to act before the event which is to be dreaded has actually taken place. However, we cannot well act alone, but should act in concert with France. We can really not be expected to save Europe against her will. Therefore we must agree with France on a plan of action, in case of certain clearly determinable contingencies.

Some distinguished British and German, and a few French, politicians and statesmen are of opinion that France is too weak to oppose Germany, even if she had the support of this country. But those who have an intimate knowledge of the French and the German armies do not take such a hopeless view of the military strength of France. In fact, it may be asserted that the French army is at present approximately equal to the German army in numbers, in the equipment of men and horses, and in its tactics. It should also not be forgotten that the very restricted territory between the frontier fortifications where the decisive battles will probably be fought is not favourable to the employment of very large masses.

It is quite true that the German General Staff feels perfectly confident that the German army can defeat the French forces, and it is also true that many distinguished Frenchmen are sceptical as to the help which Great Britain could offer to France on land. But, at the same time, it must be borne in mind, assuming that Germany should defeat France on land, that such a defeat would not end the war, for she could not at present defeat Great Britain on the sea. A war with France on land may last three months or a year, and it may conceivably be ended by the victory of Germany ; but a war with Great Britain on the sea would last until Germany made peace on Great Britain's terms. Such a war may last interminably.

A lengthy blockade of the German coasts would lead to the collapse of the industries of Germany and to a terrible impoverishment of the whole country ; it would lead to the dissatisfaction, the disheartening, and perhaps the mutiny, of the army, and it would at last lead to the creation of a continental coalition against Germany, for Germany's weak neighbours would regain courage should Germany be greatly enfeebled. The story of our war with Napoleon I might repeat itself, and Germany is hardly prepared to incur such a risk.

Let us remember these few facts, which cannot be gainsaid, and let us also remember the following words of the Earl of Chatham, which he pronounced in 1770 :—

‘ Preventive policy, my Lords, which obviates or avoids the injury, is far preferable to that vindictive policy which aims at reparation, or has no object but revenge. The precaution that meets the disorder is cheap and easy ; the remedy which follows it bloody and expensive.’

The German camp, with its 4,000,000 well-drilled, well-armed, and perfectly organised soldiers, may overwhelm the continent of Europe, or it may abstain from aggression. Whether it will do the one or the other will depend chiefly, if not entirely, upon the determination of British statesmen and the use which they are prepared to make of the British fleet.

CHAPTER XIV

EDUCATION AND ITS DANGERS

EDUCATION, after having been more or less neglected for a long time in Great Britain, has now become an all-powerful panacea in the eyes of the British public and of the British politician. As the alchemists of the dark ages expected to be able to turn any base metal into gold with the help of the philosopher's stone, even so the politicians of the present day expect education to work wonders in Great Britain and to benefit the nation most marvellously in every direction. And, as in the Middle Ages unenlightened princes often subjected their entire States to the fantastic experiments of astrologers and alchemists, half-crack-brained mystics not entirely innocent of fraud, half-nebulous scientists full of extravagant superstitions, in the hope of benefiting their people thereby, even so the patient British nation is to be experimented upon by the schoolmaster at the bidding of the politician, and education is to work wonders in every way. The stagnation of British commerce is to be converted into commercial triumphs by commercial education. Our former industrial supremacy is to return at the hand of technical education, improved military education is to endow us with capable officers—in fact, the whole nation will have to put its nose in a book. But may not the nation become shortsighted, in the literal and in the metaphorical sense, from too much study, and may not the promised blessings of the schoolmaster's activity prove largely an illusion? At present it seems as if we

were going to fall from the Scylla of under-education into the perhaps more dangerous Charybdis of over-education.

Whilst educational enthusiasts in and out of politics are strenuously advocating the 'training' of leaders of men in every field of human activity, it is useful to consider occasionally the limitations of education, and to remember how few of the leaders of men have been 'trained' to their leadership by third parties either in schools or otherwise.

It is an old experience that the most prominent men in nearly every province of human activity have been amateurs, and that is one of the reasons why amateurs, and not professionals, are selected to rule our great public departments. Our great administrators have nearly all been amateurs and autodidacts. To take a few of the best-known examples: Cromwell was a farmer, Warren Hastings and Clive were clerks, Mr. Chamberlain was brought up for trade, Lord Goschen for commerce, and Lord Cromer for the army. Other countries have had the same experience with self-taught amateurs. Prince Bismarck was brought up for law, failed twice to pass his examination, became a country squire, and drifted without any training into the Prussian diplomatic service and the Cabinet, and founded the German Empire. George Washington was a surveyor, Benjamin Franklin a printer, Abraham Lincoln a lumberman, M. de Witte a railway official.

In a less exalted sphere we meet with the same phenomenon. Sir William Herschel was a musician, Faraday a bookbinder, Scott a lawyer's clerk, Murat a student of theology, Ney a notary's clerk, Arkwright, the inventor of the spinning machine and the first cotton manufacturer, a barber, Spinoza a glass-blower, Adam Smith a clergyman, Lord Armstrong an attorney, Herbert Spencer an engineer, Pasteur, the father of modern medicine and surgery, a chemist, Edison a news vendor; George Stephenson and most of the great inventors and creators of industry of his time were ordinary working men.

When we look round we find not only that many leaders of men were devoid of a highly specialised training in that particular branch of human activity in which they excel, that they were self-taught amateurs, but that many of the ablest politicians and of the most successful business men have not even had the advantage of a fair general education. Abraham Lincoln had learned at school only the three R's, and those very incompletely, President Garfield worked with a boatman when only ten years old, President Jackson was a saddler and never spelled correctly, President Benjamin Harrison started life as a farmer, and President Andrew Johnson, a former tailor, visited no school, and learned reading only from his wife. George Peabody started work when only eleven years old, the late Sir Edward Harland was apprenticed at the age of fifteen years, Andrew Carnegie began his commercial career when twelve years old as a factory hand, Charles Schwab, the late president of the United States Steel Corporation, drove a coach as a boy, and then became a stake-driver at an iron-works. Josiah Wedgwood started work when only eleven years old, Arkwright, the father of our cotton industry, was never at school, Edison was engaged in selling papers when twelve years of age, and Sir Hiram Maxim was with a carriage builder when he was fourteen. 'Commodore' Cornelius Vanderbilt, the railway king, who left more than a hundred million dollars, started as a ferryman at a tender age ; the founder of the wealth of the Astors was a butcher's boy, Baron Meyer Amschel von Rothschild a pedlar, Alfred Krupp a smith, Rockefeller, the head of the Standard Oil Trust, a clerk. All these most successful men were autodidacts. People well acquainted with the City can name a goodly number of millionaires who occasionally drop an 'h,' the only evidence left of an arduous career from the bottom rung of the ladder.

Why have so few eminently successful men been school-trained ? Because the acceptance of ready-made opinions

kills the original thinking power and unbiassed resourcefulness of the mind, and paramount success cannot be achieved by docile scholars and imitators, but only by pioneers. Besides, the independent spirits who are predestined for future greatness are usually impatient of the restraint of schools, and of their formal and largely unpractical tuition, and wish to be free to follow their own instincts towards success.

In view of these numerous well-known instances of greatness achieved by men unaided, but also unspoiled by education, who taught themselves what they found necessary to learn, which instances might be multiplied *ad infinitum*, it is only natural to find a strong opposition to education among the unlearned men whose native shrewd common sense has not been affected by the reading of books. But even the learned begin to waver and to ask themselves whether the much-vaunted benefits of learning have not been largely over-estimated, and whether the undoubted advantages of education are not more than counterbalanced by corresponding disadvantages.

The doubts as to the advantages of education have been considerably strengthened by our experiences in the South African War. Many observers have been struck by the curious phenomenon that our most highly educated officers had on the whole so little success against the Boer officers, who were not only quite unlearned in the science of war, but also mostly uneducated, and sometimes grossly ignorant in elementary knowledge, peasants who had perhaps not even heard the names of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Moltke, whose every battle our erudite officers had at their fingers' ends.

The highest military school in Great Britain is the Staff College. The officers who have succeeded in passing through that institution are considered to be the most intellectual, and are marked out for future employment in the most responsible positions. They are our most scientific soldiers

and represent the flower of learning in the army. Consequently it might be expected that our most distinguished generals should be Staff College men. However, if we look through the Army List, it appears that our most successful officers in the Boer War—Lord Roberts, Lord Kitchener, Sir John French, Sir George White, Sir Archibald Hunter, Sir Ian Hamilton, Lord Dundonald, Sir Hector Macdonald, and General Baden-Powell—have not passed the Staff College. On the other hand, we find that the late General Colley, who lost Majuba, was a prominent military scientist and Staff College professor, and that General Gatacre, who was defeated at Stormberg, and Generals Kelly-Kenny, Hildyard, Hart, and Barton, who also took part in the South African War, though not with conspicuous success, have the much-coveted P.S.C. (passed Staff College) printed after their names. In the South African War it came to pass, as some crusty old colonels had prophesied, that the officers who were brimful of scientific military knowledge, and who could talk so learnedly on strategy and tactics, achieved nothing on the field of battle. Those who achieved something had not been 'trained' to generalship in the Staff College, and had not had their natural thinking power, their common sense, crowded out of existence by the absorption of a huge store of book-learning.

After some of our initial defeats a distinguished general was sent out, and it was reported that wherever he went a large library of military works, strategical, tactical, and historical, went with him. He and his library went to Africa to save the situation, but not many months after that distinguished scientific general returned in disgrace to England, together with his library. His imposing book knowledge, with which he could talk down any mere fighting officer, had availed him nothing in the field.

Our 'highly trained' professional intelligence officers proved also of very little value until they had unlearned

in Africa what they had been taught at home, whilst quite unlearned Transvaal peasants made splendid intelligence officers. On the other hand, 'Colonel' Wools-Sampson, by far our best intelligence officer, was a civilian.

Our politicians have unfortunately not yet learned the lessons of the South African War. Instead of investigating why the unlearned peasant officers defeated so often the flower of our military scientists, who were fortified with the most profound military education, and who had a most extensive knowledge of the battles, the strategy and tactics of all periods, from the time of Hannibal onwards, a committee of gentlemen innocent of war was deputed to inquire into the education of our officers. Naturally enough their verdict was condemnatory of the present system, and various suggestions were made by it how to improve the education of our officers. Lord Kitchener, General French, Christian de Wet, and Louis Botha, fighting officers who are no doubt the most competent judges of the qualifications required in an officer for war, were, unfortunately, not asked for their opinion on such a vital matter. It would have been interesting to learn how much or how little weight practical authorities of unrivalled weight, such as these, attach to school education of officers as practised in Great Britain, and what, according to their opinion, the effect of that school education is upon their common sense.

In view of these few examples, which are universally known, and many more which are less familiar, it is not to be wondered at that thoughtful men begin to question the efficacy of education altogether. Hence the danger seems impending that after a spell of over-education the swing of the pendulum should bring us back again to under-education. Consequently it seems opportune to consider what the object of education should be, what the advantages and the disadvantages of education are, how the disadvantages of education are caused, and how they may be

obviated, so that only the advantages of education should remain.

The object of education has been laid down by the great thinkers of all times. King Solomon recommends education in order 'to give subtilty to the simple, to the young man knowledge and discretion' (Prov. i. 4), and though he frequently recommends knowledge, he considers it as subsidiary to understanding, and wisely emphasises 'Wisdom is the principal thing; therefore get wisdom: and with all thy getting get understanding' (Prov. iv. 7).

The advantages of a proper education are too generally known to be enlarged upon, consequently we may turn at once to the disadvantages inherent to education.

No great thinker believed in the indiscriminate and uncritical acquisition, the mere storage of dead book-knowledge, to the confusion of the intellect—a result which is usually arrived at by the cramming in preparation for examinations, as practised by our present-day education. Learning by rote was probably in former ages as popular among schoolmasters as it is now, because it shows quickest some tangible results of education. Aware of this danger, Solomon urges again and again in his proverbs, 'Get wisdom,' 'Get understanding,' 'Get discretion.' He evidently thought an actively working and intelligent brain more valuable than one filled with knowledge.

No doubt the object of education should be to enlighten the understanding, cultivate the taste, correct the temper, form the manners and habits of youth, and especially to fit them for usefulness in their future stations by preparing them for the battle of life. Is this object attained to any degree by our present education, or does it chiefly endow us with a show of motley knowledge, mostly useless in after life, to the detriment of our natural thinking powers and of our common sense?

The danger inherent to the possession of a store of undigested knowledge is that it shackles, stifles, and often

kills the free working of the brain. That great danger of education has been clear to many great men, from Solomon onwards, who have given the matter a thought. Of the numerous epigrams which have been coined to warn against the danger of substituting a dead weight of undigested and therefore useless knowledge for an active unprejudiced and clear brain, endowed with common sense, I should like to mention only two: Goethe's 'The greater the knowledge the greater the doubt,' and Hazlitt's 'The most learned are often the most narrow-minded men.' The truth of these sayings is absolutely clear to everyone; only this truth, though instinctively felt, has not sufficiently been taken to heart by those who direct the education of the nation.

It has been truly said, 'Knowledge is power'; but knowledge in itself is not power, only *applied* knowledge is power. Knowledge is like money, not valuable in itself, but only valuable for what it will buy. Knowledge is like a strong weapon, but the best weapon is useless to a man who does not know how to wield it. Knowledge is an elementary power, but the power of the Niagara, or of steam, or of electricity, would be useless to mankind unless intelligence directs that power to some practical purpose. The Chinese knew magnetic iron long before the Europeans knew it. To them it was a piece of iron and nothing more. Handled by European intelligence, magnetic iron became a useful power in the compass, which gave Europe the rule of the seas. The Chinese knew also gunpowder before the Europeans knew it, but to them it was only a plaything used in fireworks. A man who has read endless treatises on boxing, and who has studied the fights of all great boxers, gets knocked out whilst he is reflecting how Jackson or Fitzsimmons would have behaved. The officer whose mind is soaked in military literature and who can tell why Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz and why Frederick the Great lost the battle of Hochkirch has lost in nine cases out of ten his common sense, the buoyancy, resourcefulness,

and impartiality of mind with which a less erudite officer would tackle a difficult question.

A learned officer whose intelligence has been swallowed up by his military studies will not immediately fit his tactics to the case in point, as his free common sense would suggest, but tries often to make the case in point fit the theories which he has imbibed, or the historical precedents and parallels which his memory, not his judgment, suggests to him. An example: On December 15, 1899, General Buller telegraphed to Lord Lansdowne from Chieveley Camp: ' . . . My view is that I ought to let Ladysmith go and keep good position for the defence of South Natal, and let time help us. . . . The best thing I can suggest is that I should keep defensive position and fight it out in a country better suited to our tactics.'

Instead of looking at the position of the enemy and his tactics with an unbiassed mind, and fitting his tactics to the ground and circumstances, General Buller evidently wished to fit the ground and circumstances to his unsuitable book tactics, and proposed to retire to South Natal in the vain hope that the enemy would oblige him by following after, and thus enable him to fight there according to the book. Other generals complained that the Boers 'bolted' before an attack with the bayonet could be 'brought home.' They seemed to consider that the Boers did not play the game squarely in deviating from the tactics taught in the text-books.

Amongst statesmen also we find that, on the whole, the comparatively unlearned have a great advantage over the very learned and bookish. Our two most capable living statesmen, Lord Cromer and Mr. Chamberlain, were brought up for the army and for business respectively. They are hard workers and practical men, singularly free from useless book learning, and have never been known to rely for an argument on a text-book or a professorial dictum. Their learning has been chiefly derived from intelligent

observation in practical life, and they have fortunately not had time for lengthy theoretical studies. Mr. Gladstone, on the other hand, was a great scholar. His mind was a perfect encyclopædia of classical and other knowledge. He could look at every question from so many sides and could enlarge on its countless minor aspects and possibilities with such a wonderful brilliancy and intellectual subtlety that, after considering all the arguments which might be raised for or against, he did at the end often no longer know himself what side to take. He illustrated Bacon's saying, that it is not so important to know what might be said as what ought to be done. Mr. Gladstone's unwieldy store of book knowledge was a millstone round his neck, and disqualified him from being a statesman of the first rank. Instead of looking at essentials, his kaleidoscopic mind became involved and entangled by the spinning out of his topic, and after straying through a confusing maze of arguments, he was apt to let slip the thread and to lose himself in trifles.

Of English statesmen of the second rank, few are more thoroughly forgotten than those of the greatest and most subtle intellect and of nearly unequalled learning, such as Edward Gibbon, Macaulay, Sir George Cornwall Lewis, Robert Lowe, and the late Duke of Argyll. They are hardly remembered as statesmen.

Compared with the men named above, the two greatest statesmen of modern times, Bismarck and Abraham Lincoln, might be called uncultured. Bismarck was comparatively unlearned and certainly not bookish. In fact, he expressed more than once his contempt of political and of economical theorists, and relied solely on his broad untrammelled common sense, taking no notice of professorial theories and protestations. Unhampered by the superfluous knowledge and the æsthetic feelings of a Gladstone, and quite free from the theories of political scientists and political economists, he brushed the hair-splitting arguments of over-culture

aside, kept his eyes steadfastly on the main issue, and rapidly led his country from triumph to triumph, to greatness, unity, and wealth. Again, that great statesman Abraham Lincoln, the former lumberman, brought the sturdy, practical, sober common sense and the fearless determination, which he had acquired in his intercourse with Nature, from the backwoods into office, and saved America from disruption. No bookish men of science would have been able to replace either Bismarck or Lincoln.

Of our rulers, unpolished Henry VIII, Queen Elizabeth, and Cromwell are among the greatest. On the other hand, of our polished rulers, James I, 'the wisest fool in Christendom,' and Charles II, 'who never said a foolish thing, and never did a wise one,' confirm that people who have filled themselves with undigested learning can talk most wisely in drawing upon their store, but cannot act wisely in applying their accumulated knowledge to practical issues, because with them knowledge has taken the place of common sense.

What applies to military matters and to business of State applies with equal force to trade and commerce. None of our successful generals in the South African wars have passed through the Staff College, and no business man of the first rank in Great Britain, America, or Germany has, as far as is known, come from commercial high schools. On the contrary, it seems that Mr. Carnegie's advice 'to start young and broom in hand' is most excellent counsel. While great fortunes and great industries have almost invariably been created by uneducated men, parvenus unembarrassed with learning, who taught themselves what they found necessary to know, we find on the other hand that those men who have made commercial science, political economy, their study, have not shown any success in business and have remained theorists. Most political economists have had to live on their pen. Mr. Cobden went bankrupt in business. It is true that Ricardo was well off, but he

was a stockbroker by trade, and with him political economy was only a hobby, not a serious pursuit. It is strange how few business men of the first rank have a good word to say of political economy.

If we look at the masses of the people we find that, owing to education, nearly everybody can read, and does read, copiously. Every labourer and his wife read regularly their paper, free public libraries are to be found everywhere, the best books can be bought at sixpence or less a volume, and there is hardly a family, howsoever poor it may be, without a library of much-read books. It might be assumed that with the opening of the intellectual world of books, the intellect of the people would also have been opened correspondingly, and that the people should be more enlightened. However, it seems very doubtful whether that is the case. Perhaps at no time have uncritical credulousness and crass superstition been greater. Perhaps at no time have swindlers, quacks, and charlatans of all kinds found a larger and more gullible *clientèle*. Cheiromancy and clairvoyance flourish everywhere and find countless patrons, from titled ladies to mill hands. The belief in ghosts is strong and spiritualism is fashionable. Millions believe in the faith cure and similar extraordinary gospels. The wildest schemes floated on the Stock Exchange find the millions of the public ready, and the thousands are raked in by missing-word competitions, bucket-shops, and other transparent frauds. Throughout the country we have large parties of convinced vaccinationists and anti-vaccinationists, of Imperialists and of Little Englanders, of Free-traders and of Protectionists, &c. However, if the average much-reading voter is asked why he is a convinced supporter of one or the other movement, he will not be able to adduce any intelligent reasons for his 'convinced' attitude from his enlightened common sense, notwithstanding his copious readings. As a matter of fact, he has had his belief drummed into his brain, which has been dulled by over-reading.

His common sense and his intellect have been smothered in paper and printer's ink. He does not reason, but believes and follows blindly.

The average man reads not for information, but for amusement. Divorces, murders, cricket, betting, &c., are the most popular items, as a glance at the evening papers, or a visit to the public libraries, will show, and popular magazines and books are filled with extravagant stories of the love and murder type, which only serve to distort the people's ideas of life, and may incidentally also be responsible for the creation of the hooligan. Even the short story begins to tire the flaccid brain and the staled palate of the multitude. Its place is rapidly being taken by papers of the *Scraps*, *Bits*, and *Chips* style.

In spite of the universal education of the people, the stage is steadily degenerating. The masses are no longer able to follow a drama, notwithstanding universal education, and can only concentrate their minds sufficiently to follow performances of the *Scraps* style, composed of comic songs, ballets, acrobatic feats, and buffoonery. The brain of the people has evidently not been sharpened, but been dulled and softened, by too much reading.

Public opinion is ready made by the newspapers, and is assimilated without criticism by their readers. Common sense is getting more and more uncommon, and is being rapidly replaced by a useless store of miscellaneous odds and ends of information. In fact, the mind of the multitude is beginning to resemble the contents of a number of *Tit-Bits*, with its scrappy, heterogeneous and incoherent information. In consequence of this passive state of the public brain, any movement which is undertaken by people disposing of a sufficient store of money has a good chance of success. Whatever the gospel may be, if there is money enough to drum it loudly and continuously into the public ear, the public is sure to adopt it. For a nation whose policy is based upon the will of the masses, and for a Government

which often waits for a lead from the electorate before acting, a state of affairs which supplants the native common sense and the judgment of the people by a confused mass of useless, unassimilated knowledge seems distinctly dangerous.

It might be objected that common sense is not a subject that can be taught in schools, like writing or languages. That is true to some extent, but common sense can either be developed and strengthened in schools, or can be neglected and stifled. The tendency of schools constantly to provide for the scholar authoritative ready-made opinions which he has to learn by heart, and which he need not trouble to question or investigate, is no doubt fatal to his common sense. Instead of exercising and stimulating the power of judgment and criticism in the tender brain, and encouraging it to work independently, schools work almost exclusively upon the memory, which has to assimilate a bewildering, heterogeneous mass of chiefly ornamental facts and data, which more often than not prove utterly useless in after-life.

Instead of filling the pupil's head with knowledge regardless of his judgment, schools should, before all, awaken the mental initiative and invigorate the independent thinking power of their pupils, and encourage them to use their common sense, in order to give 'subtily to the simple, to the young man knowledge and discretion.' However, instead of thus equipping their pupils for life, they cram the youthful brains so chokeful with chiefly ornamental, and therefore futile, knowledge that their common sense becomes stunted. Of what use is a smattering of history, botany, and a few words of French to a workman's daughter who, from lack of common sense, cannot cook or cannot keep house for a future husband, or bring up her children sensibly? Of what use are the vague, hazy memories of science, which he has been taught, to a workingman who ruins his trade and loses his employment because he believes in the 'scientific' restriction of labour, who goes idly on strike on the advice of a loud-mouthed agitator,

or who thoughtlessly gambles his money away, owing to the lack of that common sense which has been stifled at school, and which has been replaced by a smattering of vain book knowledge? Again, of what use are the higher studies of the merchant, the doctor, the solicitor, the engineer, &c., if, owing to stifled common sense, they can make as little use of their learning as did our highly trained officers in South Africa?

As the possession of knowledge without understanding is not only useless, but as its acquisition also deprives the learners of much valuable time which might more advantageously have been employed in a different way, it is quite clear that the schools should first of all try to develop the native intelligence, the common sense, of their pupils, instead of ignoring its presence and weakening its force. Furthermore, schoolmasters should constantly bear in mind that knowledge can only be usefully acquired in proportion to the common sense possessed by the learner, that learning must be subordinate to understanding, and that, though common sense can make excellent use of knowledge, knowledge can never replace common sense. Tuition should, therefore, always look to the intellectual power of the scholar, as the engineer looks to the pressure gauge, and regulate accordingly the rate of progress in learning, instead of mechanically filling the learner's brain to the full capacity of the memory, and thereby crowding out the common sense.

A thorough investigation of the art of teaching is needed, and such an investigation may show the necessity of abandoning altogether competitive examinations of the present type, which rather go to show the strength of the pupil's memory than the far more important soundness of his judgment.

However, more will be required than strengthening the judgment of the pupil and regulating the quantity of learning to be taught by the assimilative, not the retentive, power

of the individual. It will be the duty of our statesmen to discover whether the present practice of education and the topics taught are most conducive to fit the youth of the nation for their future stations in practical life. To the solution of that most important question every true patriot, and especially every practical man, can materially contribute, for it is essentially a practical man's question, and not an educationalist's, as has hitherto been usually assumed.

That our present education, primary, secondary, and tertiary, is on the whole so little practical that it treats the critical faculties of the pupil with sublime disregard, that it consequently tends to deprive the nation of its common sense, and thereby not fits but unfits the youth of the nation for practical life, cannot be wondered at. The reason is that our whole educational system is unfortunately schoolmaster-made.

No doubt the fittest educators for any walk of life are those men who have achieved conspicuous success in it. Lord Kitchener would probably be able to train officers of distinction, Sir Edward Clarke would probably be able to educate lawyers of prominence, and Mr. Carnegie would very likely raise successful business men. Not schools but great men have always been the trainers of great men, whenever great men have not trained themselves unaided. In proof of this I would cite the pupils of Plato, the schools of the great Italian painters during the Renaissance, the excellent officers trained by Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Nelson. Successful men are most competent to teach others how to attain success. Schoolmasters are most competent to train schoolmasters. Therefore, unless a wholesome influence from outside supplies the leaven and brings on practical reforms, primary education will remain what it is, classical education will continue to be forced on young men to whom it is absolutely useless in after-life, and tertiary education will not be brought up to the practical requirements of the nation.

It is unlikely that the services of Mr. Carnegie will be secured by a commercial academy, or those of Lord Kitchener by the Staff College, and it is equally unlikely that able soldiers, chemists, engineers, business men, &c., will throw away their unlimited chances in exchange for a tedious professorship that gives them a precarious, or at the best a moderate, income, and a mediocre position. But, even assuming that first-class practical men could be secured for teaching practical matters, they would be too much wrapped up in teaching to keep up to date in practice, and they would soon fall behind in their teaching. Besides, a practical man rapidly becomes professorial when he is put in the lecturer's chair. A Virchow, a Treves, or a Marconi could probably teach a few intelligent, self-chosen assistants more in the laboratory during a month, without taking any trouble, and without interrupting his work, than he could teach an audience in two years by carefully prepared lectures.

The triumphs of German science and industry are unjustly attributed to the numerous universities and technical and other schools which exist in Germany. Those institutions have been instrumental in turning out an immense host of professors, medical men, lawyers, &c., of medium ability, of whom the vast majority is only partly occupied or unoccupied. Men of great ability are raised not by the superficial education of the many, but by the intensive culture of the few, and Germany's successes in science and industry are traceable to the intensive, not the extensive tuition, that has been provided by her. The ability of the best German scientists, engineers, soldiers, &c., has wisely been utilised towards intensive education. Moltke was at the same time the commander of the army and the chief of the staff, and in his latter quality he trained the staff officers in the art of organisation and of war, especially those who showed most talent, such as his successor, Von Waldersee, who acted for a long time as his

assistant. Germany's successes in chemistry are directly traceable to Justus von Liebig and his assistants in the laboratory, her electrical paramountcy was created by W. von Siemens and his pupils. In fact, most of the leading men of science and industry in Germany were trained by a few very able men of the type of Moltke, Liebig, and Siemens, whose assistants they have been.

Schoolmasters are too far removed from the turmoil of the world to be able to train young men and fit them for the battle of life if left to themselves. The training of the young cannot safely be left to the unguided schoolmaster. To improve education the practical men of the nation, the men who do things and who can take a comprehensive view of the requirements of education, manufacturers, merchants, bankers, lawyers, doctors, officers, &c., must take an active part, not only a sympathetic interest, in education and assist in the mapping out of an up-to-date educational programme of real practical utility.

The shortcomings of the schools are not of modern date. As long as human records exist schools have had a distinctly conservative strain in their character. The schools of Judæa and Egypt were ecclesiastical—that is to say, conservative—and the earliest and medieval Christian schools were monastic. From medieval monastic times the present schools have faithfully preserved their classic programme and their exaggerated veneration of the *studia humaniora*. They have preserved their somewhat monastic character and programme, partly owing to the dead weight of tradition, which has ever been very powerful in schools, partly owing to the influence of clergymen upon education. No doubt the blending of ecclesiastical and scholastic influences has greatly improved the morals of the nation, and has made it high-minded ; but these influences, which have been excellent for the ideal equipment of Great Britain, have not worked as satisfactorily for the practical and scientific advancement of the country. Generally speaking, clergymen

cannot be considered to be the fittest exponents of science.

With few exceptions schoolmasters of every type form an extremely conservative, self-centred and somewhat self-important body. Speaking always with the voice of authority to their classes, they tend to become autocratic in their views, and, having themselves studied the classics, they believe the study of the classics to be the best preparation for any and every career. *Abeunt studia in mores.*

New ideas have hardly ever come from schools. On the contrary, schools have ever proved reactionary and inimical to new ideas. Great minds have ever been persecuted owing to the narrow-mindedness and the jealousy of the schools from Socrates onwards. Galileo, Columbus, and many other great discoverers were imprisoned and treated like criminals with the approval, and largely at the instigation, of schools of science because their discoveries threatened the tenets of accepted learning. Even the heavy artillery of theology has been advanced by the universities of the Middle Ages, and also of later days, against geological and astronomical discoveries. Newton and Darwin were laughed at by the faculties, and in Roman Catholic universities Darwin is still ostracised, according to report. Kant became a professor only when he was forty-six years old, after fifteen years' lecturing; Schopenhauer never became a professor, owing to the jealousy of the universities. Liebig and Pasteur were jeered at by the profession; vaccination and homœopathy had to fight for decades against the envy of the medical schools. David Strauss and Renan were compelled to leave their universities; Beethoven and Wagner were persecuted by the schools of music, and were treated like madmen because they did not conform with musical traditions. Millet was neglected by the Salon in Paris, and Whistler snubbed by the Royal Academy in London. The inventions of Edison, Marconi, Röntgen, Koch, could not be explained away by modern science schools, but their

discoveries have been greeted by the universities with personal attacks full of animosity, and these men have been pictured as the commercially successful exploiters of other people's ideas.

Wherever we look we find the schools somewhat inclined towards reaction. That being their character, not only in Great Britain, but everywhere, it seems clear that it would be unreasonable to expect that the schools should reform themselves. Therefore reforms must come from outside unless education is to remain what it is—an elaborate sham, with science in its mouth, but in reality a course of cramming, destructive of common sense.

To improve education, education may have to be individualised ; that is to say, the present uniformity of the schools may have to give way to schools catering directly for the practical needs of the various classes of the population. Why should a number of pupils who wish to follow different occupations, which require the most diversified qualifications of mind and body, and of knowledge, and therefore also a diversified course of preparatory study, all be classed together, treated alike, and be compelled to learn the same subjects ? Already pupils are enabled to some extent to choose subjects for instruction, but specialisation has not by any means been carried far enough. In future we shall very likely not so much require schools which exclusively aim at mechanically cramming their pupils for certain examinations, which are for show but otherwise of doubtful value, but we shall require intelligently designed institutions which cater directly for boys who intend to become lawyers, or doctors, or business men, &c. The various classes of the community are bound to feel, in course of time, the absolute necessity of a more practical and more directly useful tuition for their children. They are bound to recognise the absolute futility of measuring ability by examinations, which show only the retentive, not the intellectual, capacity of the brain, and the commercial instinct

of schoolmasters will supply the demand for individualised schools of a more practical type adapted to give a thorough businesslike preparation to their pupils.

Why should a boy, who is interested in a certain science or pursuit, be forced to waste a number of precious years in studying various subjects which are distinctly unsympathetic to him, and to receive at the same time during all these years but a scant and superficial tuition in the one subject which he ardently wishes to study, and to which he would like to devote his life?

A modest beginning to provide competent and efficient tuition in special subjects is already being made by practical men in a tentative way. Certain trades—as, for instance, the gunmakers in Sheffield—have established technical schools of their own, which are doing excellent work, and which, on the whole, should prove more competent and more businesslike than technical schools established by outside agencies, such as the Government, corporations, or universities. Let us hope that the spirit of combination which seems to be growing, though somewhat slowly, within the community, will in due course dot the whole country with technical schools founded and supervised by the various industries themselves, and planted under the very eye of these industries in their business centre. The application of science to industry will then become a very powerful factor and an established fact where it is now only a pious wish. Let us hope, besides, that the direct active interest in education, which practical men are beginning to take, will cause in course of time the mapping out of specialised school programmes by competent experts for all schools, from elementary schools to universities throughout the country; for, after all, practical men, not tradition-bound schoolmasters and well-meaning clergymen, can determine the practical requirements of education.

CHAPTER XV

INDIVIDUALISM OR PATRIOTISM ?—THE WAY TO A NEW NATIONAL LIFE

WHETHER the British Empire will stand or fall depends most of all on the spirit and the will of the people. We must organise the Empire. We must reform many of our institutions, but before all we must reform ourselves. We must find the way to a new national life, and Japan furnishes us with an example which must fill us with confidence and hope.

‘It is a well-known characteristic of mankind to despise what they do not know. For this reason the Japanese, until quite recently, looked down upon foreigners as barbarians. But the foreigners display the same mental attitude which formerly distinguished the Japanese. They do not know what to them is a foreign country—Japan.’

It is a good many years ago since Fukuzawa Yukichi, perhaps the foremost Japanese educationalist of modern times, wrote these words, and since then the world has learned to respect and to admire Japan for her splendid achievements in every province of human activity. But the world still believes that the reform of Japan is a thing of yesterday, a mushroom growth which has sprung up overnight, and which, as we are told, may disappear as suddenly as it came when ‘the Asiatic’ reasserts himself, tears up his European clothes, like the monkey in the fable, and returns to his native ways.

In reality, the foundation on which the magnificent

edifice of modern Japan has been erected with marvellous skill and unparalleled rapidity was laid at a time when Europe was still in swaddling clothes, and successive generations have added stone by stone to the building, which, with the adaptation of European civilisation, received its natural completion. The rise of modern Japan may seem like a fairy tale to the superficial observer in Europe or America, but to the Japanese themselves the reform of their country appears natural in view of its history, character, and traditions.

If we wish to understand how and why Japan succeeded in carrying out perhaps the most marvellous reformation which any empire has ever effected, in order to gauge what are her aims and what her future will be, we must study her progress and her reformation from Japanese sources. Such study will reveal the fact that Europe and America can now learn quite as much from Japan as she has learned from them in the past.

Twenty years ago, when Japan seemed, in European eyes, no greater than Siam or Liberia, Fukuzawa Yukichi said : ' Though we learned the art of navigation during the last twenty years, it is neither within the last twenty years, nor within the last 200 years, that we cultivated and trained our intellect so as to enable us to learn that art. That continued training is characteristic of Japanese civilisation, and can be traced back hundreds and thousands of years, and for that continuity of effort we ought to be thankful to our ancestors.

' We have never been backward or lacking in civilisation and progress. What we wanted was only to adapt the outward manifestations of our civilisation to the requirements of the time. Therefore, let us study not only navigation, but every other branch of European knowledge and civilisation, however trifling it may be, and adopt what is useful, leaving alone what is useless. Thus shall we fortify our national power and well-being.

' On the great stage of the world, where all men can see, we mean to show what we can do, and vie with other nations in all arts and sciences. Thus shall we make our country great and independent. This is my passionate desire.'

Fukuzawa Yukichi and the other great reformers of his time have now succeeded in carrying out their ardent ambition, and have raised their country to the eminent position in the world which is its due. Now let us take a rapid glance at old Japan, and then watch its transformation and modernisation.

The early history of Japan is wrapped in obscurity, but from the fact that the present Emperor comes from a dynasty which, in unbroken succession, has governed the country for more than 2,500 years, we may assume that the Japanese were a politically highly organised, well-ordered, and therefore a highly cultured people centuries before the time of Alexander the Great. Seven centuries before Christ, Japan was already a seafaring nation, for Japanese ships went over to Corea. In the year 86 B.C. the Emperor Sujin had the first census of the population taken, and in 645 the Emperor Kotoku ordered that regular census registers should be compiled every six years. In Great Britain we find that only in 1801, and after much obstruction and opposition, was the first census taken. Japan's first regular postal service was established in the year 202, and was perfected in later centuries.

The great renaissance of Japan took place in the seventh and eighth centuries, or several hundred years before William the Conqueror. Prince Shotoku initiated that period of splendid and universal progress. He organised the administrative system of the country, and he created that spirit of Japan which combines absolute fearlessness, patriotism, and the keenest sense of personal honour with unselfishness, unfailing courtesy, gentleness, and obedience to authority. The following rules of political conduct laid down by the Prince during a time of disorder have been, and

still are, the Ten Commandments of the Japanese, and were spoken of as The Constitution: ' . . . Concord and harmony are priceless ; obedience to established principles is the first duty of man. But in our country each section of people has its own views, and few possess the light. Disloyalty to Sovereign and parents, disputes among neighbours, are the results. That the upper classes should be in unity among themselves, and intimate with the lower, and that all matters in dispute should be submitted to arbitration—that is the way to place Society on a basis of strict justice.

' Imperial edicts must be respected. The Sovereign is to be regarded as the heaven, his subjects as the earth . . . so the Sovereign shows the way, the subject follows it. Indifference to the Imperial edicts signifies national ruin.

' Courtesy must be the rule of conduct for all ministers and officials of the Government. Social order and due distinctions between the classes can only be preserved by strict conformity with etiquette.

' To punish the evil and reward the good is humanity's best law. A good deed should never be left unrewarded or an evil unrebuked. Sycophancy and dishonesty are the most potent factors for subverting the State and destroying the people.

' To be just, one must have faith. Every affair demands a certain measure of faith on the part of those who deal with it. Every question, whatever its nature or tendency, requires for its settlement an exercise of faith and authority. Mutual confidence among officials renders all things possible of accomplishment ; want of confidence between sovereign and subject makes failure inevitable.

' Anger should be curbed and wrath cast away. The faults of another should not cause our resentment.

' To chide a fault does not prevent its repetition, nor can the censor himself be secure from error. The sure road to success is that trodden by the people in unison.

' Those in authority should never harbour hatred or

jealousy of one another. Hate begets hate and jealousy is blind.

‘The imperative duty of man in his capacity of a subject is to sacrifice his private interest to the public good. Egoism forbids co-operation, and without co-operation there cannot be any great achievement.’

These lines, which were written about 600 A.D., or thirteen hundred years ago, and which have the sublime ring of inspiration about them, explain the mystery of the Japanese character better than a lengthy account of Japan’s history, philosophy, and customs. When we remember that these principles have continuously been taught in Japan during more than forty generations, we can understand the character and spirit of the country, to which it owes its magnificent successes. When we read these lines we can realise that Fukuzawa Yukichi’s claim to an old civilisation was not a hollow boast, and we can comprehend why the passionate ambition to elevate their country animates every thinking Japanese, from the prince to the peasant. These guiding principles show us the moral and mental foundation of Japan, and enable us to understand why the Japanese officials are the flower of the nation, why class jealousy is absent in Japan, and why Japan is the only country in the world where, regardless of birth, wealth, and connexions, all careers and the very highest offices in the land are open to all comers.

These principles of political conduct, which might have been drawn up by a Lycurgus or a Solon, explain the wonderful unity of purpose, courage, self-reliance, self-discipline, homogeneity, and patriotism of the Japanese nation which at present astonish the world ; and it seems that Japan owes her greatness and success less to the superior will-power and to the inborn genius of the individual Japanese than to the traditional education of the character of the nation, in which the educational ideas of Athens and Sparta are harmoniously blended. British education rightly

attaches great weight to the formation of character, but it would seem that British educationalists, in the highest sense of the word, can learn more from Japan than from the United States and Germany, where education is principally directed towards the advancement of learning and the somewhat indiscriminate distribution of knowledge.

In olden times, when communications were exceedingly bad, the various centres of original culture existing in the world were separated from one another by such vast distances that each highly cultured country naturally thought itself the foremost country of the universe, considered the inhabitants of other nations as barbarians, refused to learn from them, became self-concentrated, rigidly conservative, and at last retrogressive. We find this narrow-minded, though explicable, attitude of haughty contempt for all foreign culture, which finally results in the inability to adopt a superior civilisation and organisation, in Egypt, Babylonia, Persia, Palestine, Greece, China, and many other ancient countries.

To the ever-victorious men of old Japan, also, their country was naturally the centre of the universe; it was created by the gods themselves, and their Emperor was the Son of Heaven, being a direct descendant of the great Sun-goddess. But national self-consciousness and self-admiration never became so overwhelmingly strong as to obscure Japan's open mind. On the contrary, the Japanese were always ready to learn from other countries, and to graft foreign culture on to their own. From conquered Corea Japan introduced Buddhism, and from the Chinese she learned much in literature, philosophy, and art. In the year 195 the Chinese species of silkworm was brought into the country, and later on silk-weavers from various districts of China were introduced and distributed all over Japan to teach the inhabitants the art of silk-weaving. In 805 Denkyo Daishi introduced tea plants in a similar manner. Evidently Japan was ever ready and anxious to learn from

the foreigner all that could be learned, and to adapt, but not to slavishly copy, all that could benefit and elevate the nation.

Up to a few hundred years ago European civilisation was unknown in Eastern Asia. Largely owing to the influence of Buddhism, Japan had been permeated with Chinese literature and Chinese ideas, and had come to consider Chinese culture in many respects superior to her own. Therefore it was not unnatural that, in the sixteenth century, when Portuguese missionaries caused a widespread revolt, Japan resolved to close, *more sinico*, the country against all foreign intercourse. From 1638 to 1858, or for more than two hundred years, Japan led a self-centred existence far away from the outer world, like the sleeping beauty of the fairy tale ; but in the latter year she was waked out of her self-chosen seclusion by the arrival of Commodore Perry and his squadron, who, to the amazement of Japan, had come to wring a commercial treaty from the country, and to open it, if necessary by force, to the hated foreigners.

Japan had considered herself safe from the contact of foreigners, and inviolable. The intrusion of Commodore Perry was, in the eyes of all Japan, a crime and almost a sacrilege. The sanctity of the country had been defiled, its laws had been set at defiance, and the Government had no power to resist the Commodore, who used veiled threats of employing force. The feeling of national honour, which is stronger in Japan than in any other country, was deeply outraged, and the passionately patriotic nation was shaken to its base with violent indignation.

Nothing can give a better idea of the indescribable excitement and turmoil which was caused by Commodore Perry's intrusion than the vivid account of Genjo Yume Monogatari, a contemporaneous writer. He says : ' It was in the summer of 1858 that an individual named Perry, who called himself the envoy of the United States of America, suddenly arrived at Uraga, in the province of Sagami, with four ships of war,

declaring that he brought a letter from his country to Japan and that he wished to deliver it to the Sovereign. The Governor of the place, Toda Idzu No Kami, much alarmed by this extraordinary event, hastened to the spot to inform himself of its meaning. The envoy stated, in reply to questions, that he desired to see a chief minister in order to explain the object of his visit, and to hand over to him the letter with which he was charged. The Governor then dispatched a messenger on horseback with all haste to carry this information to the Castle of Yedo, where a great scene of confusion ensued on his arrival. Fresh messengers followed, and the Shogun Iyeyoshi, on receiving them, was exceedingly troubled, and summoned all the officials to a council.

‘ At first the fear seemed so sudden and so formidable that they were too alarmed to open their mouths, but in the end orders were issued to the great clans to keep strict watch at various points on the shore, as it was possible that the “barbarian” vessels might proceed to commit acts of violence.

‘ Presently a learned Chinese scholar was sent to Uraga, had an interview with the American envoy, and returned with the letter, which expressed the desire of the United States to establish friendship and intercourse with Japan, and said, according to this account, that if they met with a refusal they should commence hostilities.

‘ Thereupon the Shogun was greatly distressed, and again summoned a council. He also asked the opinion of the Daimios. The assembled officials were exceedingly disturbed, and nearly broke their hearts over consultations which lasted all day and all night.

‘ The nobles and retired nobles in Yedo were informed that they were at liberty to state any ideas they might have on the subject, and, although they all gave their opinions, the diversity of propositions was so great that no decision was arrived at.

'The military class had, during a long peace, neglected military arts; they had given themselves up to pleasure and luxury, and there were very few who had put on armour for many years, so that they were greatly alarmed at the prospect that war might break out at a moment's notice, and began to run hither and thither in search of arms. The city of Yedo and the surrounding villages were in a great tumult. And there was such a state of confusion among all classes that the Governors of the city were compelled to issue a notification to the people, and this in the end had the effect of quieting the general anxiety. But in the Castle never was a decision further from being arrived at, and, whilst time was thus idly wasted, the envoy was constantly demanding an answer.'

Commodore Perry happened to arrive at a most critical period in the history of Japan. Since 1192 the formerly subordinate military class had held the reins of government, and the Shogun, who was supposed to be only the generalissimo of Japan, and who was appointed by the Mikado, had possessed himself of all political power. The Mikado was the nominal ruler of the country, but, though he was treated with the greatest respect, was in reality a prisoner in his palace at Kyoto. The country was divided into numerous principalities, which were more or less independent. Japan was an empire in name, but no longer an empire in fact. Thus the land was ruled by a number of great feudal chiefs, who were supported by their armed retainers, the Samurai, the soldier caste of Japan. The autonomous territories of the great nobles were ruled on different principles—they possessed their own laws, finances, and regulations. There was consequently, perhaps, less unity in Japan than there is at present in China.

In the absence of a powerful centralising influence, the country had become divided against itself: the formerly unquestioned authority of the Shogun had been shaken and gravely compromised, the nobles were intriguing for power,

the people were arbitrarily and harshly treated, feudalism felt the ground heave and give way under its feet.

The numerous Daimios, the great feudal lords of old Japan, were generous patrons of literature and art, and strove to make their residences not only seats of power, but also centres of learning. From these learned circles the ultimate revolt against the Shogun's usurpation took its beginning. In 1715 the Prince of Mito finished, with the assistance of a host of scholars, his great work, '*Dia Nihon Shi*,' or history of Japan. This classical work was copied by hand by industrious students and eager patriots, and was circulated throughout the Empire, being printed only in 1851. It is characteristic of the spirit of intense and reflective patriotism of Japan that this celebrated compilation, which gave an account of the decay of the Mikado's power and of the usurpation by the Shoguns, became the strongest factor in the eventual overthrow of the Shogunate, in the re-establishment of the Mikado's power, and in the unification of the Empire.

The history by the Prince of Mito was followed by a history of the usurpation period by the celebrated scholar, poet, and historian, Rai Sanyo, who attacked with historic proof, unanswerable logic, and patriotic fervour the Shogun's usurpation of the Imperial power. He traced the history of Japan and the Imperial House, and mourned the disappearance of the true Imperial power. The influence of his writings was enormous, and not a few of his disciples became men of action, who carried out their master's ideas. Thus the Mikado's party found a strong and growing support among the intellectual classes.

The body of malcontent idealists and students was reinforced by the large body of devout Shintoists, who see in the Mikado their god, and the fountain of all virtue, honour and authority. Shintoism, which had been lying dormant for a long time, experienced a wonderful revival, and became again a living faith. Consequently it was only natural that

the adherents to Japan's native religion were outraged when they were told that the Mikado had been ousted from power and was practically a prisoner.

Thus disorder within the country was added to the danger threatening from without. While the conscience of the people was awaking to the ancient wrong done to the Mikado and clamouring for its redress by reinstating him in power, Japanese patriotism instinctively felt the need of uniting the nation against the insolent foreigner, and added force to the growing movement towards national unity and towards the reinstallation of the legitimate ruler.

Under these circumstances it was only natural that the ferment of the nation was greatly increased by the behaviour of the insolent foreigners, and by their—to Japanese minds—outrageous demands, and the national feeling rose to fever heat when it was discovered that the Shogun had, in spite of the remonstrance of the Mikado, concluded the treaty of 1854, whereby the country was opened to foreign trade, merely in order to get rid of the troublesome and dreaded foreigners at any price.

From 1854 onward the problem whether the foreigners should be exterminated or tolerated was uppermost in men's minds, and, as the majority of the nation was in favour of expelling the barbarians, the position of the unfortunate Shogun, who had concluded the treaty without the Mikado's consent, became one of very great difficulty. During this period of national agitation and perturbation the Mikado issued a rescript, in which he said : ' Amity and commerce with foreigners brought disgrace on the country in the past. It is desirable that Kyoto and Yedo should join their strengths and plan the welfare of the Empire.' This idea rapidly became universal, and led to the rallying cry of the people, which rang from one end of the Empire to the other : ' Destroy the Shogunate and raise the Mikado to his proper throne.'

The hatred towards the foreign intruders became more

and more accentuated as time passed on. Europeans were murdered without provocation, and the guns on the coast opened fire on foreign ships, regardless of their nationality, when they passed by. These attacks led to the bombardment of Kagoshima on August 11, 1863, and to that of Shimonoseki on September 5, 1864. Though the Japanese on land bravely tried to defend themselves, they found their weapons unavailing against the superior armaments of the foreign ships.

The effect of the two bombardments on the mind of Japan may best be gathered from the following memorandum of a native chronicler : ' The eyes of the Prince were opened through the fight of Kagoshima, and affairs appeared to him in a new light ; he changed in favour of foreigners, and thought now of making his country powerful and of completing his armaments.'

The Emperor also wrote in a rather pathetic tone to the Shogun : ' I held a council the other day with my military nobility, but, unfortunately, inured to the habits of peace which for more than 200 years has existed in our country, we are unable to exclude and subdue our foreign enemies by the forcible means of war. . . . If we compare our Japanese ships of war and cannon with those of the barbarians, we feel certain that they are not sufficient to inflict terror upon the foreign barbarians and are also insufficient to make the splendour of Japan shine in foreign countries. I should think that we only would make ourselves ridiculous in the eyes of the barbarians.'

The damage done by the bombardments was, after all, insignificant, and if Japan had possessed the spirit of China, the officials might easily have explained away these attacks as being unimportant and purely local affairs. However, the proud mind of Japan required no further humiliation to drive home the lesson, but immediately realised that the time of seclusion, conservatism, and feudalism was past, and that the nation's salvation could only henceforward be found

in progress and unity. As Professor Toyokichi Iyenaga put it : ' Those bombardments showed the necessity of national union. Whether she would repel or receive the foreigner, Japan must present a united front. To this end a great change in the internal constitution of the Empire was needed. The internal resources of the nation had to be gathered into a common treasure, the police and the taxes had to be recognised as national, not as belonging to petty local chieftains, the power of the feudal lords had to be broken in order to reconstitute Japan as a single strong State under a single head. These are the ideas which led the way to the Restoration of 1868. Thus the bombardments of Kago-shima and Shimonoseki may be said to have helped indirectly in the Restoration. . . .

' When a country is threatened with foreign invasion, when the corporate action of its citizens against the enemy is needed, it becomes an imperative necessity to consult public opinion. In such a time centralisation is needed. Hence the first move of Japan after the advent of foreigners was to bring the scattered parts of the country together and unite them under one head. Japan had hitherto no formidable foreign enemy on her shores, so her governmental system, the regulating system of the social organism, received no impetus for self-development ; but as soon as a formidable people, either as allies or foes, appeared on the scene in 1853, we immediately see the remarkable change in the State system in Japan. It became necessary to consult public opinion. Councils of Kuges (nobles belonging to the Court of the Mikado) and Daimios (independent nobles) and meetings of Samurai sprang forth spontaneously.'

Recognising that the reconstitution of the country, its reunion, and the re-establishment of the rule of the Mikado were absolute necessities for the continued independent existence of Japan, the Shogun, the virtual ruler of the country, whose predecessors had governed Japan for hundreds of years, took a step which is almost unprecedented in history.

Placing the welfare of his country high above the glorious traditions of his House, and waiving the historical claims to his exalted position which he possessed, the Shogun resigned his office on November 19, 1867, in a document which should for ever and to all nations be a monument of sublime patriotism. In this document he said : ' A retrospect of the various changes through which the Empire has passed shows us that after the decadence of the monarchical authority power passed into the hands of the Minister of State ; that by the wars of 1156 to 1159 the governmental power came into the hands of the military class.

' My ancestor received greater marks of confidence than any before him, and his descendants have succeeded him for more than 200 years. Though I performed the same duties, the objects of government have not been attained and the penal laws have not been carried out ; and it is with a feeling of the greatest humiliation that I find myself obliged to acknowledge my own want of virtue as the cause of the present state of things. Moreover, our intercourse with foreign Powers becomes daily more extensive, and our foreign policy cannot be pursued unless directed by the whole power of the country.

' If, therefore, the old *régime* be changed and the governmental authority be restored to the Imperial Court ; if the councils of the whole Empire be collected and their wise decisions received, and if we are united with all our heart and all our strength to protect and maintain the Empire, it will be able to range itself with the nations of the earth. This comprises our whole duty towards our country.'

This simple declaration is as manly, straightforward, and wholly admirable as the following verbal explanation of his step which the Shogun gave to Sir Harry Parkes and the French Minister. He said : ' I became convinced last autumn that the country would no longer be successfully governed while the power was divided between the Emperor and myself. . . . I therefore, for the good of my country,

informed the Emperor that I resigned the governing power with the understanding that an assembly of Daimios shall be convened for the purpose of deciding in what manner and by whom the government should be carried on in the future.

‘ In acting thus I sank my own interests and abandoned the power handed down to me by my ancestors in the more important interests of the country. . . . In pursuance of this object I have retired from the scene of dispute instead of opposing force by force. . . . As to who is the Sovereign of Japan, this is a question on which no one in Japan can entertain a doubt. The Emperor is the Sovereign.

‘ My object has been from the first to obey the will of the nation as to the future government. If the nation should decide that I ought to resign my powers, I am prepared to resign them for the good of the country. . . . I had no other motive than the following : With an honest love for my country and people, I resigned the governing power which I inherited from my ancestors with the understanding that I should assemble all the nobles of the Empire to discuss the question disinterestedly, and, adopting the opinion of the majority, which decided upon the reformation of the national constitution, I left the matter in the hands of the Imperial Court.’ Thus the question whether the Mikado or the Shogun should be supreme was not decided by civil war, as might have been expected, but by the self-sacrifice of patriotism.

The Mikado accepted the resignation of the Shogun, and with the disappearance of the latter from power the chief obstacle to Japan’s unification and modernisation was removed. A Government was formed by the Mikado, and its first active step was a memorial to the Throne, which is so remarkable for its enlightenment and which is so important for the whole development of Japan that it seems necessary to quote a part of it. That interesting manifesto, which most clearly illustrates the mind of Japan and which brings the fundamental differences between that country and

China into the strongest relief, says: ' . . . It causes us some anxiety to feel that we may perhaps be following the bad example of the Chinese, who, fancying themselves alone great and worthy of respect and despising foreigners as little better than beasts, have come to suffer defeats at their hands and to have it lorded over themselves by those foreigners.

' It appears to us, therefore, after mature reflection, that the most important duty we have at present to perform is for high and low to unite harmoniously in understanding the conditions of the age, in effecting a national reformation, and commencing a great work: and that for this reason it is of the greatest necessity that we determine upon the attitude to be observed towards this question.

' Hitherto the Empire has held itself aloof from other countries and is ignorant of the force of the world; the only object set has been to give ourselves the least trouble, and by daily retrogression we are in danger of falling under a foreign rule.

' By travelling to foreign countries and observing what good there is in them, by comparing their daily progress, the universality of intelligent government, of a sufficiency of military defences and of abundant food for the people among them, with our present condition, the causes of prosperity and degeneracy may plainly be traced. . . .

' In order to restore the fallen fortunes of the Emperor and to make the Imperial dignity respected abroad, it is necessary to make a firm resolution and to get rid of the narrow-minded notions which have prevailed hitherto.

' We pray that the important personages of the Court will open their eyes and unite with those below them in establishing relations of amity in a single-minded manner, and that, our deficiencies being supplied with what foreigners are superior in, an enduring government be established for future ages. Assist the Emperor in forming his decision wisely and in understanding the condition of the Empire; let the foolish argument which has hitherto styled foreigners

dogs and goats and barbarians be abandoned ; let the Court ceremonies, hitherto imitated from the Chinese, be reformed, and the foreign representatives be bidden to Court in the manner prescribed in the rules current amongst all nations ; and let this be publicly notified throughout the country, so that the ignorant people may be taught in what light they are to regard this subject. This is our most earnest prayer, presented with all reverence and humility.'

Happily, the Mikado himself saw the necessity for reform and progress. Had he been a man of ordinary ability, had he not been aided by a group of enlightened and far-seeing statesmen, he might have rested satisfied with regaining, by the force of circumstances, the power which his ancestors had lost centuries ago. He would have continued a rule of absolutism, and he would merely have tried to raise the defensive power of the country sufficiently to allow Japan to return to the seclusion to which the people had become accustomed. But, happily, Mutsu Hito was thoroughly in sympathy with the reformers, and on April 17, 1869, he took before the Court and the Assembly of Daimios the charter oath of five articles, which in substance were as follows :

1. A deliberative assembly shall be formed, and all measures shall be decided by public opinion.
2. The principles of social and political science shall be constantly studied by both the higher and lower classes of the people.
3. Everyone in the community shall be assisted in obtaining liberty of action for all good and lawful purposes.
4. All the old, absurd usages of former times shall be abolished and the impartiality and justice which are displayed in the working of Nature shall be adopted as the fundamental basis of the State.
5. Wisdom and knowledge shall be sought after in all quarters of the civilised world, for the purpose of firmly establishing the foundations of Empire.

Thus the Mikado identified himself with the cause of reform, pledged the nation to progress, and made the success of the movement towards the modernisation of Japan a certainty. Henceforth the whole of the nation strove for progress and enlightenment with that passionate will-power and singleness of purpose which is not found outside Japan.

By the voluntary surrender of power on the part of the Shogun, the Mikado had been installed, and he had pledged himself to progress ; but the formidable difficulties remained how to unify and modernise a nation which for centuries had been governed by a large number of independent princes whose power rested on an immense army of Samurai. The problem of abolishing feudalism and militarism, which, so far, had formed the groundwork of all government, was one of enormous difficulty, for the feudal lords and their Samurai considered themselves, naturally, as 'the government' by tradition as well as by right. This apparently formidable question was, however, easily settled by the marvellous patriotism of those who held power in the land.

Daimio Akidzuki, President of the Kogisho (the deliberating council representing the clans), addressed the following memorial to the Throne: ' . . . The various Princes have used their lands and their people for their own purposes ; different laws have obtained in different places ; the civil and criminal codes have been different in the various provinces.

' The clans have been called the screen of the country, but in reality they have caused its division. Internal relations having been confused, the strength of the country has been disunited and diminished. How can our small country of Japan enter into fellowship with the countries beyond the sea ? How can she hold up an example of a flourishing country ?

' Let those who wish to show their faith and loyalty act in the following manner, that they may firmly establish the foundations of Imperial government :

'(1) Let them restore the territories which they have received from the Emperor and return to a constitutional and undivided country.

'(2) Let them abandon their titles, and under the name of *Knazoko* (persons of honour) receive such small properties as may suffice for their wants.

'(8) Let officers of the clans abandon that title, call themselves officers of the Emperor, receiving the property equal to that which they have held hitherto.

'Let these three important measures be adopted forthwith, that the Empire may be raised on a basis imperishable for ages. . . .'

This declaration, which was inspired by the great statesmen of the three leading clans, and which breathes a spirit of unselfish patriotism that seems almost incredible to the more stolid and the more selfish nations of the West, met with universal approval, and the great Daimios emulated one another in offering up to the Mikado their titles, their position, their lands, and their wealth. The Daimios of the west, for instance, said in their memorial: 'Now, when men are seeking for a new government, the great body and the great strength must neither be lent nor borrowed. . . . We therefore reverently offer up the list of our possessions and men. . . . Let Imperial orders be issued for altering and remodelling the territories of the various clans. Let all affairs of State, great and small, be directed by the Emperor.'

On April 14, 1869, 118 Daimios, having a revenue of 12,000,000 *kokus* of rice, or about £24,000,000, had agreed to the proposed radical restoration. A few months later 241 out of 258 of these nobles had resigned their power, and the remaining seventeen, who were the only dissentients, soon followed suit. Thus feudalism, which had existed in Japan for over eight centuries, voluntarily extinguished itself, and patriotism triumphed over selfish interests and the love of power.

The fall of feudalism was marked by the laconic Imperial decree of August 29, 1871, which simply announced : 'The clans are abolished and prefectures are established in their place.' As great an event in history has probably never been proclaimed by as short a decree.

The new era of Japan, which is truly called the 'Meiji Era,' the era of enlightenment, thus began with acts of noble self-sacrifice by the greatest in the land, and the patriotic example of the nobility stirred up the country from shore to shore. A feverish desire to sacrifice themselves for their country, a desire which is deeply implanted in all Japanese, took hold of the whole population, and when it was recognised that the enormous caste of Samurai, the warriors, who cost the country about £2,000,000 per annum, had no room in the modern State, patriotism again found the remedy. The army of professional soldiers, who had been taught that the sword was their sole and their only means of earning a living, and who disdained to earn their bread by industry or trade, quietly effaced themselves surrendered the larger part of their income, and, without a murmur, accepted inglorious poverty in the shape of pensions which amounted to but a few pence per day, and which barely kept the men from starvation.

The compensation paid to the nobles for surrendering their lands and, with the lands, their incomes to the State, the pensioning of the Samurai, and the rearrangement of finances from their local basis to an Imperial basis, was an enormous financial transaction of stupendous difficulty. The loans raised in connexion with this vast national reorganisation amounted to no less than 225,514,800 yen, or to the truly enormous sum of about £40,000,000. It speaks volumes for the financial strength of the country and for the consummate ability of the Japanese financiers that this enormous operation was satisfactorily carried out, and that by 1903 all but the trifling amount of 28,800,111 yen had been redeemed.

Many enlightened Japanese shared the opinion of the great educationalist, Fukuzawa Yukichi, who fearlessly declared : ' The Government exists for the people, and not the people for the Government ; the Government officials are the servants of the people, and the people are their employers.' Hence the desire for representative government arose in Japan soon after the reformation, though the Japanese had hitherto only known government by despotism. Though the Japanese people had had no experience whatever of popular government, the Mikado and his advisers had so much confidence in the good sense and the patriotism of the nation that they decided upon giving the people a share in the government of the country. On October 12, 1881, the Mikado issued the famous declaration, in which he said : ' We have long intended to establish gradually a constitutional form of government. . . . It was with this object in view that we established the Senate in 1875, and authorised the formation of local assemblies in 1878. . . . We therefore hereby declare that we shall establish a Parliament in 1890, in order to carry into full effect the determination which we have announced ; and we charge our faithful subjects bearing our commissions to make in the meantime all necessary preparations to that end.'

With the deliberate cautiousness and foresight which is characteristic of all Japanese action, the people were, step by step, introduced and accustomed to self-government. When the Senate had settled down, local assemblies were created, and when the local assemblies had proved their worth, it was announced that ten years hence a Parliament should be elected. Thus the leaders of public opinion had ample time to prepare the nation for the coming change, and were enabled to educate the electorate for their future duties.

In consequence of this careful preparation and this wise delay the Japanese Parliament has proved a great success. The elections cause no excitement, the people record their

votes with the full knowledge of their responsibility, and Parliament works with ability and decorum. Lengthy speeches are unknown in that assembly, and the House gets through an immense amount of work in an incredibly short time. Parliamentary peroration and obstruction are practically unknown in Japan, though there have been not a few political struggles and dissolutions. However, party struggles are confined to domestic politics.

The reconstitution of the body politic of Japan was crowned on April 1, 1890, when the Mikado solemnly promulgated a Constitution for Japan. Whilst in all other monarchical countries the Constitution had to be wrested from an unwilling sovereign by the force, and not infrequently by the violence, of the people, Japan is the only country in the world which can boast of a monarch who has voluntarily divested himself of a part of his rights, and who has by his own free will granted a participation in the government to his subjects.

This short sketch of one of the most remarkable chapters in the history of the world clearly proves that Japan's marvellous progress and her astonishing change from medieval Orientalism to modern Western culture is in no way a fact that can cause surprise.

Though the Japanese are an extremely gifted people, they are, individually, probably no more talented than are the inhabitants of many other countries. Japan's progress has no doubt been meteoric, and her complete adoption of Western culture has certainly been startling. But her progress and her transformation appear only natural if we remember that Japan is a nation in which everybody, from the highest to the lowest, in all circumstances, unflinchingly obeys the rule: 'The imperative duty of man in his capacity of a subject is to sacrifice his private interests to the public good. Egoism forbids co-operation, and without co-operation there cannot be any great achievement.'

The individualistic nations of the West in which the

interests of the nation are only too often sacrificed to the selfish interests of the individual, where party loyalty is apt to take precedence over patriotism, where ministers, generals, and admirals are rarely appointed by merit only, where jobbery occurs even in time of war, and where everything is considered to be permitted that is not actually punished by law, will do well to learn from Japan's example, for it cannot be doubted that the cause of Japan's greatness and of Japan's success can be summed up in the one word—patriotism.

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